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Recent world events have forced Japan out of isolation and into political and security roles more commensurate with its economic power. The commitment of 600 Japanese troops to Cambodia and the appointment of Yasushi Akashi (left, front) as head of U.N. peacekeeping activities there are two examples of Japan’s growing participation in the international community.
The end of the Cold War, the war in the Persian Gulf, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in North Korea, among other disrupting events, have forced Japan to reevaluate its military and foreign policies. Before 1990, Japan had been isolated and protected from having to assume political and security roles commensurate with its economic power. Its strategy of post-war noninvolvement, combined with U.S. willingness to provide for Japanese defense, enabled Japan to rebuild its industrial base and establish international trade and industrial relations.
Economic success and the reduction of Cold War security tensions have encouraged Japan to reconsider old policies and relations. In security terms, its partnership with the United States remains the most important as well as the most delicate alliance.
United States-Japan Security' Relations
In fewer than ten years, Japan has built its defense forces to a formidable level in the areas of antisubmarine warfare, aerial patrol of sea lines of communication, and defensive uses of submarine warfare, along with a limited ability to defend Hokkaido, Japan’s north island.
Despite surface appearances, U.S.-Japanese security relations always have been marked by contrasting views of security issues. Although the alliance partners generally have been in agreement as to the nature of the military threat, the intrusion in recent years of economic considerations and competition in the military arena (FSX and other cooperative military technology exchange projects), the dispute over the nature of Japan’s contributions to the Gulf War, and the relative decline of U.S. economic power are making relations more difficult.
From the alliance perspective, the intent in recent years has been to identify areas in which Japan can supplement or complement U.S. forces. Greater levels of cooperation have increased expectations on the part of the United States and raised questions in Japan about the level of cooperation necessary. Japan soon must decide whether to allocate the necessary funds to continue its expansion of more sophisticated military equipment (aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, aerial refueling aircraft, etc.). Continuing on this course eventually will result in a force structure capable of deployment overseas and patrolling of the sea lines of communication east to Hawaii, south to the Indian Ocean, and west to the Persian Gulf. Now that the United States has lost its bases in the Philippines, is facing the possible retrenchment of its bases in other Asian countries, and is establishing new security arrangements, maintaining balanced security relations with Japan becomes increasingly important.
U.S.-Japan Security Relations in 1993: At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, decisionmakers in both governments likely believed that the security objectives of their nations were beginning to diverge seriously. Political dynamics in both countries during the Gulf War had induced considerable friction over Japan’s willingness (or ability) to send troops to the Gulf and over the level and timeliness of its financial support for the war. Both Tokyo and Washington were struggling with reduced political and financial support for defense. U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had announced in 1990 that significant reductions in U.S. forces would be occurring in Northeast Asia over the following five years.
No consensus emerged in the wider Japanese political system, but the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, and other senior government officials reaffirmed the importance of the alliance.
In July 1992, Japanese Defense Agency Director General Sohei Miyashita announced that the alliance would continue to be supported for the following reasons:
► Japan would need to develop a nuclear arsenal in the absence of the alliance.
► Japan would have to increase its defense expenditures.
► Japan possibly would emerge a major militarist state.
► Japan needs a mechanism of deterrence.
>■ The treaty provides Japan and the United States the opportunity to execute their policies in the Asia-Pacific region effectively, both individually and in partnership.
The costs of replacing U.S. military forces and their overall benefits to Japan would be prohibitive. On balance, it is more prudent and cost effective for Japan to continue in the alliance and continue to negotiate the increased costs of the U.S. presence than to begin to assume those burdens unilaterally.
In July 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled for four decades, was defeated by a seven-party coalition. Although newly elected Prime Minister Morihiro
Hosokawa quickly emphasized that Japan’s ties to the United States are the “central pillar” of his government’s policy, the fact that the new coalition is composed of patties that long have been opposed, to some extent, to the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement probably will have negative effects in some areas of the relationship.
Impact of the Gulf War on Japanese Defense Planning
The onset of Desert Shield in the summer of 1990 subjected the U.S.-Japanese alliance to considerable stress. In Japan’s view, the security relationship had been based on a subordinate’s role in the defense of Japan—nothing else. The U.S. strategy of rapidly erecting a military, political, economic, and diplomatic coalition of countries with interests in the Gulf left Japan unsure of what, if any. contribution to make. Keeping in mind Japan’s modern history of pacifism, its restrictive constitution, the defensive orientation of its military forces, its ongoing friction with the United States over trade relations, and a host of other considerations, it is clear why Japan was disinclined to respond rapidly to Washington’s requests for a physical presence and a large financial contribution. Its efforts to comply with the physical presence demands met with a disruptive debate in the Japanese Diet over a “peace cooperation” law that would have permitted the deployment of a Japanese support force in the Gulf.
In the United States, however, Tokyo’s response to Washington’s demands for financial and other assistance was difficult to understand. Japan was involved with foreign policy initiatives with other Northeast Asian nations. The fact that Japan is dependent on the Gulf for 65% of its oil supplies and relies on the United States to assure continuing access to these resources highlights an important point of contention. The Japanese failed to see the crisis in the same light as the United States; Japan had » reserve of 142 days of oil and they believed they could outlast any scarcity and pay a higher price if necessary.
The chronicle of Japanese response to U.S. expectations is an example of Japan’s difficulty in assuming a more active and responsible role in international affairs. This difficult period also is illustrative of the complexities and divisions that are growing within the Japanese political system.
A combination of constant debate, intraparty negotiation, and apparent indecision on the part of the leadership of the Japanese government finally produced a limited consensus in the spring of 1991. The rapid allied victory prompted a gradual shift in support for the Prime Minister’s attempt to achieve a larger role for Japan in the Gulf coalition.
Dispatch of Minesweepers to the Gulf
The decision to deploy minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was the result of increased pressure from the leadership of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and in response to the wishes of the United States. Their commitment was of symbolic as well as utilitarian importance. In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, the question of deploying Japanese
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minesweepers had been raised when U.S. and other NATO naval forces were protecting tankers of all nations. The minesweepers were badly needed and Japan’s failure to contribute Was noticed in light of its tankers’ heavy use of Gulf waters.
From the viewpoint of military planning, the deployment of the four Japanese minesweepers and two support ships to the Gulf Was hastily done and completed under great Political pressure and oversight. This mission was the first naval unit committed to a War zone for semi-combat duty since World War II. Detailed planning was impossible; only eight days were allowed before departure. Diplomatic problems were resolved rapidly and permission was granted for the flotilla to make port calls in the Philippines,
Singapore, and Pakistan on the way to the Gulf. Military needs were subordinated to political concerns when the flotilla was committed without helicopters (highly useful in logistics and clearing minesweeping lanes) and with only vague rules of engagement regarding the use of force for self-defense.
The commitment in the Gulf revealed areas that needed improvement, but it also demonstrated that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was capable of overcoming a variety of difficulties and successfully integrating its units into a larger coalition naval force.
United Nations Peacekeeping Bill
On 15 June 1992—after two years of intense debate, theatrics, and threats of mass resignations—the Japanese Diet voted to permit the overseas deployment of 2,000 members of the Japanese Self-Defense Force as part of (J.N. peacekeeping forces. The passage of the bill represented a radical change in policy and reopened old feelings in Japan and in China, South Korea, Singapore, and °ther Asian countries regarding Japan s terrible human rights record during World War II. Most Asian countries occupied by Japan during the war believe that no sincere Apologies have been offered and that no national atonement has occurred within Japan.
The Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill (PKO) reflected the Opposition of the socialists and others concerned with the ^militarization issue. The legislation is very restrictive and makes deployment of forces a limited option for the Japanese government. The passage of the PKO law, with its emphasis on Japanese participation in U.N.-sponsored Peacekeeping missions, probably was the only way the Japanese government could, with one gesture, mollify the United States and still satisfy the objections of those concerned about the remilitarization of Japan.
U.N. operations in Cambodia have given the Japanese government an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its interest in contributing more than money to the international community. The head of U.N. peacekeeping activities in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, is a Japanese diplomat. The appointment of a Japanese national to a senior
peacekeeping position may mark the beginning of a greater participation by Tokyo in U.N. activities. It certainly has placed greater pressure on Tokyo to be generous in its financial contribution to the U.N. effort in Cambodia.
The PKO law enabled Japan to respond to the United Nations’ request for 600 military and 82 police personnel for duty in Cambodia by October 1992. Japanese performance there was uneven. One policeman was killed in a pre-election show of force by the Khmer Rouge. The remaining 81 police officers returned to Japan before their tour was completed. The 600 Army engineers will complete their one-year tour without incident. Japan also has committed 48 soldiers to peacekeeping duties in Mozambique. Debate continues within the Japanese government as well as in the press and in society. Public opinion in support of peacekeeping duties has dropped from 68% in October 1992 to 31% in May 1993.
External Concerns
Although Japan’s diplomatic emphasis in the postwar period has been on expanding its trade and manufacturing network, a variety of military-political issues are demanding attention. Because the United States has provided for the nuclear and conventional defense of Japan, the Japanese Self-Defense Force has not been seriously concerned with defending mineral resources in the East China Sea or, in an extreme example, defending against a missile threat from North Korea. But with the current and planned reductions in U.S. military personnel and in overseas bases, the perception exists that Japan may not be able to rely on the United States to the extent—and in the fashion—it previously enjoyed. One of Japan’s most vital and long-term international requirements remains the continuing free flow of mineral resources and food. The trade routes to India, the Persian Gulf, Australia, Southeast Asia, and the west coast of Canada and the United States have been—aside from one instance of closure—open and guaranteed by the U.S. Navy and Air Force.
Following is a brief analysis of the most important is- sues/disputes that may be faced by Japan in the future
and potential Japanese government and military (if appropriate) response.
The Kuriles: The dispute with the Russians over the ownership and occupation of the four islands of the Kurile island chain located to the north of Hokkaido has been simmering since the end of World War II. Japan is adamant about the return of all of the islands as soon as possible and has tied the grant of large-scale financial aid to Boris Yeltsin’s government to the resolution of this question. The issue is trapped in the dynamics of Mr. Yeltsin’s governance of an increasingly divided Russian nation. Russian opponents to the return of the four islands are invoking Russian nationalistic themes and voicing concerns over relinquishing minerals and fish and the loss of a military buffer. The islands have acted to screen the Sea of Okhotsk, which continues to host Russian submarine bases and ballistic-missile-firing areas. The islands also serve as bases for advanced jets and signals-intelligence posts.
Because political trends within the Commonwealth of Independent States remain fluid and difficult to predict, the presence of Russian naval, air, and ground forces within sight of Hokkaido continues to create uncertainty. Few observers expect overt Russian military acts against Japan. What may be expected, however, is continued friction over fishing, borders, and undiscovered mineral resources.
Senkaku Islands Dispute: China, Taiwan, and Japan all claim the five uninhabited rocks located approximately equidistant from Okinawa and Taiwan. The ownership claims are based on the belief that possession would grant title to some 21,645 kilometers of the continental shelf. The East China Sea also is believed to contain one of the last unexplored sources of oil and natural gas in maritime Asia. In a successful claim, sovereignty extends to air space above the islands as well as to the seabed and under it.
Behind the dispute is China’s reassertion in February 1992 of its sovereignty over the Senkakus, the Paracels, and the Spratly islands. The Paracels and the Spratlys are located in the South China Sea and have been the subject of joint claims by many of the adjacent states. Fighting has occurred between Vietnam and China over selected islets, and nations with maritime claims (Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines) have been rearming to represent themselves militarily in the South China Sea. China’s motives are economic, as well as military. As seen in Tokyo, China is changing its strategic policy from a defensive orientation to one of naval activity and operations in the wider Pacific area.
Maintaining Japan’s Trade Routes and Sources: Japan is dependent on imports for most of its raw materials. It must have secure trade routes and free access to the countries supplying it with these raw materials. Japan trades predominantly with Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia. India, Canada, the United States, Persian Gulf oil-producing states, and other Southeast Asian countries. Its diplomacy focuses on developing and maintaining good trade relations, and nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are key states in maintaining open trade routes.
In October 1988, the trading nations of the world were shocked when Indonesia closed the Sunda and Lombok straits for military maneuvers for a few days. In Canberra and in Tokyo it was believed that the Indonesian military was asserting its rights to restrict usage of internal waters as well as test the reaction of the user nations, especially Japan.
Japan’s initial reaction to a threatened oil shortage during the Gulf War was instructive. Polls revealed that the Japanese people believed they could pay a higher price for the oil, which would continue the supply and thus avoid the hard choices as to how to share in the extended “cost” of its continuing flow.
It is difficult to conceive of trade routes remaining interdicted for an extended period. However, many believe that the archipelaegic states of Indonesia and the Philippines will, at some time in the future, insist on payment for passage through the north-south straits. It also is possible that military force will be used once again by China and/or Vietnam in the dispute over the Spratly area.
Currently, the Japanese Navy does not possess adequate surface, air, and logistics forces to guarantee its trade routes—especially to the Persian Gulf or the United States- If the U.S. naval and air units are reduced significantly i11 the future, Japan will have to find other Asian nations willing to assist in this function, or else it will have to upgrade its military capabilities and change its security orientation.
The Korean Peninsula: The strategic importance of Korea to Japan may be explained in terms of geopolitics-
The narrow Tsushima Strait separates Japan and South Korea. The Sea of Japan acts as a symbolic buffer dividing Japan from North and South Korea as well as China and Russia. Since the Korean War, the U.S. military has guaranteed the defense of South Korea as well as Japan. In Tokyo that mission is seen as interconnected.
International concerns as to whether North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons—combined with the quandary of when and to what extent the United States will withdraw its military forces from South Korea and Japan—have created a climate of doubt.
The recent discussions on the unification of North and South Korea show that ambivalent Japanese feelings about the Koreans seem to be developing.
The debate over the reunification of the Koreas focused on whether a unified Korea represents a heightened security threat to Japan, keeping in mind the history of animosity that has existed and the seeming unwillingness of Japan to improve relations. Some observers believe that reunification would make it easier for Japan to ensure its own security. The cost to South Korea for reunification was expected to be on the order of U.S. $200 billion, and Japan was expected to contribute tens of billions of dollars to stabilize the post-reunification Korean economy.
Progress toward reunification halted in early 1993, when North Korea adopted a continuing uncooperative position with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the inspection of its suspected nuclear weapons facilities. Observers believe North Korea is well along in its capability to produce nuclear weapons. The “Hermit Kingdom’s” successful field testing of its 1,000 kilometer-range Nodong surface-to-surface missile in May 1993 has posed a serious threat to other nations in Northeast Asia. North Korea’s threatening behavior brought U.S. and Japanese defense officials together in Tokyo for planning and discussion with South Korea on the nuclear proliferation and missile threats.
Japan’s Plutonium Shipments: According to official and Press reports, Japan is receiving from France 30 tons of Plutonium, in one ton increments, at two-to-three-year intervals. Tokyo converted a merchant ship to carry the radioactive powder and, after protests regarding security on the high seas, built a high-tech, minimally armed-gun ship to accompany the plutonium vessel. The Ataksuki Maru, carrying the plutonium, left a French port in November 1992 for the month-long, 17,000 mile voyage. Persistent Petitions were registered by nations whose territorial waters might be transited during the voyage. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore—states that border the straits ot Malacca—were very concerned about the possibility of Occidents and that the ships might be attacked by the pi- fate bands, operating from islands close to the Singapore straits and local channels.
Environmental critics cite the possibilities for accidents in the coastal waterways, straits, the Panama Canal, and the open oceans. An accidental sinking of the plutonium-carrying ship could be an environmental disaster that might not be possible to clean up.
The underlying issue of importance to all involved parties is that the reprocessing of the plutonium would add to the world’s supply of a key fuel for atomic bombs. Also, in most minds, is the question of that fuel being stockpiled for future military use.
Conclusion
It appears that Japan has been reacting prudently to the increasing demands made upon it by international events, the United States, and its national trade, economic, and security interests.
The deployment of Japanese minesweepers to the Gulf and the commitment of 600 troops to Cambodia under U.N. auspices signal a radical shift from Japan’s earlier uninvolved, pacifistic stance. Despite significant internal political and economic difficulty, Japan is adapting to each new security challenge and positioning itself carefully for whatever the future brings.
The next steps in forging Japan’s new relationship with the United Nations are likely to involve its becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. If and when that occurs, Japan would be required to vote on the commitment of forces to international trouble spots as well as be free to commit its forces on those missions. At present, it would be difficult for Japan to participate in a large- scale coalition military exercise, such as Desert Storm, without changing its constitution.
It is evident that the Japanese government has embarked on a path of active participation in international security activity, as a means of breaking the previous nonparticipatory pattern. Limited military participation also enables Japan to prepare its forces for possible minor military clashes arising from resource and border disputes with its neighbors. A somewhat more aggressive military posture also reinforces Japan’s deterrence objectives.
Another major quandary is the alliance relationship with the United States. The Japan-United States alliance remains the most important relationship for both parties. U.S. fidelity to the alliance will be determined by the actions of the U.S. Congress and the state of the U.S. economy. The U.S. Department of Defense has little control over these factors. With the heightened importance of amphibious naval forces and coastal warfare, access to alliance bases and facilities will become even more important.
In 1993, Japan finds itself in a difficult position in terms of the continuing security of its home islands and territorial waters. It is apparent that incremental steps are being taken to prepare the Japanese Self-Defense Force for an increased military role, if necessary, and to condition the populace for somewhat greater military related activity in the defense of Japan’s national interests.
Dr. Rau is a professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy and the recipient of two Fulbright-Hays Awards—the most recent in 1989, for study and research in Japan, Southeast Asia, and Australia. He has been a frequent lecturer for the U.S. Information Service, U.S. Department of State, in Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia. Australia, and New Zealand. He has studied, interviewed, and lectured at the Institute for South East Asian Studies in Singapore and the University of New South Wales-Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra, Australia.