How About A Permanent Waiver?

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The unique obligations of reactor safety could keep an overwhelming majority of nuclear-trained officers from competing for flag rank. To remedy this situation, the existing waiver—moving the joint tour pre­requisite gate for flag selection from rear admiral (lower half) to rear admiral (upper half)—should be made permanent.

lhe sweeping requirements of Title IV of the De­partment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) washed over the U.S. military like a tidal wave. In the ensuing seven years, the receding waters have uncovered a permanently altered defense land­scape that appears to have benefited from service integra­tion. Actions in Panama and the Persian Gulf underscore that the joint age has arrived. But a closer look at the Navy’s new shoreline shows some potential storm dam­age. Of particular note is the dilemma of nuclear-trained officers in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—caught between their obligation to safe­guard a militarily necessary but potentially hazardous technology and the joint tour requirements necessary for their advancement.

Congress quickly became un­easy with the conflict it had in­advertently legislated between Title IV and nuclear safety.¹ Ex­ecutive Order 12344 and the resulting public law charge the Secretary of the Navy and Sec­retary of Energy to “preserve the basic structure, policies, and prac­tices developed for this [Naval Nuclear Propulsion] program” and to assure that “the Program will continue to function with excellence . . . . ” Accordingly, the Fiscal Year 1988 and Fiscal Year 1989 DoD Authorization Acts amended the Goldwater-

Nichols Act to shift the joint tour prerequisite gate for flag officer selection from rear admiral (lower half) to rear ad­miral (upper half) for nuclear-trained officers.² This is sig­nificant in that it permits this community to meet its unique obligations to safeguard our reactor safety record without sacrificing the promotion opportunities of its officers. If this provision is allowed to expire on 1 January 1994, an overwhelming majority of nuclear-trained officers will be disenfranchised by fiat from competing for flag rank. This should not be the price of reactor safety in our joint world.

Reactor Safety

Just how compelling is the issue of reactor safety? Why did Congress see fit to vest cradle-to-grave authority and responsibility in the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propul­sion Program for all aspects of the nuclear propulsion program, including personnel training, assignment, and career management? Let’s examine a naval nuclear propulsion program of comparable size and complexity to ours—that of the former Soviet Navy. A shortened, unclassified listing of its past nuclear safety problems is outlined in Table l.³

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This is by no means the full account, but contrast this record with that of our nuclear Navy. Although only 15% of the Navy’s unrestricted line officers are nuclear trained, they currently are operating 49% of the Navy’s war­ships. These ships have amassed 4,300 reactor years of operation in 38 years without any reactor accidents or sig­nificant release of radioactivity into the environment.

Because radiation is involved, nuclear technology in our democracy depends on public confidence for contin­ued military application. The mere perception of a nuclear accident on board one of our nuclear-powered ships could severely inhibit the operation of our nuclear fleet at home and abroad. Yet our Navy’s remarkable safety record en­ables U.S. nuclear aircraft carriers, cruisers, and sub­marines to call at more than 150 ports worldwide. High standards in design and support play a key role, hut ultimately the officers and men in their crews are responsible for the opera­tion and maintenance decisions that perpetuate this record.

The Discipline of Technology

But what sets this community apart from the rest of the Navy regarding the impact of Title IV? The answer requires a deeper look at what makes the nuclear of­ficer corps tick. It all starts with what the late Admiral H. G. Rickover called the “discipline of technology” inherent in harnessing nuclear reactors for shipboard propulsion. An officer selected for this program must agree to marry up with this dis­cipline for the duration of his career.

Each candidate is carefully screened for tech­nical ability and aptitude, facing a battery of interviews hy senior Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program headquar­ters engineers and culminating with a final interview by the Director, currently Admiral Bruce DeMars. Those selected begin an arduous and extensive 12-month train­ing program, including six months at an operating reac­tor plant—the first step in a continuing process of exam­ination, qualification, and requalification.

It is during this initial training that each officer adopts ^a deliberate approach to learning all he possibly can about reactor plant theory, design, construction, and operation. He must know more than even his most senior enlisted shipmates and anticipate the consequences of decisions or ^actions in advance, to avoid costly or dangerous mistakes. TTiis knowledge is at his core, coming even before he com- rriences learning warrior skills from his respective type ^commander. It will remain essential throughout his career.

Two brief examples illustrate this point. Assume a sub­marine on a mission far under the polar ice pack has a propulsion casualty. In the civilian nuclear industry, the conservative response to a casualty is to shut down the reactor. In a submarine, however, this would terminate far more than just the mission. Without the reactor, the boat has only a few hours of battery capacity to sustain her. Propulsion problems in these circumstances have to be re­solved quickly and safely through the technical leadership of the officers involved, as access to advice or assistance from the outside world is limited.

Next, assume a nuclear-powered carrier is conducting flight operations far out at sea. A propulsion casualty that significantly slows the ship could have dangerous conse­quences for recovering aircraft because sufficient wind speed could not be generated across the deck. Air­craft carry only limited amounts of fuel; restoring propulsion would carry great urgency. There may be no alter­native airfield.

As these examples illus­trate, there is no way around the continuous in­vestment in nuclear propulsion skills. Con­stant education and demonstration of pro­ficiency through rig­orous testing are re­quired to instill this level of technical competence in the of­ficers who staff these nuclear ships.

A Navy pilot, in con­trast, is a master at oper­ating his craft but has little real opportunity to effect re­pairs should it fail in flight. As a result, a pilot’s training focuses on operations, with much less em­phasis on the design or maintenance of the aircraft. The conventional surface warship may have propulsion problems that affect mission accom­plishment, but the ship’s survival rarely hinges on im­mediate repairs in peacetime operations. It is the tech­nology that drives this difference. The high military payoff from nuclear power justifies this disciplined re­sponse from the program and the people involved in it. But it is important that this cost not be made unbearably high for the community.

Upon reaching his first ship and throughout his career, the nuclear officer must qualify on his specific plant and maintain proficiency. More than his shipboard chain of command is involved in following his progress in this en­deavor. The officer also faces:

► Rigorous technical examinations by Naval Reactors headquarters personnel prior to initial operation of each new reactor plant and after each reactor plant refueling >Annual examinations by specifically selected and expe-

rienced fleet operators on the Nuclear Propulsion Exam­ining Board of each Fleet Commander-in-Chief > On-site surveillance of nuclear propulsion plant opera­tions and work by Naval Reactors personnel in field of­fices near shipyards and operating bases

In addition to formal training and examinations, the qualification process leading to command hinges on the assignment of officers to positions of increasing scope and responsibility to develop expertise in all aspects of the nu­clear propulsion plant and their warfare specialties. In the initial shipboard assignment, the officer serves as a divi­sion officer and develops experience in reactor plant op­erations. After two years at sea, each nuclear officer com­pletes a comprehensive written and oral examination administered in Washington, D.C., to determine his suit­ability for subsequent assignment as an engineering offi­cer. Those who fail serve the remainder of their naval ca­reers in non-nuclear roles outside the program.

Nuclear propulsion officers must work their way through prescribed shipboard assignments—division of­ficer, department head, executive officer, and eventually commanding officer. The qualification process continues throughout these assignments. For example, even offi­cers selected for command return for an intensive 13- week prospective commanding officer training course conducted by Naval Reactors headquarters. Candidates in this course must pass a battery of examinations and oral boards, testing all aspects of their technical knowl­edge and capabilities.

Nuclear officers who have demonstrated exceptional technical and professional expertise are likely to be as­signed to key nuclear safety and readiness jobs for their shore duty assignments. These officers comprise the Nu­clear Propulsion Examining Boards, train operators in the pipeline training commands, direct operations for the

squadron commanders, supervise propulsion plant repairs, serve as staff at Naval Reactors headquarters, and so on.

By the time an officer reaches command of a nuclear- powered ship, he has the tactical competence to employ his ship against a determined enemy and also is an expert in nuclear propulsion plant operations. He also has spent most of his career at or near the sea. In fact, tour length is a major difference between nuclear officer and other community career patterns. Remaining in key shipboard assignments long enough to be responsible for the poli­cies and practices you have fostered and to fully invest the expertise you have gained in the early stages of the assignment is a hallmark of the nuclear Navy—and the key to its exceptional safety and performance record. Three-year tours are mandated for junior officers, de­partment heads, and commanding officers, and two-yeaf tours for executive officers.

The need for progressive nuclear proficiency and longer operational tour lengths, and the absolute necessity to keep

quality as the discriminator for key nuclear safety as­signments create a dilemma for many nuclear officers, who also must serve a joint tour to be eligible for flag rank. As Admiral DeMars testified to the House Armed | Services Committee’s nuclear facilities panel in March 1991, “I must pick the best to run the land-based reactors, be on the safety examining teams, and so forth. That has to take precedence because of reactor safety. For this rea­son, the finest officers in the business are unable to get those joint tickets punched and [we] are going to require a permanent waiver.”⁴

A Permanent Waiver

The January 1994 expiration for the current waiver is approaching quickly—it is time to get on with a solu­tion. In the final judgment it does not matter that new joint billets are coming on line or that DoD-wide revisions to Title IV are being contemplated based on statistical anal)" ses. The real issue is quality. As our best and brightest work their way up, we must ensure that no single elimi' nation criteria unfairly disenfranchises any of them as t* result of the unavoidable demands of reactor safety. You have a limited number of years to task a highly select and

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historically successful cadre of officers. What do you re­ally want them to do?

The nuclear officer community is assigning many top- quality officers to the Joint Staff prior to major command. But to ensure compliance with public law regarding nu­clear safety, the lion’s share of nuclear officers receiving orders to joint duty comes from the pool of flag-contending captains who have completed one or more major com­mand tours at sea. The small size of the community com­pared with the large number of nuclear-powered combat­ants requires that many of these officers serve in critical operational billets until then. Some of the best officers are continuously assigned to reactor safety related billets until after major command.

After major command, many of our best officers are immediately assigned to a joint tour because nuclear safety is finally off their plate at that seniority. Unfortunately, this may be too late, because they already are in the flag selection window. Additionally, joint assignments may not always be readily available to give these officers this last minute reprieve. The effect is that guaranteed com­pliance with the joint duty requirement cannot be rea­sonably enforced until one pay grade later (between rear admiral [lower half] and rear admiral [upper half]) than for the other Navy communities.

It is revealing to look at who was selected by the two most recent statutory boards for rear admiral (lower half)- In the fiscal year 1993 board, of the four (non-materiel Professional) line officer submariners selected, three would need waivers by current criteria. Neither of the two nu­clear aviators selected had a full joint tour either, although one did have one year of credit from an Air Force test- Pilot school. In the fiscal year 1994 board, five of the eight nuclear-trained officers selected required a nuclear waiver, and two needed a currently serving waiver.

In 1994, 70% of the flag-eligible, major command served, nuclear-trained officers will not have completed joint duty assignments. This is despite a genuine full court Press by the nuclear detailers, as validated annually by the Secretary of Defense to Congress. Recent projections by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in­dicate that over the next 12 years, the maximum possible fraction of nuclear-trained flag-eligible officers who will have served in a joint tour will average 36% of the com­munity—despite the large number of new joint billets Associated with Strategic Command. The other Navy com­munities enjoy a much higher percentage.⁵ As Admiral James Watkins wrote four years ago:

I appreciate the reasons for having good people in joint duty assignments. But the safety and effectiveness of naval warships require a permanent exemption for nuclear propulsion officers. The very best nuclear of­ficers we have must continue to be assigned to reactor safety and readiness jobs without jeopardizing their fu­ture promotion potential. I was very aware of this as Chief of Naval Operations. As Secretary of Energy, I remain deeply concerned.⁶

Title IV has been a watershed for our armed forces, but it also has inadvertently threatened the uniquely success­ful nuclear officer community by impeding their upward mobility even as they are striving to perpetuate a re­markable nuclear safety record. A permanent solution is needed for this permanent problem. The existing provi­sion, which shifts the joint tour prerequisite gate for flag selection from rear admiral (lower half) to rear admiral (upper halO for nuclear-trained officers, should be made permanent. This is the necessary price of nuclear safety in the joint age.

'Executive Order 12344 of 1 February 1982 designated responsibilities of the Di­rector of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Public Law 98-525 of 19 Octo­ber 1984, 1985 Defense Authorization Act (Title 42 U.S. Code 7158) enacted Executive Order 12344 as permanent law.

²Public Law 100-180, 1988 Defense Authorization Act Section 1305 established special transition rules for nuclear propulsion officers to expire on 1 January 1992. It also required development of a plan for nuclear trained officers to meet the joint duty requirements by 1 January 1992. Public Law 100-456, 1989 Defense Authorization Act Section 515 extended the exemption from joint duty for nu­clear propulsion officers to 1 January 1994, and added a requirement for an an­nual report to Congress from the Secretary of Defense on implementation of the transition plan.

'Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence memo 3800 Ser 092B/2U545971 of 17 Jan­uary 1991, “Soviet Reactor Plant Casualties.”

Testimony before the House Armed Service Committee’s Nuclear Facilities Panel in March 1990 by Admiral Bruce DeMars.

The Joint Speciality Officer Modeling System combines information from the Joint Duty Assignment Information System and the Officer Distribution Information Sys­tem to simulate the Navy billet assignment process for up to 15 years. The 36% average cited addresses only nuclear submarine officer annual data points between fiscal years 94 and 06, and includes those officers with joint equivalent credit. Be­cause nuclear-trained surface officers and aviators have even fewer shore duty op­portunities than submariners, including them would lower this average further. ⁶Secretary of Energy letter of 1 June 1989 (no serial) addressed to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney.

Captain Griffiths, a nuclear submariner, currently is serving on the head­quarters staff of Admiral Bruce DeMars at Naval Reactors in Wash­ington. During Desert Storm, he participated in Tomahawk strikes against Iraq as commanding officer of the USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720). He pre­viously has served as a member of the Atlantic Fleet Nuclear Propul­sion Examining Board and in the Bureau of Personnel.