Fewer C-17s Buy More Lift

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To deploy combat power quickly and continuously—here, the Cape Mendocino loads military cargo during Desert Shield—the Department of Defense must ensure that sufficient lift is available from the onset of a crisis. Could a reallocation of C-17 funds provide the answer?

We need a force capable of projecting power quickly when and where it’s needed. . . . and the Navy must maintain sufficient. . . forces, as well as more sealift.

President Bill Clinton¹

With the end of the Cold War, one may suppose our need for strategic sealift has eased. As the Gulf War and Somalia have proved, however, the large lift-capacity requirement for the U.S. military continues. The United States must maintain its ability to take the war to the enemy, especially as our focus shifts from global war to rapidly forming regional contingen­cies. With U.S. forces and equipment returning to the con­tinental United States, increased strategic lift is required to get them to the point of conflict.

As the U.S. Merchant Marine declines, the Department of Defense must take action and be prepared to act inde­pendently to procure its own organic shipping.

U.S.-Flag Shipping and Manning Requirements

The United States emerged from World War II with the world’s largest merchant fleet. It now ranks 16th in the world in numbers of vessels and 10th in overall carrying capacity.² As former Maritime Administrator Warren G. Leback stated:

In the immediate post WWII years, the U.S.-flag fleet flourished, carrying over 60 percent of the nation’s wa­terborne foreign commerce. By 1950, the U.S.-flag share had dropped to under 43 percent. Ten years later, the competition from lower cost foreign-flag carriers had reduced U.S.-flag carriage to only 11 percent. Since 1970, U.S.-flag carriage of our waterborne foreign com­merce has hovered between 4 and 5 percent.³

The many reasons for this decline include:

►  U.S. shipping companies must compete with foreign government controlled or subsidized shipping. Three of the world’s largest shipbuilding countries—Japan, South Korea, and Germany—provide shipbuilding subsidies.⁴

►  U.S. merchant seamen and shipyard workers are among the highest paid in the world.

►  There is a greater supply of ships worldwide than cargo, keeping shipping prices down.

In 1981, the United States cut off subsidies for our Mer­chant Marine.⁵ Without maritime reform or government subsidies, the U.S. foreign-trade merchant fleet is unable to compete in the world market. As former Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card recently noted:

In 1979, 18 major U.S.-flag liner companies operated in foreign trades. Today, there are only six. ... the two largest U.S.-flag liner operators, American President Lines (APL) and Sea-Land, said they will withdraw their vessels from the U.S. flag starting in 1995 un­less reforms are implemented to help U.S.-flag opera­tors compete in world markets.⁶

With the Clinton administration’s decision to forgo fur­ther operating subsidies, it is certain that the U.S. mer­chant marine industry is doomed. Today there are no in­centives or economic reasons for a company to invest in this capital-intensive business. The high cost of building' manning, and maintaining these ships is driving shipping companies to foreign flag.

Should sealift again be required—as it was during the Gulf War—the United States will need a well-trained mer­chant marine force to man the ships of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). “Just for the RRF; Desert Shield created about 3,000 jobs virtually overnight.”⁷

The United States traditionally has relied heavily on the civilian sector to provide mariners to support the mili­tary in times of crisis; these mariners may not be there in the future. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, one

° s. ARMY (B. CUMPER)

“major problem ... was finding enough qualified civil­ian seamen to crew [the RRF], ... As the U.S.-flag fleet has declined, the number of experienced sailors has di­minished as well.”⁸ Without U.S. merchant ships to pro­vide them with jobs, civilian mariners gradually will dis­appear.

Another obstacle to manning the Ready Reserve Force Was the lack of reemployment security for mariners. For the Gulf War, many jobs had to be filled by former mariners; many would not leave their current jobs, how­ever, because they did not have the reemployment rights afforded to military reservists. The Maritime Administra­tion (MarAd) has proposed a Merchant Marine Reserve Program (H.R. 1109 passed the House unanimously and currently is in the Senate), which would provide a pool of qualified mariners for contingencies and guarantee their civilian jobs once they were released from active duty. If Voted into law, this bill could help alleviate the shortage of merchant seamen.

The Gulf War highlighted the United States’ continued dependence on both U.S.- and foreign- flag sealift—despite the end of the Cold War— and reinforced the critical importance of strate­gic sealift to our nation’s defense. “In total over 3.2 million short tons of dry cargo and over 6 million tons of petroleum products were deliv­ered.”⁹ To put that in perspective, 3.2 million short tons of dry cargo would require approxi­mately 128,000 C-141 airlift missions.

Of the total military cargo, 85% went by sea. U.S.-flag merchant liner vessels carried 36% and MSC-controlled and chartered vessels shipped about 41% of all military cargo; the other 23% was carried by foreign-flag ships.

During Gulf War operations, the U.S. gov­ernment chartered more than 160 foreign-flag ves­sels. “The United States was fortunate in having ready access to foreign lift. . . . Nonetheless, the availability of foreign-flag vessels to meet U.S. lift requirements in future crises is an issue.”¹⁰ If the United States engages in an unpopular war, for example, foreign-flag vessels may be unwill­ing or unable to participate. Also, “the DoD was forced to pay premium rates” for these ships."

The deployment of heavy ground forces to Saudi Arabia was possible only through the use of strategic sealift. “Initial military options were limited by the time required to move large forces into the theater. Ground force deployment de­pended on sufficient, dedicated, fast sealift. Sealift shortages resulted in slow buildup of heavy forces” during the first few months of the de­ployment.¹² Desert Shield deployment commenced on 7 August 1990; however, it was not until 23 September 1990 that the first heavy division, the 24th Infantry Division, was in place.¹³ The United States cannot assume future aggressors will wait for the buildup of an offensive force.

During Desert Shield, the United States, for the first time, activated components of the Ready Reserve Force. “Despite [their] significant contribution, the RRF activa­tions were burdened by a variety of management prob­lems . . . related to ship readiness, maintenance, opera­tion, and lay-up. . . . MarAd also experienced difficulty in manning the ships.”¹⁴ Many of the ships “suffered from deferred maintenance, due to funding shortfalls. In fiscal year 1990 . . . [MarAd] requested $239 million, but Con­gress appropriated only $89 million" for the upkeep of all 96 ships.¹⁵

Although these problems degraded MarAd’s ability to activate the RRF within specified time frames, they by no means degraded the force’s overall worth to the Gulf War. The fact that more than 80% of the RRF was activated clearly demonstrates its value.

The Gulf War, although very successful, was conducted under the best of conditions. Coalition forces had six months to build up in an area where they had air superi­ority and sea control. Harbor facilities and airports were modern and secure. Fuel was accessible in-theater. The United States had the support of most foreign nations, allowing better access to foreign-flag shipping. This may not always be the case. We must not let the euphoria of victory cloud the problems hidden between the lines and prevent us from learning from our mistakes.

Mobility Requirements Study

In January 1992, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed a comprehensive study to determine the future requirements of strategic lift. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) set its requirements based on potential regional contin­gencies in 1999. It considered several critical factors that would affect U.S. success, including potential threats and alliances, forward presence, future U.S. and allied merchant shipping availability, and prepositioning.

To meet future U.S. objectives, the MRS determined a requirement to move 4 2/3 Army divisions 8,700 nautical miles in approximately six to seven weeks. Because of

The Navy has made notable progress in strategic sealift in the past year, awarding contracts in September 1993 to both Avondale Industries (inset) and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company for construction of sealift vessels.

AVONDALE/NASSCO (K. LEC)

fiscal constraints, available strategic lift, and the as­sumption of a moderate rather than low risk, however, the arrival time was increased to approximately seven to eight weeks. The study’s requirements were constrained to pro­vide a mobility program adequate for the fiscally uncer­tain 1990s. Although these new requirements are less demanding than the earlier need to transport ten divisions in ten days to the European theater, we do not have the luxury of knowing where the next war will be or who the next adversary will be.

Interestingly, the MRS reflects DoD’s acceptance of the continuing decline of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet. The study estimated that the U.S.-flag fleet will decrease from its current number of 134 militarily useful dry cargo ships to 71 ships by 1999. It considered a range of possible con­tingencies in the Middle East, Korea, East Europe, and Southeast Asia. The study used more than 90 separate war games and lessons learned from the Gulf War to deter­mine the minimum requirements to meet the U.S. National Security Strategy. It recommends the following to deploy a substantial force with moderate risk at moderate cost in seven to eight weeks:

>• Maintain 20 large, medium-speed (24 knots), roll-on/roll- off (RO/RO) ships. Eleven would be used for surge sealift in the rapid deployment of heavy Army divisions. Nine would be used for an Army afloat prepositioned package.

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In addition, two 2,000-container-capacity ships would be leased for prepositioning.

^ Expand the RRF by 1997 from the cur- tent 97 ships to 142 ships and increase the readiness of the fleet

^ Continue the C-17 program to improve the airlift component of strategic mobility

Although the MRS calls for significantly less sealift than previous mobility studies,

>t still requires the United States to increase >ts current sealift capacity.

Interestingly, the Gulf War and the MRS have had a significant impact on the U.S.

Congress. Congress transferred $1,875 billion in previously appropriated sealift funds and $600 million in fiscal year (FY)

1993 sealift funds to Navy shipbuilding and conversion.¹⁶ Congress approved the ^eXpansion of the RRF, and MarAd used $266 million of appropriated funds to pro­^cure three existing U.S.-flag and nine ex­isting foreign-flag RO/RO ships to sup­plement and upgrade the RRF.¹⁷

The U.S. Navy also has made notable Progress in strategic sealift since the MRS was released. On 30 October 1992, the Navy awarded contracts to five U.S. shipyards to develop designs for the conversion of listing commercial vessels to militarily useful RO/RO ships.¹⁸ On 30 July 1993, the Navy awarded $1 billion in contracts for design and conversion of five RO/RO ships. Additionally, two contracts totaling $2.6 billion were awarded in September 1993 for design and construction °f 12 RO/RO ships, raising the total to 17.

An Alternate Plan significant loss in total airlift capacity. The C-17 is de­signed to carry more than twice the load of a C-141 (160,000-pound maximum load versus 70,000-pound max­imum load). In essence, 26 C-17s would replace the 52 retiring C-141s.

The C-141 is not as capable as the C-17 because it lacks the advantages of a new aircraft, outsize cargo capacity, and the ability to land on austere airfields. In most cases, however, it is doubtful that the Air Force would risk land­ing a $340 million C-17 on a dirt airfield. “The Air Force has stated that it cannot rely on an off-pavement capabil­ity from . . . any other aircraft in wartime. It states that soils around airfields . . . will not support aircraft land­ing gear. Also, some soils can be rendered unusable by precipitation.”²² If this is the case, why should the Amer­ican taxpayer purchase the C-17, to get a capability that the Air Force has no intention of using, especially at such an enormous price? The 109 C-5s currently in the Air Force inventory easily could handle the outsized-cargo requirement.

According to DoD, the C-17’s primary role would be strategic airlift over long ranges, not short tactical lifts that the Air Force C-130 is used for.²³

The money saved by reducing the number of C-17s pur­chased from 120 to 26 and extending the service life of the C-141 s would pay for the ships recommended by the MRS (the 20 new RO/ROs at $300 million-$400 million each and the extra RRF ships) and still reduce the over­all defense budget by billions of dollars.

It is less expensive to convert a ship to military use than it is to buy a new C-17—and ships can carry far more cargo, albeit at a slower speed. For example, the Navy re­cently bought a RO/RO ship with 154,000 square feet of cargo space for only $13.95 million.²'^{[1] [2]} That’s 25 times less than the cost of one C-17, yet it can carry approximately 250 times the cargo.

Conclusion

Not getting to the war in a timely manner gives an ad­versary the opportunity to take and continue the offen­sive—occupying vital strategic territory and inflicting un­acceptable losses on U.S. forces. The United States must be able to deploy its combat power quickly and continu­ously. Sufficient lift must be available from the onset of a crisis.

The recently completed Mobility Requirements Study and congressional appropriations for conversion and construction of new ships and increasing the size of the RRF is a step in the right direction. It is doubtful, how­ever, that anything will be done to offset the decline of the U.S. foreign-trade merchant marine. DoD either must act independently or risk not getting our troops and equip­ment to the next war on time. The efficient and effective answer is reallocation of C-17 funds to the C-141 ser­vice life extension program and sealift ships recom­mended in the Mobility Requirements Study.

’Robert E. Martinez, “Desert Storm and the Role of Sealift: A View from the Mar­itime Administration,” Proceedings, January/February 1992, p. 6.

“Kent N. Gourdin and Robert E. Trempe, “Contingency Transportation in a Chang­ing World: Meeting the Challenge,” Logistics Spectrum, Spring 1992, p. 14. ‘’Card, p. 1.

"’Martinez, p. 3.

"Ibid.

^l2Ibid., p. 50.

“Ibid., p. 59.

^I4U.S. Department of Defense/Department of Transportation, The Ready Resent Force: Enhancing a National Asset, October 1991, p. vi.

'’Martinez, p. 5.

¹⁶Shipyard Chronicle, 15 October 1992, p. 3.

^I7“MARAD Will Buy Twelve RO/RO Ships for the RRF,” Shipyard Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 23, 12 November 1992, p. 4.

'“American Association of Port Authorities, “Strategic Sealift,” AAPA Advisor}'- Vol. XXVI, No. 50, 21 December 1992, p. 1.

^I9U.S. Government Accounting Office, Status of C-17 Aircraft Development Pro­gram, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington: April 1992)- p. 2; John D. Morrocco, “Congressional Support Eroding for C-17 Program,” 4 W' ation Week & Space Technology, 15 March 1993, p. 30.

’"John D. Morrocco, “USAF Studying C-141 Life Extension,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 February 1993, p. 56.

^2lIbid.

²³U.S. General Accounting Office, Performance Capabilities of the C-5 and C-P Cargo Aircraft, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Sen­ate (Washington: July 1984), p. 13.

“Ibid., p. 2.

²⁴”MARAD Will Buy Twelve RO/RO Ships for the RRF,” Shipyard Chronicfa Vol. 1, No. 25, 18 December 1991, p. 4.

Commander White, a graduate of the Naval War College, currently *^s assigned to the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in Washington, D.C. He previously has served a^s the strategic lift coordinator and C-17 program manager on the U.S. P^a' cific Command Staff and was actively involved in Desert Shield and | Desert Storm deployment, serving as executive officer of the USS Harold E. Holt (FF-1074).

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Current U.S. Strategic Sealift