As the Sea Services prepare to fight along the littorals, they need to organize ways to deploy and coordinate the forces, such as the Coast Guard’s Island-class patrol boats, that will defend vulnerable—and crucial—coasts, harbors, and ports.
During the early 1980s, the United States beefed up its capabilities to fight the Soviet Union on a global scale. During this process, it was determined that both the coastal waters—through which cargo ships carrying the supplies and materiel needed to support U.S. and allied forces overseas would pass—and the U.S. ports, where the cargoes would be handled, needed increased protection. Therefore, the Coast Guard and the Navy collaborated in creating two Maritime Defense Zones (MDZs)—one on the Atlantic Coast, one on the Pacific Coast—and developing structures and tactics to accomplish the Mission.
Recently, however, the focus of U.S. national strategy has shifted from global war with the Soviet Union to regional conflicts. For the regional conflicts that planners anticipate, supplying U.S. forces deployed overseas would require perhaps three or four U.S. ports—instead of the more than 30 ports that would be needed in a global war.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the United States can deploy the bulk of its power only by sea. In either humanitarian missions, regional contingencies, or full-scale war, operations from the sea require the establishment of a landside anchor for the reinforcement and resupply of forces in the theater. Therefore, control of coastal regions—the littorals—where the resupply ships will unload their cargoes is vital to establishing and sustaining U.S. forces ashore.
The Littoral: Back to the Future
The recent emphasis on the littoral region is nothing new to those who have been involved in sustained overseas operations. During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese supplied arms and ammunition to the Viet Cong by sea, infiltrating all along the South Vietnamese coast. Operation Market Time—the seaborne interdiction of this traffic—used a wide variety of Navy and Coast Guard forces to conduct coastal surveillance, search, and interdiction.
During the Persian Gulf War, Coast Guard law-enforcement detachments (LEDets) on U.S. warships coordinated many of the boardings conducted by the multinational Maritime Interdiction Force in the Persian Gulf. However, the coastal-warfare effort concentrated on protecting the means by which the overwhelming bulk of the coalition’s supplies were transported—ships and ports in Saudi Arabia. The Coast Guard was heavily involved in this operation; its Port Security Units (PSUs) provided security at Saudi ports.
Although the Coast Guard’s contribution during the Gulf War demonstrated its ability to respond to an overseas crisis, the units deployed in theater for port-security operations encountered several difficulties which need to be addressed. The specialty of the PSUs is harbor security—not antiterrorist work or offshore interdiction. Nevertheless, because units were not available to perform these missions, they were assigned to the men and women of the PSUs. Although there were no incidents of terrorism during the Gulf War, the potential for it was ever present. During future deployments in the littoral, it is important that we have the assets to deal with a wide range of threats.
The different responses needed in the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War also emphasize the diverse nature of the coastal-defense mission. With the wide range of potential threats in the littoral, effective harbor defense will require an integrated structure that can coordinate the operations of diverse units in a variety of geographic and political environments and against various threats.
Where We Fight
Before determining the most effective structure to conduct coastal warfare, however, the littoral itself must be defined—not an easy task, considering the variables of coastal warfare. The makeup of any littoral depends on the scenario. If there is a forcible-entry operation, the littoral would be defined as the amphibious objective area, and come under the control of the amphibious task force commander. In this case, harbor defense would be established after the assault, to support the forces moving inland. Another scenario is that of U.S. forces coming ashore through friendly foreign ports and, subsequently, using these ports for resupply and reinforcement. In either case, the littoral will be a confined, congested sea and air region filled with friend and foe, as well as neutrals—creating entirely new tactical challenges.
Any foreign port that is used as a point of resupply by U.S. forces will be an extremely tempting target to any enemy dedicated to halting their deployment. A modern port is a large, complex facility whose operations could be disrupted or halted with relative ease; it is the Achilles’ Heel of any deployed force.
Ports will not always be the target of conventional ground offensives; however, they would be vulnerable to modern naval special-operations forces and weapons—e.g., midget submarines. Explosives could disable crucial cargo-handling facilities; sinking a ship in a channel or at pierside could close a harbor. Even if the ports are located in friendly nations, the potential for infiltration by special-operations forces or terrorists would be high.
Harbor Defense Command
Because of the MDZ system, the Navy and the Coast Guard have established standard practices for protecting U.S. ports and coastal waters; however, the methods and structures to protect overseas ports, beachheads, and littoral waters have not been developed.
Using the stock of coastal-defense expertise within the MDZs, the Navy and the Coast Guard can design an organization that can meet the diverse environments and threats encountered in the littoral and protect the coastal flank of U.S. operations all over the world: the Harbor Defense Command (HDC)
The HDC will be required to coordinate coastal-warfare forces in order to perform the following missions:
Coastal Sea Control: The employment of friendly forces to ensure unimpeded use of the littoral. Although composition will vary, this is an offshore function which should be a component of battlegroup operations.
Harbor Defense: Control of a port or anchorage and its seaborne approaches, emphasizing defense against submarine and surface attacks, minelaying, special operations and sabotage.
Port Security: The protection of ships and facility inside the port against sabotage, terrorism, and specific operations.
Port Safety: The prevention of damage to ships and facilities from accidents, negligence, or civil disturbance This mission often is ignored in planning for reinforcement operations; nevertheless, far more damage has been inflicted on ports through accidents than enemy action
The HDC should be mobile and flexible, capable of being tailored to meet various scenarios from low-intensity harassment to mine warfare to direct assault. The coordination of the HDC’s coastal-warfare units would be based on geographic operating areas. (See accompanying diagram.)
Coastal sea control would be the ultimate responsibility of the amphibious task force commander or battle group commander, although, as with other warfare areas, a composite warfare commander could be assigned the coastal-warfare mission.
HDC Staff: The HDC staff would have overall control of harbor-defense operations. It would be a flexible command element whose composition would be based on the Potential threats in each area and the communities involved in countering these threats. For example, in a port where the mine threat is high, there would be greater representation by the mine-warfare community than, say, the port-security community.
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) Units: MlUW units possess a surface-search radars and communications gear, and are able to use sonobuoys to detect subsurface movement. MIUW vans are mobile command-and-control units that have proved their ability to coordinate diverse units in a harbor-defense environment. An advantage of MIUW units is their mobility; they can deploy to any coastal environment and are self-sustaining.
Outer Zone/Harbor Operations
Coast Guard Patrol Boats: For operations in this area, the Coast Guard’s Island (WPB-1301)-class patrol boats Would be the HDC’s mainstay. These extremely versatile, Medium-range, fast 110-foot cutters are capable of performing interdiction and defense missions offshore and Within the port. In joint training exercises with the Navy, they have demonstrated their capabilities for high-speed interception. Unlike the Navy’s smaller special-warfare craft, they can conduct sustained operations over a period of several days without significant replenishment.
To date, the Coast Guard has not deployed these cutters to any overseas theater; but it could, if necessary. The cutters could be transported by reinforcement shipping and eventually conduct operations in squadron formation, using organic support packages that would be ashore at the HDC command site.
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Units: Mines are one of the most serious threats to face in the littoral. Therefore, mine-clearance operations should be a standard hurt of reinforcement shipping. MCM units assigned to the HDC would vary according to the level of the threat, but could include Avenger (MCM-1)-class ships, minekeeping helicopters, and Cardinal (MHC-51)-class mine hunters. The mine-warfare commander would serve as part of the operational HDC staff, acting as liaison and commander for clearance operations.
Inner Zone (Port) Operations
Coast Guard Port Security Units: PSUs are deployable reserve components, each made up of 117 personnel who Specialize in inner-harbor and waterside security of port facilities and other offload sites. Designed as deployable units, PSUs establish waterside security zones around the asset to be protected—e.g., a facility ashore or a ship anchored in the harbor—and employ personnel ashore and armed boats to enforce security.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD): Sharing the responsibilities for the Inner Zone with the PSUs would be Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams. These units have proved their worth in exercises and actual conflicts—e.g., the mine-clearance operations during and after the Persian Gulf War. Their experience and expertise in harbor clearance and ordnance disposal would make EOD teams invaluable additions to any coastal-defense organization.
Coast Guard Utility Boats (UTBs): The Coast Guard’s 41-foot, high-speed UTBs are used routinely for coastal law enforcement and search-and-rescue. Adding a number of UTBs to the HDC organization would provide the local commander with short-range interception capability as well as work boats that could perform a multitude of tasks—e.g., limited command-and-control and the transportation of forces within the area of operations.
Special Warfare (SpecWar) Units: The personnel of Navy SpecWar units—Special Boat Units and SEAL teams—are highly trained specialists in the conduct of littoral warfare. In harbor-defense scenarios, where there is a high threat from terrorists or enemy special-operations forces, they would be extremely valuable assets.
When assigned to their respective geographic areas of operation, these diverse operational elements would provide the HDC the ability to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies in the littoral. Given the wide range of these units’ capabilities, the HDC would be able to act as a flexible coordination element for the direction of coastal and harbor defense.
Conclusions
As the United States focuses its national strategy on regional conflicts, it is clear that warfare along the littorals will become an increasing priority for our deployed naval forces. In this environment, the Harbor Defense Command concept has enormous potential for insuring the effective conduct of coastal warfare. The HDC is a joint command that stresses flexibility above all else, specializing its structure to meet a specific need or threat. As a deployable element, the HDC would allow coastal-warfare, harbor-defense, and port-defense forces to be assembled and brought to the scene quickly—in order to ensure the smooth flow of reinforcement and resupply shipping. After years of preparing for the MDZ mission, the Coast Guard is ready to execute this concept and perform in this distinct—and crucial—element of national security.
A 1985 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Lieutenant Watts has served in the USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716), as a Maritime Defense Zone fleet-exercise planner for MDZ Atlantic, and as an exchange officer in the USS Josephus Daniels (CG-27). A qualified surface-warfare officer and graduate of the Naval War College, he has published articles in Proceedings on coastal defense and the Maritime Strategy. Lieutenant Watts currently is assigned to the Fifth Coast Guard District.