Comment & Discussion

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Contents:

2015—14

Standing up for Truth—14

Out of the Bull’s Eye—14

Learning the Right Lessons—16

Expansion of the Regular Membership Category—17

Eire Support: Fill the Gap—17

A Better Hornet: Promises, Promises—18

Legal Assistance and Unit Readiness—20

Surface Navy:

Still in Search of Tactics—20

Pushing Them Out the Back Door—23

Canada Is Ignoring Its Navy—24

Go, NAPS, Go'.—17

“2015”

(See W. P. Houley, pp. 49-52. October 1993

Proceedings)

Walter Wade—In the matter of “stealthy” designs and air-independent propulsion systems, I refer Admiral Houley to the Autonomous Maritime Power Supply con­cept proposed by Canada. Using the very safe “slowpoke” reactor to power a Stir­ling engine-driven generator, it is suffi­ciently small to fit in a (hull) plug for an existing diesel-electric boat.

The system is self-regulating; should the cooling system be shut down, or turned off for stealth purposes, the reac­tor will gradually and safely reduce the power automatically. Installed in either an existing diesel-electric boat, or a new, purpose-designed diesel-electric boat, the system—rated at approximately 400,000 watts (thermal)—could simultaneously provide quiet, propulsive power for cruis­ing; maintain the batteries in fully charged condition; and supply the boat’s “hotel” load—including atmospheric scrubbers and electrolytic oxygen gen­erators. The fully charged batteries would provide “peaking power” for combat ma­neuvers or for sprint-and-drift combat pa­trols. This hybrid design would have the endurance of a “pure” nuclear boat and the stealth of a diesel-electric boat. □

ment—and a repudiation of the ideals of equality that we serve to protect.

The issue is a matter of truth, honor, and values. Lieutenant Tracy Thorne i^s as heroic, honorable, and as imbued with integrity as Major Johnson. Their loss to the military is equally tragic. Until all Americans can serve their country with­out being compromised in their speech, association, religion, or identity, “lib­erty and justice for all” will be nothin? more than a well-intentioned lie. □

Robert C. Stem—I disagree strongly with Major DeCamp’s statement that the “mil­itary should not be a laboratory for social experimentation.” As the most visible em­bodiment of the goals and ideals of out society, the U.S. military has a profound responsibility to lead the nation in pro­moting a society in which only ability de­termines how far a person can go.

Major Johnson joins the ranks of those too small-minded to tolerate change. Just as there were a number of resignations over the admission of blacks or the inte­gration of women in the military, there will be resignations over the very limited tolerance granted to homosexuals by President Clinton’s new policy. As was the case with those who left over past is­sues—no matter how personally brave Major Johnson may be—the military is better off without him. □

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or mili­tary interest for possible publica­tion on these pages. A primary purpose of Proceedings is to pro­vide a forum where ideas of impor­tance to the sea services can be ex­changed. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in Proceedings. Please include your return address, your social security number, and a day­time phone number.

“Standing Up for Truth”

(See W. DeCamp, pp. 89-90, September 1993;

J. T. Willmon, p. 14, November 1993

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander D. M. Walter, U.S. Navy—If “the war has just begun” over the issue of homosexuals serving in the military, then Major DeCamp and I are on opposite sides. I agree that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” compromise is fun­damentally flawed, and I admire the per­sonal integrity Major Johnson showed by resigning over the issue. However, I strongly disagree that homosexuality is incompatible with military service, and I resent the implication that thinking this way is immoral and dishonorable. There are honest men on both sides of this issue.

The compromise maintains a system under which gay men and lesbians can be discharged solely because of the prej­udice of others. For those of us who view military service as defending the diver­sity and individual freedom of the United States, the compromise is an embarrass­

“Out of the Bull’s Eye”

(See J. A. Gattuso, pp. 31-36, October 1993

Proceedings)

John F. Ellingson—Tailhook demon­strates a loss of focus on honor and in­tegrity as the cornerstones of a service career. No matter what action is taken to set policy or conduct the business of the military on a day-to-day basis, with­out a firm anchor in honor and integrity- the result will be the type of incidents and conduct so well illustrated by Comman­der Gattuso. From the incidents at Tail- hook 91 to the current cheating scandal at the Naval Academy, it all comes down to a lack of honor and integrity.

Commander Gattuso correctly place* importance on character as a crucial cfl' terion in selecting future aviators; how­ever, the criterion should apply to all officers. Naval officers are obliged to en­sure that honor and integrity are the cote elements of conduct at all levels. □

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“Learning the Right Lessons”

(See B. J. Coyle, pp. 31-36, September 1993 Proceedings)

Major Harries-Clichy Peterson, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Captain Coyle made some useful observations on what we might learn from the Cold War era. However, as an intelligence officer, 1 have some criticisms of his section headed “Our Intelligence and Warning Systems Don’t Work.”

Captain Coyle paints with too broad a brush, blaming indications and warning (I&W) for political failures. As any I&W watch officer will tell you, the warning process and the warning decision are quite different beasts: one warns of dan­ger, but the other refuses to listen. So, blame the decisionmakers, not the intel­ligence providers.

Second, contrary to his sweeping ac­cusation, U.S. intelligence has not “guessed wrong on almost everything.” I’m not sure where Captain Coyle was in July 1990, just prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. I was in Florida, participating in General Norman Schwarzkopf’s joint exercise Internal Look. Generally speak­ing, what we in the 1st Marine Division did during the exercise was extremely close to what we did in Desert Shield. While there was much public noise about the crisis being just a paper one, at least the military was not guessing wrong.

In 1981, the Soviets were poised to in­vade Poland to suppress its rising demo­cratic movement. The President took the I&W seriously; certain counter-moves were made and communicated to the So­viets. They did not invade. We did not guess wrong—and, although the story is an unsung one, it is a significant exam­ple of a major U.S. intelligence success.

Almost every year intelligence is faced with the daunting challenge of warning about a possible invasion of South Korea by North Korea. A review of the past decade shows that some years there was little evidence to support a warning, and it was not given; in other years, there was compelling and disturbing evidence of imminent hostilities, warning was pro­vided, and decisionmakers took prudent precautions that North Korea was made aware of. We’ve not guessed wrong yet.

To be fair to Captain Coyle, what caught him up was the paradox of warn­ing: if you succeed in warning a politi­cal leader about an impending crisis, and he takes steps, and the crisis does not occur, do you count that as good I&W or an erroneous warning?

Third, you can’t have it both ways. Those of us in the intelligence commu­nity are told that we have guessed wrong on everything, but that after crises de­velop, politicians react with feigned sur­prise. If it was feigned, then they knew; therefore we didn’t guess wrong—the politicians just acted wrong. Which is it? It isn’t an academic question: do we need to fix the I&W or the politicians?

Fourth, Captain Coyle accuses “our in­telligence systems” of defining wildly ex­aggerated capabilities as actual threats in order to support programs and budgets. This accusation is itself wildly exagger­ated. For the most part, threat analyses are pretty good. Very few budgeteers are willing to stick their necks out based on politically tweaked single-service threat analysis; they know that various con­gressional committees will catch them— and kill their programs. The real problem is force-strategy alternatives that do not match threat forecasts. Even so, most of the justifications made today for multi- billion-dollar “overkill” systems are not based on bad intelligence assessments, but a need to preserve a critical industrial base or to bring home the bacon to a congressional district.

Finally, what is really missing from Captain Coyle’s critique is the realization that warning always is ambiguous, and, therefore, subject to error. I&W may be called a system, but is certainly not any­thing like a mechanical system with quan­tified inputs that can be measured against quantifiable outputs. He notes that intel­ligence agencies “guessed” wrong, that they failed to “predict,” and that “ambi­guities and alternatives are interpreted.” The point is that because intelligence deals with future acts by people we can’t get to easily, it is extremely difficult to do well. Furthermore, as Captain Coyle points out, it is frequently corrupted by the political process. To get a good ap­preciation of the problem, ask yourself how good you are at predicting your own boss’s decisions.

So, what should be done? Let me offer two prescriptions:

First, tighten up the I&W process. The Defense Department has a good system, but it is used by neither the State De­partment nor the CIA. As a result, there is no commonly shared, commonly un­derstood method for providing warning to decisionmakers. This is inexcusable— we cannot rely on gut instincts and guess­ing (no matter how educated). Since the Director of Central Intelligence is ulti­mately responsible for warning the Pres­ident, Mr. Woolsey should wander over to the Pentagon, acquaint himself with how the DoD’s system works, and then demand that it be used throughout the in­telligence community. Come to think of it, Mr. Aspin and Mr. Dalton should go along to find out what’s going on as well Second, dilute service intelligence m favor of strengthening intelligence for the theater commanders. This will help re^­move politics from sectarian budgeting- It will also give the warfighting coni' manders more authority to provide warn' ing of conflicts and structure their forces- And, ultimately, it will give them a big' ger warning hammer with which to g^el the political leaders’ attention. □

^ajor Edward F. Palm, U.S. Marine L'°rps (Retired); Chairman, Language ^vision, Glenville (West Virginia) State Loll_eg_e—As one who has served as an tostructor with the Marine Corps En- hsted Commissioning Education Program,

“Go, NAPS, Go!”

{See A. B. Myslinski, pp. 33-36, October 1993; T. C. Lynch, pp. 14-16, November 1993 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Bruce J. Black, U.S. Navy— Commander Myslinski brings up some interesting points about the Naval Acad­emy Preparatory School (NAPS), but Pays too little heed to the intangible prod­ucts of its curriculum. NAPS is meant to produce individuals who will succeed in the Naval Academy environment. While it appears that a graduate of NAPS fares no better or worse than any other midshipman, there are characteristics of MAPS graduates that are of vital impor­tance to the Naval Academy—character­istics that become readily apparent dur­ing Plebe Year. A “NAPSter” already knows what to expect and what is ex­pected of him at the Academy; whereas toe plebes who come straight from a civilian environment often do not. NAP- Sters can pass on this knowledge and help toeir classmates adjust to the dramatic changes that Plebe Year introduces. No °ne makes it through Plebe Year alone, und countless midshipmen have made it torough with the help of NAPSters.

Commander Myslinski also questions 'he need for NAPS’s athletic program. If midshipmen are expected to participate in athletics at the Academy, why shouldn't there be an athletic program ^at NAPS? Furthermore, many plebes have houble adjusting to the time constraints °f academics, athletics, and military train- tog placed upon them. While NAPS makes heavy academic demands on its midshipman candidates, the military train- tog load is minimal compared to that of toe plebes. Taking away the athletic com­mitments, therefore, would weaken the Program. If Commander Myslinski wants MAPS to produce well-rounded mid­shipmen for the Academy, then increas- tog its military training requirement "'Quid be the most likely reform. □ ^[1]

terthought at NAPS, Commander Mys­linski suggests the real reason the Navy is fighting so hard to maintain the status quo. The preference for “growing our own,” as General A1 Gray used to say, may sound innocent on the face of it. But what such advocates really are talking about is nurturing and perpetuating the sentimental attachments and mindless en­thusiasms of youth.

How, for instance, does one justify throwing a newly minted ensign with no academic credentials into a classroom? The answer has to do with military role models. An ensign is indeed the best choice if the primary concern to get as­piring midshipmen to identify with an image and adopt a certain set of atti­tudes and values. But that’s indoctrina­tion, not education. To paraphrase Emer­son, the current priorities at NAPS would seem to be saying to the world that we don’t want thinking officers; we want of­ficers thinking—but only occasionally and only within prescribed bounds.

The events of our recent past, if noth­ing else, should have demonstrated that loyalty and esprit de corps can be over­done. Today, more than ever, we need a truly professional officer corps composed of officers whose horizons extend beyond the institutions they serve. That sort of outlook is the product of (dare I say it?) a liberal education, not inbreeding. Kudos to Commander Myslinski for pointing out that, while the emperor may not actu­ally be naked, he certainly isn’t wearing academic garb. □

“Expansion of the Regular Membership Category”

(See F. B. Kelso, p. 22, March 1993; H. W.

O'Quin, A. Masulaitis, T. R. Daniel, p. 20, May 1993; B. Longo, J. E. Shassberger, pp. 14-19, June 1993; K. S. Yamashita, p. 25, November 1993 Proceedings)

Master Chief Richard E. Ullrich, U.S. Navy (Retired)—It is time to allow en­listed members of the sea services to become regular members of the U.S. Naval Institute. Today’s enlisted men and women are better educated than ever be­fore—many have advanced degrees—and their contributions would benefit the en­tire sea-service establishment, as recent letters to Proceedings from enlisted per­sonnel have shown.

However, I would not like to see Pro­ceedings turned into a way to air petty gripes that should be handled through the chain of command. With this in mind, the Naval Institute’s Board of Control should consider initially limiting regular mem­bership to the top three enlisted pay grades. These people are truly profes­sionals in their fields. What commanding officer has not at some time turned and asked, “What do you think, Chief?” □

“Fire Support: Fill the Gap”

(See C. T. Morgan, pp. 54-58, September 1993

Proceedings)

H. Robert Moore, former Naval Sea Sys­tems Command Deputy Program Man­ager for Semiactive Laser and Infrared Guided Projectiles—Back in the 1980s, what prevented 5-inch and 8-inch guided projectiles from becoming operational was a political—not fiscal—decision of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. The rationale for canceling both programs was “unafford­ability.” They cited bogus round-for- round cost comparisons with standard ballistic ammunition and the cost of the Mk-71 8-inch gun, while totally ignoring the cost and operational effectiveness of the highly accurate guided projectiles.

Politics—inside and outside the Navy— killed the Mk-71 8-inch gun, here test fired by the USS Hull (DD-945).

Moreover, the inherent inaccuracy of ballistic naval gunnery—that required to fire for effect, a spotter to correct for fall of shot, and a high rate of fire—had so biased the Navy’s opinion of gunnery that, for a decade, it built surface ships with no guns at all.

If you want to know the full story about naval gunnery, ask the Marines about the need for accurate naval gunfire support against moving targets, enemy artillery, and defensive fortifications. Then ask today’s surface warriors how the Navy is meeting those requirements.

Unfortunately, the same backhanded treatment given to guided projectiles in 1980s probably will be applied to the au­thor’s excellent near-term solutions. His suggestions are obviously too “low-tech” or too “costly” to compete with the Pen­tagon’s current pet projects. □

“A Better Hornet: Promises, Promises”

(See J. Stevenson, p. 104, October 1993

Proceedings)

Commander Craig F. Weideman, U.S. Navy—As a requirements officer to the Chief of Naval Operations on F/A-18 issues, I was unsuccessful in locating any “promises” in OpNav archives that Mr. Stevenson alleges the Department of the Navy made about the F/A-18 Hornet. World threats drive requirements and the Operational Requirements Document is then translated into aircraft specifications. These requirements and specifications— not promises—are the standards to which an aircraft is judged during operational evaluations. As a former commander of a F/A-18C squadron, I take exception to the operational limitations, comparisons, and misconceptions that Mr. Stevenson characterizes as “promises.”

His speculation about F/A-18E/F’s ca­pabilities with 480-gallon external fuel tanks is incorrect and not consistent with current operations and development plans for the E/F. The 480-gallon fuel tanks were not developed for the E/F to meet its range requirements, either for the fighter escort or strike interdiction mis­sion. The F/A-18E/F launching from air­craft carriers and land bases will have the increased operational flexibility that comes from being able to carry as many as five 330- or 480-gallon fuel tanks. A requirement for plumbing the E/F for an air-refueling store (ARS) package was recognized and approved because of the accelerating retirement of the A-6, the Navy’s workhorse tanker. The F/A-18C/D was never engineered to carry an ARS and, although the 480-gallon external tanks are compatible for shore-based op­erations, insufficient clearance precluded their use on carrier-based F/A-18C/Ds.

The F/A-18E/F spot-factor specifica­tion is 1.5 with a desired objective of no greater than 1.4. The present develop­mental spot factor actually is 1.24. Dur­ing the 1970s, deck-spot requirements drove carrier-deck multiples when carrier air wings exceeded 80 aircraft. When the F/A-18E/F enters the fleet in the next cen­tury, the likelihood of a carrier air wing being that large is extremely remote. Con­sidering that one third of an F/A-18 air­frame generally occupies free real es­tate—i.e., hangs its tail over the water—future aviation boatswains are not likely to be agonizing about locking up the deck during the final cycle recovery.

An aircraft’s approach speed is just one of many factors that determines its carrier suitability. Other significant fac­tors are: handling qualities, forward vis­ibility, engine/go-around response, and the speed of wind over the deck needed for recovery. The F/A-18 excels in all of these areas and has the boarding-rate credentials and safety record to prove it. While the approach-speed specification for the E/F is 150 knots, current program status shows that the approach speed—at maximum gross “bring-back” weight—is 145 knots, three knots above the speed of the F/A-18C/D. Mr. Stevenson also fails to mention that the E/F will require lower wind over-the-deck speed (11 knots) than the F/A-18A (18 knots) and the F/A-18C (14 knots). Factor in a car­rier’s speed-of-advance with the standard wind-over-the-deck speed and the closure speed is nothing extraordinary.

Improvements in air-to-ground strike capability of the F/A-18E/F center around enhanced survivability and the ability to carry larger ordnance loads farther than current Hornets. On strike missions, the E/F with its improved countermeasures and materials technologies and reduced vulnerable areas will be harder to detect, hit, and disable than current Hornets. While avionics changes in fact are min­imal, cockpit improvements will enhance a pilot’s situational awareness and over­all effectiveness. Two more weapons sta­tions will allow the F/A-18E/F to carry more air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons.

Contrary to Mr. Stevenson’s asser­tion, the F/A-18 has long been a platform for delivering precision air-to-ground weapons. For example, the Walleye, Wall­eye II, Maverick, Harpoon, and Stand-off Land Attack Missile were developed and integrated on the F/A-18 in the early 1980s. More to the point: the Laser Spot Tracker (LST) was original equipment for the F/A-18A and entered service in 1984. The LST gave Navy and Marine avia­tion the capability to deliver precision laser-guided weapons in conjunction with other laser designators.

In April 1992, an independent team of experts was assembled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review the Navy’s performance estimates for the F/A-18E/F. This team was comprised of the nation’s top aerodynamic and propul­sion experts. Their evaluation:

>■ Validated the Navy’s mission radius predictions

>• Classified aerodynamic and propulsion risks as low

►  Expressed high confidence in predicted aerodynamics

>■ Noted a high probability of exceeding engine-performance objectives

►  Found the Navy’s performance esti­mates to be conservative

The Defense Science Board—which thoroughly evaluated the technical aspects of the F/A-18E/F—concluded in a report released in February 1993:

The F/A-18E/F is not a high-risk pro­gram in terms of concept, design, per­formance and operational suitability .... The aerodynamic and structural concepts for the F/A-18E/F are essentially the same as those of the F/A-18C/D.

Despite my differences with Mr- Stevenson’s commentary, perhaps he should be commended for his interest in a program that is so crucial to naval avi­ation. Given the expensive lessons learned from the A-12, AFX, and other development nightmares, everyone in­volved in the acquisition process—in­dustry executives, program managers, and representatives and senators—must main­tain their vigilance over major acquisi­tion programs. □

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^radar, usable weapons systems, or engines ^capable of performing both fighter and at­tack missions. While the F/A-18A/B vis­ibly resembled the YF-17, it was physi­cally a new aircraft from the ground up. in fact, the commonality of parts between the F/A-18A/B and the YF-17 was near *ero. By contrast, the F/A-18E/F retains ttore than 90% of the C/D’s avionics ^suite; it is roughly 15% identical in struc- htres and subsystem parts, and will use ftuch of the same training and mainte­nance equipment. The Defense Science hoard—convened in early 1993 to review ^lhe F/A-18E/F program at the request of Congress—concluded that:

[T]he F/A-18E-/F is an evolutionary development based on the F/A-18C/D. The F/A-18E/F airframe is a scaled- up version of the F/A-18C/D with a new engine derived from the A-12 program and other recent programs. The avionics are planned to be al­most a direct carry-over from the F/A-18C/D.

Another of Mr. Stevenson’s claims is 'hat the Navy “failed for 15 years to pro­cure the laser-spot tracker” to demonstrate ^lts stated intention to rely more on pre­dion-guided weapons rather than gross '°nnage for strike missions. However, a der spot tracker—the AN/ASQ-173— "'as standard equipment on the F/A-18A ^ginning in 1984. This system—a pod ^carried on the starboard engine nacelle— Provided Hornets the capability to deliver Precision laser-guided munitions. Both ’he Navy and the Marine Corps have em­ployed the system in coordination with hr- and ground-based laser designators. V the F/A-18 has long been a plat- ^f°^rm for delivering precision-guided "'eapons such as the Walleye, Maverick, ’he Harpoon, and the Stand-off Land At- *^ack Missile.

There simply is no basis for Mr. ^’evenson’s conjecture that the F/A- *^E/F has a carrier-suitability problem. Carrier suitability always has been a top Priority for the E/F development program. ⁿ fact, the F/A-18 E/F will have far bet- j^^r overall carrier suitability than the ^-I8C/D, which many would agree is *h^e most carrier-suitable aircraft ever. For Sample, the E/F will recover with 50% ^l"°re payload than the C/D; yet, it will ^re9uire less wind over deck than any ^CUrrent Navy fighter or attack aircraft.

Mr. Stevenson also claims that the _wing loading “exceeds that of any ^VeNion of the F/A-18.” Wrong again. The J°mbat wing loading of the F/A-18E/F °^r fighter-escort and interdiction mis- ^S'°ns is less than that of any F/A-18 p°del delivered since Fiscal Year 1980. C^yen at full internal fuel, wing loading

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is nearly identical for fighter-escort load­ings, and it is several pounds per square foot less for an E/F loaded for an inter­diction mission.

Finally, the author appears to pick and choose range data that suit the purpose of discrediting the F/A-18E/F. For in­stance, he compares only those range fig­ures which “normalize” mission-radius estimates to the earliest F/A-18A/B spec­ification. In doing so, however, he fails to mention that when measured against this outdated specification, even the F-14D falls well short of meeting the fighter-escort requirement for the F/A-18A. A truly valid comparison would normalize range comparisons to the spec­ification that reflects the way the aircraft will be used in service. Under these ground rules, the mission radius of the F/A-18E/F is substantially more than all previous F/A-18s.

If the inaccuracies and distortions in Mr. Stevenson’s commentary are precur­sors of his upcoming book. The Pentagon Paradox (Naval Institute Press, 1993), then its credibility is deeply suspect. □

Fighters Need Lawyers Too

Major Carl Andrew Lewke, U.S. Marine Corps—During the initial stages of the Persian Gulf War, the Law Center at the Beaufort, South Carolina, Marine Corps Air Station halted its routine business as the military attorneys worked frantically to execute wills and powers of attorney for the Marines going overseas. It was a scene that was repeated in the legal of­fices of every military base. More than 300,000 wills were executed by the end of the conflict.

Although the Beaufort squadrons were able to deploy as scheduled, the lack of time to discuss legal matters with the de­parting Marines increased their anxiety and that of their dependents. The adverse effect on morale was apparent. Marines who are worried about legal matters when they deploy—or receive Red Cross mes­sages from home—are unlikely to per­form to their full potential.

The last-minute confusion during the Persian Gulf War highlighted the need to view legal-assistance requirements as an­other component of unit readiness. Legal assistance officers and battalion adjutants should work together to screen units every six months in terms of legal readi­ness issues. Every Marine and sailor— especially those with dependents—should have a current will, power of attorney, and allotments. An active legal assistance program will work as a "force multi­plier" by improving the morale and readi­ness of naval personnel and preventing last-minute deployment problems. □

“Surface Navy: Still in

Search of Tactics”

(See C. H. Johnson, pp. 92-95, September 1993

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Kenneth Brown, Judge Ad­vocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy— Captain Johnson hits the nail squarely on the head. From a junior officer’s point of view, the tactical deficiencies that Captain Johnson discusses are symptoms of the problem that the surface warfare community has with setting its priorities. As Captain Johnson points out, today’s surface officers are technicians and ad­ministrators more than tacticians or war­riors. The title “surface warfare offi­cer” implies that tactical and strategic abilities are the basis of the profession; however, these traits are rarely used— and infrequently encouraged. Instead, a junior officer is judged mainly on his ability to memorize facts and follow de­cision flow charts, as well as administer and manage a division or department- while these abilities have utility, pla^c" ing them above the development of a tat? tical mind—which values flexibility and imagination over strict doctrine^ is to ignore the most basic rules warfare.

Some may disagree with Captain John' son, but I could not agree more. My fi^ve years as a surface warfare officer we^re filled with frustration over the same 11'" focused programs and theories he cfl¹¹' cizes. Numerous examples come to min^ that illustrate how tactical ability 0 development were pushed to the bott⁰"¹ of the priorities list. It was clear to tfl that the term “combat readiness,” as aP' plied in the surface warfare context, ha little to do with actual combat abiliti^eS’ Instead, it was a mishmash of inspe^c' tion results that focused on admin¹' strative skills and basically ignof^e practical ability—except, of course, ^1,1 engineering.

At the core of every line officer’s p^r® fessional being should be a tactician an a leader. Sure, it is a good idea for sn^f face officers to know how the engine^¹ ing plant works, and to be able to con trol damage that may occur, but it more important for them to be able ¹⁰ fight their ships—in order to avoid dm¹¹

does not extol tactical knowledge as cardinal virtue might as well be pad ⁰ the Merchant Marine.

If the Surface Navy expects to do ¹ duty on the day it faces a comparah foe, then it must foster tactical develop ment. This may not require the develop ment of an institute, as Captain John^, advocates, but it will at least require

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surface warfare officers’ priorities be ^ oriented. Otherwise, the surface con¹ munity will be nothing more than ■ organization of well-armed, seago^1|lc clerks. □

William S. Lind—Colonel Burton asks, [Wjhere was the U.S. Air Force in all °f this [the successful retreat of Iraq’s Republican Guard]?” The answer throws ^some interesting light on the persistence °f interservice rivalries despite the “re- | forms” of the Goldwater-Nichols act.

The Republican Guard’s retreat was Picked up by the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, and the Air j force planned an attack. But just before R was launched, General Norman j Schwarzkopf—at the request of the VII Corps commander, General Franks— shifted the fire support coordination line iPSCL) all the way to the Euphrates i River. That put the Republican Guard in­side the FSCL; therefore, according to the dilebook, aircraft could not attack with­out a forward air controller (FAC) on the : scene. No FAC was available because no ! B.S. ground forces were anywhere near ’he Republican Guard at the time and "'eather prevented the use of airborne ^FACs.

“Pushing Them Out the Back Door”

I (See J. G. Burton, pp. 37-42, June 1993; J.H.

I Cushman, p. 17, July 1993; S. E. Dietrich, R.

I M. Swain, R. H. Griffith, pp. 59-65, August [ 1993; P. E. Funk, M. T. Davis, B. B. G. Clarke, I pp. 22-26, September 1993; W. B. McDaniel,

I C. D. McFetridge, p. 24, October 1993; J. G.

I Burton, pp. 19-25, November 1993 I Proceedings)

The Air Force protested the shifting of ’Re FSCL, and General Schwarzkopf briefly shifted it back south—but then ^again moved it up to the Euphrates, h response to Air Force arguments ’Rat he was allowing the Republican Cuard to escape, he replied that VII Corps would take care of things. The ^ir Force argued that VII Corps' slow- fess would prevent it from cutting off the Republican Guard’s retreat. General Schwarzkopf insisted that “his boys”— ’Re Army—would “take care of the Problem.”

The Air Force proved to be right, and [Re second chance to destroy the Repub- Rcan Guard was lost. In effect, there was a reverse Dunkirk—a potentially decisive ^air attack was blocked so the Army could Ret credit for the kill—a kill it did not ’’’ake. Tossing away this opportunity for ^a decisive air strike was all the more ’’•'fortunate because, in general, air power [!^ehieved much less than it was credited ^f°r initally.

Colonel Burton is fully correct that ^Ochronization—a concept that is anti- ’Retical to maneuver warfare—coupled [['Rh the poor operational mobility of the tank, slowed VII Corps’ pace and al- °'ved the Republican Guard to escape.

He is perhaps too optimistic when he states that in the early 1980s, the Army’s firepower/attrition doctrine “largely was replaced with a philosophy of maneuver and deception.” During the 1980s, at­tempts were made in the Army and the Marine Corps to adopt maneuver warfare. In the Army, it never really got off the ground. The School of Advanced Mili­tary Study at Fort Leavenworth taught maneuver warfare for its first few years, but gradually slipped back into an em­phasis on process and planning. The Army’s National Training Center never focused its critiques on tactics in such a way as to teach maneuver warfare; how­ever, it concentrated on honing tech­niques. Most important, however, few Army units adopted the culture of ma­neuver warfare—with its decentralization, emphasis on initiative rather than obedi­ence, and focus outward on results rather than inward on method and process.

In the Marine Corps, maneuver war­fare has fared somewhat better. A new generation of officers is developing a gen­uine understanding of maneuver warfare. But the Persian Gulf War showed the lim­its of the Marine Corps’ adoption of the concept. At the level of division head­quarters, the 1st Marine Division at­tempted to follow maneuver-warfare doc­trine. However, at the regimental and battalion levels, these concepts were grasped unevenly. Faced with mission or­ders, thrust vectors instead of phase lines, and a high tempo, many field-grade of­ficers could not cope. In contrast, the division’s junior officers and noncom­missioned officers were generally com­fortable with the maneuver-warfare ap­proach and used it to drive the tempo as fast as possible.

The 2d Marine Division fought a me­thodical battle. Its planning was central­ized and rigid control measures abounded. The division’s focus was inward—largely concerned with keeping the line even. When units got to the ends of their boundaries they sometimes stopped until new ones could be drawn up. When one battalion commander quickly pulled his unit back to avoid an Iraqi fire sack and counterattack, he was condemned for the grave sin of “breaking the line.” The 2d Marine Division’s approach certainly worked—but only because everything worked against the Iraqis, on the tacti­cal level.

While seeing the degree to which ma­neuver-warfare doctrine acutally has been adopted in the Marine Corps has not been entirely encouraging, it is encouraging to see the truth about the Persian Gulf War finally coming out, thanks to work by people like Colonel Burton. Although

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three of the five great powers and a coali­tion of regional powers were lined up against one Third World country, the war was indecisive strategically and a fail­ure operationally. Even the tactical vic­tory is colored by the reality that, for the most part, the enemy did not fight. If this truth is grasped by the U.S. military, it may open the door to genuine adoption of a manuever-warfare doctrine. □

“Canada Is Ignoring Its Navy”

(See A. M. Wooley, pp. 83-87, March 1993;

P. W. Cairns, pp. 30-32, May 1993; B. M. Weadon, p. 25, June 1993; R. Thompson, p. 26, October 1993 Proceedings)

Michael S. Lindherg—As an American who has spent the last two years living in Canada and studying its defense and naval policies, 1 see the views of Mr. Wooley and Commander Weadon as rep­resentative of the two extremes in any discussion about the Canadian Navy. Mr. Wooley focuses nearly exclusively on the problems that currently confront the Canadian Navy; Commander Weadon emphasizes the so-called rebirth of the Canadian Navy—as typified by the ac­quisition of new frigates and minesweep­ers and the modernization of its destroy­ers. No doubt, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

It can hardly be denied that Canada’s navy has suffered from official and pub­lic neglect for many years. As one Cana­dian Forces member told me, “some of our frigates are so old you can actually see the deck plates moving under your feet.” The hiatus of nearly 20 years in new warship construction speaks for it­self about Canada’s commitment to its naval force. While the acquisition of the new City-class frigates will enhance Canada’s naval capabilities—as long as the new EH-101 helicopters are ac­quired—the fanfare that they have re­ceived is telling in and of itself. What in most countries would be seen as little more than the normal replacement of obsolete ships by new ones has been treated as something out of the ordinary in Canada.

Notwithstanding the problems that the Canadian Navy has had to deal with at home, it has done a first-rate job fulfill­ing its NATO and international commit­ments. Its personnel are described re­peatedly as “top-notch” and among the most “professional” in all of NATO. Con­sidering the obsolescent equipment with which many of them have had to contend, this is no small accomplishment. The navy has received a great deal of public support for its recent actions in the Per­sian Gulf War and off Somalia. Never­theless, many Canadians still view Cana­dian Forces personnel as being at the lower end of the social scale in Canada. As one Canadian explained to me, “My father's reaction to my suggestion of join­ing up was: ‘Only dropouts and halfwits join the military.’” While this sort of at­titude certainly is not unique to Canada, it is perhaps more pervasive in this country which prides itself on being so “unmilitary.”

Canada is not unique among the West­ern nations in having to reevaluate its de­fense policies because of the changing world strategic situation. What makes Canada unique, however, is that this is the first time in its postwar history that defense policy—particularly, naval pol­icy—has become a major national issue (notwithstanding the debate in the 1980s about the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines). Canada is faced not only with important naval acquisition questions—e.g., the EH-101 helicopter and the replacement of its aging subma­rine fleet—but also questions about the very nature of the navy’s mission.

Canada is a maritime nation with three coasts with which it must be concerned-' Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic. It is in the latter two regions where the Canadian Navy likely will find its new raison d’etre. While not abandoning its vital role in NATO, the Canadian Navy must forge a new mission philosophy outside of the alliance.

In order for the Canadian Navy ^t0 maintain the high level of pubic support that Commander Weadon alluded to. it must justify its existence to the Canadian people. This will not be no easy task. Defense issues have never loomed large in Canadian politics or in the mind of the Canadian,public. Unlike in th^e United States, the post of Minister of National Defense has never been consid' ered a nationally important—or politically advantageous—position within the Cana­dian government (notwithstanding the re­cently defeated Prime Minister Kim Campbell). In this sense, Canadians really have been quite “unmilitary." I¹ isn’t, however, that Canadians are uninterested in defense issues, but rather that they have lacked the necessary direction from their political leaders that would allow them to participa^te intelligently in a debate on such issues­Owing to the rigidness of the Cold War era, successive Canadian govern­ments were able to sidestep mos¹ defense issues. Those days are over. 1° the future, Canada will have to coordi­nate its foreign and naval policies much more so than it has in the past. If Canada wishes to continue to be an active “middle power” on the internationa¹ stage, it must have a navy that ca" support such a role. This means maim taining a blue-water fleet with modern combat capabilities in all three of th^e naval-warfare environments: antiair, an­tisubmarine, and antisurface warfare. Aj the same time, the Canadian Navy vm have to focus more on operations in home waters in order to prove its worth to th^e Canadian public—and political leaded ship—during peacetime and non-crisn periods.

To be sure, the Canadian Navy is ¹¹ the rag-tag collection of antiquat® ships some would have us believe, bu neither is it the well-balanced, state-⁰' the-art force which a maritime an industrial nation such as Canada should''' and could—possess. The current statin’ of the Canadian Navy is some where in the middle, but with prop^cf governmental planning and public p^af ticipation, it could enter the next ce" tury with a well-balanced fleet wh'^c^ has a clearly defined and articulate mission. □