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... or is the Navy applying a Band-Aid to a wound that needs a tourniquet? Tailhook acted as a catalyst for the Navy Core Values program, which the Navy should now go a step beyond and establish an in-depth ethics educational program.
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By all accounts today’s military personnel are better educated and trained than during any previous era in U.S. history. Nevertheless, military officers low are more frequently faced with issues that require e(hical consideration—and visible breaches ot ethical conduct seem to occur more often than in the past. Highly Publicized incidents, such as the sexual harassment at Tailhook convention—and the manner in which some Senior naval officers handled it afterward—are obvious Samples. Other incidents include the behavior ot miliary officers in the Iran-Contra affair and the initial hanging of the battleship Iowa (BB-61) investigation. These ’Ucidents illustrate how officers entrusted with the role ot e*liical leadership ignored or forgot ethical standards.
Generally, those who choose military service envision a nioral career in an organization that embodies ideals they value. Few are foolish enough to believe that they will ’Ud a body of homogenous values within the military, but ,fley expect leaders in the services will be examples and enforcers—of ethical conduct. Despite these expectations, military officers receive little training in ethics. The recent institution of the Navy Core Values program has dramatically broadened the awareness of the need for ethical behavior in the Navy, but it does not provide the depth of training required.
The establishment of an ethics educational program in the U.S. Navy is long overdue. The nascent Navy Core Values program attempts to achieve many of the same goals as an ethics course. However, flaws in the program will preclude its improving the Navy’s moral direction. True ethical training, taught by trained faculty, should be required of incoming officers. NROTC and Naval Academy midshipmen should take university-quality courses, while other commissioning sources should require some form of coursework on the subject.
Navy Core Values
The Navy Core Values program is a post-Tailhook initiative to reestablish traditional values in the Navy. The
program is largely a result of the transgressions at Tail- hook. Two-day courses have been given for at least a year in commissioning programs, and five-hour courses have now reached the fleet. The program promotes three Navy value “sets,” each divided into three individual ethical traits, as follows:
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rom the school of Reason. With the advent of the scien-
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> Honor: Honesty, integrity, and responsibility
> Commitment: Competence, teamwork, and concern for people
> Courage: Loyalty, patriotism, and valor
Despite the manifest benefits of these values, some immediate problems are apparent. First, where do these values really originate? The Navy Core Values instructor’s manual suggests the foundation of Navy Core Values is derived from various historical and legal documents that make up the written heritage of the United States and its Navy: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
the Navy Standard Organization and Regulations Manual, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and others. Relying solely on these sources as the foundation of a value system is suspect. These are legal USL~*VT ' documents and, with the ex
ception of the Declaration of Independence, are subject to the legislative process and therefore are too temporal for a strong value system. A “value system” based on laws and rules written by a bureaucracy that can change rules as the political winds shift is susceptible to altering its values in order to justify its actions. These same documents have permitted, and perhaps even encouraged, dishonorable behavior by the Navy. Some examples, such as the libelous Iowa investigation, occurred while the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Standard Organization and Regulations Manual were in effect, and they neither deterred nor punished the participants. Shouldn’t our value system transcend mere legal limits on behavior?
The Navy Core Values program ignores three basic sources of most individuals’ value systems. First, for centuries people have derived their personal value systems from religion. Christians might argue that God’s teachings provide the authority for a core of values based upon Judeo-Christian ethics. The values of a theologically mixed, ethnically diverse, and secular Navy, however, will not stem solely from a single faith.
A second possible source of ethical teachings comes
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tific method, much of Western society has come to rel tha on rational thought to resolve ethical dilemmas. Reasoithe though, has limitations. Can one promote valor by aphat pealing to intellect? The heroism, sacrifice, and self-dc ket nial we demand of sailors and soldiers will not material ize through an appeal to reason alone.
A third ethical system based upon a tradition of he roes was recently proposed by a Proceedings author.1 He roes are admirable, but unfortunately many of today’s ot ficers are unfamiliar with the actions or convictions o their predecessors, ranging from John Paul Jones to Mat Mitscher to James Stockdale.2 Furthermore, an ethic base1 upon tradition is only as worthy as the tradition. The nave tradition contains much to admire, but the “tradition” o Tailhook abuses chronicled in the Department of Defend Inspector General report shows clearly that some "tradi tions should not be continued. Without question, man) bases for naval ethics exist. The three pillars of religion reason, and tradition offer the beginnings of a nava ethic and can make the concepts of ethics easier for junior officers and their troops to understand. The NaV) Core Values program virtually ignores these possible an tecedents for ethical behavior, preferring to base its values on the Standard Organization and Regulations Man ual, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and other leg3' documents. Rejuvenating ethics in the Navy should b done by conviction—not by direction.
The second problem with Navy Core Values is it* greatest flaw. How are conflicts between competing val ties resolved? When I’ve posed this question to personae who have completed Navy Core Values training—or eve11 the trainers themselves—the usual answer is: commo" sense. Unfortunately, today’s stickiest ethical situation* frequently defy common sense and require a far mod sophisticated level of decisionmaking than we commonl) choose to pursue. The Iran-Contra and Tailhook investigations provide examples of conflicting values. Possibly- the Iran-Contra participants believed that patriotism and loyalty (to the Contras and the President) were in confix1 with their legal duty to be honest (with Congress). Don* honesty always supersede loyalty? To whom does one * loyalty belong? Does patriotism supersede honesty? Son^ individuals interviewed during the Tailhook investigati011 felt torn between their loyalty to friends and the Navy ^ their legal duty to report illegal or unethical behavior. Evidence in the DoD Inspector General report, together wi1*1 anecdotal evidence, shows that some officers and sofl1^ investigators had a difficult time resolving these conflicting values. The Navy should strive to give its officer' the tools, and a broader conceptual understanding, to resolve these conflicts.
Professional Ethics
The time has come for the Navy to reexamine its o'v'1 professional ethic. In the mid- to late 1980s many pr°‘ fessions found themselves requiring a renewed emphas's on ethics. As a result, top business, medical, and 1^ schools nationwide began or rejuvenated courses in ethicS. Awareness of ethical courses has become so widespr^
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would provide a permanent position for the teaching of naval ethics and advocacy of continuing ethics training. The professor should have a background in philosophy or ethics, and should also be well-versed in Navy tradition, preferably from military experience. NROTC units will need to rely more on civilian courses to provide their ethics training, during which midshipmen should be encouraged to raise questions about critical considerations pertinent to the profession of arms.
Conclusion
that annual rankings of schools include information on '1 their ethics programs.3 Just as civilian professional schools have semester-long courses teaching the ethics of marketplace transactions, medical procedures, or legal tactics, the Navy should provide similar training to its officers. This training should be intellectual, but also tailored to the specifics of military service. Military officers face decisions that are just as arduous—or more so—than the ttiost difficult civilian ethical dilemmas. The unique nature of decisions made by military leaders at all levels requires an even greater understanding of ethical behavior than civilians because the decisions frequently are made °n the spot, sometimes under fire, and often confront life- °r-death issues. Military officers rarely will have time for Masoned contemplation; therefore, such time should be Provided during extensive training, going well beyond a hve-hour course.
The curriculum for a course on naval ethics will incite controversy: witness the critiques of Navy Core Values in issues of Proceedings and elsewhere. Despite potential disagreements, a broad-based education is required to Arouse interest in concepts of ethics and to strengthen underpinnings for an ethic that must appeal to a large and diverse number of individuals. Ethics is a “moral philosophy or philosophical thinking about morality, moral prob- iems, and moral judgements.”4 Readings and lectures should begin with basic philosophy texts, ranging from Cicero and Aristotle to Machiavelli and Hobbes. The courses should also encompass religious perspectives. The fear of appearing to endorse a particular religion frequently causes the Navy to avoid examining religious teachings. The exclusion of a religious perspective, however, can Make individuals with deep religious roots unable to refete their personal morality to the ethic of a large, secu- fer organization. Any Navy course on ethics will need to explore openly different ethical perspectives—whether religious or secular, ancient or modem.
The naval ethic is unique. Beyond traditional topics, sPecific ethical questions are germane to service in the Military. The use of force and the prospect of killing—or being killed—raises ethical questions not examined in Most professional environments. Michael Walzer quotes Ml Israeli general speaking of the Six-Day War. There hasn’t a single soldier who didn t at some stage have to decide to choose, to make a moral decision . . . quick and Modern though [the war] was, the soldier was not turned Mto a mere technician. He had to make decisions that were ()f real significance.”5 Any course on military ethics should jMdress battlefield concerns. Today’s military leader should be conversant in the various schools of thought on the use
force. Introduction to the realist school, just-war the- °ty, and other widely studied principles of ethics and the dse of force should be provided in a military ethics cur- r*culum. Public discussion of military policy is more widespread than ever, and junior officers should be armed with skills to discuss service-related ethics in an informed "My.
NROTC units and the U.S. Naval Academy are the right Jjfeces to begin a new course on naval ethics. The en- 'fe'vinent of a chair in naval ethics at the Naval Academy
As naval officers, we must be able to establish and defend our own ethic—or someone else will define it for us. Today, as the services face probing questions about mission, force structure, and their role as a social institution, naval officers must understand the larger ethical questions that are being posed. Blind appeals based upon patriotism and the rigors of combat are likely to no longer
When critics complain about the time a semester-long ethics course would take, they would do well to remember the seven and one-half years of captivity and torture that Admiral James Stockdale endured through the strength of his moral and ethical underpinnings.
refute arguments for social change within the military or excuse behavior by military members that may have been forgiven in an earlier era.
Many critics will complain about the time a semester-long ethics course will consume. Already, many Navy personnel contend the five hours spent on Navy Core Values are too long, but perhaps this is because they sense the course is only a momentary distraction from business as usual. Because of the changes being imposed upon them, many military members feel that the “good old days” have disappeared from the Navy. This feeling is partially a result of genuine change. It is also a result of the Navy’s failure to establish credible ethics training, to assist its members in understanding the changes they face and in challenging them to learn.
'Lt. Lawrence Bauer. USN, “An Ethic Without Heroes,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993, pp. 50-51.
!Ibid.
’U.S. News and World Report, 17 March 1993.
'William Frankena, Ethics. 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1973), p. 4.
'The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk About the Six Day War (London. 1970) as quoted in Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books. 1977), p. 304.
Lieutenant Frewing is currently serving with VAQ-141 on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) where he has been involved in operations Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch. He was graduated from Harvard College in 1990.