This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
“Sentence first—verdict afterwards,” cried the Queen of Hearts in Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. The situation appears to be much the same for the U.S. Navy, as the Department of Defense slashes the military budgets with little regard for future strategy, missions, or requirements. This approach to military planning could be disastrous.
The latest round of Navy reductions, submitted by the Navy to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on 8 February 1993, responds to directions to cut $3 billion from the Navy’s planned $82 billion fiscal 1994 budget. This cut will cost the Navy an additional 40,800 personnel between 1 October 1993 and 30 September 1994— above the 19,800 already projected to be cut under the Bush administration’s plan. Also cut would be another two carriers (the Saratoga [CV-60] and Forrestal [AVT-59]), eight cruisers, the six hydrofoil missile craft, three tenders, eight frigates from the Naval Reserve Force, and the first attack submarine of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class. Also being retired early are two A-6E Intruder squadrons, two SH-2 LAMPS-I squadrons, two P-3 Orion maritime patrol squadrons, and one reserve carrier air wing.
The draconian cuts in service budgets are being forced without long-term regard for missions and related requirements and capabilities. For example, how will the retiring of the training carrier Forrestal affect the deployment schedule of the fully operational carriers? Does the decision to accelerate the retirement of the A-6E Intruders relate to the procurement of Tomahawk land-attack missiles—-the Navy’s other long- range conventional strike weapon—or the F/A-18E and F or AFX programs? How does the building rate of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyers, each with 90 vertical-launch cells, relate to the Army-Navy sea-based antitactical ballistic missile program, which would employ such ships, or in the context of the nation’s long-range conventional strike capability (i.e., Tomahawks, carrier-based aircraft, and land-based aircraft)?
These and many other important questions appear not to be under consideration as Secretary Aspin dictates finite dollar amounts to be cut by each service. Rather, total numbers are being addressed, without input from the report on roles and missions by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was completed in February 1993.
Mr. Aspin, while chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in 1992 presented several options for fleet size as alternatives to the base force proposed by the Bush administration. Option C, calling for some 340 active ships, was endorsed by Mr. Aspin and favored in the House-passed version of the defense budget resolution for fiscal 1993. But the latest round of budget cuts will shrink the fleet to even fewer ships by the end of the decade—a maximum of 320 has been estimated by some observers.'
Naval Aviation: With respect to aircraft carriers, 12 deployable ships are still being supported by the Defense Department. There is still considerable backing for procuring the CVN-76, the ninth ship of the nuclear-propelled Nimitz (CVN-68) class. With the Enterprise (CVN-65) now being refueled and modernized, the Navy would have ten “nukes” in the early 21st century—a number President Bill Clinton has said is sufficient.
• The CVN-76, estimated to cost some $4.8 billion, is considered critical for maintaining Newport News Shipbuilding as a viable shipyard for carrier overhauls, nuclear refuelings, and as a potential source for nuclear submarine construction. Further, the Virginia congressional delegation is strong.
The naval aircraft situation is far less sanguine. Table 1 shows that the fighter/attack component of carrier air wings is declining. And that number will be maintained only by assigning Marine F/A-18 Hornet squadrons to carriers.
Retirement of A-6E Intruder squadrons will be accelerated, with the funds planned to upgrade and operate those aircraft being used instead to modernize F-14 Tomcat fighters to the so-called “Bombcat” configuration. The 127 F-14s planned for upgrading will be given an “iron bomb” and limited smart bomb capability with computer upgrades, forward-looking infrared radar/laser, and head-up display. While they will lack the payload, sensors, and all-weather efficacy of the A-6E, they will be dual-purpose aircraft, like the F/A-18 Hornets.
At this time, development continues of the improved F/A-18E and F Hornets, with procurement scheduled to begin in the mid-1990s. In the longer term is the AFX, a fighter/attack aircraft that replaces the aborted A-12 Avenger and subsequent AX specialized attack aircraft in Navy planning. If development is successful and funding available, AFX procurement would begin about 2005 and, under current plans, the fighter/attack components of carrier air wings in the year 2015 would consist of the later Hornets and AFX.
Less clear is the future of special-purpose aircraft for carrier air wings—the successors to the E-2C Hawkeye radar
| Table 1: | Carrier Air Wing Fighter Attack Aircraft |
| |||
| 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 2000 | 2005 | 2015 |
F-14 | 24 | 20 | 20— | —►14 | 14 |
|
F/A-18C/D | 24 | 20 | 24— | -►36 | > 36 |
|
F/A-18E/F A-6E | 10 | 16 | 10 |
| 1 | 40 |
AFX | — | — | — | — | — | 20 |
Total | 58 | 56 | 54 | 50 | 50 | 60 |
aircraft, the EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasures aircraft, and the S-3B Viking antisubmarine aircraft. The advanced tactical support aircraft previously proposed for these missions has been deleted from near-term planning. Also in limbo is the V-22 Osprey, needed by the Marines for the assault role while providing a potential platform for Navy radar and antisubmarine missions. While Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney opposed production of the V-22, Congress kept the program alive while President Clinton made supportive comments about the aircraft during the presidential campaign.
Question marks also remain for maritime patrol squadrons as several additional active and reserve P-3 units are being eliminated.
Surface Combatants: The retirement of the Leahy (CG-16)-class cruisers is being accelerated, and the Belknap (CG-26) class will quickly follow. The major question is the fate of the six newer nuclear-propelled cruisers, the CGN-36 through -41. Two of these ships will be scrapped under the Navy’s February 1993 $3 billion budget cut. Completed in 1974-1980, these ships lack the Aegis radar/weapon control system, and only the four later ships have Tomahawk missiles (16 per ship). Being nuclear-propelled, they are expensive to operate and will require refuelings in the 1990s; the retirement of all six ships can be expected by 2000, leaving a surface combatant force of some 90 ships:
27 CG-47 Ticonderoga class -30 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class 4 DDG-993 Kidd class 31 DD-963 Spruance class There still may be a few Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates in active service, but more likely all will be assigned to the Naval Reserve, with the frigates of the Knox (FF-1052) class being stricken or transferred to other navies.
Mine Countermeasures Ships: By 2000 the Navy will have completed the current mine countermeasures program—the 14 Avenger (MCM-1) class and the 11 Osprey (MHC-51) class. Because of the priority for mine countermeasures in littoral operations, the Navy should be able to continue with plans to convert the Tripoli (LPH-10) and probably another large amphibious ship into MCM support ships.
Amphibious Ships: Significantly, the base force and most of the options for the future fleet discussed in 1992 provided for 50 amphibious ships. This reflected the wide-spread support for both “am- phibs” and forward-deployment ships. Construction of the sixth Wasp (LHD-1)- class large assault ship, as well as the new FX design of some 23,000 tons, can be expected to continue.
Attack Submarines: The most controversial aspect of the future fleet continues to be the attack submarine (SSN). The decision to retire the Baton Rouge (SSN-689) in lieu of refueling her means the entire Los Angeles (SSN-688) class will not be retained through the end of this decade. Retiring the Baton Rouge will save an estimated $281 million. The submarine was commissioned in 1977, thus this decision establishes the precedent of retiring these SSNs after 15 years—one-half their planned service lives. Once retired these ships cannot be returned to service because of the extensive work required to defuel their reactors and dispose of the radioactive components.
No additional submarines of the Sea- wolf (SSN-21) class are now envisioned beyond the lead ship and the Connecticut (SSN-22).2 Thus, under current conditions, a force of some 40-45 attack submarines is probable by the year 2000.
More important than the number of attack submarines, however, will be the impact of no additional SSN construction on the nation’s two submarine construction yards, Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia and the General Dynam- ics/Electric Boat yard in Groton, Connecticut. The Centurion design is several years away from key design decisions. It is unlikely that a new SSN would be ready for authorization until at least 2000, although a fiscal year 1998 authorization is now planned.
With the existing SSN and Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine programs being completed by about 1997 and no new starts after the SSN-22, both yards will be out of the submarine construction business before 2000. Since Electric Boat only builds and overhauls submarines, it is probable that the yard will go out of business. Newport News also builds and overhauls surface ships and does commercial work, hence the yard is more viable, especially with construction of the CVN-76.
It is unlikely that a new attack submarine authorized in 2000 would become operational before 2006. Indeed, design and startup requirements after several years of no submarine construction could delay the new attack submarine several years beyond that date.
Strategic Missile Submarines: The current Ohio (SSBN-726)-class program consists of 18 submarines, the last to be completed in 1997 by Electric Boat. There is talk of canceling the last submarine, not to be launched until about 1996.
More likely, the first eight submarines, which are armed with the Trident C4 missile, will be retired during the 1990s as they require refueling. It had been planned to rearm them with the improved D5 missile when they came into the yard, but it is already too late to rearm the first two units when they undergo mid-life overhaul and refueling.
Further, the reduction of the Soviet- Russian strategic missile threat and the limitations imposed by the new arms treaties diminish the requirement for strategic missiles.
The U.S. Navy of 2000 will be very different—and much smaller—than the fleet of today. The key questions are how small it should be and what its missions should be. Those questions, unfortunately, are not being asked and are not being answered. The recently published Navy doctrine “. . .From the Sea” gives very broad guidance—too broad for developing specific requirements. This situation, coupled with “jointness for the sake of jointness,” fails to take into account how navies actually were used during the Cold War era and how they should be used in the foreseeable future when crises and conflicts are expected to continue.
'See, for example, John D. Morrocco, “Defense Cuts Made in Policy Void,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 February 1993, p. 21.
The naming of the SSN-22 again demonstrates the Navy’s failure to pursue a coherent scheme for naming ships; all other submarines with state names are SSBNs. Thus, attack submarines now in service have four name sources: states, cities, members of Congress, and fish.