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Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II
Stephen Howarth (editor). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 602 pp. Ind. Notes. photos. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Captain John Coote,
Royal Navy (Retired)
This book is an impressive collection °f essays profiling 31 naval leaders of World War II. In any work of this nature, °ne is tempted to look for those who are absent from this subjective role of honor father than argue against any of those included. That no Italian naval leader qualified for inclusion is not surprising, although individual acts of bravery by their thidget submariners achieved spectacular results. Although many other combatant nations did more than their fair share at the sharp end—e.g., the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, Australia, and Canada—they did not have sufficient forces involved to justify top Allied naval commands and, thus, have anyone who qualifies for inclusion in this book. Then, there are those who "'ere omitted from full treatment be- eause they had to fight without the relative abundance of resources that their victorious successors enjoyed. This particular oversight is remedied in part in the foreword written by Admiral of the fleet Lord Lewin.
The leaders who added the most luster to the naval heritage of their countries were those who turned disaster Into ultimate triumph by skillful use of inferior forces. As Napoleon observed, great commanders not only had to be good; they also needed to be lucky. On the U.S. side, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Admiral Raymond B. Spru- ance could have lost the war in the Pacific in its early days but succeeded because they made a brilliantly detached analysis of each situation as it arose— and, at crucial moments, the dice rolled their way. Both men also had a flair for choosing immediate subordinates in whom they reposed total confidence.
E. B. Potter saw wartime service and served at Pearl Harbor in 1943; therefore, his 1976 authorized biography of Admiral Nimitz was written with first-hand knowledge. It forms the basis of the profile of the man whom history will surely
judge to have been the prime architect of victory in the Pacific—even if General Douglas MacArthur persisted in his own Philippines strategy and persuaded President Harry Truman to grant him center stage at the surrender ceremony. John F. Wukovitz was in his cradle when the war ended; nevertheless, his chapter on Admiral Spruance displays meticulous scholarship, with every fact and opinion backed by references to their sources.
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King—the autocrat who by combining in himself the offices of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, soon after Pearl Harbor became supremo of all U.S. naval forces—is held in obvious es-
teem by his chronicler Robert W. Love, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy. Unfortunately, his profde of the acerbic Admiral King fails to mention any of the sources on which he bases some of his more cutting opinions. Professor Love declares the Battle of the Atlantic to have been “a problem of Britain’s own making”—for failing to invade Europe in 1942—and states that “Britain had no record of accomplishment in the North Atlantic.” He blames the Ad
miralty for “mishandling its aircraft during the poorly managed hunt for the Bismarck:” The fact of the matter is that— unlike Admiral King who meddled constantly in the Pacific theater from his desk in Washington—the Admiralty exercised no operational control over t e Bismarck chase. Instead, it issued a series of accurate appreciations of the German battleship’s likely intentions not all of which were acted upon soon enough by the commanders on the spot.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt is chided for his decision to transfer 54 obsolescent destroyers—described by Professor Love as “the Navy’s antisubmarine reserve”—to the Royal Navy in exchange for invaluable bases from which the approaches to the Eastern Sea Frontier could be guarded. Professor Love claims this was “disastrous” to early U.S. ASW efforts. Actually, these ships were of little use to anyone; only 31 ever saw ocean-escort duty and were little better than administrative escorts until the Royal Navy upgraded their ASW equipment and gave them greater endurance.
The whole Mediterranean campaign and the bitterly fought Russian convoys are judged to be peripheral side-shows that dispersed available resources “in order to bolster Churchill’s misconceived strategy.” The Royal Navy’s part in the closing stages of the war against Japan is described as “relatively ineffective”—a view not shared by the late Professor Arthur J. Marder in his authoritative Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford University Press, 1990).
After reading this profile, I can only hope that if any of the midshipmen Professor Love taught decide to write naval history, they will adhere to the essential analytical approach to all the available sources. A prejudiced iconoclast might sell books, but he does so at the expense of the special discipline required of any historian.
It is not surprising that Stephen Howarth had difficulty in finding more than two German admirals of note— Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Grand Admiral Karl Donitz. Therefore, the coverage of the Kreigsmarine is extended to recognize two outstanding U-boat captains; Otto Kretschmer who sank 262,000
tons of shipping before being captured in March 1941 and Gunther Prien of U-47 who penetrated the British defenses at Scapa Flow and sank the battleship HMS Royal Oak. It would have been as well to have remembered all the U-boat commanders who kept the morale of this elite service intact to the very end and in the face of horrendous losses—32,000 sailors out of 40,000.
John Winton’s excellent chapter on Great Britain’s greatest fighting sailor Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham is a fitting tribute to a man who earned imperishable distinction not only for holding the Mediterranean during the dark days of 1941 with a handful of light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, but also for his resolute stands against those who tried to interfere in his theater of operations—notably the impulsive and domineering Winston Churchill. The chapter also describes vividly how Admiral Cunningham—while acting as chief of the British Naval Mission to the United States in 1942—managed eventually to win Admiral Ernie King’s grudging admiration.
It is interesting to note that, in September 1939, four of the nine British leaders in this book—James Somerville, Max Horton, Bertram Ramsay, and Frederick Walker—were on the retired list or in serving appointments that withheld the prospect of further employment.
The late Peter Kemp—to whose memory this book is dedicated for his work as the Admiralty’s official historian—has left us his perceptive memorial of Great Britain’s least glamorous naval leader, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, who bore the burden of First Sea Lord until he died in 1943. Kemp’s service in the Royal Navy’s Operational Intelligence Center throughout the war gave him firsthand exposure to Admiral Pound and, undoubtedly, helped him draw a detailed portrait of him. In this chapter, Pound emerges as a man who deserves to be remembered for much more than his only tactical intervention in operations at sea— the calamitous signal in July 1942 ordering the Murmansk-bound convoy PQ17 to scatter and its escorts withdraw in the face of an imminent attack by a powerful German surface force, including the battleship Tirpitz.
The last section of the book is appropriately headed “Unsung Heroes.” It is about four officers whose contributions were at least the equal of many seagoing admirals: Vice Admiral Ben Moreell, the father of the U.S. Navy’s SeaBees; two from the shadowy world of intelligence— Admiral John Godfrey, the Royal Navy’s Director of Naval Intelligence, and the
U.S. Navy’s brilliant cryptologist Captain Joseph J. Rochefort—and Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps.
In spite of the varying standards of the literary merit of its contributors, this book must be read and kept for future reference by all who want to know how the sea-lanes were kept open and how, despite their early victories, our enemies were thrown back and, finally, routed.
Captain Coote served in the Royal Navy from 1940 to 1959, mostly in submarines—including a tour as captain of HMS Totem. He joined Beaverbrook Newspapers after leaving the navy and rose to the position of Deputy Chairman. He is the editor of The Norton Book of the Sea and a frequent contributor to Proceedings.
No Shining Armor: The Marines at War in Vietnam:
An Oral History
Otto J. Lehrack. University Press of Kansas, 1992. 398 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Photos. $35.00 ($31.50) Hardcover. $14.95 ($13.45) Paper.
Reviewed by Colonel O.W. McCormack, U.S. Marine Corps
Don’t catalogue No Shining Armor as just another Vietnam book to be read and then stored away on the library shelf. This is a memory-jolter for those who were there and an eye-opener for those who weren’t—68 personal accounts of what it was like to walk the ground, seek the enemy, attack him, and sometimes be attacked. As recounted by one story teller, “it doesn’t get much more sophisticated than that.” The Marines and the sailors (chaplains and hospital corpsmen) who marched and fought with them tell their stories, in their own words, of what it was like to participate in what Lehrack probably correctly describes as “the biggest event in the lives of the men whose story is told.”
The overall story of these men is confusing and piecemealed at times, but that is how the individual Marine and sailor on the ground saw and lived it. What is distinctly told—and clearly embedded in the memory of each of these men—is the day-to-day misery of being hot, wet, tired, and not always right; the chaos of most of the fire fights; and, the esprit of depending on and taking care of each other. These memories prevail throughout and make the book both readable and hard to put down. A statement by one Marine epitomizes the overall tone: “There were a lot of periods where I did some things that I personally feel like I was ashamed of in that I didn’t do it like John Wayne would do it.”
Told by the men who served with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in Vietnam, No Shining Armor vividly portrays “what it was like to.. • seek the enemy, attack him, and sometimes be attacked.”
U.S. MARINE COW*
If the piecemealed effect of the individual stories is a detraction, the ability to track the progression of the war through the men’s stories is the worthy compensation. No Shining Armor chronicles the service of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in Vietnam from 1965 to 1969, and Lehrack has organized the individ- | ual stories so that the reader feels both the escalation of the war and the maturing of the Marines and sailors immersed in it. As the conduct of the war changed from early searches for Viet Cong t0 later defense against the North Vietnamese Army, the frustrations, fears, and hopes of the men doing the searching and defending also changed. Meu stopped searching for war souvenirs and sought only to return from the field alive—and with their comrades. Frustrations deepened as the men saw the war as being fought under a set of rules that changed frequently—usually to their disadvantage.
Lehrack has captured in this compilation of individual stories the collective experience of thousands of other military personnel in combat—the memories of people who made a difference and took care of one another when they were truly needed.
No Shining Armor is a superb story— told by courageous Marines and sailors in their own unvarnished words.
Colonel McCormack is the head of the Humanities and Social Sciences Division at the U.S. Naval Academy. He served in Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader with the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines.
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naval historian Stephen Howarth published his highly accurate and beautifully written To Shining Sea (Random House, 1991). The director of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum, Kenneth J. Hagan, produced his study, This People’s Navy (Free Press, 1991), with its contentious thesis criticizing the value of capital ships. And Naval Academy history professor Robert Love released his monumental, two-volume study. Each of these new books is different and has its own particular value, but seen in the broad context of writing on naval history, we can say something more about the state of U.S. naval history as well as the specific strengths and weaknesses of the books.
Love’s work is by far the largest, most detailed, and fully annotated of the recent studies. With more than 550 pages devoted to the period after 1945, it fills a huge void in the specialized literature on the Navy, while serving the larger purpose of a general history. In his introduction, Love explains his view and purposes. “The object of this book,” he writes, “is to chronicle and explain the high politics of American naval history."
While concerned with the interplay of international politics, foreign policy, strategy, tactics, and operations, he quite appropriately rejects any overarching theory that would codify events. His introductory statement is, in some respects, more sophisticated in concept than the narrative he produced. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the author s priorities. In his view, the issues of science, technology, sociology, industrial and government economics, party politics, and nationalism are secondary to the Navy s main business, “to serve as the handmaiden of diplomacy, the clenched fist of foreign policy.” Carrying through this theme to the end of the book, he asserts, “Not only American interests but also the world’s body politic and humanity in general should welcome and share in the order, justice, and peace a strong United States Navy can help to create.”
Love’s interpretation of naval history undoubtedly contrasts sharply with that of his colleague, Professor Hagan. At the same time, Love shares much in common with the older naval histories that have preceded his. Throughout, he concentrates on descriptions of naval operations at sea, juxtaposing them with the main events in U.S. foreign policy associated with the Navy’s operations. In the process, he mentions the Navy’s acquisition of key ships and weapons and officers.
Unlike earlier studies, Love defends Thomas Jefferson’s gunboat policy. In the early 19th century, he argues, the Navy helped advance both continental-
History of the U. S. Navy
Robert W. Love, Jr. Harrisburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 1992.
Volume One: 1775-1941. 766 pp. Maps.
Photos. $39.95 ($35.95).
Volume Two: 1942-1991. 912 pp. Maps.
Photos. $39.95 ($35.95).
Reviewed by John B. Hattendorf
The extent of Robert Love’s contribution can best be measured by understanding it in relation to other general histories about the U.S. Navy. For half a century, Dudley Knox’s 1936 History of 'he U.S. Navy (G.P. Putnam's Sons) dominated the field as the authoritative, general history of the U.S. Navy. Although U.S. naval historians have recently concentrated on specialized monographs that detail particular issues and biographies, the idea of writing a general history is an old one. Thomas Clark made the first attempt in 1814 and had the advantage of corresponding with many of the key figures from the early days. James Fenimore Cooper shared the same advantage when he published his famous two volumes in 1839. Since the turn of the century— When Mahan demonstrated the wider implications of naval affairs—other historians have put their hand to the task.
Among them are Edgar Maclay, John Spears, George R. Clarke, Alan Westcott, and Fletcher Pratt, who wrote widely read general histories, while others such as Oscar Paulan, Harold and Margaret Sprout, and Robert Albion followed such major themes as diplomacy, administration, and policy through the course of the Navy’s history.
From the 1960s onward, the Navy has needed someone to synthesize our increasingly detailed and fragmented knowledge of naval events into a larger pattern. Russell Weigley touched on some of the key naval issues in his study of strategy and policy in The American Way of War (Macmillan, 1973), while Allan Millett and Peter Maslowsky widened the context in their contribution, For the Common Defense (The Free Press, 1984).
Although these books tied the Navy’s activities into the larger picture of U.S. military affairs, we still lacked a modern and concise summary of the Navy’s own experience and institutional development. In the 1970s, there were rumors that one scholar or another had begun the task, but it was not until 1986, when Captain Edward L. Beach published his The United States Navy: 200 Years (H. Holt), that such a book appeared.
Following Beach, a number of historians took up the challenge. In 1991, there was an embarrassment of riches. British
ism and maritime access. During the Civil War, he observes, the U.S. Navy failed to exploit its greatest advantage. After the Civil War, the nation did not ignore the Navy but, he asserts, partisan politics prevented an earlier development in new ships and guns. In discussing Pearl Harbor, Love faults Admiral H. E. Kimmel s .4 anvernment
leaders in Washington.
World War II bridges the two volumes. In Volume One, Love devotes 69 pages to the events leading up to the war, including the Atlantic Neutrality Patrol and Pearl Harbor. In Volume Two he provides a new 277-page summary ot the war, citing some additional background and choosing Ernest J. King as the key leader, along with combat leaders William Halsey, Raymond Spruance, H. Kent Hewitt, Thomas Kincaid, and Richmond Kelly Turner. Love’s summary of the postwar period is, in itself, a pioneering contribution to naval literature.
Love has a particular penchant for making sharp judgments and vivid characterizations of events and individuals. He notes about James Lawrence, for example, that “more than once the bitch goddess of honor tempted an American captain to his doom.” Josephus Daniels “failed the most meager test of an executive”; Franklin Roosevelt’s “short attention span and imperfect grasp of events prevented him from establishing a consistent naval policy” in the 1930s. Admiral William Leahy’s “greatest virtue was not truth telling. Love recounts the British fleet’s error-ridden hunt in 1941 for the battleship Bismarck, a late May misadventure”; Dwight Eisenhower was “a shameless devotee of Allied unity. At the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, we learn that “Richard Neustadt, a sometime Harvard political science professor, had just finished gutting Eisenhower's wellfunctioning NSC staff system.” Later, we read of “[Hyman] Rickover, the turgid cleric of nuclear reactions.”
Disappointingly, there are many small errors of fact and careless handling of detail in the text. The first U.S. dry docks were at Norfolk and Boston, not Philadelphia and New York. President William Taft’s Secretary of the Navy was George von Lengerke Meyer, not von Gerke Meyer. Sims was not “exiled to Newport and the presidency of the Naval War College”; he chose that assignment as the place to make his longest-term effect on the Navy. His successor at Newport was Admiral Harris Laning, not Lanning.
In general, the illustrations are quite good, but there are a few infelicitous choices. The illustration of the destroyer USS Chew (DD-106) selected to accom-
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pany the text on the 1940-41 period shows her before commissioning in 1918- The caption identifying a photograph ot the Navy’s first destroyer, the USS Bain- bridge (DD-1), identifies her as DLG(N)' 25. The 1986 photograph of the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), operating in Norwegian waters, should have illustrated the chapter on the Maritime Strategy, rather than the New Isolationism of the late 1970s.
In short, although we cannot rely entirely on Love’s book as an authoritative source, it is, nonetheless, extremely valuable for its range, its compilation ot detail, and its listing of sources. However imperfect, Love has done a good job with it, and I judge it the best of the studies written to date.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the state of naval history in other countries, we have no writer who has demonstrated, in detail, the complex interrelationship between operations at sea and the machinations of politics in the nation’s capital- No American to date has pointed out convincingly the restraint of finance and technology on U.S. naval policy, design, construction, procurement, and subsequent operations. The changing bureaucratic structure of the Navy forms the basis for the control of naval operations, yet we lack an adequate historical appreciation of it.
We have a tendency to be overly nationalistic in our outlook, and we have yet to see a dispassionate, comparative study of naval developments around the world, well grounded in foreign source materials, explaining the basis for contrasting policies, relative strengths, disparate capabilities, and achievements in any given period. Even more importantly for the coming years in U.S. defense-policy discussions, we have yet to see a history that avoids parochialism as it explains naval and maritime events in the context of national security affairs.
All these are essential themes in naval history. It will require greater intellectual effort and more detailed studies on specific themes before we can reach the point of incorporating such issues into a general history of the U.S. Navy. These books demonstrate that, as a sub-specialty of historical study, U.S. naval history is a toddler. While they represent the best we have for the moment, let us not rest on those laurels. All of us who are naval and maritime historians share “promises to keep,” as Robert Frost put it, and have many “miles to go” before we sleep.
Dr. Hattendorf is the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History and Director, Advanced Research Department, at the Naval War College.
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Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Liberty Ships in Peacetime
I. G. Stewart. Chatham, NY: Hallenbook, 1992.
320 pp. Append. Bib. Ulus. Ind. Photos. Tables.
$65.00 ($58.50).
The vital role of Liberty Ships in World War II is fairly well known, but what is not often appreciated is their importance to the maritime commerce of the United States in the years following the war. Photographs and data on each ship are included as well as a narrative account of the history and contributions of these mass-produced wonders.
Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World
Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. 330 pp. Figs. Ind. Maps. Notes. $60.50 ($54.45). $18.85 ($16.96) paper.
A series of essays by noted experts in their fields discusses the anticipated role of low-intensity conflict in a changing world. The 15 essays include such topics as “United States Government Organization and Capability to Deal with Low-Intensity Conflict, Thailand. The Domino That Did Not Fall,” “The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem,” and “Implications of Low-Intensity Conflict for United States Policy and Strategy.”
Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini
Michael I. Handel. Portland, OR: Frank Cass,
1992. 188 pp. Figs. Notes. $30.00 ($27.00) $15.00 ($13.50) paper.
Michael Handel, Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, provides a thought-provoking comparative analysis of three of the most important names in classical strategy. This is a useful guide to novices who are unfamiliar with the three strategists, but it is also a stimulus to further analysis for those who have read any or all of the writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini. There is practical as well as academic value in these pages. Leadership, the relationship of politics and war, intelligence, surprise, deception, and mobilization of the people are among the many issues treated.
Rogues’ Gallery: America’s Foes from George III to Saddam Hussein
Larry Hedrick. New York: Brassey's (U.S.), 1992. 235 pp. Ind. Notes. $24.00 ($21.60).
Fidel Castro, Kaiser Wilhelm, Adolf Hitler, Ho Chi Minh, Hideki Tojo, and Joseph Stalin are all names that “raise the hackles” of most Americans. These men, and the others included in this book, have all found themselves at odds
ES The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard
Col. James G. Burton USAF (Ret.). Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993. 352 pp. Append, tod. Ilius. Photos. $23.95 ($17.96).
prom the late 1960s until the mid-1980s, the military reform movement challenged the way too Pentagon did business. This book examines the movement and its proponents and de-
scribes how the defense establishment responded to their criticisms and efforts to change entrenched ways of thinking. The author, who worked in the Pentagon for 14 years, presents an inside view of the Defense Department and exposes serious flaws in the U.S. military policymaking process, particularly in weapons development and procurement.
Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War
Clarence R. Wyatt. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993. 272 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $22.95 ($20.65)
Many people long have held the belief that, for ideological reasons, the U.S. news media turned U.S. public opinion against the Vietnam War; therefore, they bear a large burden of responsibility for the ultimate communist victory. The author, a college professor, takes a contrary view: from the very beginning of U.S. involvement in the region, U.S. government officials in Saigon and Washington including Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—either manipulated or tried to manipulate news coverage of the conflict.
with the United States of America at one point or another. Each is discussed in a fair amount of detail, revealing much about their personalities and the reasons they are regarded as enemies by most Americans. Readers will learn from these pages which of the included villains had a huge funeral ceremony conducted over his amputated leg, and which one refused to dance with women but often waltzed with his officers.
The U.S. Military: Ready for a New World Order?
John E. Peters. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993. 192 pp. Bib. Figs. Ind. Notes. Tables.
$49.95 ($44.95).
Lieutenant Colonel Peters, drawing upon his experience in the Army and, in particular, his tours of duty in the Pentagon, provides a “risks and consequences” assessment of the emerging post-Cold War world and the perceived role of the U.S. military in that changing and challenging environment. Readers current on the recent debate in this area will find this book a departure from the majority of opinions so far expressed.
The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 504 pp.
Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $24.95 ($22.45).
This comprehensive account is both a fascinating narrative of the events and a cogent analysis of the causes, prosecution, and aftermath of the recent Persian Gulf War. There is considerable emphasis on the relationship among the diplomatic, political, and military aspects of the conflict, and the reliance upon several sources not previously employed in other accounts offers fresh insight into some of the key questions arising from the war.
Video
Guadalcanal—1942: The Turning Point
Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Rim Media Company, 1993. Color and Black & White. 29 mins.
$19.95 (includes postage and handling). To order, contact: Pacific Rim Media Company; 2600 Pualani Way, #2201; Honolulu, HI 96815.
(808) 922-5438.
Covering the first few months of this pivotal campaign in the Pacific, this video is the first part of a series that provides an overview of the sea, air, and land battles in the Solomon Islands during 1942-43. Emphasis is placed
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on the often-overlooked heroic efforts of the Coastwatchers—who provided warning of Japanese attacks down The Slot—and the Solomon Islanders, also at great risk, who assisted U.S. forces against the Japanese.
Other Titles of Interest
The Price of Peace: The Future of the Defense Industry & High Technology in a Post-Cold War World
William H. Gregory. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1993. 225 pp. Ind. Notes. $24.95 ($22.45).
Notes from a Sealed Room: An Israeli View of the Gulf War
Robert Werman. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993. 192 pp. $24.95 ($22.45).
The War Between the Spies
Alan Axelrod. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1992. 325 pp. Ind. Photos. $23.00 ($20.30).
Raid on Qaddafi: The Untold Story of History’s Longest Fighter Mission by the Pilot Who Directed It
Col. Robert E. Venkus, USAF (Ret.). New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Gloss. Ind. Notes. Photos. $21.95 ($19.75).
The Media and the Persian Gulf War
Robert E. Denton, Jr. (ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993. Bib. Illus. Notes. $55.00 ($49.50).
The Ultra-Magic Deals: And the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946
Bradley F. Smith. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993. 276 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $24.95 ($22.45).
With A Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea
Lyle Rishell. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 1993. 176 pp. Append. Ind. Photos. $24.50 ($22.05).
Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy
Gregory A. Fossedal. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1993. Bib. Ind. Notes.
Photos. Paper. $18.95 ($17.05).
Ribbentrop: A Biography
Michael Bloch. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1993. 544 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $25.00 ($22.50).
The Soviet Military and the Future
Stephen J. Blank and Jacob W. Kipp (ed*- Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1993. 328 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $49.95 ($44.95),
No Margin For Error: The Making of the Israeli Air Force
Ehud Yonay. New York: Pantheon Books, 1993. 427 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes.
$27.50 ($24.75).
Archeology of the Frobisher Voyages
William W. Fitzhugh and Jacquelin S. Ohn (ed.). Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993. 271 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. MuS' Notes. Photos. $45.00 ($40.50).
Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada
David W. Hogan, Jr. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. 272 pp. Bib- Illus. Maps. Notes. Photos. $47.95 ($43.15)-
Legend, Memory, and the Great War in the Air
Dominick A. Pisano, Thomas J. Dietz, Joanne M. Gernstein, and Kurt S. Schneide- Washington, DC: National Air and Space Museum, 1992. Append. Bib. Gloss. Iluus- Photos. Paper. $34.95 ($31.45).
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