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Contents:
Pushing Them Out the Back Door—14
LCACs Can Support Shore Bombardment—14
Creating the Ultimate Meritocracy—16
Index to Flag and General Officers: Correction—17
An End to the Depots—20
Why Isn’t Proceedings Leading?—20
Where’s the Admirals’ Revolt?—20
To Preserve, Protect, and Defend—23
Blasts from the Past—25
It’s Time to Think Profit and Loss—25
We Are Here to Stay—26
Save the Constellation—29
It’s Time for the ‘Gators—29
“Pushing Them Out the Back
Door”
{See J. G. Burton, pp. 37-42, June 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)—Although he raises some important issues, Colonel Burton misunderstands the Persian Gulf War’s land campaign and, therefore, unfairly maligns Lieutenant General Franks. The Iraqi Republican Guard got out the back door because General Norman Schwarzkopf—whose concept of operations stressed the need to “destroy” the Republican Guard—did not plan on the basis that to trap that force would be the best way to destroy it. The zone of action of General Franks’ VII Corps sent him head-on into the Republican Guard; without a boundary change, he could not go around it. General Gary Luck’s XVIII Airborne Corps on the left of VII Corps should have closed the back door. It had the means to do so and on the land campaign’s fourth day was in a position to do so, but General Schwarzkopf failed to order that action.
Furthermore, General Schwarzkopf contributed to his own frustration with VII Corps when he planned to hold back it and XVIII Corps until the day after the Marines attacked on their right. That plan could have been scrapped—and should have been scrapped—on 20 February 1991, when he told The Washington Post that the Iraqi Army units opposite his forces were “on the verge of collapse.” But he waited until 24 February—the day of the Marine attack—to change his mind and order Generals Franks and Luck to attack that afternoon. It is reasonable to order a battalion to hurry up like that, but not two corps.
Colonel Burton is right; “synchronization” is a bad word. It signifies an idea that is easily misunderstood. To the Army, synchronization is supposed to mean bringing to bear at one time and place the combined power of maneuver, artillery, air, deception, and other means so as to strike the enemy again and again with massed power greater than the sum of all the parts. It is the essence of combined-arms teamwork. Synchronizing in that fashion, General Franks’ VII Corps was a warfighting machine of unparalleled effect.
Colonel Burton misreads synchronization as operating according to some kind of production-scheduling system. Some Army commanders have made that mistake in training—even to the extent of publishing in an operation order a “decision matrix” that tells each subordinate, whether by event or by time, when he is to carry out various actions. But not General Franks in the Persian Gulf, who fought a far better war than Colonel Burton thinks. □
Editor’s Note: Colonel Burton’s article struck a nerve with several readers whose responses arrived too late to publish in this issue. Their views will be published next month.
“LCACs Can Support Shore Bombardment”
(See R. K. Fickett, pp. 88-89, February 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Bob Young, U.S. Navy—Mr. Fickett presents an interesting concept that could fill a gap in naval gunfire support. The combination of the air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) and the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) seems impressive; however, an issue paper developed by the Naval Coastal Systems Station in January 1992 uncovered certain compatibility problems that, while correctable, make the idea unworkable.
When fired, the MLRS’s M-77 rockets generate a large amount of thrust and backblast; therefore, they can be launched only from an angle to the longitudinal axis of the prime mover. If mounted in an LCAC, the M-270 launcher would have to be placed in an athwartship manner. As the cargo deck of the LCAC is 26 feet wide and the M-270 is 23 feet long, it would be quite a test of driving skill to park the M-270 at the proper angle on deck while simultaneously maintaining the LCAC’s proper trim and balance. A crane could be used to position the M-270 properly, but then the LCAC could not carry other loads until it was removed.
Furthermore, the M-77 rocket’s exhaust plume reaches temperatures high enough to significantly damage the LCAC’s aluminum deck and hull struc-
ture. When fired, the rocket also generates large pieces of debris—i.e., the aft tube cover, igniter mount, forward tube cover, sabots, fin-restraint cable, rocket- restraint pins, and igniter. All these objects could damage significantly the LCAC’s structure, rotating machinery, and engines. For example, the igniter is ejected out the back of the tube with enough energy to penetrate the cargo deck.
The M-77 rocket motor uses a powdered aluminum propellant. Finely powdered aluminum acts like sandblasting compound. Therefore, if the LCAC’s main engines blow-in doors opened during firing and unfiltered air entered through them, the turbines could be damaged. This propellant also creates hydrochloric acid which becomes highly corrosive in the presence of moisture. The LCAC produces large amounts of spray while on cushion over water and, therefore, would be subject to this corrosion. The large open-deck spaces could be washed down by operating the craft for a short period of time after firing; however, the main air filtration system, lift fans, air ducting, and auxiliary power unit filtration systems contain relatively inaccessible areas where moist air, not spray, is ingested and where corrosion would be a concern.
The stabilization-reference package described by Mr. Fickett is designed for static ground firing and not the rolling, yawing, and pitching deck of the LCAC. A gyrostabilized launcher platform would have to be incorporated with the onboard computer positioning package to ensure that the rockets were properly referenced to the horizon prior to firing. The reloading system—which involves lifting preloaded rockets in six packs, each weighing approximately 5,000 pounds— also is designed for use on a static surface. The system and reloading procedures—including methods for moving the reloads—would require substantial modification. Methods for moving the reloads on the deck of the LCAC also would need to be developed.
Furthermore, additional tactical considerations make the concept less useful than it first seems. First, the LCAC is not an assault platform. To fire the MLRS, the LCAC would have to stop and come off cushion; a stopped LCAC in front of a “hot” beach would be very vulnerable.
The LCAC would be restricted from other uses until the MLRS had been removed and from refiring until the MLRS was reloaded—another operation that could be performed only if the LCAC were stopped.
While the LCAC/MLRS combination has some merit, current generations of both vehicles are not compatible. It will take time and money to develop mutually compatible units that would capitalize on the advantages of both and make the Shore Bombardment Air Cushion System viable. □
“Creating the Ultimate Meritocracy”
(See S. Baldwin, pp. 33-36, June 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant David F. Twyman, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Baldwin claims that placing women in combat will eradicate sexism and sexual harassment because “for men to fully respect women in the Navy . . . women must be allowed to compete against men in every billet.” This competition is supposed to create
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Index to Flag and General Officers: Correction
(See p. 193, May 1993 Proceedings)
Francis W. Keane
Assistant to the Director Defense Logistics Agency
“the ultimate meritocracy.” Lieutenant Baldwin’s assumption is that men are sexist or that they sexually harass women because they do not respect women’s capabilities.
But sexual harassment is not caused by a lack of respect for capabilities. It is caused by social ineptitude or a serious character flaw. Harassers either do not recognize that their displays of sexual attraction are inappropriate (a behavior that can be eliminated by education), or they are threatened by women and think they must intimidate women to inflate or protect their egos (behavior that may only be corrected by discipline). Those who refuse to change their behavior should be discharged.
Unfortunately, the problems of male- female interaction in a military unit do not end there. Sexual-harassment training can cure the socially inept, but what training and regulations will be provided to deal with consensual relationships?
Lieutenant Baldwin fails to address the far more grave challenge to the chain of command: fraternization. What happens when the sexual advance is not rebuffed? It is a problem that the military never has faced honestly. How will the impartial standards of the “ultimate meritocracy” survive when fraternization is rampant? Will all intimate relationships between service members be considered fraternization? If not, where will the line be drawn?
On an aircraft carrier, will air wing aviators be allowed to date enlisted members of the ship’s company, because they are outside the aviators’ direct chain of command? Will officers be allowed to date other officers? Could petty officers date seamen? Will married couples be allowed to serve on the same ship? Will married officers be allowed to share a stateroom? Will married enlisted personnel be granted conjugal visits? Will married or dating aircrew be allowed to fly together? If they are not, imagine the scheduling nightmare required to keep them separate during round-the-clock flight operations.
We have created a policy that places men and women together and then demands that they be sexless robots. Legal or not, service members will engage in fraternization. Placing young men and women together on ships for long deployments guarantees it. Our sailors and officers are the best in the world, but they are human. Is the military truly ready to deal with fraternization of this scale?
The “ultimate meritocracy” will present another serious challenge to the combat commander. Lieutenant Baldwin mentions the battle record of the USS Acadia (AD-42) but fails to report something else for which the Acadia made headlines: high pregnancy rates. The policymakers in Washington, D.C., should study the
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Pregnancy rates of Navy women and ask aircraft carrier skippers how they will handle losing that percentage of their Pilots, flight-deck crew, or reactor personnel to pregnancy midway through a deployment.
Pregnant women clearly are incompatible with combat service. They will have to be transferred out of combat Units. To prevent this requirement from being abused, regulations will have to be Written: Women assigned to combat units ■nay not become pregnant.
But how will these regulations be administered? Will written contracts be required, stating that the female service- member will not become pregnant while °n combat duty? Would violation be Punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s Article 115 (malingering)? Will women be required to have contraceptives medically implanted? In time of war, will pregnant servicewomen be required to have abortions? Will abortions be performed aboard ship, to allow the servicemember to continue combat service? Is society willing to confront those questions? Can commanders of combat units afford not to?
The “ultimate meritocracy” is a noble ideal, but what price will be paid in uchieving it? □
Commander Jill D. Wolfe, U.S. Navy— The Navy’s recent announcement that it will begin opening combatant ships to female sailors both surprises and alarms me.
In March 1980,1 was the third woman to report on board the USS Prairie (AD- 15) and served in her for more than three years, initially as the first lieutenant and later as the operations officer/navigator. I have also attended various damage-control schools during my first ten years in the Navy, including the basic shipboard fire-fighting school and the shipboard helicopter-fire-fighting school.
Throughout my 17-year career, including my tour in the Prairie, I have kept myself in excellent physical condition to the extent that routinely I score an outstanding for men in my age group on the semi-annual physical-fitness test. I am certain that I am in better shape than 95% of the female sailors with whom I have worked.
However, with all my experience, my damage-control training, and my physical conditioning, I cannot lift a wet mattress and stuff it into a hole in the side °f a ship. And therein lies the problem With the Navy’s plans to increase the number of shipboard billets open to Women and, eventually, to open combatants to us.
Physical strength is crucial in saving a damaged ship at sea. However, currently there are no physical-strength requirements used in deciding who is and who isn’t qualified to serve in a ship. Will the Navy take it into consideration as it expands the role of women in the surface Navy? I doubt it, primarily because special-interest groups will scream discrimination, as they have when physical standards have been applied to other jobs where strength is critical—e.g., civilian fire fighting.
It is significant to note that naval aviation is a different story. If a male aviator can’t handle the physical stress of flying his particular aircraft, he washes out. The same applies to female aviators—at least in theory. Those who are qualified and who can handle the physical demands of combat flying should be allowed to fly in tactical aviation; those who can’t should be told to find another job. Similarly, sailors, female and male, who don’t have the physical strength to be an effective member of a damage-control team should not be allowed to serve in any Navy ship.
If more women will be sent to sea in
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all kinds of ships, the Navy must ensure that readiness is not diminished. The only way to keep readiness high is to enlist and commission only those people who can meet a realistic strength standard.
Waiting to apply such a standard until a sailor is about to get orders to a ship could perpetuate the perception that women get all the cushy jobs ashore because so many women would fail to qualify and, therefore, would have to stay on the beach. The more appropriate places to apply the standard is at boot camp, Officer Candidate School, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units, and the U.S. Naval Academy. In that way, all Navy personnel would be qualified to serve in ships and available for shipboard duty. This may reduce the pool of women able to serve in the Navy, but in a time of cutbacks, we can certainly afford a smaller pool. This would also eliminate current discrimination against male sailors, who don’t have the option of turning down sea duty.
The politically correct may say that making all recruits comply with a strength standard is arbitrary and discriminatory against women. But, they shouldn’t worry; there are women who have the strength to do the job. The real issue at hand is saving lives and ships—and that’s where our emphasis must be. Crew a ship with too many women (or men) who are unable to lift a wet mattress and stuff it into a hole in the side of a ship and you increase dramatically the risk of losing the ship and the entire crew. Political correctness is not worth that price. □
An End to the Depots
Colonel Peter Boyes, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General Michael Cams stated recently that the Air Force has nearly twice the
depot capacity it needs and that this excess capacity upsets the balance between support and combat capability.
To stop the tail (support) wagging the dog (combat capability), General Cams proposed collecting common service requirements under one manager. Then, more as an afterthought, he made another suggestion: that some maintenance should be performed by civilian contractors. He should have gone a step further with the latter idea and proposed a system in which the manufacturers of the material—whether it be aircraft, tanks, ships, or electronics—perform the bulk of depot maintenance—while the services perform routine maintenance at individual military installations.
There would be many benefits to allowing industry to perform depot maintenance. The various manufacturers involved would receive a much-needed financial “shot in the arm.” It would sustain the military industrial base which is critical for our national security. The military depots—which, in a sense, are the last military remnants of the New Deal— could be eliminated. Finally, and of no small moment, the tail would no longer e wagging the dog—and more money could go toward enhancing the services’ combat capability. □
M'hy Isn’t Proceedings Leading?”
(See C. E. Besancon, p. 16, May 1993 Proceedings)
William John Shepherd—Ms. Besancon indicts the Proceedings—and, thereby, the U.S. Naval Institute—for a lack of leadership, for rehashing unsupported opinions; and for tolerating racist, sexist, and homophobic commentaries.
One can only wonder who appointed her Public Censor? She appears to com
pletely misunderstand the raison d’etre of Proceedings as a forum to discuss contemporary naval policy as it is influenced by military, political, economic, social, and technological developments. She states that “dissenting opinion is treated like heresy,” yet she advocates an approach that tolerates no dissent from liberal dogma and labels those who do as bigots, racists, or homophobes. Is this an example of the “forward” thinking she desires?
Ms. Besancon needs to lighten up and be more tolerant of viewpoints other than her own and cease to castigate the Naval Institute for sponsoring discourse regarding the myriad legitimate concerns affecting naval policy and personnel in this time of rapid change and uncertain national leadership. Not everyone is as certain as she is that their values and opinions are the only viable options for progress. Consensus building is the logical manner to achieve this goal. □
“Where’s the Admirals’ Revolt?”
(See J. L. George, pp. 66-71, May 1993 Proceedings)
General C. E. Mundy, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant—Please convey the following to Dr. George: There is a Marine Corps. □
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Murphy, U.S. Air Force—I was a little surprised to see Dr. George’s article tucked into a very good section on joint operations. Certainly, Dr. George is entitled to write and Proceedings is the proper forum for expressing his views; however, there are three major problems with this article.
The discussion of Air Force roles and missions in the post-Cold War world is intellectually deficient. Dr. George pre-
sents a list of “primary” and “secondary” Air Force missions. But, as he admits, this is not how the Air Force sees its missions nor is it the list of functions assigned to it in the 1948 Key West Agreement. Therefore, I can only assume he invented the list to fit his argument. Also, had Dr. George been intent on producing a serious piece of scholarship, he would have subjected the Navy’s missions in the post-Cold War world to the same analysis. They go entirely unmentioned.
Second, pejorative and inaccurate statements are allowed to stand without support. Some of his comments—e.g., “No further moneys should be spent on [intercontinental ballistic missile] modernization. . . they simply are not needed;” “The B-1B does not work;” and “The expensive C-17 airlifter program should probably be terminated. That airlift mission no longer exists”—present interesting, sometimes amazing, opinions that are not at all based on fact.
His conclusion that the Navy’s role Will increase in all eight of the “Roles and Missions” and “Force Package” trends—while the Air Force’s and Army’s decrease in all but two each—is an interesting little bit of data-free analysis. The conclusions are entirely unsupported by data except for a couple of undocumented numbers tossed out in two of the areas. The result is Figure 1: two charts that look good for the Navy, but are entirely useless as analytical tools.
Dr. George concludes his article by calling for a new admirals’ revolt. Now, I’m no admiral but my guess is that any admiral bent on revolt would want to take into battle a much sharper weapon than Dr. George’s analysis. □
First Lieutenant Mike Cale, U.S. Air Force—As a B-1B crew member, I feel compelled to respond to Dr. George’s unjust and unwarranted criticism of the aircraft.
Dr. George poses a viable question in asking about the Persian Gulf War: “Where were the B-lBs?” The answer is they were on alert, ready to respond to a nuclear attack; a position that many aircraft—including B-52s and KC-135s— assumed for decades. Until recently, the “Bone” was dedicated completely to the nuclear mission. Although the B-1B was designed to perform both the nuclear and conventional mission, it was not thought that its conventional capabilities would be exploited so early in the life of the aircraft. Therefore, the conventional capabilities were not thoroughly flight tested. The Air Force decided that instead of sending the Bones into combat to face possible unforeseen software or hardware problems, the conventional flight testing would be completed before their combat debut.
As for his contention that the B-1B “does not work,” Dr. George could not be more incorrect. Like any new weapon system, the B-1B has not been problem- free. But to say that the B-1B “does not work” is ludicrous. It is out there every day, putting bombs on target.
Nevertheless, because the decision to produce it was an especially hot political controversy, the Bone has never been short on critics who have exaggerated— and sometimes fabricated—its faults. Furthermore, the money that the Air Force has requested for the B-1B is to provide it with next-generation precision-guided munitions—and, thereby, gain the maximum combat capability from a shrinking number of aircraft. Once this program is completed, the B-1B will have a combination of speed, range, and payload unsurpassed by any other aircraft. □
Major Don Ware, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—I have a notion that either the picture on page 68 has been reversed—or the color bearers have committed an awful faux pas by having the U.S. flag to left of the others. □
“To Preserve, Protect, and Defend”
(See C. A. Preble, pp. 13-14, May 1993 Proceedings)
“Info Wars”
(See J. H. Petersen, pp. 85-92, May 1993
Proceedings)
Peter John Zerilli—Lieutenant Preble’s emphasis on the military’s membership in U.S. society at large and the common oath of our civilian leaders and members of the U.S. armed forces is particularly timely.
With the end of the Cold War, economic recession, and a generational change in leadership, an era of close understanding between the military and civilians—especially elected officials— has ended. With the passing from power of a generation which—either through war or conscription—had been exposed almost universally to military service, future political leaders likely will lack military experience and may not be acquainted even socially with members of the military. Coupled with fiscal austerity and the traditional isolationism of the United States, this lack of personal ex-
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perience will make politicians less sensitive to the concerns of the services.
These forces also may mark an increasing divergence between civilian and military cultures. Current debates involving the military illuminate the honest ignorance of both sides about the contemporary culture of the other. Many civilians wonder why the military is reluctant to become involved in Bosnia: There is simply no knowledge of the U.S. military’s capabilities and limitations. Many civilians are genuinely ignorant of the importance of military camaraderie and small-unit cohesion, and, therefore, they cannot know why the military is so concerned about the issue of homosexuals in the military.
Education is essential to reasoned conclusions regarding the roles of the military and its social composition. As John Petersen noted, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the Navy learned that there is more to public communication than adversarial dealings with journalists. Ignorance only encourages mistrust. Communication is a crucial matter of informing a potentially sympathetic citi
zenry of the nature and importance of the services’ roles. Civilians are genuinely interested: The better we understand the armed forces, the more likely our political leaders will be to listen to the military’s legitimate concerns.
The burden of communication and education, however, does not lie solely with the armed forces. Recent articles in Pro- j ceedings, while intelligent and well-reasoned, display an honest ignorance of civilian workplaces in which men and women, straight and gay, work alongside each other and share gymnasiums and locker rooms without incident or concern.
The notion of the citizen-soldier is fundamental to the United States; we cannot afford the risk to our security and our institutions that might follow a divergence ; of civilian and military cultures. Com- I munication—based on recognition of the good faith and patriotism of both cul- tures—is crucial to bridging the gap. □
David J. Rutkowski—I understand that j common courtesy, a strong sense of selfpreservation, and the privileges of rank I precluded a refusal by the Navy to ac- j commodate President Clinton’s basking in the reflected honor of the crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). Perhaps, today, participation in presidential photo opportunities is simply prudent; but why should Proceedings dignify this j presidential hypocrisy?
It’s not just a matter of overlooking a ; youthful indiscretion—as Admiral William Crowe characterizes President Clinton’s Vietnam-era conduct—unless Jane Fonda’s conduct can be similarly characterized. President Clinton’s speeding tickets or even his alleged extramarital hi-jinks constitute indiscretions that can be overlooked. Giving aid and comfort to the enemies of this country, however, comes closer to the treason of Benedict Arnold than to the indiscretions of John F. Kennedy.
Mr. Clinton has planned enough mis- j chief for the armed forces in order to pay off his political debts. Let’s not dignify his prior actions or present intentions when there are so many other individuals whose daily performance of difficult [ and dangerous duties makes them far more deserving of an appearance on the cover of Proceedings. □
“Blasts from the Past”
(See D. K. Stumpf, pp. 60-64, April 1993
Proceedings)
Commander Robert E. May, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Stumpf is correct in every aspect but one. Regulus did not die from a lack of money; it was the advent of the Polaris system that killed it.
In 1957, there were two tremendous technological breakthroughs: the small thermonulcear warhead and the solid propellant for missiles. Three years later, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) made the first Polaris patrol. She had 16 functional missiles when she left port and 16 functional missiles when she returned. It was a development, procurement, and deployment feat without peer. After that performance, who would consider spending a penny more on Regulus?
When I worked on the Polaris at the General Electric plant in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, as a member of the Special Projects Office, over my desk hung a picture, turned face to the wall and labeled “First Target Shot Down by Polaris.” When turned around, it was a photograph of a Regulus II. □
“It’s Time to Think Profit and
Loss”
(See W. Carroll, pp. 12-14, April 1993; F. P.
Blaisdell, p. 14, June 1993 Proceedings)
Michael L. McDaniel, Force Warfare Aircraft Test Directorate, Naval Air Warfare Center—In many ways, Lieutenant Commander Carroll is right. The current ways of doing business won’t work in the changed strategic and fiscal situation. The Navy must admit the limitations of Total Quality Leadership, the need for an aggressive public relations program, the need to reward rather than punish aggressive junior officers, and the need to reform procurement.
However, Commander Carroll unjustly blames the Civil Service for the procurement mistakes of the Navy and the Congress. Admittedly, the Civil Service has its flaws. The inability to pay according to performance makes it difficult to hire or keep the top performers; and, the current personnel system makes it hard to get rid of the bad apples. After 12 years of federal service, I have found that the average working-level Navy civilian employee is like the average sailor or officer—an honest, hardworking victim of a system whose answer to every abuse is to pile on another layer of management.
A real flaw in the procurement system, Which Commander Carroll recognizes, is the massive bureaucracy that operates it. The government has become so obsessed with preventing waste that it is prepared to spend a dollar to save a penny. The days when a working-level officer or engineer could write a contract or fix a problem are long gone. Now there is a vast chain of supervisors and highly specialized offices, all of whom demand a chop before letting work be done. Worse, these “support” personnel usually have no vested interest in mission accomplishment, and thus no incentive to do their work promptly and well.
Furthermore, the Navy’s civilian employees take their orders from people in uniform. If these decisions are wise, the inefficiencies of the system can be overcome. If they are foolish, no amount of change in the support structure can help—and the Navy’s track record in this area has not been impressive of late.
There are several reasons why the Navy—particularly naval aviation—has made major procurement errors:
► The Navy lets rice-bowl politics dominate equipment selection, rejecting out- of-hand platforms and weapons that are not a direct successor to exactly one existing system. Multi-role equipment that cannot be pigeonholed into old concepts faces an uphill battle for acceptance.
► Navy communities tend not to ask fundamental questions about strategy and tactics when specifying a new system. Instead, they ask for an improved version of what they have—without asking if the basic operational concept makes sense.
>• Procurement decisions often seem to be made by admirals who don’t consult the fleet about what it would like to see in new equipment.
► Often, the source-selection process is interfered with for political reasons. Officers feathering their nests and Congressmen seeking to buy votes have forced bad equipment down the Navy’s throat.
► A program manager’s performance is usually graded on whether or not a program was kept on schedule and within budget. Recommending termination of a failed program—or even slowing a program down to fix a problem—can be hazardous to a career.
Commander Carroll’s proposed solutions to the Navy’s procurement problems—keeping the warriors out of Washington and turning procurement over to contractors—are prescriptions for disaster.
Keeping the warriors out of Washington is a bad idea because people who have operational experience also have the best idea of what is needed for the future and what will work in the real world.
Also, a program manager who came from the fleet—and who expects to return to it—has a stronger incentive to develop the best possible weapons than a manager whose only interest is in meeting a budget.
Using temporary assignments would also be an error. It takes time to become familiar with the procurement process and the multitude of programs that a class desk officer must manage. Officers rotated into these slots for a few months will not have the experience to make informed decisions. Instead, they will become puppets of the adviser who has the most influence, rendering the entire position worse than useless.
Turning procurement over to contracted managers would open a Pandora’s box of corruption. The Navy already uses contractors to support the procurement process with technical advice and clerical support, but they are not entrusted with procurement decisions because of possible collusion. The loss of a procurement contract would mean not only a loss to the prime contractor, but also the loss of the management contract. To prevent program terminations even the smallest problems would be hidden—very likely leaving the Navy to fight with defective weapons.
In many ways, I agree completely with Commander Carroll that we must reform procurement. But it should not be done by making scapegoats of civil servants, putting key program decisions in the hands of inexperienced short-term program managers, and turning the process over to contractors whose interests do not coincide with the Navy’s. A change for the worse is worse than no change at all. □
“A Right to Serve?”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 81-84, May 1993
Proceedings)
Captain E. A. Eve, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—It won’t be too many years before people who read Captain Kelly’s article will think: “It’s hard to imagine that people were so unenlightened.” There are many places to pick at the logic in this article, but, in the end, Captain Kelly tears down his own house of cards when he flatly admits that “It is wrong and always has been wrong to discriminate against benign human characteristics such as gender.” Well, guess what? By definition, homosexuality is a gender issue. It is not, as Captain Kelly implies, a “behavior” that people consciously choose— therefore, making themselves fair game for the discrimination he proposes. □
“We Are Here to Stay”
(See P. Adams et. al., pp. 92-94, April 1993; O.
Gotay, J. King, G. D. Gibson, pp. 20-24, June
1993 Proceedings)
Deborah Taylor Sweeney—In the April 1993 Proceedings, there were nine articles on gays and lesbians in the military. I understood that the series would present opinions from both sides of the issue.
Only one article, written by Captain Philip Adams, took a stand against discrimination and prejudice. The other articles, filled with varying degrees of homophobia and ignorance, supported discrimination.
1 urge Proceedings to present a more healthy balance of opinion in the future on this issue. □
Arthur B. Moulton—There is a hint in Captain Adams’ article that there is a gay organization of Navy men and women who are known to the Service Academy Gay and Lesbian Alumni, but not to the rest of the Navy. This hidden organization of personnel who do what they want to do with little apparent regard for rules, regulations, and the sensibility of the majority should be of great concern to the Navy. It could become a second chain- of-command, linked by what Oscar Wilde called “the love that dare not speak its name.” □
Commander Peter C. Olsen, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—My 23 years of service—active duty and reserve—have taught me to judge people by what they do—not by what they are. I want to serve only with people who act rightly, speak honestly, and care about the good of the service and the other men and women with whom they serve. If they meet those criteria, then I’ll accept happily whatever else comes with it. If they don’t, then nothing else matters. □
Carsten H. Fries—I agree with Captain Adams on one point only; The commander-in-chief is ultimately responsible for military discipline and morale. Sadly, the current one seems to be very mistaken in how to go about maintaining these cornerstones of an effective fighting force. □
Captain Christopher W. Castelli, U.S. Marine Corps, and Captain Alan M. Greenwood, U.S. Marine Corps—Although disguised in terms of “benefits to the military,” the authors’ views and proposals are nothing but an extension of gay activism.
It is easy to see through the smoke that they use as substance in support for lifting the ban on gays in the military. The smoke first begins to rise as the authors try to lessen the credibility of Commander Gomulka’s claim that homosexual behavior is not “normal conduct.” Let’s be honest. Homosexuality by its very nature is unnatural. The human race does not procreate through homosexual acts. This may be the very reason why homosexual behavior has been outlawed and demeaned for centuries.
The authors make a real reach by using a quote from Marine Corps General John Lejeune to support their cause. To insinuate that his statement that recruits will be “far better physically, mentally, and morally than they were when they enlisted” is somehow a reason to lift of the ban on homosexuals is both historically wrong and deceitful. General Lejeune was speaking of the relationship between officers and enlisted—not homosexuals. If one reads the entire passage—which first appeared in the 1921 edition of the Marine Corps Manual and can be found in the first chapter of the
latest edition of that same publication___
it is clear that he was espousing the need for strong moral leadership, not condoning free-spirited growth of young men in their formative years.
The reasoning behind the authors’ assertion that the military would reduce its HIV-positive rates by lifting the ban is questionable. Homosexuals are among the groups at highest risk to infection with HIV. Therefore, if homosexuals are allowed to serve in the military, how can we expect the military HIV rate to go down?
Furthermore, lifting the ban would place undue burden on military medicine in treating HIV-positive service members. According to current Marine Corps policy, if a Marine chooses to ride a
motorcycle without proper protection___
a helmet—and is injured, then the government is not liable for his medical expenses. If the motorcyclist who makes the choice to engage in high-risk activity, but fails to protect himself must face the financial consequences. Therefore, why should the military pay for treating HIV-positive or AIDS-infected service members who have infected themselves by deliberately participating in high-risk behavior—i.e., homosexual acts? All HIV- and AIDS-positive cases should be subjected to a misconduct investigation that would determine if the infection resulted from a blood transfusion or illegal sexual acts.
The authors assert that “every leader in the military establishment has the responsibility to carry out his or her orders in the spirit in which they were issued.” This mindset promotes the very rationalization used by the defendants at the Nuremberg war-crimes trials—“I was following orders.” The officers and civilian leaders of the U.S. military have a moral obligation to exercise judgment when orders or instructions violate ingrained beliefs.
Contrary to what the authors claim, if the ban is lifted, that the Naval Investigative Service will not save man-hours and money because it will no longer conduct “witch hunts.” Sodomy is still a crime under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Therefore, all instances of suspected homosexuality will have to be investigated because, by its nature, homosexuality implies sodomy.
The authors’ conclusion that lifting the ban would allow the U.S. military to reflect more accurately the diversity of the nation’s population attempts to create a standard the nation doesn’t want for its military. The U.S. military has never reflected the entire diversity of this country—and with good reason. People in the military are held to a higher standard than other Americans. If Mr. Adams is correct, then our ranks should contain an appropriate number of drug abusers, obese people, and thieves. Furthermore, it is specious to claim that the quality of life for men and women in the military will improve if gays are allowed to serve.
Mr. Adams and company state that another alleged benefit resulting from their proposal would be “increased personal integrity for all service members who can be who they are—not what others would have them be.” Maybe Mr. Adams was misled at the Naval Academy, but in the military you do not have the freedom to be who you want to be. You wear a uniform, wake up early, march in formation as part of a team, subject yourself to incredible self-discipline, and earn the trust of your buddies. At the Naval Academy, these values and practices should be instilled during Plebe Summer. We hope the professional development departments at the academies continue to build on these principles for the full four years they have with these midshipmen and cadets.
“To serve” is a powerful concept that requires forfeiting certain liberties and rights. It is obvious from some of the authors’ demands—e.g., benefits for same- sex couples—that they have lost sight of the true meaning of “to serve one’s country.” □
ATTENTION ON DECK!
I CITY
“Save the Constellation”
(See J. Metcalf, p. 40, April 1993 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commanding Officer of the USS Constitution—Why is it so all- fired important that the Constellation in Baltimore be certified as the famous Constellation commanded by Thomas Trux- hin? The fact that, before she was adulterated in the late 1950s, she represented the only example of the final sailing man- °f-war design for the U.S. Navy is enough to warrant her preservation.
Is there another case anywhere where a ship has been totally dismantled—even to the disassembly of keel pieces—with some of the pieces then used in the construction of a different design, and the end-product has been considered to be the same ship? By that yardstick, if a piece of wood from Baltimore’s Constellation Were placed in the aircraft carrier USS Constellation (CV-64), one could say that the latter is the very same ship in Which Thomas Truxtun twice fought good fights. The provenance is the same.
Let us remember that the group who gained custody of the second Constellation from the Navy in 1955 embarked on a program to make everyone believe she Was the earlier ship—even to the point of modifying her bow and stem to approach the earlier design. That is how all the arguments began. Let us remember also that this same group participated in some Pretty irresponsible documentary games—as shown in the recent “Fouled Anchor” study. Let us acknowledge that at least some of the descendants of Commodore Truxtun want Constellation #2 to he thought of as Constellation #1. And then let us put all that disputation and emotionalism behind us and proceed with restoring the ship to what she really was: a corvette of mid-1850s design that was built using some of the wood from her frigate predecessor—as was done with a number of other ships; none of which was ever thought of as the same ship in continuous existence. That done, Baltimore Will have the “omega” of U.S. Navy fighting sail while the “alpha” will be represented by the USS Constitution in Boston. □
“It’s Time for the ‘Gators”
(See J. B. LaPlante, pp. 49-52, May 1993 Proceedings)
Captain W. Grant Carson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral LaPlante’s article is puzzling. He provides eight points of departure from the present with which I agree almost completely. But then he provides eight conclusions concerning the future, many of which I find questionable. The puzzling part is how the latter eight were derived from the former eight.
I particularly disagree with those conclusions concerning the integration of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships into the task groups, perhaps commanded by a single commander with a single staff. This idea has appeared time and again in Proceedings and not once has it been justified.
First off, amphibious forces sometimes require carriers for protection, but often they don’t. For example, during the evacuation of Liberia, there was no need for a carrier to be in the South Atlantic. Nevertheless, if carriers and amphibious forces were integrated with a single commander, it will guarantee that a carrier’s time would be wasted in such operations.
Furthermore, aircraft carriers never require amphibious ships to be present for strike warfare. But the carriers that attacked Libya would have been burdened by a retinue of amphibious ships if the two types of forces had been integrated. Speaking of being burdened by amphibious ships, the commanders of carrier battle groups that are constrained to a speed of advance of 20 knots or less just might become a bit perturbed.
What happens when an amphibious force of greater size than that deployed with an integrated group is needed in a benign environment? Will the carriers linger off shore, doing nothing, while the amphibious ships from two or more groups do their thing? And will the amphibious ships be hampered in doing their thing because more than one commander is involved?
Where is the Navy going to find a task group commander sufficiently competent in both carrier and amphibious operations to command an integrated force well? As Admiral LaPlante writes, amphibious operations are “devilishly complicated.” So are carrier operations. I don’t expect a great rush of carrier aviators to apply for amphibious assignments in order to qualify, and amphibious sailors assigned to carriers might be tolerated, but not welcomed. Admiral LaPlante states, “Exclusive warfare-specific expertise has no place in the close and intimate world of littoral warfare; it is an extravagance that we cannot afford.” That’s whistling in the wind.
Please, Proceedings—before you publish one more article concerning integrating carriers and amphibious ships, require the author to address these concerns. Now, when strategies are changing and forces are being reduced, is no time for fuzzy thinking. □
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