The election of Bill Clinton as President, the convening of the 103rd Con- Stess, the continuing fermentation of the ^°rld political, economic, and military balance, and the mandate for change generated by this confluence of circumstances make the 1993 congressional semester one of unparalleled significance 0r the Navy and the nation.
Bill Clinton has discovered that he was elected president—not king—and the institution demands a shared responsibility at the helm of our ship of state, particularly when it comes to the allocation
resources and priorities
Defense Secretary and former Representative (D-WI) Les Aspin (left, at confirmation hearings) has a lot of friends on Capitol Hill—including former Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) (center) and Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) (right).
of
titat shape our military strat- e8y, structure, competence, a°d capabilities.
Complicating all this, in tite last decade of the 20th Century image and illusion re'gn over detail, deliberation, and substance in the Political decision-making Process. Vision and expec- titt'ons are more important ban facts and analysis, and nrrn prevails over content.
are a nation where mar- *et'ng controls engineer- lng. and appearance is of ‘Pore importance than product or results. It may have ®lways been so, but it has r'ever been so apparent and °1 so much consequence.
Apparently, there were Pot enough seats on the bus bat brought the Clinton eam to Washington from I tile Rock. The result is a arge vacuum in the deci- si°n-making positions in be executive branch, particularly in the entagon, and we seem to have govem- tiient by stealth rather than process. When a°upled with the propensity of the Clin- ?n team to select social issues (gays in tie military)—rather than strategic appreciation —as the litmus test for partic- jPation in the national security debate, .ti's tendency to prefer a royal decree on jssues rather than the constitutional de- merative process has left the Navy in confronting an unreadable seascape, be ill winds and thunder clouds of the never-ending Tailhook saga hover about the fleet and its admirals as the Navy tries to get under way.
Given these conditions, the President made an astute move in selecting Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense—if Aspin’s health concerns are not debilitating. No one inside the Washington beltway, in or out of uniform, has his cleverness, maneuvering skills, and experience in the Defense budgeting process. He will extend his domain to both sides of the Potomac. While Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA), the new House Armed Services Corn- mittee Chairman, will be no patsy, expect no serious food fights between the Pentagon and Aspin’s old colleagues in the Rayburn Building.
From the Navy’s perspective, the new Pentagon leadership may offer promise, since the preferred Aspin alternative to the Bush Base Force concept, as articulated in last year’s budget debate, has a distinctive nautical flavor and closely matches the Navy-Marine Corps leadership’s desired core capability and structure: a streamlined force centered around 12 carriers and 12 big-deck amphibious assault ships (LHDs and LHAs). This bodes well for maritime forces.
The lack of senior Pentagon political appointments to date on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service staffs, however, could be a precursor of a serious effort, albeit requiring significant legislation, to realign and consolidate the Pentagon organization—even to the point of eliminating the individual service staff and functions. Given the dramatic decrease in our military expected in the next decade and the clamor for jointness and efficiency, there is a case for this kind of real change: “If not, why not? If not now, when?”
Under current perceptions of the Navy’s management and leadership style and prowess, the service is fortunate to have a large guy in Army Blue as the point man in articulating the need for a robust Navy with a base force of 12 carriers. General Colin Powell has no equal in the complexities of prevailing in the rough and tumble of top-level political- military decision making. His proponency is unfettered by parochialism and he is, indeed, a steady hand on the wheel.
• While there has been a great deal of oversight and direction by the Navy’s admirals, the team of Vice Admirals William Owens, Leighton Smith, and Steve Loftus—with the help of their Marine Corps counterparts—has charted a course to consolidate and realign the services to make an integrated Navy/Marine Corps team operating “ . . . From the Sea” a reality. The integration is not yet perfect, but things are moving in the right direction. All realize that today’s sailors and Marines will either sail together or check into the Transportation Department as an Auxiliary Coast Guard.
As the overall director and final arbiter of the fleet’s new structure, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) will influence the process from beginning to end; and, while not necessarily an unabashed advocate of sea-based enabling and projection power, he will give Colin Powell and the Navy-Marine Corps advocates a fair hearing.
At the end of the 1993 budget deliberations, the familiar faces of the appropriators—Senators Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) and Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI) and Representatives John P. Murtha (D-PA) and Norman D. Dicks (D-WA) et al.—will, as usual, decide the content of the winning and losing programs that come before them. The major difference this year, given the Democratic Party’s ownership of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue and both sides of the Potomac, will be a lessening of the ability to tinker with the decision process as it moves through the Congress. While changes on the margin will be made and constituent issues will be addressed, major program adjustments will be rare. If you are not in at the beginning you probably won’t be in at all. Any variations will be negotiated quietly off-line, with minimal confrontation. An exception will be this year’s base realignment and closure round, which by its very nature will be heated. Given the special commission and the review process, it will be the subject of much media debate.
An often overlooked facet of our constitutional system is that membership in one’s institution is often of more consequence to the individual than his party affiliation: a senator or representative first, a Democrat or Republican second, particularly when the issue is on the high ground of broad national interests and policy. President Clinton experienced this mind-set when he neglected to consult with Senator Nunn on the issue of gays in the military. The Republicans in the Congress will benefit from this phenomenon in their new role as critics rather than defenders of executive policies and
Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA) took over Aspin’s job as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee—expect no serious disagreements between him and his old colleague.
programs; if they choose their issues carefully, their influence on specific issues may be greater rather than lesser.
The overpowering issue in 1993 is how to reduce the deficit while avoiding economic chaos. The government does not have the luxury of filing for Chapter 11 relief from bankruptcy, and the philosophical dispute over whether the private or public sector should resolve the dilemma has been concluded: President Bill Clinton and his team have been elected to solve the problem, no matter how it is defined.
From the Navy’s view, the reality of reduced budgets demands that the streamlining programs put in play by Vice Admiral Owens must be executed now. There is a real opportunity for the Naval Service to make a strong case that investments in a strong Navy are of great utility now and in the foreseeable future. Since we no longer have a well-defined threat on which to justify our force levels and structure, capabilities and utility will be the drivers. The mobility and range of firepower in the newly integrated Navy-Marine Corps team make these sea- based forces particularly valuable. Naval forces should receive a larger portion of the diminishing defense dollar because, from a top down, joint perspective, they have greater utility.
On the other hand, some members of the Clinton team, former independent critics who now enjoy status and access have a different view. Their agenda >s to solve the deficit issue and reduce the influence and content of the military establishment in our society. They see the two goals as complementary and plan 10 dismantle the current outreach and crisis- management capabilities of our arflie® forces and establish a National Guard ana Reserve concept as the core of our mil1' tary institutions.
They do not want the United States to shoulder global peacekeeping responsibilities under any guise. They want to disengage internationally to provide more focus and emphasis on domestic issues- They make sense in the context of them views, and, while they are not isolationists of the old order, they see military capability as irrelevant, or, at best not vei1 useful in the new world order. But, aS Senator Nunn said in his 5 March speed1 on the Senate floor, Defense-is—and h®s been—paying more than its fair share t® the deficit-reduction effort, and the world is still a very dangerous place.
Somalia, Bosnia, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, and other crisis-prone states ha'e not gone away, and, while President Clinton is responding to the electoral sentiment and putting priority on domestic social and economic problems, America s self interest requires us to be involved on1 there. This requires prudence and patience as we streamline the armed forces to reflect new requirements. In particular we do not need to overextend and cut deeper into our already heavily committed seabased forces—the ones that are o’1 patrol out there.
With all this going on, it is incongruous that the front-burner national security issue as we move into the 1993 legislative season is centered around the gaJ rights agenda, but that’s the way it is, and it reflects the Clinton team’s inclinations- It is clear that the gays want a politic®1 payoff for their electoral support; attaining recognition and acceptance of the® life style at the national level, rather tha® limiting themselves to accepting tolerance at local levels by individual citizens, carries their interests a long way. The ethical righteousness, legality, and fairness of this initiative and its military efficaU will be scrutinized by the Congress—the final outcome is yet to be determined- The fairness aspect, particularly when addressing privacy and health concerns- should encompass all service member and not be limited to the gays’ sent1" ments. This issue also has the potential given its acceptance, to make a significant contribution to the agenda of reducing the military ethic and role in our s°"
ciety, compatible goals that may explain the game plan strategy that pushed the gay agenda to the forefront.
The 300-plus ship Navy that will be unveiled when the fiscal year 1994-95 administration budget is finally presented prompts some questions:
>• How to integrate the previously independently operated attack submarine force into the team, in a way that exploits its stealth and firepower in a complementary fashion.
>■ How to rationalize the combined inventory of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation, to optimize and streamline sea-based enabling and projection power.
>• How to use the awesome strategic firepower of 18 Trident submarines.
>■ How to package the investment strategy required to decrease the size of the force, so that it makes sense and is executable.
The sprawling Defense industrial giant that was created and sustained during the last half century to arm the nation during the Cold War and its many ancillary crises has served the nation well—accomplishing or providing among other things the following:
>• The military strength and capability that accelerated the demise of Soviet Communism
iting the spread of regional conflicts I. jj At issue is how to realign this giant to ^ “ reflect new realities while maintaining i , core facilities and capabilities—and §
avoiding massive unemployment. The ^
first step in the process is to define the | force. Call it Base Force or whatever, but tg get it defined and establish the indus- ^ trial capacity needed to support it. Con' i | comitantly, establish a defense industria 9 policy that provides the rationale to aS' sign roles and functions to either public ( or private sector management on the bast* t of efficiency, cost, and public interest. « Our high current inventories preclude g high rates of production for weapon syS' 5
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MCAS El Toro, California, is scheduled to shut down and move its units to NAS Miramar, although little on-base housing is available there. Several San Francisco Bay-area naval installations also are on the hit list, and Californians in the House and Senate already are fighting hard to reverse these decisions, given the depth of the recession in their state.
>■ Public and private sector jobs that stimulated economic growth
> Research and development investments that spawned complementary products and markets in the civilian sector
>■ Investment opportunities that made a number of people a lot of money, that was in turn reinvested in other segments of the economy
> Preservation of the global peace by li in
cost benefits, at the obvious expense
sure process should take these aspects into consideration—but it does not.
Within the private sector itself the management and ownership rearrangements that are occurring through marketplace opportunity and activity, in the form of acquisitions and mergers, will accelerate. There simply is not going to be enough defense business to support the existing multicorporation competitive environment. At the end of the day, we will emulate the British experience of 40 years ago—with “U.S. Aerospace” and “Electric-News” as prime Navy suppliers.
The list of recommended base closings,
' c°nsolidations, and relocations submitted bY Les Aspin to former Representative lames Courter’s Base Realignment and Closure Commission, as predicted, has met with little applause. From the Navy’s viewpoint, Charlie Nemfakos and his team hid a good job in providing minutiae and analysis to justify the decisions related to tbe sea services input to the proceedings. The problem is not with the details, but mther with the initial assumptions and the decision-making framework. There is no Question that the Navy must reduce its °verhead and become more efficient. The Problem is that cost avoidance in and of itself does not necessarily equate to effi- eiency. It is possible to be frugal and inefficient, and budget cutting-efforts that are generated by a bottoms-up requirements assessment, myopically focused on near-term bottom-line impacts, are rarely rational in the long term.
The list that the Navy has generated is Sarbled, one that seems to have accommodated a number of interests: Navy-Ma- r'ne Corps burden-sharing, geographic and political spread and balance, re- Tenchment of the Washington-based bureaucracy, etc. It also has some aspects that will generate considerable heat in the review process, to wit:
The appearance of a great deal of shuf- ^*tig and motion without real consolida- h°n and streamlining The facade of being “non-political by targeting (inadvertently?) the constituents of the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and the rank- ln§ majority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee * In the Pacific, the shifting of the home- Porting locus to the north, without due regard to operating, logistic, and train- mg needs and existing linkages (For instance, the equivalent of a deployment tllf Will be required for the Puget Sound- based units to use the traditional Southern California training and operating areas. This will affect operational tempo ar,d home port time.)
Nevertheless, the base-closure process
is an attempt to get movement in the direction of reducing the base and port infrastructure. It has, though, missed the opportunity to effect real change, which is the mandate of the 1990s. It is the entire defense-wide support base, public and private, that must be rationalized and streamlined. To attempt to reduce the publicly owned and operated base structure through a political process and simultaneously let the content of the private-sector industrial infrastructure be determined by raw market forces is folly.
While there has been a great deal of rhetoric about the need to establish a Defense industrial transition policy and a plan to accomplish it, there has been no real action. That the federal government has the ultimate fiduciary responsibility for both sectors of the Defense industry— being both banker and customer for the private side and owner and operator of the public domain—is often lost or ignored. What is needed is a top-down look at where we are, where we should be going, and how to get there.
We cannot simply close bases; we must transition the work force and facilities to profitable commercial use. The current process won’t hack it; the champions of change, now in the White House, must address this issue and get on with it.
A major factor in establishing the demand function that will shape our industrial-base requirements is the approach we take to modernizing and replacing the current inventory of sea and land-based tactical airplanes. The urgency generated by the threat from the former Soviet Union has receded and a more measured pace is now in order. What is clear is that we can no longer afford the luxury of generating independent, mutually exclusive, highly focused, single-mission and service-unique requirements. The current program lineup of the Air Force s F-22 and multirole fighter (MRF), and the Navy’s AFX, advanced-short-takeoff-and vertical-landing (ASTOVL) fighter, and F/A-18E/F cannot be executed—especially with the requirement to fund a medium-lift replacement aircraft for the Marine Corps (read the V-22 tiltrotor).
A program that can accommodate low and variable production rates and emerging product improvements within affordable boundaries and still be profitable is a real challenge for “U.S. Aerospace.”
The shipbuilding industrial base faces a similar lack of new production demands, and if the private sector, particularly the nuclear-propulsion component, is to survive, the industrial base realignments discussed above must take place. The industry needs the stimulus of a continuing nuclear carrier series production line, not only to make the new carrier (CVN-76) affordable, but also to provide the scope of business activity and jobs necessary to keep critical suppliers on line. The alternative of not funding CVN-76 in 1995 puts the warship-building capability of this country in serious jeopardy.
Tailhook. Will it ever end? The three minutes in a Las Vegas Hotel corridor that scuttled the fleet has created a situation that is both sad and ludicrous for all involved, directly and remotely, and for the Navy and the nation. That an incident, no matter how outrageous, could be allowed to fester and grow into a national scandal without the benefit of due process or, for that matter, without the filing of charges that would allow any kind of process even to come into play, is astounding. It is the worst example of official and unofficial investigative detective activity, media reporting, and a plethora of interrelated political agendas combining to cause great harm to individuals and institutions. In most cases, it is irreparable and, to date, is based on illusion and opinion, not on facts and proof.
The damage to naval aviation has been disheartening and far reaching not a pretty picture, and no real benefit to anyone’s cause. A generation of leadership has been sidetracked at a crucial time. The impact on morale and esprit becomes more debilitating with the passage of time, and no resolution or conclusion in sight—20 months and still counting.
At this writing, the Pentagon Inspector General’s report is in place, ready to be released or leaked; waiting, ostentatiously, for the nomination and confirmation of a Secretary of the Navy to handle the mess. There are no volunteers yet. Amazingly, the release of the report will mark the beginning of the legal process and associated judicial activity where complaints and charges must be filed—where the accuser must accuse and the accused must be identified and given due process rights.
The Clinton team is in the cockpit and budget realities, not foreign threats, will be dictating the course rules. We have a powerful and useful fleet. The task of husbanding the available resources and shepherding the Navy into the 21st century is upon us—ready or not.
Admiral Hogan is a consultant. He commanded VF- 92, the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), and the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland. He was the Navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs when he retired in 1987. He is a frequent Proceedings contributor.