The U.S. Navy

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By Norman Polmar, Author, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet

The Mother of Reorganizations

The most far-reaching reorganization of the U.S. Navy headquarters—the Of­fice of Chief of Naval Operations or OpNav staff—in almost 50 years has de­stroyed the so-called “platform barons.”

in the world situation have dictated a reduction in the force structure of the U.S. Navy. This reduction also re­quires that the Navy review how its command and administrative structure

Figure 1: Chief of Naval Operations Staff Organization

N9 ★★★★

Vice CNO

Note: Ranks are indicated by stars.

AVCNO = Assistant Vice CNO (Captain) DCNO = Deputy CNO NavRes = Chief of Naval Reserve Oceano = Oceanographer of the Navy

N00                      ★★★★

Chief of Naval Operations

N1 ★★★

DCNO Manpower & Personnel

N3/5     ★★★

DCNO Policy, Strategy & Plans

N6 ★★★

Director Space & C⁴ System Requirements

N7             ★★★

Director Training & Doctrine

N8                      ★★★

DCNO Resource, Warfare Requirements

& Assessments

The reorganization, re­galed on 22 July 1992, ^also eliminates several f*^ag billets, including four vice admirals, and j"^uts the size of the headquarters staff by about 150 positions.

These changes are be'

^lr>g made, according Jo the Navy’s statement to Congress,

because:

The dramatic changes that have taken Place and are continuing to take place

Defense] and [Joint Chiefs of Staff] as well as operational staffs.¹

However, the reorganization reflects a long-standing desire by DoD officials, as well as senior Army and Air Force of­ficers, to bring the Navy into line with the other services. The new organization also brings the Navy into closer align­ment with the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The principal subordinates to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) under the new setup will be the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (now N9), four Deputy CNOs, and three directors.

The major organizational changes are the elimination of the “platform” spon­sors at the three-star level—the Assistant CNOs for undersea warfare (OP-02), sur­face warfare (OP-03), and air warfare (OP-05). The concept for these offices, which sought to control their respective communities as fiefdoms, dates back to August 1943, when the Deputy CNO for air was established with responsibility for “the preparation, readiness, and logistic support” of naval aviation.

Until 1971, surface and submarine warfare matters were directed by a sin­gle Deputy CNO, who also had general sponsorship responsibilities for aviation ships. Pleas for “equality” from Admiral H. G. Rickover, the head of naval nuclear propulsion, and from the submarine community led the then- CNO, Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, to es­tablish a sepa­rate Deputy CNO for submarine warfare (OP-02). Admiral Zum­walt believed that “setting up the Deputy CNO for Submarines made it easier to deal with the submarine com­munity and with

is organized. Navy leadership has rec­ognized for some time the need to have a tighter, leaner headquarters or­ganization, better tailored and coordi­nated to deal with [the Department of

Rickover.”

This led to OP-03 becoming the Deputy CNO for surface warfare, and initiated two decades of intra-Navy or “union” competition as the platform

*^>r°cecdings / September 1992

121

barons competed for resources, political position, and even flag billets. For ex­ample, prior to the establishment of OP- 02, submarine-qualified officers could serve as OP-03, while the air and surface communities worked much more closely together. Beyond the competitive aspects of the new arrangement, it was easy for non-platform specific programs to be­come lost or underfunded—to fall through the cracks—especially mine war­fare and certain C³ programs.

The 1992 reorganization—which downgrades the platform barons from three stars to two and inserts the inter­mediate Deputy CNO for resources, war­fare requirements, and assessments (N8)—seeks to alleviate the disruptive competition between the air, surface, and submarine “navies.” Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe, in announcing the changes, stressed.

One of my primary concerns is end­ing rivalries and jealousies between the various key warfare fighting com­munities in the Navy. . . . We be­lieve there can be no jealousy among the fingers of a strong fist. This Navy reorganization will begin the process of bringing our warfare fighters to­gether into a tighter, stronger fist.²

The downgrading of platform sponsors at headquarters will lead the Navy to rely more on fleet input to determine re­quirements, rather than driving those re­quirements from Washington.

Also downgraded are the current three- star positions of Director, Test and Eval­uation and Technology Requirements (OP-091) and the Deputy CNO for Navy Program Planning (OP-08).

Other changes include the elevation of the Director of Naval Intelligence to a major staff position (N2), and the dou­ble-hatting of the Chief of Naval Educa­tion and Training as the Director for Training and Doctrine (N7). Accordingly, the principal offices of the Navy staff will be:

• Nl Deputy CNO Manpower & Per­sonnel: the current Deputy CNO Man­power, Personnel & Training (OP-01), but with the training functions transferred to N7

• N2 Director of Naval Intelligence: the existing Director of Naval Intelligence (OP-92); however, a major consolidation of Washington-area naval intelligence ac­tivities into the National Maritime Intel­ligence Center under the Director of Naval Intelligence, coupled with the N2 being made a major staff office, makes naval intelligence a “winner” in the reorganization

• N3/5 Deputy CNO Policy, Strategy & Plans: essentially the existing Deputy CNO Plans, Policy & Operations (OP-06)
• N4 Deputy CNO Logistics: same as the current Deputy CNO Logistics (OP-04)
• N6 Director Space & C⁴ System Re­quirements: the current Director Space & Electronic Warfare (OP-094), plus cer­tain OpNav C³ functions
• N7 Director Training and Doctrine: the Chief of Naval Education and Training at Pensacola, Florida (The Navy is seek­ing to establish a doctrine command like those of other services, but has not yet decided how to do so. The N7 will now oversee the doctrine part of the reorga­nization.)
• N8 Deputy CNO Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments: combines the Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements (OP-091), as well as the former platform sponsors (OP- 02/03/05), and the Navy’s financial staff

The changes announced in July will be implemented through the end of 1992. Additional changes can be expected next year, in part because of the expected re­tirement of Gerald Cann, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, De­velopment, and Acquisition; it is antici­pated that his position will be divided (as it was prior to 1990) into the research and development and the acquisition func­tions. Other changes in the Navy secre­tariat and in the naval systems commands, as well as in the naval staff, can be ex­pected in the next year.

During the discussions prior to the re­organization, the position of Chief of Naval Operations was considered for re­naming as the Chief of Staff of the Navy, to bring the Navy further into alignment with the Army and Air Force. However, that change, according to one officer in the Pentagon, was not made but “will probably occur in the future ... we will see more changes in the headquarters staff and in the type commands.”³

Another factor driving the Washing­ton area reorganization has been the need to eliminate 34 flag billets, including six vice admirals, by 1995. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, has said that he prefers to cut the flag positions in Washington, to preserve leadership positions in the fleet. (There are currently some 250 admirals, with a requirement to have 216 by 1995.)

Unfortunately, the reorganization missed opportunities to return antisub­marine warfare programs and mine war­fare programs to a realistic staff level. Considering their increasing importance for potential operations in littoral areas, they should have been placed at the same level within N8 as the C³ systems,

air, surface, and subsurface offices.

Secretary O’Keefe has declared that at the fleet level the current structures “pos­itively will remain the way they are, be­cause that’s where the requirements are driven.”⁴ But Admiral Kelso added, “I think you’ll see us do a lot of streamlin­ing and consolidation in the fleet level, particularly in the shore establishment in the years ahead.”⁵

No major reorganization of Marine Corps Headquarters currently is envi­sioned, as it already reflects traditional military staff structures. However, the Navy headquarters changes will cause some “disconnects” with the Marine Corps. For example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for aviation in the Marine Corps is a lieutenant general, who in the past served as an Assistant Deputy CNO to the head of naval aviation. But the latter is now a two-star position within the N8 organization.

As this column was written, it was not clear who within the Navy supported and who opposed the reorganization. It was announced two weeks after Mr. O’Keefe became the acting Secretary of the Navy. Mr. O’Keefe came to the Navy post from the position of DoD comptrol­ler at the personal request of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Further, the recent sex scandals that have plagued the Navy reduced the overall credibility of Navy officials who may have opposed the re­organization, making it impossible to lobby behind the scenes on Capitol Hill-

Bottom lines of the reorganization are difficult to ascertain at this point. How­ever, coming on the heels of the resig­nation of Secretary of the Navy H- Lawrence Garrett, problems with several major naval aircraft programs, the Sca- vi'o//(SSN-21) submarine problems, sex ' scandals and the inept efforts by the Naval Investigative Service to track down the Tailhook culprits, alleged rev­elations about the Vincennes (CG-49) shootdown of the Iranian Air Bus, and other Navy difficulties, the reorganiza­tion certainly will have a negative im­pact on Navy morale and possibly effi- j ciency. Unfortunately, this occurs at a time when the importance and potential roles of the Navy are increasing in the post-Cold War period.

'Memorandum from Capt. J.R. McCIeary, USN. subject: “Reorganization of the Naval Headquarters Staff,” 22 July 1992.

’Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe, press confer­ence, the Pentagon, 22 July 1992.

’The position of the Chief of Naval Operations was j established on 11 May 1915.

’O’Keefe, op. cit.

^sAdm. Frank B. Kelso, Jr., USN, press conference, the Pentagon, 22 July 1992.