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Contents:
Commanders Must Command—12
Short Circuit—12
It’s Time for a Revival—14
Turn the Sub Skippers Loose—15
A Vital Humanitarian Mission—18
Let’s Avoid Another Stark—18
Save the Tailhook Association—18
ASW Is Still Job One—20
Maritime Patrol: Gotcha Covered—20
Cost-Effective Mine Warfare—21
Save the Cubi Point Art Collection—23
Exocets, Air Traffic & the Air Tasking Order—23
Nurse Selection Could Be Better—23 Total-Quality: A Postscript—23 Those Damn Mines—23 Waging a War to Protect the Seas—24 Updates on The Republic Navies—24 Stalking the Enemy’s Coast—29 SEALs Plan for Future—29 Cl: The New Linchpin—29
“Commanders Must Command”
(See E. Hebert, pp. 56-59, September 1992
Proceedings)
Captain E. B. Hontz, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Aegis Training Center, Dahlgren, Virginia—We in the surface forces have a terrible inferiority complex. We have been led to believe that our jobs are so simple and so basic that all surface line officers can be assigned to almost any job in any department on any class of surface ship and perform these jobs in an outstanding manner.
So, after the requisite 6-, 10-, or 14- week school, we have deck officers from oilers assigned as main-propulsion assistants on gas-turbine ships, officers with minesweeping experience assigned as antisubmarine warfare officers on board SQQ-89-equipped ships, and Aegis operations officers with no prior experience on board missile-armed or Link-11 ships. And, of course, we have lieutenants responsible for major portions of cruisers’ and destroyers’ weapon systems who have no prior combat-systems education or experience.
Just because an officer is a naval aviator, the Navy doesn’t presume that he can fly and professionally employ any airplane. An avaitor never will report to a LAMPS-III squadron from an A-6 squadron needing a few months to get up to speed on sonobuoys. However, that is equivalent to what the Navy expects from its surface warfare officers. And, those of us in the surface warfare business keep pretending that there is no difference between an amphibious ship, an Aegis cruiser, and a fleet oiler.
As a result, the average surface warfare officer will play catch-up ball for at least half of a two-year tour of duty. As a lieutenant or lieutenant commander, he is already well behind his aviation counterpart who is in his second or third tour of duty flying the same type of aircraft and getting masters-level experience in his warfare specialty.
Our current assignment policy worked in the past when our systems were comparatively simple and easy to learn, and when seniority was almost synonymous with experience. The captain and the executive officer could be counted on to have the background necessary to bring along and teach the junior officers. But, today’s technology turnover—and the rate at which new systems are being intro duced—means that a new ensign report ing on board a ship as the strike-warfare officer has just as much experience with the Tomahawk system as everyone else on board. Chances are the new ensign will be teaching the captain.
In World War II, it was necessary to man large numbers of warships with rel atively inexperienced wardrooms. Today, we find relatively inexperienced officers in many of our shipboard billets as a matter of choice, not necessity. Now that, in the post-Cold War era, we face de' dining budgets, different strategic pri' orities, and new operational concepts, h is time to reconsider our surface warfare officer career and assignment policies- From a warfighting perspective, we can no longer afford to force surface warfare officers to be jacks of many trades and masters of none. □
“Short Circuit”
(,See B. Norton, p. 28, August 1992; H. A.
Caldwell, p. 13-14, September 1992
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Douglas Beal, U.S. Navy—-As the Tailhook scandal unfolds and my fu ture in naval aviation looks increasingly dim, I feel obligated to express some o' the views and concerns of my fellow J"' nior officers about the state of the Navy s character.
Although I have been a designated tail hook aviator for the past four years, last year was my first trip to the Tailhook Convention. I attended because it was ;l traditional “check in the block” for every naval aviator. The corporate displays were educational and informative and seeing colleagues whom I had not seen f°r years was great. The Flag Panel was the highlight of the affair—there is no oth®r such forum in the Navy. Yes, there waS some joking around, but the forum waS an easy way for senior officers to hea the viewpoints of a cross-section of nava aviators. Now that it’s gone, I fear that senior Navy leadership will become eve" more detached from the operators.
While I was at the convention—a" on the third floor—I heard rumors of events that took place there. But with the crowd and the commotion, I neither sa"
them nor was aware of when or where they occurred. When you pack 3,000 naval aviators and their guests on the third floor of a hotel, not all of them are going to see everything that goes on there. So, believe it or not, many of us actually did not see any of the criminal
While the debate rages on about the future of naval aviation, naval aviators are on the sharp edge of U.S. foreign policy. Above, the USS Saratoga (CV-60) shows the flag in the Adriatic.
acts that occurred there. So, despite what some people may think, I was never in any position to put a stop to it.
Nevertheless—and I am not self-righteously looking down at my peers—after I heard through the chain of command and the news media about the crimes and molestations that occurred, I was appalled and embarrassed as, I’m sure, were all my fellow junior officers. But, for more than a year now, I have been told by every flag officer in my chain of command that, collectively, junior officers
lack basic core values, integrity, and moral fiber.
This sweeping generalization is both insulting and incorrect. Most naval aviators are imaginative, talented, and morally sound professionals. Surely, there is a problem with a infinitesimal minority of naval aviators, but it can be solved! Admittedly, the only way to reach those who truly need core-value training is to put the whole Navy through it, but let’s address this problem and get on with the real business of naval aviation.
Naval aviators are proud of what they do, and that pride helps make up for the fact that most Americans are not aware of what we do or the sacrifices we make. Daily, both in peace and in war, we naval aviators put our lives on the line for our country. We know the pain of being away from our families for 300 days out of the year. We alone know the thrill and fear of trying to land on board a pitching carrier deck at night. We’ve all lost friends to accidents, seen marriages dissolve under the stresses of long separations, and had our hearts sink when, after six months at sea, our young children forget who we are. We live on crowded, floating cities with no telephones and no contact with the outside world except for the occasional radio telegram or two-week-old letter from home.
So, why do we keep doing it? Quite simply, we thrive on challenge, we love to fly, and we love our country.
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of Tailhook, the image most Americans have of naval aviators is the sea-going equivalents of the hard-partying slackers from the film Animal House. Sadly, the Navy’s senior leadership seems to have lost faith in the junior officers out in the fleet and echoes the public’s ill-informed assessment.
The junior-officer naval aviators are men of high moral fiber and character, who are tired of being told what a bunch of childish fraternity boys we all are! Don’t question my morals and values without examining me personally! I take great offense at being lumped into any prejudiced stereotype.
Finally, the time to focus on negative issues is past. Now is the time for us to emphasize the positive aspects of naval aviation—the heroism, the hard work, the patriotism, and the camaraderie. The Navy needs to focus discussion on the real issues, such as the role of the aircraft carrier in the “New World Order” and the future of the AX, the F/A-18E/F Hornet, and the V-22 Osprey. Instead of reacting to the Tailhook scandal, we should be acting on the vital issues that affect the future of naval aviation. Let’s resume the work of defending and preserving the most effective and flexible weapon in out nation’s arsenal—the aircraft carrier. □
“It’s Time for a Revival”
(See J. A. Winnefeld, pp. 30-35, September
1992 Proceedings)
Admiral R. J. Kelly, U.S. Navy, Coin- mander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet—' Commander Winnefeld’s article could not have come at a better time. Naval aviation is indeed at a crossroads. We have twin problems that require our immediate and full attention.
The first is to get back on track after being derailed by Tailhook and its aftermath. This wound will heal only with aggressive corrective action on our part. We must take positive and visible steps to ensure this type of behavior will never happen again. This must be done with actions designed to overcome the culture and environment which fostered this event, actions which are ongoing.
We must also realize that women are in the Navy to stay. We must accept them as equals in whatever jobs they do and treat them with dignity and respect—not because we will be punished if we don t. but because everyone is a valued member of the Navy team.
Our second challenge is to shape and build a new naval aviation force. To paraphrase Commander Winnefeld, we nmst keep what will work in the 21st century and get rid of the rest.
Three factors make our debate and decisions about the future of naval aviation especially critical and time-sensitive- First, the nature of the threat has changed- We’re moving from a Navy with an almost exclusive emphasis on blue-water operations to one more concerned with operations in littoral waters, from war-at- sea to regional contingencies.
The second factor is that naval aviation is going to have to make do with lesS money. This will affect everything front aircraft selection, to training, to overal force structure. The bottom line is—-l'ke it or not—that affordability is going t0 be a determining criteria in everythin? we do or buy. This is going to be an eS' pecially tough nut to crack as costs continue to climb while procurement dollar decline.
The final factor influencing our future is that we are starting several new aircra programs simultaneously. This factor lS linked to the first two. With a change i strategic emphasis and a smaller budge1, our airframe choices must be justified 0,1 more than Navy-specific requirement^ They must be based on how well they
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complement the roles and missions of the other services. The nation cannot afford to expend—and the Congress is unlikely to spend—scarce resources for redundant capabilities.
Answering these three challenges with Workable and affordable solutions will require unprecedented innovation and change. We must debate everything— from strategy to tactics to airplane choices. Just as we all learned in school, there’s no such thing as a dumb ques- tton. And when you’ve come up with what you think is a good solution, don’t kt one person knock down your idea, discuss it vigorously in the ready room. Last, but far from least, document your ideas and, as Commander Winnefeld has done, contribute to the intellectual debate.
Commander Winnefeld has done the Navy and naval aviation a tremendous Service, He has opened a window which allows us to look to the future. It’s not a Predictable future, but, if we get together, "'o can help shape it and decide which Way we should go. Therefore, I am confident that naval aviation will be stronger lhan ever. □
‘Turn the Sub Skippers Loose”
T. J. Best, p. 35, August 1992 Proceedings)
^eor Admiral F. P. Gustavson, U.S. ,avy, Director, Attack Submarine Divi- f!°n (N-872)—Today’s submarine force ls manned by the brightest, most creative ^aval officers around who operate the ‘lest warships ever put to sea. And while n° one would argue that both man and Machine can’t be improved, a quick read °f Commander Best’s article might lead °ne to believe that the submarine force— Working with tactics that were “developed at the office” and are “no longer ef- ective”—is itself well on the way to “elective early retirement. Nothing could
be farther from the truth.
Submarine tactical guidance is, first and foremost, the product of endless at- sea exercises and demanding real-world operations. The most remarkable aspect of these exercises is the continuous stream of new ideas our skippers produce; they are out there trying to find a way to fight better, to fight smarter. As a past prospective commanding officer (PCO) instructor, I have firsthand knowledge of the rapidity with which these lessons are first imbued in each new generation of submarine skippers and then folded into force tactical guidance. The submarine force is learning and getting better every day.
Commander Best’s perspective on tactical guidance is interesting and instructive, but reflects a misunderstanding of the role attack centers play in submarine warfighting. Attack-center exercises are relatively “canned scenarios,” played out under rather sterile conditions and evaluated against the guidance of the naval warfare publications (NWPs). Truth is, this is as it should be. Before you can build on the tactical guidance, you’ve got to know and understand that guidance, and why it was developed. To deviate from doctrine in a particular circumstance, fully cognizant of the risk-vs.-gain tradeoffs inherent in your decision, is a markedly different thing than recklessly hazarding your ship because you’re ignorant of the lessons countless at-sea operations have provided.
No one training tool is as useful, as safe, and risk-free in teaching and evaluating the force’s understanding of NWP tactics than these attack centers. But neither they nor the shore-based institutions that support them are necessarily developers or innovators. That coveted role in the submarine force belongs to the operators, those folks out there trying to find a better way today because their lives may well depend on it tomorrow.
The discouraging engagement-rate statistics quoted by Commander Best are not correct. Recent at-sea PCO exercises demonstrate that targets are hit more than half the time; even more often when the recommended firing position is used. However, Commander Best correctly points out that an attacking submarine is at great risk to counterfire if it commences its attack too close to the enemy; that’s why our current tactics stress not getting into that position. We’ve learned this lesson precisely because we have conducted several aggressive and realistic exercises at sea, in which submarine captains are free to exercise tactical initiative. More importantly, these lessons have been turned around rapidly and sent out to the fleet via changes to tactical publications.
Commander Best states that “Most submarine exercises are too restrictive,” and suggests conducting one-on-one combat exercises. In fact, our most common exercises are ones where captains are given objectives and then left to their own devices. Best of all are the PCO operations and the series of one-on-one, free- play exercises conducted by both type commanders to encourage tactical proficiency (known in the Atlantic as “Top Torp”). Submarine crews compete against other crews on instrumented ranges with exercise torpedoes in the most realistic scenarios that can be devised. The winner is the captain who achieves the best kill ratio—not the one who uses the book the most. The “tactical sixth sense” Commander Best seeks is being developed where it counts most—at sea.
So much for our differences. In what is perhaps the most important respect Commander Best is absolutely right. Innovation and creativity are absolutely essential in maintaining our submarine warfighting edge. Without it, we’ll lose. It is essential that all hands in the undersea-warfare field recognize this fundamental truth and work hard, first, to learn and understand existing tactical guid-
□
ance and then strive each and every day to improve their warfighting skills. □
A Vital Humanitarian Mission
Commander Robert J. Tepper, U.S. Naval Reserve—The United Nations expects 200,000 to 300,000 people to die in Bosnia-Herzegovina this winter from epidemics and a lack of functioning hospitals, basic medical care, and inoculations.
The U.S. Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), homeported in Baltimore, Maryland, recently demonstrated
The Comfort could be sent to the Adriatic to provide medical relief to the victims of strife in the Balkans, after her mercy mission to Florida ends.
in response to Hurricane Andrew that she can sail on short notice. The Comfort has a 1,000-bed hospital and 12 operating theaters, can accommodate a medical staff of 820, and is a complete hospital.
Why not send this ship to the Adriatic Sea on a humanitarian mission? Patients who need surgery could be airlifted to the ship while Navy medical teams could go ashore to provide some of the basic medical care that is desperately needed.
A well-organized public subscription would relieve our government of a large part of the expenses. If action is taken quickly, the current human suffering and the forecasted death toll this winter could be much reduced. □
“Let’s Avoid Another Stark”
(See D. S. Freeman, pp. 34-39, June 1992; R.
F. Woodford, B. R. Blakeley, pp. 14-16,
August 1992; K. F. Amacker, p. 27, September 1992 Proceedings)
Commander T. P. Beatty, U.S. Navy, Director of Training, Fleet Combat Training Center, Atlantic—Senior Chief Freeman suggests that the missile attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) in 1987 was directly attributable to either “negligence or abysmally ineffective training,” and that “the training establishment had poorly equipped” the officers and men of the Stark to defend against the attack. The Stark incident is not new to anyone, and there have been more than enough discussions of the problems and deficiencies that led to the disaster. Therefore, it is time to ask: “What has the Navy done to fix the problem?”
In 1987, the fledgling FFG-7 Weapons System Officer (WSO) Course focused on providing exposure to a maximum number of watch stations for a maximum number of students. The predictable outcome was that the students were masters of none of the watch stations. Since then, the course has been rewritten totally, and currently is undergoing a second major revision. One of the performance-testing criteria for the second revision—due for implementation this month—is a satisfactory level of proficiency at each major position—antisubmarine warfare officer, tactical action officer, and weapons control officer.
A second improvement in training is the 20B5 combat-systems training vans. These devices, which came into use in the 1980s, plug into a ship’s combat system while pierside. Therefore, WSOs train on their equipment, with their own battle orders, and under the scrutiny of their own COs. It’s a step toward “training the way we’re going to fight.”
The overcrowding mentioned by Senior Chief Freeman may have been a problem during his tenure; however, in the 20 classes of the FFG-7 WSO course since November 1990, only six had more than the maximum number of students listed in the Catalog of Navy Training. In fact, a March 1992 Fleet Combat Training Center, Atlantic (FCTCLANT), class review indicates that the class can accommodate up to 11 students; given that figure, only three classes had excess students—one had 13, the others had 12. So, while the overcrowding problem hasn’t been solved completely, it is not as critical as it was in 1987.
Senior Chief Freeman offers no empirical data to support his observation that “the young sailor. . . gets far less formal operator training than the average high school student gets in a semester of driver education.” A student at FCTCLANT receives 72 hours of lab time alone, learning the three major consoles in addition to support equipment and other consoles. After graduating, he is able to train on his own console whenever his ship takes advantage of the 20B5.
There is another very important difference between the 1987 FFG-7 WSO course and the current version. The instructor of today is likely to be a student from Senior Chief Freeman’s days. He has worked with the equipment, knows its capabilities and limitations, and likely stood watch on that equipment during several periods of heightened tensions if not war. He is a member of a training organization that constantly seeks out ways to improve the course content, and is dedicated to providing the best possible product to the fleet users.
There is valid reason to study the problems of the past, but merely looking back does not help you see where you need to go. Senior Chief Freeman’s article is a good attempt to carry out one step of the “Plan-Do-Check-Act” process. The Navy has been through the entire loop, and continues to refine the process as we learn from our mistakes. The bottom line is that we recognized the need for improvements in the combat-systems training of FFG-7 watch standers before the Stark tragedy, and had laid the ground work for improvements to rectify the shortcomings- The current FFG-7 WSO course is jus1 one example of the training community s awareness of the process and its dedication to solving problems. We carry out the entire loop taking us from “then” 10 “now,” improving as we do. □
“Save the Tailhook Association''
(See J. Towers, p. 26, Janaury 1992; S. Hunt, Q
pp. 27-28, March 1992; B. Tillman, pp. 19-2°’
April 1992; R. J. Kelly, p. 17, June 1992; C. A- Skelton, R. L. Lawson, pp. 20-23, July 1992; /
- J. Smith, p. 14, August 1992; A. J. Principe
- A. Scoles, B. Tillman, W. F. Foster, pp.
17-26, September 1992 Proceedings) C
Captain J. H. Woodward, U.S. Air FoNe Reserve (Retired)—During World War l> when the life expectancy of a pilot wu-j ^ two or three weeks, the tradition of ham drinking and fast living began, and *aS j continued by the pilots of World I II, particularly by those who served in th® I early days of the Eighth Air Force atm j faced similar odds. During my training and subsequent active duty as an Alf I Force pilot, hard drinking and rowdy parties were generally the norm. problem is that alcohol consumption de‘ stroys good judgment and often leads10 unacceptable behavior.
Women have proven that they can b6 superior pilots, and be brave under fire'
So it’s high time for an attitude adjus1' ment by male military pilots, who show now realize by now that they’re not qu'ie so special.
The solution requires a comply change of approach, starting on the fir
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day of training. Currently, the effort to develop aggressive combat pilots leads to other aggressive behavior that is condoned—often encouraged—by senior officers who were brought up the same way. It’s necessary to teach new pilots that aggressiveness can and should be confined to appropriate flight operations or sports, and eliminated from all social situations.
Instructors must be carefully chosen, trained, and observed to ensure that by word and deed they support the new attitude and instill it in their students. Alcohol consumption should be placed in proper perspective, and peer pressure by upperclassmen and experienced officers should be on the side of acceptable behavior. Finally, commanders at all levels must lead by personal example, and act quickly and positively to stamp out any regression to the old ways. □ “ASW Is Still Job One”
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 30-34, August 1992 Proceedings)
“Maritime Patrol: Gotcha
Covered”
(See A. R. Maness, pp. 86-90, August 1992
Proceedings)
John R. Benedict, Jr.—Admiral Holland and Admiral Maness each stressed the importance of preparing for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in both blue-water and green-water environments. Nevertheless, near-term ASW activity—research and development tactics, training, intelligence, and oceanographic activities—should focus more on countering nonnuclear submarines in regional green- water contingencies than on global confrontations involving nuclear submarines in the open ocean. Although a relatively recent development, the proliferation of modern submarine technology to the Third World represents an emerging threat—especially to surface forces—that should not be discounted.
Any apparent systemic inability of the U.S. Navy to provide adequate ASW protection to its warships and other maritime units during forward-presence and crisis-response operations would have adverse military and political consequences. In the short term, it could disrupt or even end naval operations, including those designed to support forces ashore; in the long term, it could make policy makers reluctant to use the Navy and Marine Corps in their traditional contingency roles or in regional conflicts.
As Admiral Holland pointed out, there is a strong general tendency to overestimate our ASW capabilities or underestimate submarine threats. When air or surface superiority is achieved, it often translates to a complete rout of the opponent (e.g., the Iraqi air and naval forces in the Gulf War). By contrast, having good ASW forces does not necessarily mean that an enemy submarine force can be neutralized completely—as the British would have learned in the Falklands if the Argentine Navy had not been plagued by unreliable torpedoes.
The lack of operational proficiency by certain countries’ submarine forces has been used by some to discount all Third- World submarine threats. However, the performance levels vary throughout Third World submarine forces. The effectiveness of any submarine force is also highly dependent on how difficult its mission and operational circumstances are, including what type of target is being attacked—merchantman or warship—and where it is being attacked—at a choke point, in confined seas, or in open seas-
So, when considering worldwide submarine threats, do not consider only the aforementioned problems of the Argentine Navy in 1982. Take, for instance, a success and a near-success of Pakistan* submarines in the 1971 Indo-Pakista*11 War. A French-built Pakistani Daphne- class submarine sank an Indian frigatekilling 191 of its 288 crew members. Another Da phne-class submarine, operating approximately 3,000 nautical miles from its Karachi base, attacked the India*1 Navy aircraft carrier Vikrant. The attack failed, but, contrary to Indian reports, the submarine was able to evade the India*1 counterattack. (In fact, no modern nonnuclear submarine has ever been sunk by ASW forces.) It also should be noted that- in 1971, the Daphnes had been in th*- Pakistani Navy for only about a year, an*1 Pakistan had operated submarines for lcsS than ten years. No one would have pre' dieted their 1971 performance based °n previous peacetime observations—thus- another example of the perils of unde*' estimating submarine threats.
Although it is true that no maritin11’ unit in any regional contingency invob' ing U.S. forces since World War II haS been attacked by a submarine, this doe' not alter the fact that submarines—-a|1 advanced antiship torpedoes—are in--0| will soon be in—the naval inventories 0 Syria, North Korea, Libya, Cuba, Alge ria, China, Iran (in the near future W** the acquisition of Russian Kilo-class sub marines), and other potentially unfriend*, and unstable countries. The level of pr° ficiency of potential adversaries can*10 be controlled, but the Navy can contr°
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Nothing I have witnessed in 25 years as a surface-warfare officer contradicts dmiral Holland’s assessment of our °^eraU ASW abilities. Officers have been a forded limited opportunity to focus on
1(s own ability to conduct effective ASW operations in regional contingencies. Ad- Rtiral Maness is correct in saying that the [1 Rute to enhance our ASW capability for c°Untering conventional submarines is en°w—not after a U.S. warship or merchantman has been sunk.Q
^biTOR’s Note: Mr. Benedict co-authored with ear Admiral James Fitzgerald “There Is A «b Threat” which Proceedings published in Altgust 1990.
S
naPtain William R. Burns Jr., U.S.
^avy.—Admiral Holland addresses two .’ lrnPortant issues: the seriousness of the Continuing submarine threat and the 6N;ivy’s lack of preparedness to perform effective antisubmarine-warfare (ASW) s ’’Pe rations. The former issue will certainly
s ,e debated in the years ahead on a na- j donal level as the military develops a lf J>0sf-Cold War strategy. However, the lat- f er issue should be addressed seriously , and immediately by the Navy as it re- h i !tructures to accommodate a smaller
n 1 force.
ASW and develop their ASW skills. This was, perhaps, epitomized by the assignment of an ASW specialist fresh from the Navy Postgraduate School as my damage-control assistant in the engineering department of an aircraft carrier. In the fleet, units rarely are afforded the time to conduct meaningful ASW exercises, and then they are, they are so constrained that the scenarios ignore the realities of actual combat.
We will develop skilled ASW tacticians and be prepared to conduct meaningful ASW exercises only when we commit to specialization in the various warfare areas. We continue to expect every surface warfare officer to be qualified in all warfare areas—and as a propulsion engineer. He must also be qualified in joint operations and in some chosen subspeciality. Given this broad spectrum of qualification, what exactly does “qualified” mean?
The U.S. Navy has long resisted the idea of specialization, but in my own association with officers of other navies, I have been particularly impressed with the expertise of their warfare specialists. It is time for the Navy to reassess the idea of specialization in order to ensure that we develop and maintain the warfighting expertise necessary to complement our proven technological capabilities. □
“Cost-Effective Mine Warfare”
(See C. H. Fries and G. M. Blusher, pp. 95-98,
August 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander L. E. Dove, U.S. Naval Reserve—The writers made some good arguments for maintaining the craft- of-opportunity program (COOP). Many of these have been used by the strong Naval Reserve lobby to convince Congress to continue to fund the program even though the Navy wants to cancel it. However, they left out one major problem with COOP.
The COOP method of locating mines is to tow a side-scan sonar behind a boat without a mine-avoidance sonar or degaussing system. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to know that this is sheer lunacy. The side-scan sonar looks down and to the side, not to the front; therefore, either the COOP boat or the sonar itself could hit a moored mine before the sonar ever detects it. Also, there in a very good chance that the boat could set off a influence mine like the USS Princeton (CG-59) did—again, before the sonar sees it. In both cases, the result would be the same—the loss of the boat and, almost certainly, all hands on board.
The highly qualified COOP sailors mentioned in the article obviously have not studied mine-warfare tactics and capabilities. If they had, they would insist
Th.
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e proper preparation of joint-compat- e computer programs would mean a
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that all COOP units be equipped with a mine-avoidance sonar.□
“Save the Cubi Point Art Collection”
(See T. W. Hair, p. 20, August 1992 Proceedings)
Captain B. V. Wood, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Cubi Point—Lieutenant Hair and other fans of the Cubi Point Officers’ Club will be happy to know that the artifacts of the 9ub are on their way to the Museum of Naval Aviation in Pensacola, Florida.
The museum is building a reproduction of the club’s plaque bar and will use 11 as a functioning bar for special events >n the museum. Look for reopening of the world-famous Cubi Point Officers’ Club plaque bar in the summer of
1993. □
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“Exocets, Air Traffic & the Air Tasking Order”
(See L. Di Rita, pp. 59-63, August 1992; T. F. Marfiak, p. 13, Spetember 1992 Proceedings)
lieutenant Terry Johnson, U.S. Naval Reserve—The Navy’s difficulty in receiv- lng and processing command and tactiCal data from the air tasking orders (ATOs) was highlighted wonderfully by Commander Di Rita. The “300-page, Personal For,’ flash-precedence, randomly sorted message” he described is '•he latest example which shows that data c°mmonality and protocol among the ser- ytces require standardization.
In this age of computer-assisted de- Clsion making, the wrong information (Words in text) is being sent in the Wrong format (computer printouts) to Ihe wrong user (humans). There is ab- s°lutely no valid reason that ATOs can- n°t be transmitted electronically from 'ae Joint Air Forces Component Commander to Navy ships, to be processed ®nd displayed by shipboard systems. ^Uch a processing system would allow c°nimanders afloat to better execute 'heir required cruise-missile and tactic-aviation missions.
With electronic ATOs, Aegis-equipped Cruisers and destroyers could receive and Pr°cess three dimensional no-fire and s'rike-corridor zones into their command and decision systems and then pass the a'a on to other Link-11-capable ships.
S|8nificant reduction in blue-on-blue engagements in future conflicts. □
“Nurse Selection Could Be Better”
(See K. A. Brooks and N. H. Fraser, pp. 64-65, June 1992; L. Noreiga, p. 18, August 1992 Proceedings)
“Total-Quality: A Postscript”
(See M. T. Ibach, pp. 65-66, June 1992
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Nancy H. Fraser, Nurse Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—Taking heed of our own recommendations that reserve nurses take more focused training in preparation for future forward deployment, Lieutenant Brooks and I attended the Combat Casualty Care Course in San Antonio, Texas. According to the course’s organizers, it is “designed to prepare medical department officers to function on an integrated battlefield during a mid-[to]-high-intensity conflict at forward points in the casualty care system.” The practical goal of the course is to develop skills in assessing and managing the battle casualties so they may be returned to duty or evacuated. Over nine days, we studied advanced-trauma life support (ATLS), participated in combat-casualty care exercises, and practiced nuclear, biological, and chemical defense.
Among the future training opportunities we plan to take advantage of are: the
Fleet Hospital Training Course, the Trauma Nurse Care Course, and other trauma-care conferences.
Following Admiral Ibach’s recommendations, subspecialty codes are beginning to come on line for reserve Nurse Corps officers (we have applied for ours). The paperwork to update our Naval Officer Billet Classifications was completed shortly after our return from service in the Persian Gulf. □
“Those Damn Mines”
(See E. Fortin, pp.30-34, July 1992
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Carl Douglas, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Fortin implies that mines were the primary reason an amphibious landing was never attempted in the Persian Gulf War. Although mines were a deterrent to an amphibious assault in Desert Storm, the basic decision hinged on a prior consideration that unacceptable collateral damage would result from such an assault. That is, much of Kuwait City would have been destroyed in an amphibious assault to recapture it. And, don’t forget that the amphibious demonstrations and feints during the war did tie down several Iraqi divisions (about 80,000 Iraqi troops). □
“Waging a War to Protect the
Seas”
(See J. W. Kime, pp. 57-59, October 1991; G.
L. Brooks, p. 29, January 1992; R. P. Fiske, p.
21, March 1992; J. W. Lockwood, p. 27, June
1992 Proceedings)
Captain James Drahos, Master Mariner and Pilot—I was first astounded then outraged, and, finally, insulted by Admiral Kime’s statement that “85% of marine casualties are the result of human error; drugs and alcohol play a large role.”
I have no argument with the first part of that statement. Human error has long been at fault for the greater part of marine casualties worldwide. The second part of that statement, however, was out of line, particularly because it is unsubstantiated by any documentation. I read every National Transportation Safety Board marine accident report and every U.S. Coast Guard marine board of inquiry report that the Coast Guard cares to send me. From the facts presented in these reports, I do not have the sense that “drugs and alcohol play a large role” in marine casualties.
Also, my own experience as a captain of a U.S. merchant ship counters Admiral Kime’s generalization. Over a period of four-and-a-half years, my ship—with a crew of 22—made 16 voyages to South American ports known for traffic in drugs. Of the 858 men (crew equivilant) who served in the ship, I estimate that there were approximately 20 involved in drug/alcohol incidents (or about 2.5%)—none of which involved casualties.
1 decided to write Admiral Kime and challenge him to document his allegation. Admiral Kime replied, but he did not submit any figures to substantiate his prior statement that “drugs and alcohol play a large role.” Rather, he backwatered, contending that he “did not intend that his very general statement to apply only to commercial maritime operations.”
This reply was simply not consistent with the context of the remarks in the article. A review of that “very general statement” indicates that it is quite specific in referring to “commercial maritime operations.” While the first sentence might be construed as an all-encompassing statement, the second sentence definitely pinpoints those referenced in the first sentence by specifying “merchant marine.” In the third sentence, the terms “ship" and “on watch”—terms not usually associated with recreational boating—are used. The final sentence addresses “vessel operators” which—by official inference and definition—specifies “commercial maritime operations.”
Six months ago, I again challenged
Admiral Kime with a very direct question to provide the documenting statistics. In writing him, I outlined my position and further suggested that he might arrange an explanation through Proceedings. I am still waiting.
Admiral Kime correctly observes that prevention is better than reaction, especially in the case of oil spills, where national cleanup capabilities are minimal- However, his discussions of prevention puts the Coast Guard in the spotlight and completely neglects any mention of those who are doing the day-to-day work of prevention: professional mariners.
As has been pointed out in several Proceedings articles by Coast Guardsmen and merchant mariners alike, there is—
The new commander of the Russian Navy— Admiral F. N. Gromov- visited the United States last year.
Updates on “The Republic Navies”
Norman Polmar, author of Guide to the Soviet Navy—The changes continue for the former Soviet Navy.
Personnel: The volatile political, economic, and military conditions in the former Soviet Union have led to some recent high-echelon naval personnel shifts.
Admiral of the Fleet V. N. Chemavin, who succeeded the legendary Sergei G. Gorshkov as head of the Russian Navy in 1985, has now been relieved as head
of the Russian Navy by Admiral Felix Nikolayevich Gromov.
Admiral Gromov was Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, the largest of the former Soviet fleets, from 1988 until April 1992 when he was named First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The 54-year old admiral had served most of his at-sea career in cruisers and destroyers. In July 1991, Admiral Gromov commanded the Soviet Navy task force that visited Mayport, Florida.
Admiral Chemavin—now age 64, four years over the regulation retirement age for full admirals—likely will continue to play some role with the Russian Navy and possibly the Russian Ministry of Defense.
In another personnel-related development, Vice Admiral Oleg Aleksandrovich Yerofeyev, a former nuclear submarine commander, has taken command of the Northern Fleet.
Black Sea Fleet Control: The bitter but bloodless conflict between Russia and Ukraine over control of the Black Sea Fleet apparently has been settled. In early August, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk reached an agreement under which the two countries will control and fund the fleet jointly through 1995 after which separate national fleets will be established.
Also, by 1995, the two countries’ national defense staffs will work out details of dividing the existing ships and resources, and such issues as Russian use of certain facilities in Ukraine.
In a related move, apparently the presidents are transferring some smaller naval units to Georgia, which borders on the eastern Black Sea, while President Yeltsin has approved the shift of about ten smaller ships of the Caspian Sea Flotilla to Azerbaijan. The latter transfer is to take place in November 1992.
The future of the Black Sea Fleet, including its aviation and naval infantry components, was especially critical for Russia. Only an amicable agreement could permit future use of certain naval air installations in the Crimea that, for at least the near term, are vital for Russian naval air development and training activities, while the Black Sea Shipyard at Nikolayev on the Black Sea is the only yard in the former Soviet Union that constructs aircraft carriers and could provide extensive overhauls of them.
The New Ensign: Meanwhile, the photograph on the cover of the August 1992 Proceedings of the hauling down of the Soviet naval ensign on board a Typhoon ballistic missile submarine was particularly timely. As of 27 July, the Cross of St. Andrew—the ensign of Tsarist navy—has replaced the familiar Soviet ensign as the Russian naval ensign. □
and has been for some time—an adversarial relationship between the Coast Guard and professional mariners. This situation is unlikely to change when the man who sets policy avoids answering hard questions or chooses simply not to respond.
Admiral Kime makes grandiose refer
ences to how the Coast Guard intends to curb this rampant rampage of the seafaring druggies and winos who he implies make up a large portion of U.S. merchant mariners (I suppose it is the norm, in Washington, D.C., to magnify problems to ensure ample funding.). However, he gives short shrift to the causative prob-
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lems the Coast Guard has allowed to develop. Fatigue, reduced manning, unreliable automation, no oversight of shore- maintenance programs, and marine inspection program deficiencies—these are all much more to blame for marine casualties than drug and alcohol abuse.
Proceedings readers are unlikely t0 have read the Report of the Tanker Safer) Study Group. It is an excellent report and one of the few honest assessments of Coast Guard oversight of the U.S. merchant marine. The worth of the Coast Guard in this area will be judged by the way the report’s recommendations are implemented.
Consider what the reaction of Navy and Coast Guard officers would be if’ ship and cutter operations were governed by civilians with little or no mil1' tary experience; people and training programs were evaluated by people with little, if any, practical experience; and. inspections were conducted by someone who knows what is on a checklis1 but not why. Well, that is the situation in which professional mariners fi11^ themselves. Mariners are not involved very much in the Coast Guard’s vision of prevention or its policymaking and regulatory matters. When we do get 3 chance make our views known, our informed opinions seem to have no greater weight than those of people who have never been to sea or the Coast Guard bureaucrats who have never had to sat1 under the rules they impose. Offers ot assistance from the Council of American Master Mariners have been rejected anu the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Council is composed entirely of undoubted!) well-meaning admirals.
The Coast Guard and the U.S. Mef' chant Marine have a common goal-"
safety at sea. However, in the present a°' versarial atmosphere, there is little chance of achieving it. What is the solution? T° begin with, Admiral Kime should refrain from appearing to promote the Coast Guard at the expense of the U.S. Merchant Marine. Second, if the captain ofi Coast Guard cutter wants to know 'vhat is really happening on his ship, he’ll listen to his crew. However, whenever * deals with mariners, the Coast Guard s overall attitude seems to be: “We’re tbe experts. We don’t need any advice.” 1 Admiral Kime—and the rest of the Cous Guard—want to know how to win “tbe war to protect the seas,” they should U1 volve professional mariners in process. Many U.S. mariners have e* cellent ideas, born of seagoing exPef j ence, which could help the Coast Guar and the nation. Is the Coast Guard read, to listen? □
as peace came, he would be returned to storage—where he could do little damage to the infrastructure—and a capable Manager would return to run day-to-day derations.
My experiences in and out of the service show that purely charismatic leaders are successful in the attack mode, but °ften fail miserably when charged with developing a coherent budget or training plan, for example. The point Lieutenant Baldwin misses so clearly is that neither pure managers nor pure leaders are effective in today’s challenging times. A successful officer must have both abilities, and while I personally believe some °f the best charismatic leaders are born, others leaders develop as they progress through their careers. There is no doubt successful management skills can be taught to anyone with the proper moti- 'ation. And, in case Lieutenant Baldwin has missed some recent initiatives, Total Quality Leadership rejects the bottom- i'ne mentality he so readily hangs on the neck of management in general.
Lieutenant Baldwin’s otherwise well- done synopsis on leadership deserves a better conclusion. Motivating your peo- Pfe to achieve higher goals is the leader’s f°le, but giving them the means to do it ls the manager’ s.Q
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^ear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman II, V-S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Baldwin’s otherwise fine effort is spoiled by What seems to a consistent thread in many Writings about naval leadership: denigrating the manager.
Somehow it must be impressed upon today’s naval officers that a great leader teust also be a great manager—because fhe bottom line of leadership is readiness ln all its aspects. The examples of bot- |urn-line managers used by Lieutenant “aldwin are interesting. Could it be that lhc skipper of the squadron had more ’ffggets than usual and needed more lights per month, and that the operations ufficer got together with maintenance and SuPply and managed to squeeze enough to get the extra time? Could the ship’s CaPtain—who wanted more time at sea
improve readiness—have provided h® high quality leadership that produced ue operating-target funds to allow for the Cxira time under way?
Whether acknowledged or not, it takes ^standing leadership to manage less- han-adequate budgets, both at sea and ashore. The bottom line—readiness—is °° important to make a fictitious differ- eUtiation between management and lead- ®rship. Great naval officers must excel in both fields. □