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Rear Admiral J. B. LaPlante, U.S. Navy
Admiral LaPlante is the Vice-Director for Logistics, J-4, on the Joint Staff. He served as Commander Task Force 156/Amphibious Group Two during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf.
Proceedings: How does the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept fit into amphibious warfare? Admiral LaPlante: I think the CWC argument was always theological and not tactical, because in the amphibious world it revolves on whether the commander of the amphibious task force can personally discharge all his responsibilities, or whether he is willing to delegate some. I don’t think he can personally discharge all those responsibilities, because, number one, no staff is big enough or broadly competent enough to be CWC in a multithreat environment and to run an amphibious operation.
And number two, even if there were such a staff, we don’t have a flagship that is even minimally capable of putting all those functions together—control of Aegis ships in an AAW [antiair warfare] environment, for instance. I think that the only way that makes sense is for the CATF [Commander, Amphibious Task Force] to delegate some of his responsibilities.
That is the way we did it in the Gulf. Admiral [Daniel] March, the battle force commander, was charged with gaining and maintaining air and sea superiority over the Northern Gulf, which, of course, included the amphibious objective area (AOA). He did that, and the various forces that had to operate in the Northern Gulf—mine forces, amphibious forces, the frigates that went after the platforms, the SEALs—would come in under the umbrella, do their job, and back out. It worked well.
Proceedings: Do you see that as a watershed . . . did people recognize it for what it was?
Admiral LaPlante: I think it’s very significant. I think it’s a watershed. For instance, I think the old flagship argument is now moot. The argument runs like this: we have two amphibious flagships [the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) and the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20)] that were purchased specifically to be flagships for Commander Amphibious Task Force and Commander Landing Force [CLF] of a Marine expeditionary brigade-size landing operation. The operations in the Gulf, though, were larger— there were two brigades involved. But clearly, we in the amphibious task force were not going to get an LCC. That was Admiral [Stanley] Arthur’s flagship. We were driven to this arrangement where responsibilities had to be delegated, because the LHA [the USS Nassau (LHA-4)], which was the flagship we had is, of course, not anywhere near as large or as capable as the LCC in terms of com-
mand-and-control and staff spaces. We made it work.
Proceedings: How would a Wasp (LHD-l)-class ship have worked? Admiral LaPlante: I
could not have done the job in an LHD. The ship is much more advanced from the standpoint of a purely command-and- control capability, but, as you know, the main structural difference between LHAs and LHDs is that the command-and- control spaces on the LHDs have been removed from the island— all the radios, combat information center, the flag spaces, the flag bridge, the briefing rooms, the war rooms, the intelligence spaces—all of that went down to the 02 level, to make it less vulnerable.
And at the same time, the LHD hospital got much bigger below decks. So you had these two extra requirements then demanding space inside the ship, and also a strong desire by the Marine Corps and Navy not to sacrifice troop space. To make these large increases without sacrificing troop spaces below the flight deck level, the command-and-control spaces shrank. An LHD is sized precisely to the requirements of an amphibious squadron commander and a Marine expeditionary unit commander
Proceedings: Would you put a ski jump on any of these ships?
Admiral LaPlante: Clearly, it would have been a nice thing to have in the Gulf, especially when you’re operating in the summertime. Temperatures above 100 degrees [Fahrenheit] really do limit the amount of ordnance that a Harrier can launch with. If you have a ski jump, that would dramatically increase the amount of ordnance the Harrier could carry, or the length of the sortie, given how much fuel he has to carry.
The tradeoff, obviously, is helicopter deck spots, and we have made those tradeoffs in the past in favor of maximizing the helicopter deck spots—of staying at nine deck spots. There are lots of tactical implications to reducing the number of deck spots, lots of implications for the embarked commander and his scheme of maneuver ashore, how fast he can get ashore, what kind of flexibility he has tactically. I think the tradeoffs were right. I think I would
U.s. NAVY
Prefer, as an amphibious task force commander, to have the helicopter deck spots rather than the ski jump on the assumption that if 1 have some heavy lifting to do in close air support, I’m going to have a carrier to help me do it.
Proceedings: How important is a V-22, or let’s say something that has a V-22 capabilities, to what the Navy and Marine Corps are going to be asked to do in the future? Admiral LaPlante: What is immensely important is solving the medium-lift problem and getting a replacement f°r the CH-46. An argument infrequently made is that the V-22 takes up fewer deck spots than any of the alternative mixes. If your objective is to move a given size Ending force in a given period of time, which is the tactical end of the argument, then it’s going to take more,
smaller airplanes or fewer larger airplanes to do that. More, smaller airplanes will drive a requirement for more flight decks. So with a solution to the medium lift problem that includes, let’s say, the larger CH-47 [Chinook] or some other helicopter, also comes the additional bill tor added ships to provide the added flight deck spots required.
Proceedings: What about Eastern Exit [evacuation ot noncombatants from Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1 J • What would a V-22 have done for you there?
Admiral LaPlante: Oh, we would have pulled off the operation probably a day early. Clearly, the farther you can go and the faster you can go, the better it is; except from an affordability viewpoint, of course.
Proceedings: Is there an alternative to the battleships tor naval gunfire support? How important will naval gunfire
be in the future? . ,
Admiral LaPlante: Well, it’s immensely important when
we’re talking about a world of littoral vice blue water naval warfare. And I think the Navy realizes that. A surface fire-support study has just been published, and I see genuine enthusiasm within the Navy for attacking this problem. A mission-need statement was approved last spring, and the formal acquisition process is under way to provide a surface fire-support capability that would answer the requirements of littoral warfare in the next century. At the high end of that requirement is the ability to throw ordnance up to 60 miles. There are lots of alternatives, ranging from modifications to current systems, vertical launch systems, new gun systems that fire smart munitions and so forth. I am optimistic that, this time around, the Navy is going to take it on. The solution is long-term— we wouldn’t field anything until very late in the decade, if not early next century. In the meantime, I think the Marines should embrace a technique that General [Harry] Jenkins and his Fourth MEB perfected during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and that’s the fire-base concept. They lifted 155-mm. howitzers and ammunition externally, flew in, dropped the crews, the ammunition and the weapons, and within a very short time afterward had rounds going down range.
It was an artillery raid. That’s not as reactive or as agile, certainly, as naval gunfire. But it is an interim solution that makes sense.
Proceedings: The ‘Gators have been the down-trodden for years. What’s going to change that? What is going to improve the image so that a naval officer will want to be a ‘Gator?
Admiral LaPlante: It’s a problem that exists at several levels. It exists in my view, certainly, at the flag level; it exists at the commander level; and it exists down at the junior officer and department-head level. It needs to be addressed on all levels. I think we’re making significant progress; we’ve got a ways to go. As an example, two surface officers are now commanding LHAs, who did not go to those commands as sequential commands. It is their first command as a captain. Previously, an amphibious guy would have to go to an LPD [amphibious transport, dock] or an LKA [amphibious cargo ship], prove himself in that command, go through another formal screening process in the Bureau of Personnel—where he would be screened for sequential command—and then, in the fullness of time, he would be assigned to an LHA or an LHD. That gave us very professional, very talented, very experienced commanding officers. The down side, of course, was that by the time that CO finally got far enough along in order to be a viable flag candidate, the Navy had already selected all the flag officers they were going to get from his year group. Making the LHA and LHD an initial vice sequential command will put surface officers, amphib officers, into the flag eligibility
Getting the causeways to an amphibious objective area will be a problem after the last LSTs are decommissioned. Air- cushioned landing craft (LCACs) proved reliable in Persian Gulf operations and have opened up many more miles of the world’s coast lines to amphibious landings.
window much sooner and increase their chances. So I think that’s going to produce additional amphibious warfare flag officers. And there will hopefully be a trickle- down effect, if you will.
Clearly, as the Navy gets smaller, the percentage of the surface Navy that is amphibious is going to grow. And in my view, probably 25% or more of the surface Navy will be amphibious ships. That’s significant.
Proceedings'. How do you make the amphibious Navy attractive to an ensign?
Admiral LaPlante: I’ve been up to the surface warfare officers’ school. I think amphibious warfare has a tremendously good story to tell. The Marine Corps, as you know, is fond of saying that every Marine is a rifleman.
I am, in turn, fond of saying that everybody assigned to an amphibious warfare ship is a sailor. And by sailor, I don’t just mean a guy in a blue suit; I mean a sailor, because when an amphibious ship is doing its best thing and ■ being all that it can be, the whole crew’s involved. They’re ■ handling lines, they’re boat crews, they’re moving cargo. ^ They are all personally involved in that ship executing its j
and the young men who try that out, by and large, get to liking it. The ones that leave, I think, have left with reluctance, but because they just did not see a path to the top. I think we’ve taken a step toward fixing the top and, hopefully, we will remove that impediment to keep in some of the real good young men that we need to keep.
Proceedings: Getting back to ships again, who’s going to carry the causeways when the last LST [tank landing ship] is decommissioned?
Admiral LaPlante: I think that’s very much a concern. Certainly we can’t take them in our well-deck ships and displace LCACs [air-cushion landing craft]. One of the ways [to get the causeways there] is, of course, on the MPS [maritime prepositioning ships], another way is on one of the several LASH [lighter-aboard ship] vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command. The concern there, of course, is that having any MPS ship, LASHs, any commercial-standard vessel, in the amphibious objective area makes me very nervous—because they don’t have the damage control facilities and systems that a combatant ship has. They don’t have anywhere near as much reserve stability; they don’t have the numbers of crew to fight fires and control damage, and so forth. So one of these ships into a hot AOA on D-Day or D-plus one is °f concern. In my view, though, it’s a risk we’re going to have to take.
Proceedings: Is our amphibious doctrine up to date? Admiral LaPlante: [Our current] amphibious doctrine was developed in the late 1950s and issued in 1962. I entered the Naval Academy in 1958 and was also issued *n 1962, and there is a world of change since then. But aniphibious doctrine has not changed appreciably, while other things have. Littoral warfare is going to be the mode °f warfare in the future. Amphibious forces will be involved in that, but, clearly, much more broadly than in executing conventional assaults. We need an institutional way to think about those sorts of things, and how VVe’re going to establish command relationships and what lhe tactics are going to be.
Second, we’re doing a far greater range of operations with amphibious forces than is covered by NWP-22—non- combatant evacuation operations, interpositioning as was done [to aid the Kurds] in Provide Comfort, humanitarian assistance operations, the amphibs played a fairly significant role in the execution of the maritime interdiction force and sanctions-enforcement operations. Those are the kinds of operations that amphibious forces are doing, and we don’t have any doctrine; we don’t have any tactical notes to govern those. Whenever one of those operations comes along, the commanders get together on an ad hoc basis to decide what sorts of command relations they would be comfortable with and go ahead and do it that way. Frankly, some of them have been fairly bizarre. I think we need to think through these kinds of operations ahead of time so that we don’t have to reinvent it every time.
Proceedings: Is there going to be a doctrine center?
LaPlante: The CNO is committed to the establishment of a Navy doctrine center. Still to be decided is exactly where it’s going to be and how it’s going to be organized.
Proceedings: What is the Navy doing about mine warfare? Was it a big problem in the Gulf?
Admiral LaPlante: I’m not the best source on what we’re doing. It was certainly going to be a big problem in Desert Storm, but I don’t think we should come down too hard on the seriousness of that problem. Desert Storm was unique. As you remember, during the whole of Desert Shield—and that was five months—our job was to deter and defend. A large portion of that deterrent operation was to convince Saddam Hussein that if he came south, he was going to have an amphibious landing come in behind him and cut him off. We were successful in convincing him of that, and to some degree the fear of an amphibious operation played some role in his decision not to come south, some portion of that deterrence was amphibious deterrence.
The down side of that was that he listened to us so closely and he paid such good attention that over six months he constructed elaborate, deep, and innovative beach defenses on the very few Kuwaiti beaches that were suitable for an amphibious assault.
We had been openly talking about our amphibious warfare capability and our willingness to use it tactically, there was lots of press coverage of our amphibious forces, a limited number of assault beaches, and unlimited time to prepare them—an unusual set of circumstances. Few o those conditions are going to obtain, necessarily, in uture conflicts. So the opposition’s problem is not going; to be quite as easy as it was during Desert Shield and Desert
There were significant technologies introduced in 9uan' tities during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, t e g o a positioning system (GPS), for example. If you give every LCAC coxswain and every Marine LVTP [assault amphibian] driver a hand-held GPS receiver he can locate himself within yards. He doesn’t need to be controlled remotely. He can control himself precisely, and the width of the channel that needs to be swept through any potential minefield is much, much narrower.
Proceedings'. What about doctrine concerning the control of LCACs ashore—possibly using them farther inland? Admiral LaPlante: I would be much more favorably disposed to do that now after the Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience than before. The principal argument against operating LCACs inland is what happens if it suffers a casualty. If an LCAC is water-borne and suffers a casualty, it can be towed back to its mother ship, fixed, and off we go. If it suffers a major casualty inland, there it sits.
We found that the LCAC is immensely reliable. I was surprised at how reliable those craft were and their time between failures was impressive—it surpassed my wildest expectations.
Proceedings'. How about using LCACs to counter mines? Admiral LaPlante: I’m not the guy to ask, but I think LCACs are very much a part of what’s going on in Panama City and Ingleside on the shallow-water mine systems. I think the LCAC is going to deliver the systems.
My only concern on the whole mine warfare issue is that whatever system that’s decided on, comes with some sort of a delivery vehicle other than an amphibious ship. During the war we lost the Tripoli (LPH-10) to go be a minesweeping support ship. She took the mine hit; we had to replace her. We lost the New Orleans (LPH-11). So here’s the commander of the landing force contemplating a major operation, and he just lost two of his seven big-deck amphibious ships with all the helicopters, with all the Marines that were embarked, and all the ordnance that was embarked. That’s a significant hit. We need to reserve amphibious ships for amphibious tasks and cover mine countermeasures separately.
Proceedings: Can amphibious forces put heavy forces ashore for some limited period and then extract them? Not just a few Marines with rubber boats and grease guns, but a more substantial mechanized force?
Admiral LaPlante: In fact, one of the raids that we planned, but did not execute, was very heavy: lots of armor, all 17 LCACs, lots of helicopters, fairly significant duration on the order of 24 hours, give or take, heavy artillery—155s and so forth. The mind-set is that a raid is a very small thing done by Special Forces or similar units. But, in fact, they can be massive.
And I might add that in a maneuver warfare mind-set, the raid becomes very important, much more important than in the traditional frontal assault. In such a campaign, massive raids from the sea are going to become a tremendously effective tool. And this gets us back to doctrine. We need to think that through: how does this work if the amphibious operation is not the only operation in town,
but is a supporting operation? What then is the relation- i ship between CATF and whoever is running the ground campaign?—and so forth. We need to think through all of these.
Proceedings: Did any of your aircraft come under the air tasking order (ATO)?
Admiral LaPlante: We flew some 400 Harrier sorties during Desert Storm over Kuwait and southern Iraq. All those sorties were in the ATO. The Nassau was called CV-58 in the tasking order, because, of course, General Jenkins was Commander Task Force 158; if you look at an ATO, you’ll see CV-58 listed. In fact, that was the Nassau with the Marine Harriers. We had the same difficulty getting our hands on the air tasking order as everybody else, but we were in it and we operated under it, and fairly successfully.
Proceedings: Had something happened, were you satisfied that your medical support was OK?
Admiral LaPlante: I was satisfied with the in-theater capability. I was very hopeful and anticipated that if we had done an assault we would have had one of the hospital ships close to hand. I share people’s concern about mass casualties. The other side of that coin, as always, is the tradeoff between the amount of internal space you devote to casualty receiving and treatment—that always comes at the expense of berthing spaces for the Marines, of cargo holds for munitions. So I guess I am satisfied with the balance that has been struck.
Proceedings: Any question you would like to answer that we haven't asked?
Admiral LaPlante: We’ve talked about the expanding role of amphibious forces and the kinds of operations we’re going to do in the future, whether it’s presence operations, littoral warfare, or any of the other peacetime use of forces.
That has produced a fairly impressive list of things that need to be done. What we don’t have in amphibious warfare is a game plan for doing these things. We have lots of players: the type commanders; the amphibious group commanders; the Washington players, OpNav, and so forth; the numbered fleet commanders; the fleet [ commanders themselves—there are a lot of players, but if I can be glib, there’s no coach, there’s no manager.
I think we should decide once and for all who is going to be the amphibious warfare daddy rabbit, if you will— whether that’s going to be the doctrine center, or whether ^ it should be somebody in Washington, or whether we I should impose the same kind of solution we did to mine S warfare, where we finally got into enough trouble in mine warfare and said, “Enough. We are going to put one guy in charge of mine warfare; he’s going to be a two-star flag officer; he is going to own doctrine; he’s going to own tactics; he’s going to own operations; he’s going to be the resource advocate, and we’re going to fix this.”
I don’t want us [the amphibious forces] to get into that kind of trouble.
The point is that we need a formal way to address things amphibious and right now we just don’t have that.