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even an appendix of a draft, is cause for alarm.

The CWC was devised as a means to decentralize decision making in order to reduce reaction time while defending against a coordinated, multidimensional Soviet missile attack on a carrier battle group on the open ocean. That CWC has been made to work in any other scenario besides this very particular, outdated one is a tribute to the smart, dedicated peo­ple in the fleet, who can make any sys­tem of organization work because it must. But they shouldn’t be so hamstrung.

The first flaw of CWC is that it is a concept for defense. This flaw requires little explanation, in light of the origins of the concept, but one wonders why anyone would consider CWC for am­phibious warfare, which is purely offense. The second flaw is that the concept is not mission oriented. Warfighting forces should be task organized to accomplish the mission. After a mission has been as­signed and analyzed, tasks necessary to accomplish it should be determined—and, only then, specific forces assigned to ac­complish the tasks. Organizing avail­able forces into task forces, groups, units, and elements—with each subordinate organization’s task supporting the next senior organization’s mission—is how most of the world’s naval forces have been used since the U.S. Navy devised the concept in the 1930s. On the other hand, CWC-organized forces are not task organized to accomplish a mission; they are organized forces waiting for a mis­sion—which may or may not fit the or­ganization. In short, the mission should precede the organization, not the other way around. Of course, often naval forces must respond with whatever is on hand, without having the luxury of proper task organizing, but that certainly is not the preferred method of warfighting.

Another flaw of CWC is that it is in­appropriate for almost all naval opera­tions—from submarine operations and mine warfare to special warfare and con­voy escort—not just amphibious warfare. Also, CWC confounds our sister services and allies. They see no need for the U.S. Navy to have a unique method of orga­nization—a forceful argument when “joint” and “combined” have become op­erative watchwords.

Basically, CWC is a poor way to or­ganize anything, but here are a few rea­sons why it is an especially bad way to organize amphibious forces.

► Officers experienced in carrier opera­tions should command carrier forces, and officers experienced in amphibious operations should command amphibious forces—period. The current method of carrier forces being in general support of amphibious forces with an amphibious commander works very well.

• Amphibious ships are slow. Should a carrier task force be limited to 17 knots when responding to a crisis?

• Amphibious forces weren’t needed in the strikes against Libya. Carrier forces weren’t needed for the embassy evacua­tion in Somalia. Why tie the two types of forces together when not needed?

It is time to kill—once and for all— the idea of organizing amphibious forces using the CWC. And, it is high time to get on with the greater debate of whether CWC as a means of organizing any naval force should be abandoned. □ “Rogue Warrior”

(See D. Andrade, pp. 98-99, August 1992

Proceedings)

Commander W. L. Hamilton III, U.S. Navy—Despite Mr. Andrade’s somewhat negative review, I think Richard Marcinko’s Rogue Warrior should be re­quired reading for all Navy special-war­fare personnel. Within the SEALs, “Demo Dick” will be known forever as one of our legendary “fouques”—the man who rose from the enlisted ranks to be one of the most spellbinding and influ­ential personalities in Navy special war­fare. Anyone who served with him—or who ever met him at a party—has at least one good Marcinko story to tell.

Nevertheless, entertaining though they may be, the stories of Marcinko’s exploits should not prevent a comparison of his concept of unit integrity—“screw” any­body who tries to get in the way of the squad, the platoon, or the team—against that of some of other special warfare leaders—quiet professionalism.

During my first days in Underwater Demolition Team 21, my commanding officer told me the kind of attitude frog­men shouldn’t have: that because we are different from the rest of the Navy, be­cause we are “special” (whatever that means), we don’t have to live by Navy rules. Eighteen years later, when I took command of Unit One, my commodore told me that if my men got into fights in Olongapo, he would consider it a lack of leadership on my part. From both men, the message was plain: rogue behavior was unacceptable within Navy special warfare.

It is as true now as it was then: To be a SEAL, you don’t have to prove your manhood in a bar fight against a drunken Marine or by sucking peas through your nose. Being a SEAL means being tough and doing all the demanding things we

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are paid to do. Unit integrity means tak­ing honest pride in being members of the finest fighting force in the U.S. military.

If the members of the Navy’s special- warfare community want to be respected and taken seriously as Navy profession­als, then we should cultivate the reputa­tion of being “quiet professionals.”

Leaders within the community should make it clear—by word and deed—to our men that, while Richard Marcinko stories make for great barroom banter, quiet pro­fessionalism is the legacy we should leave to those who follow in our fin prints. We all deserve to be remembered by our suc­cessors, the Navy, and the nation as much more than rogue warriors.□ “The Leadership Formula”

(See S. Baldwin, pp. 82-86, July 1992; R. G. Freeman, p. 29, October 1992 Proceedings)

Editor’s Note: Because of a production Problem, the incorrect version of page 29 Wqj run the October 1992 Proceedings. Below is the complete text of the letter that was only partially printed.

Jonathan K. Osgood, Science Advisor, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command—Lieutenant Baldwin’s award­winning essay sailed smoothly until it ap­proached the rocky shoal of maligning management in favor of leadership, Whereupon it quickly ran aground. His glorification of the heroic leader re­minded me of my Marine Corps service, ^and how we joked about the need for cruise-box leaders” during time of war, ^and managers in time of peace. In times °f war, when a heroic leader is needed, ^a Smedley Butler or a Chesty Puller Would be pulled from a stored cruise box.

soon as peace came, he would be re­ined to storage, where he could do *'hle damage to the infrastructure, and a ^CaPable manager would return to running day-to-day operations.

My experiences in and out of the ser­vice show that purely charismatic lead­ers are successful in the attack mode, but often fail miserably when charged with developing a coherent budget or train­ing plan, for example. The point Lieu­tenant Baldwin misses so clearly is that neither pure managers nor pure leaders are effective in today’s challenging times. A successful officer must have both abil­ities, and while I personally believe some of the best charismatic leaders are bom, other leaders develop as they progress through their careers. No doubt, suc­cessful-management skills can be taught to anyone with the proper motivation. And, in case Lieutenant Baldwin has missed some recent initiatives, Total Quality Leadership rejects the bottom­line mentality he so readily hangs on the neck of management in general.

Lieutenant Baldwin’s otherwise well- done treatise on leadership deserves a bet­ter conclusion. Motivating your people to achieve higher goals is the leader’s role, but giving them the means to do it is the manager’s. □ “It’s Time for a Revival”

(See J. A. Winnefeld, pp. 31-35, September 1992; R. J. Kelly, pp. 14-16, October 1992 Proceedings).

Captain Charles Sapp, U.S. Navy, Com­manding Officer, Naval Aviation Depot North Island—At last, a possible end to the whimpering and self-flagellation! Fi­nally, a chance of emerging from the Pit of Despair we have been in lo these many months! In less than five pages, Com­mander Winnefeld outlined the frame­work within which we in naval aviation can begin to plan our future.

As much as our warrior caste eschews running a military organization “in a busi­nesslike manner,” there are some lessons

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NAVAL PRINTS FROM THE

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As featured in Naval History magazine, Fall 1992 issue

The first in a series of fully illustrated catalogues from the Beverley R. Robinson Collection at the United States Naval Academy includes 268 engravings, etchings and lithographs. Depicted are naval battles and engagements characteristic of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that reflect the naval history of Europe, the New World and the United States.

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from business that we ignore at our peril. Pressing requirements—to define our present state honestly, to decide what we want to be in the future, and to craft a scheme that lays out exactly how we in­tend to get there—demand a carefully considered and clearly laid-out strategic plan like Commander Winnefeld’s.

A vision does not guarantee success. But without one, the likelihood of failure certainly increases. Naval aviators must ask the seminal questions: What value does naval aviation add to the overall na­tional defense equation? What are its unique capabilities? If naval aviation did not exist, what difference would it make?

Once we answer those questions hon­estly, then we can tell the naval-aviation story in terms that are rational and be­lievable to the American public. We must stop claiming that we can do everything worth doing better than anyone else. Naval aviators can no longer justify our existence (or our off-duty antics) by say­ing that we can land on a pitching deck at night—as if the nation’s survival de­pended on the daily performance of that particular circus act. By pulling in our horns, we may lose a carrier or two along the way but—in return—we will get to keep most of the carrier fleet.

Every successful company has a clearly stated set of guiding principles or core values. Without them, the moral compass swings randomly in the shifting winds of “I’m OK . . . you’re OK.” It gains us nothing to point to the way some civilians may behave at, say, a hardware convention in order to justify the ac­tions of a few tailhookers in Las Vegas. After all, tales of antics in the Philippines, at the Cubi Point Officers’ Club, are leg­endary. And, as much as we now try to distance ourselves from the Top Gun image, the fact is that it is an image that we ourselves cultivated carefully and guarded jealously. It will take a con­certed effort to change that image, but change it we must—for the public we serve has become more demanding.

Will such a cultural metamorphosis somehow diminish our aggressiveness and, consequently, our effectiveness in combat? I remember clearly when the un­official order of the day was to “hassle in the stack.” Dogfighting was consid­ered a meaningful and a downright manly thing to do while waiting for clearance to land. The same held true for flat-hat­ting—how better to prepare to go fast and low in pursuit of the enemy than by buzzing airfields whenever we got the chance? Any citizens who objected ob­viously had an attitude problem.

Today, such free-wheeling actions seem anachronistic, but not too long ago they were held just as firmly by air wing commanders and squadron skippers as they were by the newest ensigns. Nev­ertheless, naval aviation has survived their passing and I think we are better for it.

Finally, there’s the issue of executive development. For any company to sur­vive, its leadership must expand its intel­lectual horizons continuously. We must be experts in our warfare specialty and we must—to paraphrase Dr. Deming— begin a ceaseless quest for profound knowledge. Understanding systems think­ing—as well as the theories of variation, knowledge, and psychology—constitutes a full-time learning effort in itself. But the Navy’s anti-intellectual bent, which goes back at least as far as the days when Cap­tain Alfred Thayer Mahan was ridiculed for reading and writing instead of going to sea, exists today. But, once outside the immediate confines of the ready room, a “1,000-trap” patch and a few dollars will buy you a cup of coffee.

Commander Winnefeld’s article should be part of every ready room’s profes­sional-reading board and should be dis­cussed and debated from the highest to the lowest levels of the Navy. He has given us a starting point. The rest is up to us. □ “The Desert Five Can Score

Again”

(See R. E. Norris, pp., 67-70, June 1992

Proceedings)

Major S. R. McMeans, U.S. Marine Corps—Lieutenant Commander Norris made many good points about the hazard of success and the dangers of fighting the last war. His push for jointness, consol­idation, and greater cost effectiveness was well-taken. However, his discussion of Marine Corps aviation was somewhat off the mark.

First off, none of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation is called tactical aviation (TacAir). And, while there is no arguing with the importance of Navy and Marine fixed-wing jets, if TacAir is characterized as anything that carries ord­nance, then the AH-1W Cobra must be included. If TacAir includes any aviation element that flies into the face of an enemy’s combat arms, then all Marine Corps aviation—especially assault sup­port—must be discussed. Power projec­tion by Navy and Marine jets from air­craft carriers is vital, but more often power projection missions are conducted by Marine Corps helicopters, flying front

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amphibious ships. Let’s not forget the successful evacuations in Somalia and Liberia.

Furthermore, the discussion of the role of Marine Aviation Weapons and Train­ing Squadron One (MAWTS-1) in the Desert Five might lead the uninformed reader to believe MAWTS-1 conducts op­erational training and evaluation (OT&E), vice tactics development and training. HMX-1 is the sole Marine squadron reg­ularly conducting OT&E, its mission since it was formed in 1947. The squadron does OT&E for all Marine he­licopters except the AH-1, which is con­ducted at VX-5. HMX-1 participates in the MAWTS-1 weapons-and-tactics in­structor classes and conducts many of its projects at Yuma in order to utilize the expertise centered there. Part of an OT&E project is to produce an Operations Tac­tics Guide (OTG), and once again the ex­cellent working relationship between MAWTS-1 and HMX-1 comes into play.

I strongly concur with Lieutenant Commander Norris’s proposal for more joint test programs like the V-22 Multi­Service Operational Test Team (MOTT), which includes Air Force, Navy, and Ma­rine Corps, and is led by HMX-1. All phases of development and Operational Test are closely monitored or conducted by the V-22 MOTT from both pilot and maintenance perspective. The MOTT al­ready flies tactical scenarios in the sim­ulator to determine rotary-wing/fixed- wing ratios, to plan for more cost-effective ways to conduct OT&E fly­ing, and to begin OTG development. Throughout this program, the HMX-1-led MOTT has worked closely with MAWTS-1 and will continue to do so.

Finally, Commander Norris discussed current TacAir range restrictions, recom­mending the acquisition of new ranges and the consolidation of all Navy and Marine Corps flight-test programs at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake. The definition of a TacAir range was unclear. HMX-1 conducts flight tests for both ord­nance and electronic warfare projects at ranges on the East Coast, including Ma­rine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Many tests are conducted from ships, in the mountains, and in dense forests and jungles, since many projects may require ranges or areas other than the desert. Commander Norris’s thoughts and proposals have merit, but his failure to mention Navy or Marine helicopters and his predilection toward the desert made me wonder if he was, at times, still fighting the last war. □

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(See B. Norton, p. 28, August 1992; H. A.

Caldwell, p. 13-14, September 1992

Proceedings)

Midshipman 1st Class Aundrea Taplin, U.S. Navy—Hamlin Caldwell was right on the mark about issues of accountabil­ity and the ever-present public eye. Why shouldn’t the Navy as an institution be required to meet the standards it sets for individual officers? The practice of lead­ing by example is not a random objec­tive. It is a carefully planned sensible means of motivating others to complete a mission. By the nature of the job, mil­itary personnel are subject to public scrutiny; but we should not allow con­cerns about our image to dictate our ac­tions entirely.

The U.S. Naval Academy’s well-pub­licized denunciation of the recent per­formance by comedian Howie Mandel at the Academy illustrates the Navy’s fear of admitting to a mistake. Because of a vague contract or an ill-placed faith in Mr. Mandel’s propriety, the show was less than tasteful. But whose fault is that?

Is it Mr. Mandel’s, whose stage act is well-known for its crude language and insults? Or is it the Academy’s for book­ing this tawdry comedian one week after a Navy-wide sexual harassment stand down?

Instead of admitting to a mistake, the Academy tried to shift the blame for the inappropriate show to Mr. Mandel. The public might have been more impressed by a little humility: “The Academy apol­ogizes to the spectators and does not en­dorse the views of the performer.” In other words, “Sorry, we goofed.” □ “Turn the Sub Skippers Loose!”

(See T. J. Best, p. 35, August 1992; F. P.

Gustavson, pp. 16-17, October 1992

Proceedings)

Captain J. S. Almon, U.S. Navy, Com­manding Officer, Naval Submarine School—Lieutenant Commander Best states that at the Submarine Officer Ad­vanced Course (SOAC) prospective sub­marine department heads are told that the guidance in naval warfare publications (NWPs) should be used only in the ab­sence of other tactics.

Although I can’t state with certainty that the following philosophical approach to using NWPs was taught when Com­mander Best attended the SOAC in 1988, I can state with confidence that it is now: Officers attending the SOAC are expected to use the NWPs and to apply intelli­gently the tactical guidance they contain.

The guidance in the NWPs is a body of expert knowledge that is known to work. This knowledge has been culled from exercise results, actual experience, equipment and system capabilities, and intelligence information and estimates. As Commander Best points out, when­ever an adversary’s capability or response is other than predicted, a captain’s intel­ligent and innovative use of his boat is often the key to success.

There is no conflict between follow­ing the book, drawing on the knowledge of others, and tailoring proven tactics to the unexpected. I would call that fight­ing smart. □ “Respect: The Key to a Superior

Navy”

(See P. D. Smith, pp. 95-96, October 1992

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Philip Mendez,, U.S. Navy—I was appalled at the note that appeared in the May 1992 leave-and-earnings state­ments. Remember? It said: “If you need help buying food, see your base’s family support center for details about Federal food-stamp programs.”

The morale and well-being of men and women in dungarees and utilities always should be one of our top priorities. They turn the wrenches, chip the paint, and wash the airplanes. They are the life force of our Navy—without them there would be no Navy! They deserve better treat­ment than being handed food stamps.

Where is the initiative and dedication to finding better resources to assist our sailors? Instead of food stamps, how about a pay increase to improve their quality of life, or a change in the basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) system that takes into account the number of depen­dents? Can’t Navy commissaries offer savings through double-coupon days? What about a mandatory education pro­gram that teaches sailors and their fami­lies how to live more comfortably within their means? I’m sure there are better ways to assist our men and women than passing the buck and shunting them over to the welfare system.

Given all the time and effort we ask from our people, is a recommendation to apply for food stamps the best we can offer in return? □