ComAirSols: A Real Joint Command

Joint air operations conducted by elements of the armed services of the United States are seldom conflict-free. But why should this be true in an era of military professionalism and maturity, when we take great pains to nurture cross-pollination and doctrinal understanding in all our joint schools? Nevertheless, the same arguments and hard positions are repeated and refought every time we send out a joint U. S. force. They may be somewhat

subdued today under the centralization of the National Command Authority, but they are still rumbling away.

The joint operation with the lowest conflict quotient (CQ) in recent memory was probably the Solomon Islands campaign in World War II. Only the Korean War and the Vietnam War, prior to Desert Storm, are sufficiently comparable in scope to the Solomons for doctrinal analy­sis. Preliminary examination tends to show that, if any­thing, the conflicts in command-and-control of joint air operations have increased in intensity over time.

All four of these cam­paigns involved joint command-and-control of air operations. Joint rather than combined because, while there was significant partici­pation in each by other than U. S. air elements, the predominant partic­ipant in all four was def­initely the United States. Although all four could be classified as com­bined operations, from a doctrinal point of view they were commanded and controlled as U.S. joint operations.

Certainly the lowest possible CQ in the com­mand and control of joint air operations is desirable, and the cam­paign in the Solomons has lessons for us today.

When the decision was made to land in the Solomons (Operation Watchtower), responsi­bility in the Pacific was split between two individuals: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CinCPac) with headquarters in Hawaii, and General Douglas MacArthur was the Commander, Southwest Pacific in New Guinea (ComSoWesPac). The Solomon Islands were on the west­ern edge of Nimitz’s area, immediately adjacent to MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific area, which made mutual support important for any operation in the Solomons.

The successes at Coral Sea and Midway made it feasi­ble to consider a switch to operations designed to halt the Japanese advance through the Solomons, and the am­phibious assault of two enemy positions in the southern Solomons, Tulagi and Guadalcanal, became the first step.

The Guadalcanal campaign opened as a Navy-Marine operation under the command of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander, South Pacific (ComSoPac), a sub­area of CinCPac with headquarters at Noumea, New Caledonia. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious task force (CATF), and Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift commanded the 1st Marine Di­vision, the only amphibious-trained unit in the Pacific, as the Commander, Landing Force (CLF).

Vice Admiral Ghormley stayed in Noumea, and desig­nated Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher as the officer in tactical command (OTC) for the landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Because Fletcher devoted most of his at­tention and concern to the operations of the three carri­ers of the force, Turner handled much of the overall di­rection of the other combat elements of the command.

Fifty years later, there are several points to bear in mind when examining the Solomons campaign from the aviation perspective. All the U.S. military services were expanding frantically and, by August 1942, were just be­ginning to show a little progress. This meant that every­thing from advanced and improved aircraft, pilots, weapons, spare parts, and all the aviation support sys­tems for combat, were just barely beginning to trickle °ut to where they were so vitally needed. The famous Navy Construction Battalions—the SeaBees—who later hacked out coral airstrips for assault beachheads almost overnight, were largely still in training in 1942. The first of the famous F4U Corsairs did not arrive on Guadal­canal until 12 February 1943, five days after the island Was secured. Fleet carriers were at a premium because of losses and battle damage at Coral Sea and Midway. The famous Essex (CV-9)-class carriers did not begin to appear in combat in significant numbers until late in '943. All these factors are pertinent when assessing Guadalcanal and the Solomons campaign from the joint G. S. air combat perspective.

Because of the operation’s accelerated tempo, air sup­port of the 1st Marine Division was initially assigned to Marine Air Group (MAG)-23 in Hawaii; The 1st Marine Mr Wing and five of its units were to follow as soon as Possible from bases on the West coast. This placed an ad­ditional load on the carriers of Task Group 61.1, com­manded by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes. It meant that the ^11 burden of air defense of the landings, and air sup­port of the landing force for the first two weeks would depend on the three air groups from the Saratoga

(CV-3), Enterprise (CV-6), and the Wasp (CV-7).

Marine Air Group-23 had four tactical units—two F4F-4 fighter squadrons and two SBD-3 dive bomber squadrons. All four had new, combat-ready aircraft, but in each of the squadrons, a small cadre of experienced of­ficers led a complement of relatively untrained pilots.

The first two squadrons—one fighter and one dive bomber—flew into Guadalcanal from a transport carrier on 20 August. The second pair came in from another light car­rier on 30 August, completing a very welcome first incre­ment of support for the beleaguered 1st Marine Division.

The joint aspect of air support actually began with the arrival on the island of the first Army Air Corps detach­ment of P-400s on 23 August, followed by the first Navy carrier detachment operating ashore the following day. As rapidly as Pacific logistics would permit, the joint partic­ipants of the what came to be called the Cactus Air Force—for Guadalcanal’s code name—were reinforced, replaced, or locally augmented whenever the rapidly changing circumstances in the South Pacific area made it feasible.

From August to December, at various times, all air units were reinforced by commitment of pilots and last re­maining spare aircraft from rear-area fields in response to tactical needs at Guadalcanal. Holding the island through this critical period was a close call, but it was also a clas­sic example of how well joint operations can work when the collective will of the different participants is solidly “in sync.” One of the paramount national values demon­strated, and one that should not be forgotten was the close commonality of equipment that exists between Naval and Marine aviation. Many fighter and attack missions went out as a mix of Marine and Navy pilots, led by either ser­vice. As a joint air operation, Guadalcanal clearly showed what can be done when the objective is, to paraphrase Vince Lombardi, “the only thing.”

This spirit continued as the turn to the offensive took solid shape and the final phases of the Solomons cam­paign began—first the Russell Islands, then central New Georgia, Vella Lavella, the Treasuries, and finally, on 1 November, central Bougainville. Through 1943, as each phase of the campaign up the chain evolved, there was a quantum improvement in availability of ships, aircraft, equipment of all kinds, and especially in the depth of pilot training. The industrial might of the country was begin­ning to make itself known and all services were fully ready.

At this stage of the war, strategic priority for allocation of forces was weighted heavily toward the war in Europe. This had an adverse effect on aircraft availability, mak­ing it particularly difficult for the Pacific Army Command, for example, to assign adequate numbers of heavy bombers to the campaign. The supply of Army fighters was bet­ter, but these were generally older types, which often had limited performance at altitude. Typical were the P-39 and its near twin, the P-400, a version originally built for export.

The primary fighter mission in the early months was air defense of Guadalcanal and the majoi buiden tell to the Marines and the Navy with their F4F Wildcats. The

P-400s and the P-39s were there early, as noted, but were mainly relegated to ground support, escort and antiship­ping missions, where they did a superb job. Later, as the * battle for Guadalcanal continued, P-40s and the newer high-performance P-38s were added to the Army air ele­ments on the island.

All shore-based aircraft not at Guadalcanal were under the operational control of Commander Air South Pacific (ComAirSoPac), including those of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force. The commander executed control through an island com­mand structure within the ComSoPac area. An extremely important operational responsibility of ComAirSoPac was the daily long-range search plan covering the approaches to Guadalcanal. The command used Navy PBYs, Army B-17s, Royal New Zealand Air Force Lockheed Hudsons, and other long-range aircraft for this vital mission, which augmented short-range searches out of Guadalcanal. [See “Three Cruisers, Two Destroyers, Two Seaplane Ten­ders . . .” Proceedings, August 1992, pages 80-85.]

Later, as the last of the major Japanese attacks was beaten off in November, joint air strength began to in­crease slowly. Strike missions against land targets ab­sorbed a growing percentage of the daily allocation of available assets. Air defense of Guadalcanal was still a paramount concern, but strikes against nearby bases like Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel were increasing. In Decem­ber 1942, enemy activities in central New Georgia, espe­cially airfields under construction at Munda and Vila Plan­tation, came into the mission-planning picture on a daily basis.

A very significant step in the genesis of the Air Solomons command occurred when the first air transport landed at Henderson Field on 3 September. It carried Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, commanding general of the First Marine Air Wing. Geiger, right then and there, decided to remain at Guadalcanal, while Wing Headquarters was established at Espiritu Santo. As se­nior naval aviator on Guadalcanal, he assumed the rela­tively unofficial title of ComAirCactus, the forerunner of ComAirSols.

This command passed successively to Brigadier Gen­eral Louis E. Woods, Assistant Wing Commander of the First Wing, in early November, and to Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, commanding the Second Marine Air Wing, in late December.

After Guadalcanal was declared secure on 7 February 1943, the first official Commander Air Solomons, Rear Admiral Charles P. Mason, took command on 15 February. He was followed by Rear Ad­miral Marc J. Mitscher a month later. As the campaign progressed during 1943 .and 1944, command was further rotated between the Army Air Forces and Marine aviation. Ad­miral Mitscher was relieved in the latter part of July by Major General Nathan F. Twining, U.S. Army Air Force, who in turn was re­lieved by Major General Ralph J. Mitchell, U.S. Marine Corps in mid-December. Mitchell took over as intensive air operations began against nearby Rabaul from the newly con­structed fighter and bomber strips at Torokina and Piva on Bougainville. With Green Is land and Emirau fields added to the encir­clement of the Rabaul com­plex in early 1944,Japanese air was essen­tially headed for oblivion in the South Pacific area. Mitchell turned the command over to Lieu­tenant General Millard F. Har­mon, Com­manding Gen­eral of all the U.S. Army air forces in the South Pacific area—and also deputy to Ad­miral Halsey,

ComSoPac. Harmon held the command until it was de­activated in the late spring of 1944.

As these changes in ComAirSols occurred service by service, each commander in turn was served in every case by a truly joint staff including a chief of staff from a ser­vice other then his own. The structure of the joint staff, from the beginning at Guadalcanal, grew in emphasis on direct responsibility and accountability for function, in lieu of advice from liaison officers.

Examination of these operations explains why there was such a low CQ in the Solomons. A low order of doctri­nal conflict between participants in any joint air operation Would seem to be an essential ingredient for maximum success. If that premise is accepted, it follows that care­ful analysis as suggested above could elicit valuable in­sights for policies governing current joint air operations. In this era of jointness, any effort to maximize the effec­tiveness of U.S. joint operations and reduce the levels of any doctrinal conflict would seem to be in order.

While this piece is merely suggestive in scope, several Points of thought have emerged. They should be consid­^ered in any more detailed analysis of the Solomons cam­paign. The key points are:

^ A truly joint staff for the commander. In the minimiz­ing of conflict, it is essential to emphasize responsibility and accountability for function and deemphasize liaison ^representatives who offer advice. Joint staff positions ^should be as evenly proportioned by service as the as­signment of forces to the overall task.

^ An air component commander with authority. In the Solomons Campaign, ComAirSoPac, working for Com-

SoPac, commanded all the support means for the tactical combat air command—ComAirSols. He also retained some full-time and some temporary command functions, in­cluding scouting, search, shore bombardment, heavy bombardment, logistics, training, and bases. ComAirSoPac can be viewed as the air component commander for Com­SoPac, with ComAirSols as an air combat task force com­mander. Similarly, under the principles used in task or­ganization, the other type commands in support and furtherance of the campaign, e.g., amphibious, search, sur­face bombardment, strategic bombardment, carrier air, etc., can be used—as they were in the Solomons—organized as specific task forces.

> Command rotation. The shifting of the ComAirSols com­mand from service to service as the campaign progressed, with each service holding the command employing a truly joint staff is of extreme importance. It fosters a spirit and feeling of team accomplishment on the part of all par­ticipants and creates a solid basis of true jointness.

These are the real factors that made for low CQ in the Solomons campaign 50 years ago. A more detailed study along the lines indicated would seem to have a very hig potential for guidelines that would minimize conflict in future joint U.S. air operations.

General Condon, a 1934 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a dis­tinguished Marine Corps aviator, was the operations officer ot mAirSols fighter command under Admirals Mason and Mitscher 1                                                              -

and later commanded ComAirNor[Northern]Sols fighter command during the Bougainville campaign. He wrote “Bringing Down Ya­mamoto,” in Proceedings, November 1990, pages 86-90.