Building Blocks of Naval Power

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

By Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy

Effective offensive and defen­sive mine warfare underlies— literally—the success of littoral military operations. With a renewed focus on the threat and a reorganization of the mine warfare command struc­ture, we can now ensure com­mand of the sea—from the air, the surface, and below.

We recently relearned some hard lessons—how mines can frustrate even the most powerful of naval forces. During Operation Desert Storm, Iraq’s extensive minefields all but stymied a planned am­phibious strike to liberate Kuwait. The U.S. Navy itself used naval mines to cut off the Iraqi Navy’s access to the northern Persian Gulf. This series of events showed us the clear need for a comprehensive Mine Warfare Plan.

Mine warfare is a complex and dynamic area of naval warfare that requires long-term commitment to research, intelligence, fleet tactical development, integrated train­ing, and realistic joint exercises.

The U.S. national security and military strategies rest upon our ability to use the seas freely, and maritime su­periority continues to be the most critical aspect of those strategies. The United States must be able to control the seas in peacetime, crisis, and war; maritime superiority is the key to safeguarding global sea lines of communica­tion with our trading partners and military allies, and to ensuring our ability to influence events and project joint military power to distant theaters of operation in support of our national interests.

Our experiences in peacetime crises, regional conflicts, and global war have taught us that mines present a for­midable threat to our ability to achieve and maintain sea control and project power; moreover, it is a threat that demands a co­ordinated and compre­hensive response. Recent estimates indicate that the former Soviet Navy mine arsenal alone includes as many as 250,000 to 450,000 weapons. Along with other military equip­ment, many of these mines may eventually go to Third World states so that the former Soviet re­publics may obtain hard currency to shore up their failing economies. Add to that a world mine in­ventory numbering per­haps in the hundreds of thousands, held by more than 40 states, and the full dimension of this un­dersea threat to U.S. and allied interests comes into sharper focus. The potential threat of mines to the movements of

MPA-10

KUWAIT

A! jahrdh

I3ubiyart %/

AI Ahmad i

•RiMxru

1.1111.1 mine

Ml> \-S

Khwar a! Mufattah

uro-v IVD.K-$,Cct,jda,.f           SAUDI

■Tjiiam Ci'_r.t U.S. Navy                     ARABIA

troduction into naval op­erations more than 200 years ago. The average bottom mine, for exam­ple, is a cylinder 21 inches in diameter and no more than six or seven feet in length. Many have warheads of 1,000 pounds or more. Almost any sur­face vessel—including merchant ships and small boats as well as dedicated minelaying craft—can lay mines clandestinely, and many types can be laid by submarines, aircraft, and helicopters. Bottom mines can sit in water ranging from the surf zone to many hundreds of feet offshore; they often become buried in bottom sediment, making them virtually undetectable. Some mines also come coated with anechoic materials or materials to accelerate marine growth, making detection a much more arduous task. Deep-water rising mines can be deployed in depths of sev­eral thousand feet, extending the threat well beyond the continental margins. Moored buoyant mines, suspended

\ll)

)H,

reventing mines “from being put into the water in the first place” is t e most logical aspect of mine countermeasures—here, the mines of the captured Iran Ajr in 1987 never presented a threat.

unng Operation Desert Storm, however, Iraqi mine danger areas (MDAs) were factors in deterring U.S. amphibious operations.

U.S. Navy ships and submarines and to the commercial oceanborne trade carried on by practically all maritime nations is indeed global in scope and complexity—and demands a clearly focused mine countermeasures effort.

In a sense, mines are the true stealth weapons of the 1990s and beyond. They have been such since their in­

in the water or free-floating on the surface, are extremely difficult to detect and avoid.

The probabilities of mine detection and avoidance and of minesweeping and neutralization thus become uncer­tain, even in the best of situations. There is a premium on comprehensive intelligence and offensive mine counter­measures—the most effective of which is to prevent mines from being put into the water in the first place. The capture of the mine-laden Iran Ajr by U.S. forces in September 1987 during Operation Earnest Will (U.S. pro­tection of U.S.-flagged tankers in the Iran-Iraq War) is an excellent example of proactive mine countermeasures. Such offensive actions clearly complement the difficult and dangerous mine countermeasures operations—sweep­ing, hunting, and neutralizing mines—of our airborne, sur­face ship, and explosive-ordnance-disposal-diver assets. Good intelligence is vitally important, because it provides critical information about the location and extent of mine­fields and the types of mines in them.

Offensive and defensive mining are often-overlooked facets of U.S. mine warfare capabilities. During Opera­tion Desert Storm naval aircraft conducted the first U.S. °ffensive mining action since the Vietnam War. On 18 January 1991 the U.S. Navy laid mines at the mouth of ihe Khawr Az Zubayr River near the Kuwait-Iraq border ^to isolate Iraqi port facilities and naval bases at A1 Bas­^rah, Az Zubayr, and Umm Qasr. Eighteen aircraft from ihe USS Ranger (CV-61), including four A-6s carrying ^k-36 Destructor mines, executed the mission. Of the 48 atines carried, 42 were laid successfully at four locations.

One aircraft suffered a failure of its release mechanism and had to divert to Bahrain; one A-6 Intruder was shot down after laying its mines—testimony to the operation’s danger. Current plans also envision the tactical use of mines in defensive operations to protect flanks or impor­tant ports.

During Desert Storm, we operated closely with Coali­tion mine countermeasures forces. In future crises and con­flicts we may not have such capable allies. Because we are certain that the mine threat will not diminish, we must maintain the capability to conduct independent mine coun­termeasures operations.

A Well-Structured Mine Warfare Plan_________________

We have closely scrutinized the Navy’s requirements for effective mine countermeasures forces and concepts of such operations. Our experiences in Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm began to shift em­phasis from global conventional war to regional con icts and crises. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has given this shift an even greater impetus. U.S. national security interests—which include supporting allies, ensuring t e safety of U.S. citizens and overseas concerns, and main­taining unimpeded access to markets and r^esour^^es throughout the world—are grounded in our unfettered abi - ity to use the seas. In terms of our highest priorities, then, we have addressed the following requirements ^{,n Mine} Warfare Plan presented to Congress in spring 199 •

>• A single flag officer responsible for and possessing the authority to direct our mine warfare efforts, includ­ing operational control of mine countermeasures forces

• The resources to improve the readiness of existing mine warfare forces

• Mine countermeasures training, exercises, and person­nel development programs that will enhance current op-

Mine Warfare Reorganization

One of the most critical lessons of the Navy’s partic­ipation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was the compelling need to reorganize mine warfare within the Navy’s operational and administrative command struc-

“When you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation for all our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air­conscious. Now we’re going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week.”

erational capabilities and provide a cadre of highly skilled and motivated mine warfare people

• The resources and platforms necessary to provide lift, support, and command and control for our deployed mine forces
• The problems of conducting efficient, effective, and speedy mine countermeasures operations in the very-shal­low, surf-zone, and craft-landing-zone environments in support of amphibious assaults
• The necessary resources to improve existing mines and enhance mine-delivery capabilities

The critical initiatives and programs that we will em­phasize in the coming years specifically address com­mand reorganization and relationships, mine counter­measures training, and mines and programs for deep-water, shallow-water, and very-shallow-water/surf- zone/craft-landing-zone environments.' We are con­vinced that the plan and programs we have in place today and will pursue in the future will make effective use of scarce resources to meet real needs in an uncertain and still-threatening world.

ture. The reorganization entails two principal elements: to place all mine countermeasures forces under the op­erational control of a flag officer who has no other col­lateral duties and to provide for deployable group mine warfare commanders and staffs who are ready for rapid movement to overseas mine-crisis areas.

These goals came to fruition in January 1992 when Rear Admiral John Pearson, Commander, Mine Warfare Command, assumed operational control of all U.S. mine warfare forces from his headquarters in Charleston, South Carolina. At the same time, Mine Groups One and Two were established as the Navy’s tactical experts in mine warfare. Our plans call for the collocation of all surface—- and possibly airborne and explosive-ordnance-disposal— mine-countermeasures assets, as a means to sustain the renaissance of mine warfare throughout the Navy.

Training and Personnel Plan

In addition to the continued training of mine warfare personnel at the Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center and our intention to integrate mine warfare more fully into fleet, joint, and combined exercises, several specific as­pects of our current and future training programs and sys­tems deserve special discussion. We are convinced that these elements will contribute to the strong foundation for our future capabilities.

First, we must continue to study and exploit potentially hostile mines. This effort helps us understand how they function, determine their lethality, and develop effective counter tactics and systems. Recognition is a fundamen­tal aspect of our capability; without it, our mine counter­measures forces would in a sense be operating in the dark, putting themselves in jeopardy.

Next—and related to mine exploitation—we have put in place a program to acquire and maintain sufficient num­bers of versatile exercise mine systems for fleet training and assessments. We can program these systems to emu­late any known influence mine—including data derived from our exploitation of foreign mines—and use them to assess the effectiveness of equipment and tactics. It is also a cost-effective aid for all related operational training.

Finally, we are acquiring the AN/SSQ 94 combat sys­tems trainer in a phased modular installation on board all Avenger (MCM-1)- and Osprey (MHC-51)-class ships. This provides us the capability for on-board training of individual systems operators or the entire combat systems team. The SSQ 94 modules include the AN/SLQ 48 mine neutralization system, the SSN 2 precise integrated navi­gation system, the AN/SQQ 32 minehunting sonar, and the MHC AN/SYQ 13 navigation/command-and-control system. The addition of this capability brings mine coun­termeasures on-the-job training to an equal footing with all other naval warfare areas.

From another perspective, we know that mine warfare must be better understood throughout the Navy to ensure its future success. In addition to the training and exercise initiatives intended to integrate more completely mine war­fare tactics and operations into the operating forces and the mine courses offered at the Fleet Mine Warfare Train­ing Center, the Navy must be better educated in this com­plex warfare area. I have asked the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, to assess how mining and mine coun­termeasures subjects are taught at the U.S. Naval Acad­emy, the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps/Officer Candidate School, Surface Warfare Officers School, Sub­marine School, Naval Postgraduate School, and the Naval War College. To reach our goal of having the total force understand the importance of mines and mine counter­measures, we need to tailor an appropriate mine warfare curriculum for each level of naval education. In addition, We are working vigorously with the joint staff to in­urease the awareness of joint officers about mine warfare s Unique requirements.

Mine Warfare Technology Development Program

This program provides the resources for U.S. Navy basic ^research for mine and mine countermeasures technology Initiatives; it also supports research in mine delivery sys­^tems and improved mine effectiveness. The program places a high priority on technologies and concepts for shallow and very-shallow-water/surf-zone/craft-loading-zone mine countermeasures. Specific technologies and concepts in­clude: shallow-water sonar performance; magnetic sys­tems; rapid mine-clearance and obstacle-breaching sys­tems, such as improved-efficiency distributed explosive net arrays; a semiautonomous underwater vehicle for clan­destine, rapid, shallow-water mine detection and neutral­ization; a mobile underwater mine neutralization weapon; shallow-water air and surface influence sweep methods; and mine hard-kill techniques. We are investigating new mine delivery systems for both aircraft and submarines, and advanced mine sensor technologies with specific ap­plications for regional conflict.

International Cooperation

The U.S. Navy’s mine warfare efforts have benefited from an active international data-exchange program, an ongoing dialogue that is important because allied navies have advanced mine-warfare—particularly mine coun­termeasures—programs and capabilities. The United King­dom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan are notably ca­pable in mine warfare. In addition to numerous formal mine-warfare data-exchange agreements with foreign navies, we have adopted the following several foreign technologies and systems for our mine countermeasures force:

• A French mine classification system is incorporated into the AN/SQQ 32 minehunting sonar

>- The Osprey (MHC-51)-class minehunting ship is a vari­ant of the Italian Lerici-class mine-warfare ship

• We continue to acquire the British versatile exercise mine system
• We acquired two Swedish semiautonomous acoustic/ magnetic remote mine countermeasures systems for Op­eration Desert Storm

In the future, we will continue to seek the significant leverage derived from close cooperation with our allies and friends on mine warfare programs. We must take full advantage of foreign expertise and excellence in mine war­fare as we work together to respond to the ever-evolving mine threat.

Mine Countermeasures Requirements

While experiences and lessons learned from Operations Jesert Shield and Desert Storm strongly indicate that we nust emphasize and enhance our mine countermeasures :apabilities in shallow waters, we must not allow our ex­sting capabilities against deeper water mine threats to an >uish. Accordingly, while we are exerting a concerte e 'ort to deal with mine threats in water less than 200 teet leep to beyond the high-water mark on the shore, we wi dso continue to support programs and systems to counter nines in deep water. These range from improvements t iur existing surface and airborne mine neutralization sys- ems to completely new technologies and systems intended o permit high-speed surveillance of wide areas to deter- nine the presence and extent of mines.

Mine Requirements

U.S. strategy requires both offensive and defensive min­ing. As in Desert Storm, we need mines that we can lay in planned minefields or use tactically to support the op­erations of our surface ships and submarines. The Navy also requires mines that can be targeted against surface ships or submarines, laid in deep or shallow water, and laid by both overt and clandestine means.

The tactical use of mines in support of regional con­flicts will impose difficult requirements: shallow-water submarines; great diversity of target types and operational environments; flexibility in mine deployments and timing of fields; and a need for high volumes of weapon deliv­eries within short periods of time. We will also need 24- hour-a-day mining operations and greater operational flex­ibility in target detection devices to account for the wide variety of anticipated target types and signatures in future conflicts. We may also need to address the requirement for enhancing mine delivery capabilities from our sub­marines and for quickly sterilizing our own mines in order to respond to the unpredictable flow of battle.

Conclusion

I cannot overemphasize the fact that both mines and mine countermeasures constitute fundamental building blocks of naval power. We cannot afford to allow our ca­pabilities in this vital warfare area to atrophy or decay in the future, whether by design or benign neglect. That will be one measure of how well we respond to the enduring requirements for naval forces and the forces of change in the post-Cold War era.

The Mine Warfare Plan and our mine countermeasures and mine programs already in place will enable sea-con­trol and power-projection forces to deal with the real-world threats that we face today and that will challenge us in the years ahead. We have addressed mine warfare require­ments within the contexts of the President’s National Se­curity Policy and the Military Strategy of the United States, documents that clearly lay out the need for joint forces to enhance conflict deterrence, maintain forward presence in critical world regions, and to respond effectively to regional crises that threaten U.S. citizens, interests, and friends throughout the world. Naval forces will be en­abling elements of any joint U.S. military operation in the future. The Navy’s mine warfare forces will similarly en­able U.S. naval forces—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard—to carry out myriad missions and tasks in support of national policy and strategy, specifi­cally those occurring in littoral areas where the mine threat from Third World and regional powers is most likely to be encountered—and has been encountered repeatedly since the end of World War II. Clearly, our ability to con­duct effective mine countermeasures and to employ mines when it is in our interest to do so will be critical for the success of future naval operations.

Admiral Kelso is the Chief of Naval Operations and President of the U.S. Naval Institute.

Win $1,500

The United States Naval Institute and the Vincent Astor Foundation take pleasure in announcing the Nineteenth Annual Vincent Astor Memorial Lead­ership Essay Contest for Junior Officers and Officer Trainees of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The contest is designed to promote research, thinking, and writing on topics of leadership in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

FIRST PRIZE: $1,500, a Naval Institute Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute.

FIRST HONORABLE MENTION: $1,000 and a Naval Institute Silver Medal.

SECOND HONORABLE MENTION: (two to be awarded) $500 and a Naval Institute Bronze Medal. The first prize essay will be published in the U.S. Naval Institute Pro­ceedings. The Institute’s Editorial Board may elect to publish any or all of the honor­able mention essays in any given year, but is not obligated to do so. The Editorial Board may, from time to time, publish collections of the award winning essays and other essays in book or pamphlet form.

The contest is open to:

1. Commissioned officers, regular and reserve, in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in pay grades 0-1,0-2, and 0-3 (ensign/2nd lieutenant; lieutenant (junior grade)/1st lieutenant; and lieutenant/captain) at the time the essay is submitted.
2. U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officer trainees within one year of re­ceiving their commission.

ENTRY RULES

1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 4,000

___                                                 words.

2. All entries should be directed to: Executive Director (VAMLEC), U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402­5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 15 February 1993.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the tile page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author's name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank, branch of service, biographical sketch, social security number, address, and office and home phone numbers (if applicable) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the motto. The identity of the essayist will not be known of the judqinq members of the Editorial Board until they have made their se­lections.
5. The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors dur­ing the graduation awards ceremonies at their respective schools, if appropriate, or at other official ceremonies. Mrs. Astor or her personal representative will be invited to present the first prize each year.
6. Essays must be typewritten, double spaced, on paper approximately 8%' x 11'. Sub­mit two complete copies.
7. Essays will be judged by the Naval Institute's Editorial Board for depth of research, analytical and interpretive qualities, and original thinking on the topic of leadership. Es­says should not be merely expositions or personal narratives.