Book Reviews & Books of Interest

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How CNN Fought the War: A View from the Inside

Maj.Gen. Perry M. Smith, U.S. Air Force (Ret.). New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991. 223 pp. Append. Ind. Photos. $12.95 |              ($11.65) paper.

“Skew[ing] coverage [of Operation Desert Storm] in favor of the Marines,” aggressive members of the media interview cooperative Marine Corps aviators in Kuwait, following the retreat of Iraqi troops.

Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War

John J. Fialka. Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991. 78 pp. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $9.95 ($8.95) paper.

Live from Baghdad: Gathering News at Ground Zero

Robert Wiener. New York: Doubleday,

1992. 303 pp. Ind. Photos. $22.00 ($19.80).

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Roger G. Charles, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

These books confirm the adage that where one stands on a particular issue often depends on where one sits. The issue in this case is media coverage of the U.S. campaign to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

The authors observed the Persian Gulf crisis from different seats, and through different frames of reference. This combi­nation—particularly each author’s “baggage”—pro­duced three very differ­^ent perspectives.

First, their baggage.

John Fialka covered the War as a reporter from the Washington bureau of the Wall Street Journal. An ^eXperienced and respected Journalist, he is known for his in-depth coverage of complex issues and his in­vestigative reporting.

Perry Smith, a retired Air Force major general, served for six crucial ^weeks as a CNN (Cable News Network) military analyst. A for­^mer commandant of the National War College, he holds a Ph.D. from Colum­bia University and has had considerable experience as a tactical pilot.

Robert Wiener was the principal among several CNN producers who were assigned on a rotating basis to Baghdad, from August 1990 until January 1991. He covered the last period of the U.S. war in Vietnam, and brought 21 years of experience to the assignment in Baghdad.

Given the diverse backgrounds of these authors, then, it is no surprise that their books are dissimilar. (A major similarity, however, is that the Navy is hardly men­tioned in any of them.) Fialka’s short monograph is must reading. He focuses on the lack of timely, accurate reporting on U.S. ground combat operations in Op­eration Desert Storm. Although he spent four-and-a-half months in theater, Fialka’s Hotel Warriors has little “I was there.” He concentrates, rather, on the larger issue: the continuing dispute between the media and the military concerning their increasingly adversarial roles.

Fialka points out that Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama taught the Penta­gon an important lesson on handling the media: controlling access is the best form of censorship. He describes how an em­barrassingly large majority of “war cor­respondents” facilitated this control dur­ing the Iraqi war by preferring to live the good life in the Dhahran International Hotel in lieu of pushing to report from the field.

Stealing information from each other was common among reporters, and there were instances of entire stories being pla­giarized—with only the bylines changed. This competitiveness enhanced the abil­ity of General Norman Schwarzkopf’s public affairs officers to control the media. Reporters eagerly cut deals with senior officers who could grant access to operational forces. Senior Army officers positioned two reporters by circumvent­ing the established procedures for as­signing media representatives from the designated “pool system.” One was given a “quietly created” slot at the side of the commanding general of an Army divi­sion; the other “had a secret deal” with that same division commander. The first wrote of the division’s performance in these glowing terms: “miraculous,” had the war’s “toughest mission,” and “the greatest cavalry charge in history.” The second wrote of this same attack: “few Iraqi tanks, troops, or bunkers.” (Both were describing an attack on a mostly un­defended Iraqi sector, without any major ob­stacles.)

Fialka is candid about the flawed overall performance of the media; he claims that “the biggest mistake we made was to skew the coverage in favor of the Marines.” He credits Marines for being much more co­operative with the press, and as a conse­quence they garnered an unfair share of coverage. One exam­ple was the unusual arrangements made by a senior Marine general for a Wash­ington Post reporter. She was exempted from having to live “like the Marine troops" (as did other re­porters with the Marines), and was granted special access (accompanying the general in his mobile command post). It s not coincidental that the Post s cover­age of this officer was expansive and de­cidedly favorable.

113

Smith emphasizes the U.S. Air Force’s role in Operation Desert Storm in How CNN Fought the War. The Air Force took center ring in the Pentagon’s media cir­cus, hypnotizing millions with pictures of smart bombs going down air shafts (and no pictures of misses). Smith argues that air power really did come into its own this time as the decisive combat arm. He criticizes The Washington Post's icon, Bob Woodward, for having “naively quoted Pentagon officials with parochial motivations for hoping that the air cam­paign was not succeeding.” It’s been sub­sequently acknowledged that the numbers of Scud missile launchers destroyed were substantially inflated. Perhaps Smith should apologize to those who were du­bious of the claims of latter-day Giulio Douhets,* and were proven right in their skepticism.

Crowing about the substantial, and le­gitimate, successes of the air campaign, Smith’s basic subjectivity is confirmed by his refusal to face squarely the issue of “friendly-fire” casualties. He further shows his bias by digressing to claim that, “One of the great problems in the Viet­nam War related to the command of air assets.” (Granted, the Vietnam War had great problems, but command of air as­sets wasn’t one of them.)

How CNN Fought the War presents an interesting, firsthand account by a mili­tary analyst working for a major news network. Smith hopes such military an­alysts will become routine members of news teams for covering future military actions. He raises a number of serious is­sues that should be dealt with, not the least of which is the use of retired flag officers who trade on their connections to active duty officers to gain insights not available to regular journalists.

Wiener’s Live from Baghdad may be the least interesting to most Proceed­ings readers, but it is the most entertain­ing of the three. He is refreshingly hon­est in reciting his experience in Saddam Hussein’s capital. He describes in lay­man’s terms the technical aspects of CNN broadcasts from Baghdad, but the heart of his book is the description of the in­terplay among the various personalities. All Wiener’s portraits are richly drawn, including those of high-level Iraqi offi­cials he dealt with on an almost daily basis.

Wiener shows the failures—his own included—right alongside the successes, in vivid prose. These are tagged to spe­cific members of the media; some big-

♦Referred to by many as the Alfred T. Mahan of air power, Douhet wrote The Command of the Air (first published in 1921), the classic conceptual text for proponents of offensive air power.

name journalists won’t be happy with his descriptions.

The courage and dedication to their profession of the author and (surprisingly few of) his compatriots are absolutely clear. They wanted to inform the world from “ground zero,” and succeeded. But the effect of CNN’s broadcasts from Iraq’s capital after other journalists had fled is “TBD” (to be determined).

The pictures and sounds were riveting as CNN showed the U.S. air attacks on Baghdad, in real time to much of this globe. But was this television coverage more entertainment than hard news? Fi- alka opines that it was. “Televised brief­ings, the pool reports, and CNN all pro­vided the heightened illusion of being near the war.”

The reality of the war—from Patriot missile successes to Scud launchers de­stroyed—was substantially different, as we are increasingly aware. The reason for this divergence is aptly captured by one journalist quoted by Fialka. He writes:

[Many reporters] were totally bewil­dered and lost in an alien military en­vironment. . . . their stories tended to reflect a surface impression of the events at hand, and their attempts to obtain news were easily diverted and manipulated by military PAO officers who—it must be said—know far more about how the press functions than those disoriented journalists knew about the war they were trying to cover.

Depending on the reader’s baggage, that’s either a comforting thought, or a disturbing one.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles, a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, is a freelance writer based in Alexandria, Virginia.

M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America

H. Bruce Franklin. New York: Lawrence Hill, 1992, 225 pp. $17.95 ($16.15) hardcover; $11.95 ($10.75) paper.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett, U.S. Army

To author, English professor, and for­mer Strategic Air Command navigator H. Bruce Franklin, the whole Vietnam-era prisoner of war/missing in action issue is “the POW/MIA fantasy.” For him, this “coherent and superficially plausible pseudohistory” has become the cult of the MIA. Indeed, more than 20 years after the U.S. exit from Vietnam, we remain

DOD (R. C. WARD)

The Khmer-language edition of Soviet Union Today, dated December 1989, included the widely publicized Robertson-Stevens-Lundy photo. Defense Intelligence Agency analysts, however, determined that this purportedly recent photo—of U.S. servicemen “unaccounted for” from the Vietnam War—was fraudulent.

awash in POW/MIA movies, T-shirts, buttons, flags, Nintendo games, and even Christmas ornaments. The existence of live U.S. prisoners of war is taken on faith with “the intensity of a religion.”

Although M.I.A. is scrupulously re­searched, Franklin acknowledges that there is no logical way to prove that POW/MIAs do not exist. But, he adds, neither is there any way to prove that they do. As he quickly and devastatingly points out, despite years of investigations, tales, claims, reports, photographs, and “rescue missions,” not a single shred of tangible evidence has surfaced to buoy the hopes of the faithful. True believers, of course, will not be convinced. Many of them are not only certain that our un­accounted for are alive, but are equally certain the government is involved in a conspiracy. The author explores this Washington-directed machination theory from “believer” and “non-believer” points of view, and the result is nothing short of fascinating.

Franklin finds the entire POW/MIA matter one of subjective sentiment in the

face of objective analysis. After all, ex­haustive debriefing of POWs released during Operation Homecoming in 1973 left little doubt that known and suspected prisoners were in fact accounted for: they either appeared in person, or their death in captivity was reliably established. One thousand one hundred and one names were in the category of KIA/BNR— Killed in Action, Body Not Recovered. And several hundred more were missing in action. Regardless, none of the re­leased POWs shed any light on any MIA fates.

Last year, a New York Times poll showed that more people believed there were live POWs than did not. Franklin believes this myth developed precisely because: a) the Vietnamese have claimed for so long that no POW/MIAs exist; b) they have no plausible motive for hold­ing any; c) few, if any, would likely be alive if held under the conditions true be­lievers imagine; and d) no shred of gen­uine evidence exists to support live POW/MIAs. In short, as long as there is hope that some POW/MIAs are alive, the dead are not dead.

He further claims that the Nixon Ad­ministration used the POW/MIA issue to prolong the war, the pivotal event being a 1969 U.S. demand that the North Viet- namese/Vietcong delegation in Paris pro­vide information on every missing U.S. serviceman. The U.S. count of missing at that time was 1,406. Conspiracy buffs will be delighted to learn that the U.S. government provided no information re­garding locations or circumstances of MIA actions.

No one actively involved in the POW/MIA matter—neither activists, nor the U.S. and Vietnamese governments, nor the cottage industry of assorted op­portunists (including film producers) who cruelly exploit hopes nearly 30 years old—escapes. M.I.A. has something to disturb almost everybody. True believers, °f course, will dismiss it as apostasy, while many Vietnam veterans will resent Franklin’s frequent moralizing about the War in general. M.I.A. will stimulate in­tense debate about an issue symptomatic, the author charges, of “a profound psy­chological sickness in American culture.” For those who know, think they know, or simply want to know something more shout this thoroughly mesmerizing and Previously undocumented issue, this is a far better place to start than a Rambo movie.

Men and Whales

Richard Ellis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 527 pp. Bib. Ulus. Ind. $40.00 ($36.00).

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Horace S. Mazet, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

The golden age of whaling, if there was one, occurred when Yankee skippers took to the seas in pursuit of various species that provided oil for reading lamps and meat and bones for other industries. Mariners on Nantucket dominated whal­ing for about 50 years until, in 1760, those living in New Bedford began sailing

south. Eventually, these whalers rounded Cape Horn and returned to Massachusetts with ships full of sperm whale oil that made fortunes for their owners. During the industrial revolution, the American sailing fleet controlled whaling world­wide. Author Richard Ellis reports: "By 1833 the American whaling navy num­bered 392 ships and more than ten thou­sand sailors. In another decade, both fig­ures would double.” This was astonishing for a young nation whose sailing ships were venturing into all the seas and both polar regions to hunt for their quarry.

With the covert help of Cuban regulars, Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas launch a devastating missile attack on a small band of American special forces. And only the extraordinary intervention of the USS Missouri can avert annihilation...

“Iverson takes a fifty-year-old dreadnought at flank speed into modern combat with the same letter- perfect realism he brought to Persian Horse."

—RICHARD HERMAN, JR., author of Warbirds,

Force of Eagles, and Firebreak

“Hot, hectic....Don’t wait for the film.”

—San Diego Union-Tribune

From the author ot Persian Horse

Now at your bookstore.

ORION BOOKS

A member of The Crown Publishing Group I

Colonel Silkett teaches in the department of corre­^sPonding studies at the U.S. Army War College. A Soviet foreign-area specialist and an infantry officer, he served one year in Vietnam.

In his comprehensive book, Ellis— who has spent more than 20 years in close proximity to sea creatures, from Labrador to Patagonia, Japan to the Azores—provides a splendid history of whaling and its economic ramifications, together with a panorama of doughty old skippers and their brushes with can­nibals and enemy ships. The numerous illustrations from old volumes, plus his own notable color paintings, capture the various species of common and extraor­dinary whales alike. One cannot find a better broad canvas than Men and Whales for a gripping history of the subject.

Colonel Mazet retired after 36 years of Navy and Marine Corps service. A graduate of Columbia Uni­versity’s Pulitzer School of Journalism, he has writ­ten five books, including (Shark! Shark! Gotham House, 1933).

Naval Officers under Hitler: The Story of Crew 34

Eric C. Rust. New York: Praeger, 1991.

175 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. $42.95 ($38.65).

Reviewed by Gary E. Weir

In the midst of the massive literature on the naval history of the Third Reich, very few books offer as much insight into the officer corps as Eric Rust’s Naval Of­ficers Under Hitler. The author unearthed archival sources at the German Federal Military Archive in Freiburg, conducted scores of interviews among the 78 sur­vivors of the crew that began their train­ing on the Baltic island of Danholm in 1934, and employed detailed question­naires to probe, individually and collec­tively, the character of Crew 34.

Professor Rust selected that crew for several reasons. Primarily, a substantial number of them survived the war, mak­ing oral histories possible. Furthermore, their experiences spanned three German governments and two navies. Raised in the turbulence of the late Weimar Re­public, they joined the Kriegsmarine shortly after witnessing the rise of Na­tional Socialism. A few of them later par­ticipated in the creation of the Bundes- marine and served the Federal Republic until their retirement. One crew member, Admiral Heinz Kiihnle, even rose to be­come commander-in-chief of the Federal German Navy.

Rust uncovered not only service and political attitudes, but also the personal­ity of the crew. This is the strength of his book: a perspective often lost in the his­torian’s preoccupation with the fascinat­ing and troubling period of transition be­tween Weimar and Hitler and the conflict that followed soon thereafter. The mid­dle-class origins of the crew, their mod­erate right-wing conservatism, their image of themselves as part of a select group of leaders, and their varied expectations of a naval career emerge from this story of their collective lives in peace, war, and retirement.

But with all of its positive attributes, this study suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, the author does not spend nearly enough time placing his work in historiographical context. At the outset, we need a much better idea of how Naval Officers under Hitler complements Hol- ger Herwig’s study of the Imperial Navy’s officer corps and books by Keith Bird and Charles Thomas on the Weimar naval experience. Whereas Rust’s one paragraph offers a clear rationale for pur­suing this subject, it is insufficient to sub­stantiate the place assumed by this work in the best literature currently available.

Second, Rust too often fails to pursue important questions raised by his own re­search and exposition, and his analysis is a bit too restrained. For example, was the Navy ever unpolitical? The Imperial naval leadership before the Great War could never truly make this claim. In spite of their assertions that the Navy should re­main unpolitical in order to avoid another disgrace like the Kiel Mutiny, admirals Erich Raeder and Karl Donitz were deeply involved in politics. To what ex­tent did the behavior of the naval lead­ership send conflicting messages to the officers under training? To what extent did this situation keep the crew politically immature and unable to address the horrible reality of Adolf Hitler? Did this immaturity af­fect the reception the Federal Republic received from many of the more conservative mem­bers of the crew?

In spite of these shortcom­ings, Rust’s is a necessary and important book. As sound so­cial history, it complements the work of others in the field through whom we seek to un­derstand the motives and atti­tudes of those molded by a Navy that wore the Nazi in­signia but was deeply rooted in the traditions of Kaiser Wil­helm II and Grand Admiral Al­fred von Tirpitz.

Dr. Weir works in the Naval Historical Center’s Contemporary History Branch. He is the author of Building American Submarines 1914-1940 (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1991) and Building the Kaiser’s Navy: The Impe­rial Naval Office and German Industry in the Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919 (An­napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press).

I

Books of Interest

By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)

American Battleships

American Battleship Association. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1991. 225 pp. Append. Bib. Figs. Illus. tnd. Photos. $45.00 ($40.50).

This tribute to the most romantic of all ships includes a wealth of photographs, a general history of battleships, comments by and about many of the veterans of battleship service, an assortment of sea stories, and individual ship histories.

The Battle of Jutland: A Bibliography

Eugene L. Rasor. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991. 191 pp. Gloss. Ind. $45.00 ($40.50).

More than 500 entries make this bibliogra­phy a useful tool for researchers who wish to know more about the famous World War I bat­tle in which the British and German grand and high seas fleets clashed. No mere listing of sources, this bibliography includes annotations and a special narrative section that provide a wealth of information.

Bismarck and Hood: Great Naval Adversaries

Paul J. Kemp. London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1991. 48 pp. Append. Photos. $9.95 ($8.95) Paper.

This compact, photo-laden book brings to life the epic World War II struggle between two great naval behemoths: the pride of the Royal Navy, HMS Hood, and the newly built Ger­man battleship Bismarck. Rare photographs and dramatic action shots reveal why this confrontation caught the imagination of the World in the spring of 1941.

Discovery in the North Atlantic: From •he 6th to 17th Century

h J. Sharp. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Nimbus Publishing, 1991. 150 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. Maps. Notes. $12.95 ($11.65) paper.

focusing on those explorers who came to the New World via the North Atlantic route, Sharp recounts the legends and the history of those who dared the unthinkable of their day by ven­turing out onto an unforgiving and sometimes treacherous sea. He reminds us that Irish and Viking adventurers appear to have preceded Columbus, and he details the contributions of John Cabot, Jacques Cartier, Sir Martin Fro­bisher, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and the Basque whalers, all of whom contributed in differing but significant ways to the exploration, settle­ment, and exploitation of North America.

Flying the Edge: The Making of Navy ^Test Pilots

George C. Wilson. Annapolis, MD: Naval mstitute Press, 1992. 325 pp. Ind. Photos. $22.00 (*16.50).

With the same penetrating insight that he brought to Supercarrier, Wilson reveals the world of the Navy test pilot. In 1991 this na­tional military correspondent for The Wash­ington Post flew many hours of test flights and spent many more hours picking the brains of the extraordinary men and women who have chosen to fly. Both the current and the his­

torical aspects of this unique profession are in­cluded as Wilson weaves together documents, anecdotes, and eyewitness and personal ac­counts to reveal a world of daring, tedium, controversy, tragedy, achievement, and awe­inspiring skill. This is an exciting and thought- provoking account that juxtaposes the com­plexities of human nature with those of leading-edge technology, and it is brought to life in a way that only George Wilson can.

Hunters in the Sky: Fighter Aces of WWH

James R. Whelan. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1991. 330 pp. Ind. Photos. $29.95 ($26.95).

A companion volume to the 13-part television documentary series of the same name, this ac­count—filled with 270 black-and-white pho­tographs— focuses on the aerial achievements of 91 World War II fighter aces. Largely an oral history tied together through an informa­tive narrative, the words are frequently those of the pilots themselves as they share their ex­periences with first-person authenticity and color.

On Course to Desert Storm:

The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf

Michael A. Palmer. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992. 225 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $11.00 ($9.90) paper.

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 has its roots in the two-centuries-old U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Dr. Palmer chronicles that in­volvement, beginning with the days of sail and continuing through the post-colonial era, when the United States became more and more em­broiled in the complex and frequently chang­ing affairs of the region. The Iran crisis of 1946, the oil scare of 1947^18, the Arab-Is- raeli wars, and the Tanker War of the late 1980s are some of the many significant events recounted and analyzed in this enlightening work.

Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up for War

Henry I. Shaw. Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1991. 25 pp. Bib. Illus. Photos. Free, paper. Order from: MCHC, Bldg. 58, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374.

This fact-filled pamphlet is part of a series that commemorates the Marines’ participation in World War II. In addition to the main article, “The Eve of War,” there are numerous side­bars that briefly discuss equipment—for ex­ample, Roebling’s “Alligator” amphibian trac­tor and the Springfield ’03 rifle—in the Marine inventory when war broke out.

Our Man in the Crimea: Commander Hugo Koehler and the Russian Civil War

P. J. Capelotti. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 232 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).

Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) describes Com­mander Koehler as an “extraordinary, myste­rious and gallant man and a terrific stepfather. That familial relationship notwithstanding, the adjectives used by the senator are right on the mark. This true-life character could just as eas­ily fit into a spy novel. Koehler’s unusual ca­reer included having command of a gunboat on the Yangtze River during the Chinese Rev­olution, being the first U.S. officer in Berlin at the close of World War I, and, most sig­nificantly, being an eyewitness of the Russian Civil War while a member of the State De­partment’s staff sent to southern Russia to evaluate the potential threat of the contending Bolsheviks.

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The Reader’s Guide to Intelligence Periodicals

Hayden B. Peake. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Book Center, 1992. 255 pp. Bib.

Illus. Ind. $12.95 ($11.65) paper.

At first glance, one might assume that Periscope is a magazine about submarine war­fare, that Lobster is a journal dedicated to the fishing industry, or that Golden Sphinx is an­other in a long list of B-grade movies. But each of these is a legitimate intelligence peri­odical, described in detail in Peake’s reference book. The guide lists “Intelligence Periodi­cals,” “Intelligence-Related Periodicals,” “In­telligence Periodicals No Longer in Print,” and others, plus intelligence databases and bibli­ographies. David Kahn, author of Seizing the

Enigma: The Race to Break the German U- Boat Codes, 1939-1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), describes this book as “far more than an essential tool for scholars, it is a wonderful read ... a browser’s delight and a reference librarian’s gold mine.”

Seaborne Deception: The History of U.S. Navy Beach Junipers

John B. Dwyer. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992. 192 pp. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $42.95 ($38.65).

The mission of the “Beach Jumpers” was to create the illusion that a selected beach was being prepared for an amphibious landing, when in fact the landing was to occur else­where. This tactical deception—initiated by actor Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.—was successful in various theaters of World War II and was used in Vietnam as well. The history of this unusual arm of the Navy is traced from its 1942 origins to its modern D-day descen­dants, the “Fleet Tactical Deception Groups.”

Game_______________________

Midway

Baltimore, MD: Avalon Hill Game Co., 1992. 226 Playing Pieces. Battle Manual. 3 Boards. $26.00.

This remake of the original game that appeared in 1964 accurately re-creates the scenario for the famous World War II battle, but then al­lows the two players to rewrite history if they can. Rated as “low” in complexity, the game is nonetheless refreshingly realistic in that the commanders must not only maneuver as in most board games, but also consider other fac­tors such as the rearming of aircraft, recon­naissance, and battle damage. Those who would dare to second-guess the likes of ad­mirals Spruance or Yamamoto will find this

game a stimulating challenge.

Other Titles of Interest

Early Exploration of the New World Postcards (Twenty-four color, historical images from the collection of the John Carter Brown Library)

Providence, RI: Brown University, 1992. $3.95 paper.

Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence (Second Edition)

Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenback, editors. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. 205 pp. $49.95 ($44.95) hardcover; $19.95 ($17.95) paper.

The Universal Man: Theodore von Karman’s Life in Aeronautics

Michael H. Gorn. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. 202 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).

U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War

Brad Roberts, editor. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1992. 367 pp. Notes. Tables. $30.00 ($27.00) paper.

Voyage of the Devilfish (A novel by a former U.S. Navy submarine officer)

Michael Dimercurio. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1992. 416 pp. $21.95 ($19.75).

Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action

John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, editors. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992. 238 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. Notes. Tables. $49.95.