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On 4 June 1991 seismic activity increased dramatically on Mt. Pinatubo—21 miles north of the U.S. Naval Facility at Subic Bay and only 10 miles east of Clark Air Force Base. In response, the joint U.S.-Philip- pines scientific team working at Clark immediately briefed Rear Admiral Thomas A. Mercer, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Representative, and Commander, U.S. Facility Subic Bay. Within a few hours, volcanologists were warning Rear Admiral Mercer that the situation may become critical. Mt. Pinatubo could do one of three things: reduce its seismic activity, remain at the same level for weeks, or quickly increase activity (indicating an imminent eruption) and pose an immediate life-threatening situation to Clark Air Base and the local community.
Rear Admiral Mercer returned to Subic Bay and began planning to host the entire Clark population of 16,000. Subic Bay housing was already filled to capacity, and the possibility of more than doubling the population left very few options.
On Sunday, 9 June, seismic activity increased over the safe threshold, indicating the likelihood of a major eruption within the next 24 hours. At 2315, the decision to evacuate Clark was announced.
The 50-mile exodus from Clark on a two-lane road to Subic Bay began at 0600 on 10 June. Air Force personnel and their families, except for a few hundred security personnel who remained behind, made the four- to five- hour bumper-to-bumper trip through the mountains. Complicating the vehicle evacuation was the public security threat directed against Americans by the communist New People’s Army. U.S. Navy and Marine helicopters flew overhead as a precautionary measure.
Evacuation processing of Air Force personnel and their families proceeded until late evening. Navy and Marine Corps families shared their small base homes with two and three Air Force families. Other evacuees slept on mattresses in the two base chapels, the day care center, school classrooms, and any corner that could fit a temporary bed. Accommodations were not luxurious, but almost the entire Department of Defense population in the Philippines was out of danger.
Some Philippines politicians and media criticized the decision to evacuate, saying that it was politically—not safety—motivated and based on an attempt by the United States to obtain an advantage in upcoming base extension negotiations. Not until 12 June did the first major eruption of Mt. Pinatubo silence the skeptics and demonstrate the wisdom and foresight behind the evacuation decision.
Overcrowding at Subic Bay was severely straining the water and food supply, and other base services, prompting a decision to evacuate all Air Force dependent personnel to the United States. No one knew it at the time, but that quick decision was a major safety measure. It allowed the Navy to steam fleet assets to Subic Bay a full 24 hours before the eruption caused the loss of all support services there.
On Friday, 14 June, the first major ash fell on Subic Bay. In the evening, rain and ash mixed together, forming a heavy, sticky substance that made roads extremely | slick. By early Saturday morning, the facility looked as 3
if it had a light dusting of snow—a rather unusual sight in the Philippines, and a false calm before the devastation that would follow shortly. The highly conductive nature of the volcanic ash was already playing havoc on the facility’s power distribution and water supply system, but the situation was manageable.
“Black Saturday” began at approximately 0930. A spectacular ash plume, clearly visible from Subic Bay, rose
- feet into the air. The major eruption that many volcanologists predicted had finally arrived. All had agreed that Subic Bay would receive ash, but far more fell on the facility than any volcanologists had predicted in their worst-case scenario. At the same time, Typhoon Yunya was racing across the island of Luzon near both bases. One volcanologist said it was a “ten-million-to-one shot” that a volcano would erupt, after lying dormant for more than 600 years—and couple with a typhoon. This destructive combination briefly and radically shifted the predicted winds, causing destructive forces that no one could have predicted.
By noon, all base power was lost. Nature was totally in control. Falling ash blocked out all sunlight, reducing visibility to zero. Earthquakes, some in excess of 5.0 on the Richter scale, continued throughout Saturday and into Sunday morning, adding to the fear of the dependent population.
By Sunday morning, the base looked as though it had been hit with a major snowfall. Had the situation not approached life and death, it would have been almost beautiful. The base had no electric power, no water, no working sanitary facilities, no emergency room capability, no refrigeration capability, impassable roads, and collapsing roofs weighed down by wet ash. There was no option but to reduce the population as quickly and as safely as possible. Operation Fiery Vigil had to accelerate.
First on the scene during the heaviest ashfall, the destroyer tender USS Cape Cod (AD-43) served as an emergency lifeline for the residents by providing fresh water, food, electrical power, repair capability, and a working emergency room. Without the Cape Cod, the situation would have quickly deteriorated, and the safety of
- Americans would have been in serious jeopardy.
The evacuation began on 16 June, with nearly 900 boarding the USS Arkansas (CGN-41), USS Rodney M. Davis (FF-60), and USS Curts (FFG- 38). The next day, another 1,700 left Subic Bay on board the USS Long Beach (CGN-9), USS Lake Champlain (CG-57), USS Merrill (DD- 976), USS Gary (FFG-51), and USNS Passumpsic (T-AO-107). The USS Peleliu (LHA-5) was designated as the primary medical evacuation ship, taking the majority of full-term pregnancies and the most serious medical cases. Subic Bay Naval Hospital medical personnel augmented the Peleliu’s medical staff. The Navy’s oldest and newest aircraft carriers—the USS Midway (CV-41) and the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)—had the space to take thousands of evacuees, whose departure from Subic Bay rapidly reduced the strain on limited base life support services.
In less than ten days, the 17 7th Fleet ships that participated in Operation Fiery Vigil were able to evacuate nearly
- individuals and send them safely on their 350- mile voyage to the southern Philippine island of Cebu. Warships had been quickly converted to cruise ships. Sailors gave up their racks for the evacuees; ships’ menus changed to hot dogs and potato chips for the children; first-class lounges became playrooms; cartoons played continuously over the ships’ televisions; razor blades were replaced by diapers in ships’ stores; games of jump rope were common on the helicopter decks; pet motels were created out of boxes, not only for dogs and cats but also a pet wolf; and rubber gloves were used as baby bottles. Many evacuees visibly wept as they boarded the ships because of the genuine concern, warm welcome, and gracious hospitality exhibited by the sailors participating in the operation. Once on board the ships, the evacuees enjoyed their first cold drink, hot meal, shower, or working toilet facility in many days. A number of babies were bom during the evacuation, including four on board the Peleliu. A mother named the one baby born on board the Abraham Lincoln “Abra-
% T9
ham,” in gratitude for the hospitality exhibited by the entire crew.
After the evacuees completed their 19-hour trip to Cebu, helicopters moved them from ships to Mactan International Airport, where Air Force transports took them to their first stop in Guam and eventual transport to the United States. At each stop along the way, naval personnel and volunteers met evacuees to address their needs, including hot meals, medical attention, phones to call family members, pay matters, transportation, and lodging. One evacuee described her experience as “living the end of the world as described in the Book of Revelations.” One volcanologist estimated the amount of ash released by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo to be six to seven times the scale of the Mt. St. Helen’s eruption inl980. No sailor or evacuee who saw the destruction and ash on the ground would argue with that estimate.
Tragically, a collapsing roof killed one Air Force dependent and one Filipino during “Black Saturday.” Quick and heroic action curtailed further casualties. At the height of the ash fall, 40 people living and sleeping in the Cubi Point Naval Air Station chapel were moved to a stronger building only hours before that roof collapsed. Excepting only minor injuries, nearly
- personnel, in perhaps the biggest peacetime evacuation, escaped without incident.
This humanitarian operation was unique in that it involved Navy family members, and not an unfamiliar population. The participating sailors treated the evacuees as if they were their own family members, and their genuine concern was clearly evident.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II sent a message to all naval personnel on 25 June 1991, stating that “I continue to be impressed by the responsiveness and flexibility of our forces. This unprecedented Philippine undertaking is no exception.”
Lieutenant Commander Mukri is currently public affairs officer at Headquarters, Naval Investigative Service Command, in Washington, b.C. During Operation Fiery Vigil, he was public affairs officer, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines, based at U.S. Facility Subic Bay.
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