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% Lieutenant Sanjay J. Singh, Indian Navy
The failure of Iraq’s maritime strategy in the Gulf War sends a message to other Indian Ocean nations relying on brown- Water defenses. Lacking an integrated air- defense capability at sea, Iraq was extremely vulnerable to hostile air power. Tor one, the Royal Navy's Lynx helicopter, armed with Sea Skua antiship missiles— here, launching from HMS Cardiff— terrorized the tiny Iraqi Navy.
The recent war in the Gulf between Coalition forces and Iraq witnessed the latter’s destruction as a regional power. The allied offensive was a brilliant campaign, with coordinated employment of all four dimensions of war. The war altered the regional military balance and will influence global political and economic environments. It also will reshape current military thought and tactical doctrines, including the maritime strategies the Indian Ocean states. One reason is the effortless destruction of the Iraqi Navy by the allied forces. This ^■ll have a significant impact on other navies with similar geopolitical environments and maritime security perceptions. The Gulf War was the first clash between blue- water and brown-water navies in recent times, and the reasons behind the total failure of Iraq’s brown-water strategy are of immense importance to the Indian Ocean navies.
From the outset, Iraq followed an inadequate maritime strategy that ignored the geographical imperatives of the region. Iraq has only a 29-kilometer coastline and limited port facilities. Despite this, more than 90% of its trade, except oil, was carried by sea. Because of the Iran-Iraq tanker war, Iraq exported about 80% of its oil through pipelines—across Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey—to ports in the Red and Mediterranean seas. After the closure of those pipelines and the enforcement of an air embargo—in response to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 661 and 670, respectively—Iraq became totally dependent upon its sea-lanes for survival.
The Iraqi Navy, however, lacked the capability to protect its sea-lanes, even within the waters of the Persian Gulf, which are relatively restricted and where Iraq’s sea- lanes, therefore, are more vulnerable to interdiction. Iraq possibly realized the vulnerabilities in its maritime strategy, and its misplaced efforts to reduce those vulnerabilities and increase its maritime bases—through acquiring the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan—in fact were a major factor leading to the Gulf War. As the Iraqi Navy had neither sea-control nor sea-denial capability (see Table 1), sea control of the Persian Gulf passed unchallenged into allied hands, and the Coalition’s military buildup contin-
Table 1 Iraqi Navy Major Forces Ships | |
Frigates | 1 (+4*) |
Landing Ships | 3 |
Corvettes | 6 |
FAC (Missile) | 7 6 (Ex-Kuwaiti) |
FAC (Torpedo) | 6 |
♦remained (undelivered) in Italian ports through the war | |
Aircraft | |
Mirage FI | 64 |
Tu-16 | 16 |
Missiles | |
SSM (Coastal) | Chinese Silkworm |
ASM | French AM-39 Exocet |
ued unhindered. An international naval force was able to interdict Iraq’s sea-lanes of trade and communication, and the blockade began to affect Iraq seriously after a few months. The Coalition opted for a military solution at this stage, but Iraq’s weak maritime strategy could have been exploited further to effect its surrender.
After commencement of military operations by the Coalition, the Iraqi Navy did attempt to venture out into the Persian Gulf, but was easily annihilated by the allied naval forces. The chief architect of this destruction was the Royal Navy’s Lynx helicopter, which used Sea Skua antiship sea-skimming missiles to sink or cripple at least 13 Iraqi warships. The U.S. Navy A-6 Intruder was the next biggest killer. Integrated allied naval air power thus exploded the credibility of brown-water defense and the fast-attack-craft (FAC) myth.
Iraq's armory of 400 AM-39 Exocets could not be used in the face of overwhelming allied air superiority. In fact, Iraq launched only one maritime air strike, which was unsuccessful—the Mirage FI was intercepted and shot down by a U.S. Navy combat air patrol. The allied forces also operated beyond the range of Iraq’s coastal surface-to-surface missiles. Iraq was able to launch only a single Silk-
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| Table 2 Composition of Principal Indian Ocean Navies |
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|
|
| A. Surface Forces |
|
|
| Aircraft |
|
| Corvettes | % |
Country | Carriers | Submarines | Destroyers Frigates | FAC | Total Coastal |
Australia | — | 6 | 3 7 | 18 | 34 52.9% |
Egypt | — | 8 | 1 4 | 39 | 52 75% |
India | 2 | 15 | 5 18 | 43 | 83 51.8% |
Indonesia | — | 2 | — 16 | 27 | 45 60% |
Iran | — | 2* | 3 3 | 21 | 29 72.4% |
Malaysia | — |
| — 4 | 37 | 41 90.2% |
Pakistan | — | 6(+3*) | 7 10 | 21 | 47 44.7% |
♦Midget Submarine | ® Two being acquired |
|
|
| |
|
| B. Aerial Maritime Strike Forces |
|
| |
Country |
|
| Aircraft |
| Missiles |
Australia |
|
| 22 F-111C |
| AGM-84 Harpoon |
|
|
| 20 P-3C Orion |
| AGM-84 Harpoon |
|
|
| 72 F-18 |
| AGM-84 Harpoon AGM-65 Maverick |
Egypt |
|
| 16 TU-16 |
| Kangaroo, Kitchen |
India |
|
| 8 Jaguars |
| Sea Eagle |
|
|
| 31 Sea Harriers |
| Sea Eagle |
|
|
| 20 Sea Kings |
| Sea Eagle |
Iran |
|
| 2 P-3F Orion |
| — |
New Zealand |
|
| 6 P-3K Orion |
| — |
Pakistan |
|
| 4 Atlantic |
| AM-39 Exocet |
|
|
| 12 Mirage V |
| AM-39 Exocet |
|
|
| 8 Fokker F-27 3 P-3B 3 P-3C* |
| AM-39 Exocet |
♦being acquired |
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|
|
|
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The only reasonable success achieved by the Iraqi Navy 1 Was through mine warfare. Iraq carried out extensive min- ,ng of the northern Gulf and Kuwaiti waters. The allies
- °Perated about ten minesweeping ships and several
i ^'nesweeping helicopters continuously from August » 1990 to clear these mines, and the number of minesweep-
- 'ng units was doubled in later months, including rein- l°rcements from NATO. Iraq estimated that it laid 1,200
nines during the war; allied naval units reportedly sighted 225 and destroyed 133. The bulk of these mines were the old contact-explosion version, but they, nevertheless, Proved quite effective. On 17 February 1991, the am. Phibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and the Aegis Cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) struck such mines and Were damaged. Allied mine-countermeasures groups are still operating in the Gulf to clear Iraqi mines.
The naval war also saw the emergence of the Tomahawk cruise missile as a major component of sea power. Some 296 Tomahawks were used in the war, against seated targets in Iraq and Kuwait—including the Iraqi Pres- rdential Palace and command-and-control centers—with devastating effect. Only 5% of these missiles failed at 'aunch or en route, while 85% struck their intended tar- Sets. The amazing accuracy of the cruise missile, coupled w'th the difficulty of defending against it, make it a
- major threat in any modern theater of operations. .The Scope of this weapon is illustrated by the fact that several Tomahawks were launched from ships and submarines ln the Red Sea and flew across Saudi Arabia to hit their targets in Iraq/Kuwait—at distances approaching 1,300 Kilometers—with complete precision.
Cruise missiles (whose maximum range approaches 2-500 kilometers) and integrated air power call into ques- 11 °n the credibility of a brown-water strategy for defense even a nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty, let alone its sea-lanes and other maritime concerns. Indian ^cean navies, which have a penchant for brown-water de- ense, must review the geographical imperatives and the cultural and historical influences of the region.
The Indian Ocean is enclosed by land, and can be compared to a giant lake with four channels of access. In me north are two narrow choke points, at the Suez Canal ar|d the Malacca Strait, and in the south are two broad gateways near Australia and the Cape of Good Hope.
here are 47 nations on the Indian Ocean littoral, all of
The extensive Coalition efforts necessary to clear Iraqi mines—here, a Japanese Navy diver during Gulf War minesweeping operations—demonstrated the effectiveness of this low-cost, low-technology defense. They also revealed the Indian Ocean’s vulnerability to minelaying and the need for expansion of regional minesweeping forces.
which (with the possible exception of Australia) belong to the less-developed or developing categories. Further, almost all of these states are former colonies of Western powers that remained colonized for the better part of the 19th and 20th centuries. Consequently, these are nascent nation-states that have been plagued by political, economic, and even social and ethnic uncertainties. In their search for nation/statehood they have, as a matter of course, faced turbulence—a phenomenon experienced by the developed world only a few centuries ago—including disputes with neighbors, insurgencies and secessionist movements, attempted coups, and religious and ethnic strife.
The growing economic importance of the seas and the strategic value of the Indian Ocean to the developed world also has resulted in an ever-increasing militarization of the region by extra-regional powers. This has increased further the possibility of conflict. It is significant that, in more than 200 wars fought since World War II, 150 or more were fought in the Third World (with the United States alone contributing to at least 460 incidents of intervention in Third World affairs in the last four decades).
The geopolitical and geostrategic considerations for peace in the Indian Ocean demand strong regional forces, capable of safeguarding their national security. Particular emphasis must be placed on a sound maritime strategy.
Because of financial constraints, naval development in these countries has been along defensive lines—except where influenced by Western coalition strategies—meaning brown-water strategies generally have been adopted. Table 2 shows the compositions of some Indian Ocean navies. Their brown-water nature is evident from their modest size and also from the fact that fast-attack and coastal craft are considered the backbone of their maritime forces, forming more than 50% of the respective navies. The only exception to this pattern is Pakistan which, incidentally, has the smallest coastline and fewest maritime concerns of all these nations.
The two most formidable naval air strike forces also belong to Australia and Pakistan. The latter’s offensive maritime force, in contrast to other regional navies in nature, benefited from Western coalition strategy. It is ironic, however, that Pakistan did not abide by the coalition principle in the end and refused to send any naval forces to the Gulf— not even the eight Brooke- and Garcia-class frigates on lease from the United States under this very strategy. Nevertheless, Pakistan is the only Indian Ocean state with a maritime capability commensurate with, if not more than, its genuine security concerns.
On the other hand, Indian Ocean navies not aligned with Western military strategy will have to revise their maritime strategies in light of new threats revealed in this war. The weakest points are the overreliance on guided-mis- sile patrol boats for defense, and the lack of an integrated
53
air-defense capability at sea. This renders the bulk of the regional navies totally vulnerable to hostile air power—a lesson learned the hard way by Iraq. While Royal Navy Lynx helicopters were, on occasion, hovering a mere three kilometers from Iraqi missile boats, the latter were unable to prevent their own destruction.
The vulnerability of fast-attack boats to airborne threats demands a shift in policy, to operate them under our own air superiority—both on the high seas and within range of land-based air power—and fitting air-defense systems to provide at least point-defense capability. Because of their limited operating range, missile boats are intrinsically incapable of safeguarding a nation’s sea-lanes. A transition to blue-water forces may not be financially feasible for the less-developed and developing states in the Indian Ocean, but a compromise on light frigates capable of embarking light helicopters may be necessary.
Another area for development is aerial maritime strike capability. The potential of sea-skimming antiship missiles (ASMs) can be exploited best if the launch platform is airborne because of its enhanced flexibility, speed, and range of operation. The potency of this weapon has been seen in naval conflicts within the last decade. Fitting ASMs on shipbome helicopters would be a force multiplier that merits serious consideration.
The other new seaborne threat is from cruise missiles. Evidently, these weapons would provide a strong deterrent. Some Indian Ocean states have been pursuing missile development programs, but the probability of their attaining state-of-the-art sensor and homing technology in the near future without external assistance is not very high. On another front, the land-attack version of the cruise missile is an excellent tool for exercising gunboat diplomacy.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, some Western literature has been suggesting that certain Indian Ocean states—e.g., Iran and India—pose a future threat to their interests in the region, thus requiring a continuation of the cruise-missile strategy. Considering the developing status of these states, as well as their nonprovocative defenses, such suggestions are out of place.
The implications of this Western view must, however, be considered and a modicum of defense found. The most effective defense against the cruise missile would, of course, be destruction of the weapon platform before launch, but that would require the ability to sanitize the waters up to a distance at sea from which the weapons could be fired, i.e., about 2,500 kilometers. This would entail major expenditures, and may even prove counterproductive because of its apparently provocative posture.
A more feasible and less costly alternative would be the development of a strong sea-denial capability. This could include a potent submarine force, long-range maritime reconnaissance, and strike and antisubmarine warfare aircraft. This would raise the cost of intervention for external powers and provide a degree of deterrence.
The success of Iraqi mine warfare demonstrates the effectiveness of this low-cost, low-technology weapon. Considering the narrow access to the Indian Ocean, particularly the two northern choke points, the littoral nations are vulnerable to hostile—even terrorist—mining of these restricted waters. Regional minesweeping forces are in need of expansion, in light of the fact that, six months after they began, allies were still clearing Iraqi mines from the Gulf, despite their advanced technology and the relative obsolescence of the mines.
The principal navies in the Indian Ocean should draw lessons from the Gulf conflict and take suitable measures to meet their security requirements. But, the issue of the security of small states in the region will require coordinated action. These states are vulnerable to hostile action by even a handful of terrorists, as in the case of Maldives (1987) and Comoros (1989).
While the Gulf War had the largest number of participating nations—directly or indirectly—since World War II, this stemmed more from the war’s strategic implications for the developed nations: Iraq had gained control of 20% of the world’s oil production and threatened 60% of the world’s oil reserves. The Third World nations faced greater financial hardship, though, and, in any issue involving peace and stability in the Indian Ocean, the regional states will always have a bigger stake. There is a need for regional states to have a greater say in regional affairs, and foremost among these must be the security considerations in the Indian Ocean in the postwar scenario-
The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept was first voiced by Sri Lanka in 1964, and was supported by India in succeeding years. But, the concept did not find favor in the developed world, and the region experienced growing militarization from foreign forces in the region and their provision of arms to coalition states. The massive influx of weapons into Iraq from the developed world enabled the former to become a regional power and adopt an aggressive posture. While the U.S.-led coalition managed to liberate Kuwait, albeit at tremendous cost, it cannot guarantee the security of all small states in the region. Peace in the region is imperative for the progress of the littoral states, and the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept, suitably modified, could provide a framework.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States has accepted in principle the concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf. But this is limited in scope and ignores the imperatives of peace of the Indian Ocean. The principle of collective security could be expanded under the U.N. Charter to include the entire Indian Ocean, with regional states looking toward their own defense. This may entail joint-defense agreements among Indian Ocean states, drawing largely upon the navies of Australia- Egypt, France—which has several Indian Ocean territories—India, and Pakistan. This could provide a collective security arrangement in the region, especially with U.S. participation, and would cater to the security of all littoral states, including small states and less-developed countries. It would further preclude gunboat diplomacy and the arbitrary exercise of power by any state.
Lieutenant Sanjay J. Singh was commissioned in the Indian Navy on ' July 1986, and has served as a deck officer on board various ships. He is presently serving with the Indian Coast Guard.