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The Coalition victory in the Persian Gulf War represented what some called the triumph of the silicon chip over steel. It demonstrated that a force equipped with high-technology weapons can decisively defeat an equally large force equipped with less sophisti- eated weapons. As the U.S. military continues to shrink, high-technology weapons will be the key to maintaining hs superiority on the battlefield. To maintain this technological edge, the United States must maintain an adequate defense industrial base.
But the future of one part of the U.S. military’s technological edge and the U.S. defense industrial base was Placed in jeopardy on 31 January 1991, when Secretary °f Defense Dick Cheney announced the termination of ,e Seawolf (SSN-21) nuclear-powered attack subulate program and the cancellation of the previously Unded second and third Seawolf?, (the construction of the lrst Seawolf—already under way—would be completed j^uder this proposal). If these decisions are approved by 0ngress, the United States will not build any new submarines until the end of the century—at the earliest— "'hen work on the smaller Centurion-class submarines is Scheduled to begin.
But at least a small force of Seawolfs is needed to punter the increasingly sophisticated submarines of po- j. ntlal adversaries, to provide an advanced “silver-bullet” „ rce, and to ensure the continuing vitality of the U.S. de- eUse industrial base.
The
Reasons
Why
By Joseph I. Lieberman
Canceling the Seawolf program will save some money in the short run. But what about the long-term costs in terms of the defense industrial base, the future of the submarine force—and U.S. national security?
The Continued Threat
Concerns about the proliferation of weapons technology have focused on the development of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological. However, the spread of advanced submarines and submarine technology across the globe—20 Third World countries now operate submarines larger than mini-subs—constitutes a major problem as well.
Third World countries buy advanced conventional submarines because they want effective counters to surface naval power. Operating on battery power, conventional submarines are virtually silent and, therefore, more difficult to track. Recent propulsion-system advances have increased their submerged endurance.
Russia has sold submarines—including some of the advanced Kilo class—to India, Algeria, Libya, and Syria. Whatever the eventual form of the Russian government, continuing economic pressures will force it to continue exporting advanced submarines to the Third World. Rear Admiral E. J. Sheafer, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, has reported that Iran is negotiating the purchase of five Russian mini-submarines to add to the two Kilo-class boats that may be delivered as early as this summer. Other European countries—particularly Germany— have been exporting submarines, too. A few Third World countries, including North Korea, have begun to manufacture their own submarines, some of which will eventually be exported.
The possibility of a renewed Russian military threat cannot be discounted. If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate, the present leadership could be replaced by extreme nationalists, who might be tempted to blame the West for Russia’s domestic troubles. Such a government would have the entire Russian military-industrial complex—including all of the submarine production facilities of the former Soviet Union—under its control. Russian- built submarines partially closed the quality gap with U.S. boats during the 1980s because of crucial intelligence procured by the Soviets through the Walker spy ring and the illegal diversion of submarine-related technology.
The strategic implications of such developments could be significant. In the Persian Gulf War, 95% of U.S. military equipment and supplies traveled by sea. Protecting this vital seaborne traffic from even a handful of Iraqi submarines would have required a significant effort by Coalition naval forces. The usual problems of antisubmarine warfare would have been exacerbated by the shallowness of the Persian Gulf—sonar signals would easily bounce off the bottom—and the high noise levels produced by ships and oil rigs that would have masked the presence of submarines.
Why the Seawolf?
A fundamental reason for building Seawolf is that it will be the best submarine in the world.
The Seawolf can carry twice the number of Tomahawk cruise missiles as existing U.S. attack submarines. These precision-guided weapons proved their value during the Gulf War. If they had been available in sufficient numbers in 1986, Libya could have been attacked without risking the lives of U.S. aviators. Surface ships can fire cruise missiles, but they are far more visible and vulnerable to attack and, therefore, must operate at a much greater range than a submerged submarine.
The revolutionary BSY-2 combat electronics system will give the Seawolf critical new antisubmarine capabilities. With the proliferation of advanced submarines throughout the Third World, it is no longer enough for a U.S. submarine captain to know where a particular submarine was built. He must be able to distinguish a submarine by its owner—not just its producer. The BSY-2’s improved sonar—which has three times the detection ca- j pability of the sonar of the Improved-La? Angeles (SSN- 688) class—and its improved information-processing systems will allow a Seawolf to detect, track, identify, and attack even the most advanced submarines.
Lowering noise is a key factor in reducing a submarine’s vulnerability to enemy forces, and the Seawolf will be very quiet. Using high-strength composite materials, nearly every piece of auxiliary equipment has been redesigned to lower noise and improve system performance. For example, the Seawolf design incorporates: specially designed hydraulic pumps and valves, special bear- 1 ings in major pumps, an entirely new oxygen generator, j and quieted air conditioning plants and drain pumps. Its propulsion system and advanced propeller—the propul- | sor—will make it ten times quieter over its full range of operating speeds than the Improved-Lo? Angeles class and 70 times quieter than the first generation of the Los Angeles class.
A submarine’s “tactical speed”—the rate at which a i submarine can cruise, remain undetected, and track enemy submarines—is a critical measure. The advances in sonar, j information processing, and propulsion incorporated into the Seawolf will give it twice the tactical speed of the Improved-Lo? Angeles class. The same propulsion improvements that give the Seawolf its increased tactical speed also provide a higher spurt speed and greater maneuverability than the Improved-La? Angeles class. For exam- | pie, the Seawolf actually has a tighter turning radius than an Improved-Lo? Angeles-class boat.
As technology progresses, the submarine of the future must have the interior room to fit new advanced sys- terns. And, here the relatively smaller size of the Improved- j Los Ange/es-class boats would pose a problem. Their torpedo and missile tubes are designed for current weapons; j the tubes of the Seawolf can accommodate both current and larger future weapons. The Seawolf also has the room to fit the new generations of electronics and fire-control j systems; the Improved-Lav Angeles class does not.
Seawolf: The Silver Bullet
Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has endorsed the development of silver-bullet forces—systems capable of handling a wide array of the most difficult operations—-much like the F-l 17A stealth fighter, which was assigned some
ber of firms, located throughout the United States. The de facto eight-year construction gap—from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1997—would put enormous pressure on the 5,000 second- and third-tier contractors that manufacture other vital submarine components. Many of these firms are relatively small and specialized and would not be able to survive an eight-year suspension of new orders, if they disappear, the shipyards would have to seek foreign suppliers for some key components—an unacceptable option for such a militarily sensitive technology— 0r the Navy would have to halt all submarine construction.
Ending the Seawolf program would also jeopardize [he sole remaining U.S. nuclear ship-fuel producer. The ^avy, in essence, has become the industrial base for nuclear fuel materials. In the past, with a robust commercial nuclear power industry, we saw an ebb-and-flow of per
source for submarine design and construction technology.”
Electric Boat has been on the cutting edge of submarine technology since the beginning of this century. It was responsible for developing the first submarine, the first submarine with a welded hull, the first nuclear-powered boat, and the first fleet ballistic-missile submarine. Electric Boat also developed the modular construction system hull sections of a submarine are built at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, and then shipped to Groton, Connecticut, for assembly. This method is far less expensive and cumbersome than the traditional keel-up method.
Finally, Electric Boat has designed all but one of the U.S. Navy’s nuclear reactor plants—the most important and most difficult part of a submarine to construct. The continuing ability to build and service existing reactor plants will be crucial to the U.S. submarine industrial base.
of the most difficult air missions during the Gulf War.
A small number of Seawolf submarines would be an excellent seagoing silver-bullet force. The previously mentioned cruise-missile capacity of the Seawolf would make it a superb strike platform. It would also have the flexibility to perform non-strike missions: operating unmanned underwater vehicles, transporting special-warfare personnel, and the more traditional submarine missions—antisurface and antisubmarine warfare (the Seawolf w'\W carry twice as many torpedoes as the Los Angeles-class boats).
The Fragile Submarine Industrial Base
In the past, U.S. industry could shift easily and rapidly from producing civilian goods to military weapons. However, with weapons becoming more complex, the days of an automobile company changing quickly from building cars to turning out tanks and aircraft are long over. Building high-technology weapons requires developing and maintaining a strong network of suppliers and a highly skilled, experienced work force. If such a network falls into disuse or such a work force is dispersed, it is difficult to rebuild—and almost impossible to rebuild rapidly.
If the Seawolf program is terminated, the U-S. Navy will not procure any new-design submarines until the end of this decade. Such a hiatus would severely damage the entire U.S. submarine-industrial base. The shipyard and assembly lines of Electric Boat represent just the tip of the iceberg; many of the advanced electronic components are produced by a num sonnel between the commercial and industrial sectors. That is no longer the case.
The U.S. submarine industrial base also depends on a vital brain trust of designers, technicians, engineers, and skilled workers. Certainly, if Seawolf is canceled, many of these talented people would quickly seek employment elsewhere. And, the residual uncertainty about long-range employment prospects would discourage other talent from remaining—or becoming involved—in the industry.
If no submarines are built at Electric Boat until the end of the decade, its excellent production capabilities would erode and possibly vanish. To reconstitute Electric Boat after almost a decade in mothballs would be an enormously expensive and dangerously time-consuming operation.
Some have argued that Electric Boat could be shut down and all submarine work transferred to Newport News Shipbuilding without any damage to the national interest. However, Newport News Shipbuilding was brought into the submarine construction business during the 1980s—when
often three attack submarines were being built a year____
in order to create more competition. Newport News Shipbuilding has done a splendid job building aircraft carriers, but it has never been—nor has it ever aspired to be—the nation’s premier submarine yard. That always has been Electric Boat’s role.
As Admiral Bruce DeMars. Director Naval Nuclear Propulsion, stated in his March 1992 Report on Preservation of U.S. Submarine Capability. “By virtue of vast experience and innovation, the yard [Electric Boat] is, without question, the world’s premier re
The Real Cost of Fewer Seawolfs
Those proposing an end to the Seawolf program have not examined the transition problems this would create for the development of the Centurion submarine.
Admiral DeMars addressed this concern in the aforementioned report: “Centurion development and construction depend on experienced shipbuilder and component manufacturers whose survival, in turn, depends on at least a minimal submarine construction program. Without at least a minimal submarine construction program, the Navy will lose the highly specialized industrial infrastructure needed to build these ships. In many cases, there is no commercial demand for comparable skills; the Navy must continue to build submarines at at least a low rate.”
The unit cost of a submarine largely depends on the number of boats moving down the shipyard’s assembly line.
High-volume production reduces radically the price-per-boat because it spreads overhead and development costs and allows the systematic introduction of economies of scale.
At a production rate of one Seawolf per year, workers who have finished a job on one boat can be rotated to the same job on the next boat without requiring retraining. During the Trident program—which was
funded at one submarine per year—man-hours per boat were reduced by 55% after the first boat, because workers performed the same job on subsequent boats. If Seawolf is built at a rate of less than one per year, not only would workers have to be retrained time and time again, but the cost of a single Seawolf would increase by at least $400 million. The elimination of an efficient construction rate, as now seems certain for Seawolf, will not only sharply increase its per-unit cost, but will have grave implications for any follow-on construction.
If the Seawolf is canceled because of its price tag, the costs of developing and building the Centurion will include modernizing U.S. shipyards, rebuilding the lower tiers of the U.S. submarine industrial base, and training
a new skilled workforce. Those costs might very well make the building of the cheaper submarine prohibitively expensive. Keeping active the trained and experienced work force and production facilities of Electric Boat will allow the Navy to make a smoother— and far less expensive— transition to the Centurion class as well as incorporate in the Centurion new techniques developed and technological advances made during construction of the Seawolf
Conclusion
The United States is a maritime nation. It must maintain its technological advantage over the navies of other nations. The Sea wolf represents a breakthrough in advanced technology, where the U.S. military holds a decided edge. This edge would be maintained by developing at least some Seawolfs as the supreme undersea warfare weapon and as a seagoing silver- bullet force.
The continued production of a base level of Seawolfs will ensure that the United States has a modern submarine fleet and submarine industrial base for the 21st century. Ending the Seawolf program would place the Navy’s premier attack weapon system in harm s way, damage the defense industrial base, and jeopardize the future ability of the United States to build submarines. We would be allowing a short-term budgetary decision to turn into a long-term security problem.
Mr. Lieberman is the junior U.S. Senator from Connecticut.