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Members of a Marine shore party battalion work on a river-crossing site in Korea in January 1952.
In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953
John Toland. New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1991. 624 pp. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired)
A book on the Korean War is always welcome, especially when that war is fading even further into obscurity in the wake of the Persian Gulf conflict. And, true to his reputation, John Toland (who Won the Pulitzer Prize for his World War II epic, The Rising Sun) has written a most readable popular history of the Korean War.
Unlike the two best such histories— Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War (Doubleday/Anchor Press, 1989) and T. R. Fehrenbach’s recently republished classic, This Kind of War (Bantam Books, 1991), which both concentrate on Army combat actions—Toland takes a closer look at Marine actions. One of his primary narrators is Marine Colonel Robert Taplett, Korean War commander of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, as well as eight of Taplett’s enlisted men, two of his officers, and a dozen Marine associates.
For the first time we get not only an account of the Inchon landings and the Chosin Reservoir withdrawal (both covered in detail in other works), but also a look at the early battles of the First Provisional Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter. Another first is an account of special operations, including the exploits behind enemy lines of Navy Lieutenant Eugene Clark and his Korean irregulars.
Unlike most Korean War histories, Toland does not end his account with the end of the war of maneuver and the beginning of the peace talks in 1951. Rather, he devotes the last 130 pages of bis 624-page book to the two-year armistice negotiations (in particular, the bey issue of forced repatriation of POWs) and to the bloody outpost war from November 1951 to July 1953, which according to official Marine Corps history accounted for 1,586 Marine KIAs, or ^9.6% of the infantry Marines killed in *be entire war.
Toland also talks at length with South Korean General Paik Sun-yup and with former Chinese Communist Force soldiers, including those who refused repatriation and are now living in Taiwan. And he claims to have information that North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung had advance knowledge from China of the Inchon invasion. “There would have been panic aboard [General Douglas] Mac Arthur’s ship if they had known,” Toland writes.
Hardly. As with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and his battle plan in the Persian Gulf, surprise does not mean taking the enemy unaware. It means striking him in such a manner that even if he does know the attack is coming, he still can’t do anything about it. With Kim Il-sung's divisions already committed to the attack on the Pusan Perimeter, that’s just what General MacArthur did.
A strange note to me is Toland’s attempt to make a hero out of Army General Walton Walker, who commanded the Eighth U.S. Army from the start of the war until his untimely death in a jeep accident in December 1950. I was a corporal on the line in the Naktong Perimeter in July 1950, and my lasting recollection of Walker was his “fight to the last man” speech made shortly before he himself caught the next plane for Japan.
Be that as it may, In Mortal Combat is a valuable contribution to the scanty literature on the Korean War. That midintensity Asian conflict (as Desert Storm recently made clear) provides the most likely model for future U.S. military involvement. We ignore its lessons—especially those on unpreparedness—at our peril.
An infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Colonel Summers is the author of Facts on File’s Korean War Almanac (1990) and Vietnam War Almanac (1985) and both On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Presidio Press, 1982) and On Strategy It: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (Dell Publishing, 1992).
The Lessons of History
Michael Howard. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. 217 pp. Ind. Notes. $27.50 ($24.75).
Reviewed by Captain Paul R. Schratz, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Michael Howard resigned from one of the most prestigious academic posts in Britain—namely, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford—to become the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale. Most of the pieces in The Lessons of History were written at Oxford. Most, too, have a common focus: not so much the study of war as of the deeper processes of historical change from which the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries originated. The evolution of nations, the transformation of agrarian into industrial societies, the process of modernization and the growing pains of industrial societies, and the rise of mass communications and universal education have all raised and transformed the level of political consciousness. This was the political womb, to use Karl von Clausewitz’s analogy, within which the embryo of 20th-century warfare was incubated.
Historians may claim to teach lessons, but history does not. There is no such thing as history, only what historians write, and they are part of the process they are writing about. The lessons they are entitled to teach are: first, not to generalize from false premises based on inadequate evidence. Professor Howard repeatedly shows how decisions and policies that had disastrous consequences grew out of perfectly reasonable conclusions and calculations by well-meaning and responsible people. The military doctrines and tactics that gave rise to the terrible slaughter of the World Wars were the result of neither ignorance nor incompetence, but grew out of careful study by the military staffs of the supposed lessons of previous conflicts.
Second, the past is a foreign country; there is little we can say about it until we have learned its language and understood its assumptions. Great care is required in deriving conclusions and applying them to our day.
Third, historians must teach the importance of comprehending cultural' diversity and equipping themselves to cope with it. British colonial “experts,” believing they knew best the real needs and desires of more “backward” peoples, unleashed forces of xenophobia, resentment, hatred, and fanaticism that are still with us.
The fourth is the most somber lesson: the vulnerability of the social framework within which historians ply their trade. In some countries, the historian must abolish the past; professional survival depends on erecting in its place a socially convenient myth that one must then defend and embellish.
Only with great care, therefore, can one relate lessons of the past to present conditions. For example, the British-German arms race at the turn of the century—well developed herein—inevitably prompts comparison with the extensive arms race in the Cold War 50 years later.
Professor Howard's Lessons caution new policy elites who:
“almost boastfully ignorant of their knowledge of any world save their own, acquire authority in some of the most powerful states in the world. . . . people often of masterful intelligence, trained usually in law or economics or perhaps in political science, who have led their governments into disastrous decisions and miscalculations because they have no awareness whatever of the historical background, the cultural universe, of the foreign societies with which they have to deal. It is an awareness for which no amount of strategic or economic analysis, no techniques of crisis management or conflict resolution . . . can provide a substitute. Such miscalculations are always dangerous. In our own day they may be lethal on a very large scale indeed.”
A graduate and former faculty member of three senior war colleges, Captain Schratz is a frequent contributor to Proceedings. His review of The Art of War appeared in the June 1991 issue.
Fortunate Son: The Autobiography of Lewis B.
Puller, Jr.
Lewis B. Puller, Jr. New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1991. 373 pp. Ind. $21 95 ($19.75).
Reviewed by Colonel John E.
Greenwood, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Lewis Burwell Puller is a legend among Marines. To this day, a mention of “Chesty” brings “arrugahs” from the ranks. And no wonder, for Puller was a remarkable Marine. In 37 years of service (1918-1955), which included combat operations in Haiti, Nicaragua, Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and the Inchon and Chosin Reservoir campaigns, he won five Navy Crosses for heroism—a singular achievement.
But this is not a book by or about the legendary Chesty Puller. Rather, it is a remarkable and memorable autobiography by his only son and namesake, Lewis B. Puller, Jr. Born late in his father’s life, young Puller was part of the Vietnam generation. He received a stu- | dent deferment to attend William and Mary College, and upon graduation in 1967 he willingly followed his father’s footsteps into the Corps—but for a career destined to be vastly shorter and profoundly tragic.
After completing Officer Candidate School and The Basic School, he went immediately to Vietnam, where he served as a platoon commander in the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Less than three months later, on 11 October 1968, he was horribly wounded by a booby- trapped howitzer round: instantly losing his right leg at the torso, his left above the knee, his left hand, and two fingers of his right hand, in addition to suffering numerous fragment wounds throughout the remainder of his body. His miraculous survival and agonizing adjustment to circumstances that left him “forever set apart from the rest of humanity” stand as testimonials to his strength of character, to the quality of Navy medical care at every level, and to the support of his wife, Toddy.
In this Pulitzer Prize-winning autobiography, Puller relates the decisive events in his life in a straightforward, chronological account. He devotes a single chapter to his youth, another to his Marine Corps training and courtship of i Toddy, two chapters to his Vietnam service, two to his long convalescence, and ] the final chapters (some 125 pages) to the readjustments of his life: earning a law degree, waging a losing campaign ( for the House of Representatives, bouts ! with alcoholism and severe depression, and his changing attitudes toward the Vietnam War.
Puller presents his story with abundant I skill. He writes with clarity, crispness, and feeling; with well-chosen words and without literary pretensions. He is candid, open, and willing to share his most personal feelings. He shuns self-pity, ! preaching, interpreting, and overanalyz- i ing. Readers are drawn into his experi- j ences and become emotionally involved with almost every phase of the story.
What makes the book exceptional are , the underlying themes that quietly emerge, without pedantry, without theorizing, from Puller’s account. They appear—unannounced and unforced—as the reader reflects on what he has read, just as insights appear from life itself. A son’s view of a legendary father, the father’s i values, and the calling to which the father had dedicated his life; the father’s feeling toward the son whose life he had
Three generations of Pullers—Chesty, Lewis, and Lewpy—in 1969. The first time Lewis, Junior, saw his father cry was when the soon-to-be Purple Heart recipient departed for Vietnam the year before.
so decisively influenced; the story of Toddy, a woman of passion, strength, and intuitive wisdom as she handled adversity; an appreciation of the course of tamily life and death—father, son, grandson; the fate of inherited values when put to the severest of tests.
Disillusioned by the reality that he was maimed for life, depressed by the loss of a dozen friends in the war, angered that the sacrifices of those who served in Vietnam should be so meaningless, Puller struggled for more than a decade to find Peace of mind. For years alcohol deadened the pain and delayed the healing. A notable measure of relief seemed to come with the dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial:
I . . . came to understand how inextricably linked the memorial and I Were by the bloodshed of my brothers—I, an insignificant speck on the continuum of history; the memorial, Panoramic in its sweep, eternal, dark, silent, embracing all who would pause before its outstretched arms, in the end, comforting, spiritual, rooted in the present, but, like me, looking both backward in sorrow and anger and forward in hope and exultation.
Fortunate Son is for everyone. Men pho have hit hard times will find that uher, with his overriding will and his Weaknesses and strengths, gives them a new perspective. Women disappointed
with what fate has dealt them will find Toddy a role model against whom they can measure their own patience, strength, and understanding (providing they are not afraid of Olympic standards). Military men will find the combat narrative and interwoven leadership lessons to be of high quality. Read it, share the experiences, let them move your spirit. It’s a special book.
At the ripe age of 17, Colonel Greenwood enlisted in the Marine Corps and served on the USS Alabama (BB-60) at the end of World War II. A 1950 graduate of the Naval Academy, he was a Marine infantry officer until his retirement in 1980. Since then he has been editor of the Marine Corps Gazette, contributing frequently to Proceedings as well.
LEAD ON! A Practical Approach to Leadership
RAdm. Dave Oliver, Jr., USN. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992. 207 pp. $9.95 ($8.95) paper.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Gerald E. (Jerry) Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)
It is a particular pleasure to see an officer from the “silent service” publish his thoughts and viewpoints. Admiral Oliver has demonstrated through his several published articles and this book that he has both the time and the energy to express some current thinking on critical issues, while still fulfilling the important requirements of his active- duty assignments. Perhaps his actions will persuade others on active duty to follow suit. The need still exists to publish current thinking, not just the reflections of retirees or present-day personnel writing about the past.
In a light and breezy literary style, Admiral Oliver addresses the usual significant aspects of leadership. Integrity, special trust and confidence, delegation of authority, techniques of supervision, patience, consideration of people are all covered. Following the style of many treatises on leadership, the author uses experiences from his past to illustrate his points. In the process, he provides a pretty good primer on basic submarine design, operations, and lifestyle.
Several of the author’s illustrative examples are based on events that occurred during shipyard overhauls or in the management of weapons programs. The admiral’s extensive experience in such areas of endeavor may account for why he feels management and leadership are essentially synonymous. (A school of thought does exist that challenges his view, contending that you manage overhauls and weapons programs but you lead in combat.) The lack of references to combat experience when discussing leadership often leaves a void, but the admiral provides some interesting and pertinent examples that do illustrate his points of view.
Somewhat bothersome to some readers will be the author’s gratuitous contention that the nuclear submarine “has taken its place as the preeminent naval vessel. ... if we have a world war during the next several decades, the submarine will be the capital ship of that war.” Such statements from a flag officer reflect a lack of broad experience in the conduct of military operations and detract from the validity of other points he is trying to make. I wish Admiral Oliver had omitted that paragraph from his book, leaving such pronouncements to junior officers as they thump their chests and howl like Tarzan about the virtues of their particular branch of the military.
In LEAD ON!, the author seems impressed with the management techniques employed by Admiral Hyman Rickover. His famed interviews are discussed in the context of other references as well, extolling the “kindly old gentleman’s” virtues in a rather low-key manner. I don’t think there is much question that Admiral Oliver approves of the Rickover style. For those seeking an endorsement of the latter’s methods of managing (or leading), this book may present some new thoughts on the subject.
Admiral Miller served in combat in three wars, and he has lectured on leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy.
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Terrorism and Democracy
Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991. 288 pp. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. $22.95 ($20.65).
Reviewed by Commander Douglas S. Derrer, Medical Service Corps, U.S.
Naval Reserve
Much of former CIA Director Stansfield Turner’s latest book, Terrorism and Democracy, provides an insider’s view of the difficulties and dilemmas faced by the Carter administration as they tried to obtain release of the American hostages held in Iran. Admiral Turner chronicles many of the day-to-day struggles of the President’s Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council throughout the 444-day ordeal. Those tense times are vividly recalled as Turner carries the reader through power struggles, frustrations, and ego battles of the top decision makers and advisers to the President. As the Director of Central Intelligence under Carter, and from his
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perspective as a military professional, Admiral Turner shares his excellent insight into many of these problems, especially intelligence gathering and the military rescue operation by the then-nascent, Delta Force.
Admiral Turner portrays the conflicts and divisions within the SCC which he feels deprived the President of the best advice in managing this problem. The SCC was also hampered in its efforts by the nearly paranoid fear the Carter administration had of information leaks to the press. The President kept his special advisers so carefully compartmentalized that even they often did not know what each other was doing. This divisiveness was especially apparent in the results of the President’s decision to use the military option of an attempted rescue of the hostages. As a result of repeated interruptions in planning and preparing for this operation, when the go-ahead was finally given, the military response was inadequate, confused, and ultimately chaotic.
Eminently knowledgeable and appropriately critical, Admiral Turner carefully analyzes the anatomy of these failures for their useful lessons. In addition, he details the debacle at Desert One and discusses the value and limitations of hostage rescue teams. With wider scope, he then considers America’s more recent efforts to combat terrorism with intelligence gathering, covert actions, military approaches, rescue forces, diplomacy, and deals.
Contrary to their frequent rhetoric about neither negotiating nor making deals with terrorists, presidents have, in fact, made deals far more often than most Americans realize. Expanding his perspective from the Carter years both backward and forward in time, Admiral Turner reviews terrorist dilemmas faced by other presidents, particularly in making deals and in authorizing military rescue operations.
Because of the kidnapping activities of the Barbary Coast pirates, America’s first four presidents, and later Theodore Roosevelt, were involved in or supported deals with terrorists, including arms for hostages. With this historical backdrop, Admiral Turner examines Gerald Ford’s handling of the Moyaguez incident and Lyndon Johnson’s dealings with the North Koreans over the capture of the USS Pueblo (AGER-2). Both incidents involved hostage-taking, yet these two presidents reacted quite differently.
Teddy Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan both talked tough and were reputed hardliners in their antiterrorist stance. Yet Admiral Turner shows how they, in reality, did little to counter terrorism. By no means justifying the Iran-contra arms- for-hostages deal of the Reagan administration, Admiral Turner provides an informative historical context in which to view it.
Most important, significant questions and recommendations emerge about how terrorism should be managed by a democracy so that values are not compromised. Admiral Turner is sensitive to the frustrations of Americans with our apparent inability to strike back at terrorists. These feelings can result in calls for assassinations, punitive military attacks, preemptive strikes, and other retributions. But Admiral Turner concludes by placing America’s counter-terrorist activities in a democratic context. The United States cannot afford to take terrorist actions against terrorists. He then provides and carefully considers ten “pro-legal and pro-active options” with the caveat that “we the public, must understand the strengths and pitfalls of each one.”
His recommendations are.: Assassinations are neither an appropriate nor effective counter-terrorist tactic; punitive military attacks are a remedy we should use, but sparingly; covert actions should be undertaken, but judiciously, because the probability of success is low; rescue operations have a role but will continue to be highly risky for the United States; improved intelligence, especially human, is always desirable but difficult to achieve; restraint of the media could be helpful, but modest self-restraint is the most we can expect; economic sanctions should be used against state sponsors of terrorism, even if they take a long time to be effective; defensive security is unlikely to receive sufficient attention or money; deals are an option we cannot rule out; and legal recourse is the notion most compatible with American values.
Exercising these options on a cooperative, international scale may have the unexpected benefit of drawing nations closer together. Admiral Turner optimistically concludes:
“We should set our sights high in the hope that the burden of terrorism we are presently carrying will be a blessing in disguise by helping usher in a new era of world cooperation that will reach well beyond the suppression of terrorism itself.”
Commander Derrer earned his doctorate in social psychology from Yale University. His Navy assignments have included working for the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) School, where he directed the Advanced SERE seminar on POW activity, terrorism, and hostage survival. He is currently stationed at the Naval Hospital, Guam.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
A Concise Dictionary of Military Biography: The Careers and Campaigns of 200 of the Most Important Military Leaders
Martin Windrow and Francis K. Mason. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991. 340 pp. Ind. 524.95 ($22.45) hardcover; $15.95 ($14.35) paper.
Arranged in alphabetical order for easy reference, the 200 mini-biographies in this book range from the Middle Ages to modem times. They cover such diverse figures as Genghis Khan, Oliver Cromwell, George Washington, and Vo Nguyen Giap.
Always Home: Fifty Years of the USO
Prank Coffey. Riverside, NJ: Brassey’s (US),
!991. 190 pp. Ulus. Photos. $29.95 ($26.95).
With a foreword by (who else?) Bob Hope, and a nostalgic collection of 216 black-and- white photographs, this history of the first 50 years of the USO records the people (Marilyn Monroe, Jimmy Stewart, and thousands °f others), the places (literally all over the globe), and the events (four wars and countless contingencies) that have made this organization an important element of our na- Oon’s defense efforts.
Beyond Guns and Butter: Recapturing America’s Economic Momentum After a Military Decade
j^lenn R. Pascall and Robert D. Lamson.
Riverside, NJ: Brassey’s (US), 1991. 158 pp.
Flgs. Ind. Notes. Tables. $23.95 ($21.55).
Using a bipartisan approach, the authors cogently identify the problems in balancing security and economic considerations and then °ffer some solutions. Their prescription includes the means for providing adequate defense without putting a counterproductive stfain on the national economy.
Llausewitz and Escalation: Classical erspective on Nuclear Strategy
Stephen J. Cimbala. London: Frank Cass, 1991. 'stributed in the U.S. by International Pecialized Book Services, Portland, OR. 218 pp. ‘"d. Notes. $37.50.
Respite the demise of the Soviet Union and a ehanging world order, nuclear weapons still eMst and must be considered as an important ehient of strategy. Cimbala, a professor of Political science at Pennsylvania State UniVersity, applies the thinking of classical strate- pst Karl von Clausewitz to the related prob- his of nuclear weapons and escalation, •mbala contends that the 19th-century strate- ®lst has important things to say to his coun- '"Parts today who must contend with the “ab- ute” aspects of nuclear weapons.
Code of Conduct
Everett Alvarez, Jr., with Samuel Schreiner, Jr. New York: Donald 1. Fine, 1991. 257 pp. Ind. Photos. $21.00 ($18.90).
The first and longest-held U.S. prisoner of war in the Vietnam War shared his harrowing and inspirational story of those years in Chained Eagle (D. I. Fine, 1989). Now he returns to describe the difficult and equally inspiring years following his return home. Facing many challenges in both his personal and professional life, Alvarez put his life back together, earning three degrees in higher education, building a new family, and rising through military and civilian service positions that included cabinet-level meetings at the White House. Former POW Senator John McCain (R-AZ) writes that Alvarez’s “bravery, patriotism, inner strength, and commitment to the principles upon which this nation was built personifies [sic] the best in American ideals.”
Line of Fire
W. E. B. Griffin. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1992. 414 pp. $21.95 ($19.75).
This latest installment in Griffin’s “Continuing the Saga of the Corps” series takes place in the Solomon Islands during World War II. Two Marines are trapped at a coast watcher station and are in great peril. Their rescue— under the very noses of the Japanese—is the nucleus of this action-packed novel.
Naval Command and Control: Policy, Programs, People & Issues
Vinny DiGirolamo, editor. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1991. 390 pp. Figs. Notes. $29.95.
With hopes of “a technical shelf life of about five years and historical life of many more,” this compilation of essays by experts in the field looks at modern systems of computers, intelligence, and communications and assesses their projected impact on the conduct of naval warfare in the next decade. GPS, TACAMO, ELF, INTELCAST, NAVSA- TAR, and “The Copernicus Architecture” are among the many technological wonders explored in these essays.
Operation Buffalo: USMC Fight for the DMZ
Keith William Nolan. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991. 410 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Maps. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
Nolan adds this latest work to his already impressive list of four previous books on battles of the Vietnam War. Operation Buffalo details the experiences of U.S. Marines fighting in the misnamed Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam, where more Marines fell than in the Pacific island-hopping campaign of World War II. As with his other books, Nolan concentrates on the battle as seen through the eyes of the participants.
Remembering the Gulf War: The U.S. Marine Corps in Operation Desert Storm
Moira J. Saucer, editor. Richmond, VA: Cadmus Communications Corporation, 1991. 120 pp. Photos. $24.95.
With stunning color photographs—many of them full page—and an accompanying narrative by Washington writer Keith F. Girard, this large-format book captures much of the U.S. Marine Corps experience in the recent Gulf War. Scenes of burning oil fields, camels and tanks battling a dust storm, the pillaging of Kuwait, a touch-football game during the hours of tedium, and coffins returning home are some of the many images dramatically captured on these pages.
Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence
Abram N. Shulsky. Riverside, NJ: Brassey’s (US), 1991. 228 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $19.95 ($17.95).
Designed for the interests of both intelligence professionals and casual fans of spy novels, this readable exposition explains frequently misunderstood topics such as covert action, counterintelligence, and collection analysis. The means of intelligence collection and meth-
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WE ARE ALLTHE TARGET
A Handbook of Terrorism A voidance and Survival
CDR Dougla* S. Derrer, USNR
ods of analysis are discussed in revealing detail, as is the complicated and often abrasive relationship between the collection agencies and the rest of government and society—a relationship made all the more difficult in a democracy.
This Ain’t Hell . .. But You Can See It From Here: A Gulf War Sketchbook
Barry McWilliams. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992. 250 pp. Illus. $9.95 ($8.95) paper.
McWilliams, the only syndicated cartoonist to tour the Gulf War theater, captures the humorous side of the conflict through his cartoons and a funny, though sometimes irreverent, narrative. Interservice rivalry, Saddam-bashing, and satirical views on life as a GI in Saudi Arabia are some of the elements of this entertaining and painlessly informative book.
K1 We Are All the Target
Douglas S. Derrer. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 112 pp. Ind. Notes. $12.95 ($10.36).
Subtitled “A Handbook of Terrorism Avoidance and Hostage Survival,” this compact study by a Naval Reserve officer who holds a doctorate in psychology is timely advice. A former instructor at the Navy’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) School, Dr. Derrer analyzes predictable stages of captivity and reactions of the captive during each stage. He further offers specific counsel on how to cope with problems to maximize chances for survival. The guide places the
Middle East, Western Europe, and Latin America—three main spheres of terrorist activity—in both their past and present contexts. Dr. Derrer’s clear, engaging study is a must read for civilian and military personnel who are traveling or stationed abroad.
Other Titles of Interest
Iraq: Military Victory, Moral Defeat
Thomas C. Fox. Kansas City, MO: Sheed &
Ward, 1991. 192 pp. Append. Illus. Ind. $9.95 ($8.95).
Little Friends: The Fighter Pilot Experience in World War II England
Philip Kaplan and Andy Saunders. New York: Random House, 1991. 256 pp. Ind. Photos. $50.00 ($45.00).
Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable?
Lloyd J. Matthews, editor. Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991. 170 pp. $11.95 ($10.75) paper.
On Being Wounded
Edward W. Wood, Jr. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1991. 188 pp. Photos. $19.95 ($17.95).
Taking a Little Sailing Ship: A View of the World from a Thirty-Foot Schooner
Klaus Gehrig. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Nimbus Publishing Limited, 1991. 2tl 1 pp. $12.95 ($11.65).
Two Years Behind the Mast: An American Landlubber at Sea in World War II
LCdr. Harold J. McCormick, USNR (Ret.). Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1991. 159 pp. Bib. Ind. Photos. $16.00 ($14.40) paper.
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