The Republic Navies

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By Norman Polmar, Author, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet

The Hunt for Dae Hung Ho

Ships at sea are very difficult to find, whether they are surface warships, sub­marines, or even merchant ships. The lat­est example was the North Korean cargo ship Dae Hung Ho, which carried a ship­ment of Scud-type missile components to the Iranian port of Bandar ’Abbas, for onward shipment by air to Syria.¹

The difficulty of locating the ship be­came an issue when, about 1 March 1992, the question of the ship’s voyage was raised as a political issue in Washington. By that time the Dae Hung Ho was steam­ing along the coast of Pakistan, lost in the Profusion of coastal shipping. It was then that General Joseph P. Hoar, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command (CinCCent), belatedly ordered an all-out effort to find the ship. But the Dae Hung Ho was not found until ^she entered Bandar ’Abbas, adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.

Ironically, the U.S. intelligence com­munity already knew quite a bit about the Dae Hung Ho and her cargo. The ship, °f 3,600 gross tons, is 337-3/4 feet in ^ngth, generates 3,800 horsepower, and has a maximum speed of 13 knots. More ■mportant, the Dae Hung Ho is one of several North Korean ships known to be used on a regular basis to carry weapons to other Third World countries. Accord- ^lngly, the ship has long been of interest to Western intelligence agencies and her departure and arrival—but not her track— normally would be plotted by various uni­fied command and intelligence commu- n*ty intelligence centers, as well as by the Envy’s merchant shipping specialists at Snitland, Maryland.

Further, the international arms trade is conducted largely through commercial ^lrms. Their arms deals are generally ^vJ'^eB known among tracking agencies— •trough rumor and intelligence-collection efforts, Lloyds of London keeps a com­puterized listing of virtually all merchant ^S‘¹'P sailings and related data, which is j'padily available by subscription. And na- 'ons adjacent to strategic straits and other Waterways keep careful watch on ships Passing through their waters, sharing

feedings/June 1992 those sightings with allies.

By these and other means, the in­telligence community became aware of the pending missile component ship­ment from North Korea. Late in Janu­ary 1992, the Air Force-managed Na­tional Reconnaissance Office, which schedules U.S. spy satellite and U-2 aircraft flights, began guiding satel­lites over specific North Korean ports. These would provide high-resolution photographs that could clearly show the cargo being loaded into ships.

Thus, U.S. naval intelligence had con­siderable data on the Dae Hung Ho when she departed the North Korean port of Songin (formerly Kimch’aek), on the country’s east coast, on 3 February and sailed to Namp’o (formerly Chinnamp’o) on the western coast. From there, on 10 February, the Dae Hung Ho, sailed south­ward. Rear Admiral Edward (Ted) Sheafer, the Director of U.S. Naval In­telligence, said that if the order had been given at that time, “it would have been

The ship’s declared destination was Equatorial Guinea, on the western coast of Africa. The arms ship was next sighted entering the Singapore roadstead on 21 February. There she was carefully ob­served by various Western defense at­taches and departed the next day, pre­sumably en route to Equatorial Guinea.

The Dae Hung Ho was next sighted on the 26th by a New Zealand P-3K Orion. At the time the ship was off of Sri Lanka. From there she is believed to have steamed north, toward the coast of India, and then moved along the heavily travelled trade route past the Indian and Pakistani coasts. She appears to have loi­tered for a couple of days near Karachi. This may have been to throw off any trailing ships or aircraft, possibly for minor repairs, or even awaiting orders concerning the ship's itinerary from Py­ongyang.

At that point information on the exact location of the ship was being demanded by government and even military offi­cials. General Hoar thus ordered the naval and air forces under his command to find the ship.

A U.S. carrier battle group centered on the USS America (CV-66) was steaming in the western Arabian Sea. Several P-3C Orions from Navy patrol squadrons VP-

The Dae Hung Ho does not look stealthy, but she made headlines by transiting from the North Korean port of Songin to the Iranian port of Bandar ’ Abbas carrying Scud missile components without the U. S. Navy finding her.

105

10 and -46 were in the region, flying from airfields on Diego Garcia, at Jidda on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain and Abu Dhabi on the Persian Gulf. Several other U.S. ships were in the region, including the destroyer Ingersoll (DD-990), off the coast of Pakistan.

The America launched search aircraft, which joined the P-3Cs in scouring the area. Based on her estimated speed of ad­vance, the Dae Hung Ho was now within an area of some 260,000 square miles—a rough triangle between Bombay, Masira on the Arabian Peninsula, and the Strait of Hormuz or an area roughly the size of the state of Texas. On any given day within that area there are up to 300 merchant ships plus numerous smaller vessels.

The America's aircraft and land-based VP aircraft scanned the area. The Dae Hung Ho remained in coastal waters, possibly within the 12-mile territorial lim­its. Respecting national sovereignty in that region, U.S. aircraft remained twice that distance offshore. Further compli­cating the search was the need for the air­craft to drop down from their cruising al­titudes to perhaps 150 feet to “rig” suspect ships, flying low and slow enough to read their names painted on the stern counter.

The Dae Hung Ho evaded the search­ing U.S. ships and aircraft and, on 9 March, arrived at the Iranian port of Ban­dar ’Abbas, which is believed to be a transfer point for the shipment of Scud missiles to Syria. The next day, Depart­ment of Defense spokesman Pete Williams declared, “it would have been nice to have found [the ship],” but added, “I can’t imagine why we would have searched for it if it was going to Iran.”^{[1] [2]}

The next day General Hoar took a somewhat different tack telling how the Dae Hung Ho evaded “a concentrated ef­fort over a period of ten days to track it.” Hoar explained that, “What we have lost by our failure to pick up that ship is we would have been able to alert our intel­ligence colleagues to determine more specifically what was there.”^[3]

However, it is difficult to understand what additional intelligence could have been acquired had the Navy found the ship. For example, it is obvious that photographic satellites provided cover­age of the ship being loaded in a North Korean port and again unloading at Bandar ’Abbas. Further, it can be as­sumed that the U.S. defense attache in Singapore saw the ship himself or gained access to the intelligence re­ports of allied officers who did so, and certainly the report of the New Zealand P-3K was available to U.S. intelligence centers.

Perhaps, if found before reaching port, the Dae Hung Ho could have been ex­amined from close aboard by a U.S. or another Coalition warship in conjunction with the ongoing blockade of Iraq. But as soon as the ship’s identity and desti­nation were clarified, she would have been allowed to proceed without further delay and probably without examination of her cargo.

More plausible, the U.S. government may have hoped that the public expo­sure of the missile sale by North Korea or the trans-shipment of the cargo from Iran to Syria would have persuaded one or more of the participating governments to cancel the effort. This purpose would have gained credibility in view of the Iranian elections that reflected a move toward a more moderate government.

Regardless, the Dae Hung Ho reached Bandar ’Abbas safely and unloaded her cargo of Scud missile components and equipment for Iran.^[4] A week after the Dae Hung Ho arrived in Iran, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney pronounced the epitaph on the sailing of that ship and another, the North Korean Iran Salam, to Iran:

“In this particular case, a ship al­legedly [sic] from North Korea car­rying goods for Iran or Syria would have been halted. If our folks were satisfied that, in fact, it was a legiti­mate vessel and that trip did not in any way violate the sanctions, then they would have been allowed to pro­ceed. It was never our intention to treat it any differently than anything else. There was a lot of speculation, probably some statements by anony­mous administration officials, but the fact of the matter was, the instructions our people were operating under [was] to locate the ship, keep an eye on it, but no one was ever authorized to board it.”^[5]

With the arrival of the Dae Hung Ho in Bandar ’Abbas on 9 March, newspa­per headlines proclaimed the failure of U.S. forces to find a simple merchant ship in a known area. Overlooked by many was the delay in starting the search.

Apparently the search was immediately taken up by P-3 Orions, the destroyer In­gersoll, and, subsequently, aircraft from the carrier America. The use of satel­lites was restricted: The principal means for the overhead detection of ships at sea is by electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellite that locates radar emissions. Most merchant ships, however, use commer­cial Marconi or Raytheon radars, which are not distinctive in their emissions, and their interception would do little to nar­row the search. Photography satellites, which can take up to 12 high-definition pictures per minute and transmit them to earth receiving stations, are unsuitable for ocean search. The Lacrosse radar­imaging satellites cannot provide suffi­cient definition of small cargo-type ships to be of use.

In several ocean areas the United States has installed the seafloor sound surveillance system (SOSUS), although presumably not in the Indian Ocean re­gion. SOSUS, however, was intended to detect submarines and normally has a cut-off depth to avoid being distracted by surface shipping and other near-sur­face sounds. While this feature can prob­ably be changed with little effort, the ocean’s surface is very noisy, with mer­chant and fishing ships, weather, marine life, offshore oil drilling, and other ac­tivity complicating detection and iden­tification. And SOSUS is only installed in certain areas of the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Mediterranean.^[6] In ad­dition, a detection by SOSUS has lim­ited value for ship identification unless the specific ship’s propeller and ma­chinery sounds are in the SOSUS tape library. (The Navy’s T-AGOS surveil­lance ship program was developed in part to provide surveillance of non- SOSUS areas. Most SOSUS ships are now being taken out of service.)

The detection of surface warships is easier; their radars are more distinctive (if they are emitting). The larger warships also are more detectable from a viewpoint of radar-imaging satellites. Finally, those with four screws have greater acoustic signatures. But the location of smaller surface ships—naval as well as mer­chant—continues to be a difficult task.

106

Proceedings / June 1992

By Norman Polmar, Author, Guide to the Soviet Navy

The Black Sea Fleet

The battle over control of the Black Sea ^•eet has become symbolic of the contro- ^yersies following the breakup of the So- ''tet Union. Under the Soviet regime, the “lack Sea Fleet—with a history dating to . year 1783—was responsible for oper­ations in the Black Sea and, more signif- ^lcant, it provided surface warships and air­craft for operations in the Mediterranean ^ea as the Fifth Eskadra (squadron).¹ Today the ships, submarines, small

are\^{and aircraft of the Black Sea Flee} y, eing claimed by Russia anc

S_e.^{r ilne}! doth °f which border the Blacl

new~^W'*^ '^esser claims coming from the

non r,^{Slate 0p} ^^eor§>^a> which lies on the

Uar , ^{l6rn COast of that sea}- ^{0n 8 Jan} U_nj               the week after the Sovie

Bori^v'⁷³''.^lished—Russian Presiden Fleet > ^C'^tS'ⁿ declared that “the Black Set beca ^Cannot belong to any one republic’ erty ofm'¹ *^{as the} “indivisible” prop dent St. ^Commonwealth of Indepen being ^ateS’^{the loose} federation that was But th^etf^{Up 10} repittce the Soviet Union, eoii’iv ⁶ '’dewing day, Yeltsin stated un-

^rectlv°i^CaJ!^ ^l^^{at tFe} fleet belonged di- ^ct’y to Russia.

Pres!<|^mCd'^ate^' l'^eonid M. Kravchuk, the did nnu ^raine, argued that the fleei ^e °ng to Russia, but to Ukraine

Fie demanded that the officers, sailors, and marines of the fleet swear their loy­alty to Ukraine.

The battle of words and demands has continued for the past several months. For most of that time, virtually the entire fleet has remained at its moorings. Various proposals have been put forth for a com­promise division of the fleet, but none has been satisfactory as Russia and Ukraine argue over many facets of di­viding the armed forces of the former So­viet Union. Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, the fleet commander, has explained:

“The fleet as such cannot be split up. To single out individual forces, assets and units which Ukraine would sub­sequently build up is another matter. . . . The [Commonwealth] fleet is a single entity located in over five re­publics. How can it be turned over

The fate of the 475 vessels of the Black Sea Fleet and the multinational sailors who serve on them remains in doubt. Both Russia and Ukraine have ports and facilities to support the fleet.

Should the Commonwealth resolve other important aspects of de­unification—such as sovereignty over the Crimea—before this matter is concluded? In the meantime, many ships stay in port, here in Sevastopol, (foreground to background) are a Kashin-class guided missile destroyer; the Groznyy, a Kynda-class guided missile cruiser; the Kerch, a Kara-class guided missile cruiser; a Krivak-class guided missile frigate; another Kashin- class guided missile destroyer; and a Moskva-class helicopter carrier.

105

^rocwdin_gs/ j_u|y [g<)2

Admiral in a Hot Spot

Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov is a man in a hot spot. He took command of the Black Sea Fleet following the abortive coup against the government of Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. Shortly afterward, he became embroiled in the fight over control of the Black Sea Fleet.

Staunchly supporting the position that the Black Sea Fleet is Russian and should remain intact to serve the entire Com­monwealth of Independent States, Kasatonov is under heavy fire from Ukraine. Earlier this year, after Ukrainian officials met with him at his headquarters in Sevastopol, Ukrainian President Leonid M. Kravchuk sent telegrams to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Sha- poshnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, demanding that Kasatonov be removed from his post.

President Kravchuk also sent a telegram to Admiral Kasatonov in which he pointed out “the incompatibility of such conduct” with the position of a Ukrainian-based fleet commander.

Admiral Kasatonov is known to many in the U.S. Navy, having commanded the Soviet task group that visited Nor­folk, Virginia in 1989, only the second time since World War

II that Soviet warships had called at a U.S. port. He came across to Americans as knowledgeable and personable—“def­initely a comer,” according to one U.S. flag officer.

Bom in 1939, Kasatonov attended the Nakhimov Higher Naval School in Sevastopol, graduating as a surface line offi­cer.¹ He subsequently served in surface ships in the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets, and commanded the guided missile test destroyer Provornyy and the large ASW ship (cruiser) Ochakov of the Kara class, as well as ship units.

Ashore, Kasatonov attended the Sevastopol Instrument In­stitute, the Naval Academy (i.e.. Naval War College), and the General Staff Academy (i.e., National War College). The lat­ter two schools are prerequisites for attaining flag rank.

At the time Kasatonov commanded the task group visiting Norfolk, he was a vice admiral and the first deputy CinC of the Northern Fleet—the largest and, in several respects, the most important of the four Soviet fleets. After the attempted coup in August 1991, it was reported initially that the Black Sea Fleet had stood firmly behind the legal government led by Mikhail Gorbachev.

After additional revelations and investigations, however, the Black Sea Fleet commander, Admiral M.'N. Khronopulo

to Ukraine? And what jurisdiction would Ukraine have over our bases in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, at Novorossiysk? The fleet can therefore not belong to a single state. ... If the fleet belongs to a single state, it will disintegrate.”³

The conflict is making life and work difficult for the men and women of the Black Sea Fleet. Their pay and most of their food and supplies come from Rus­sia. But their housing allocations come from Ukraine and this is a most impor­tant factor in military life. Indeed, many ethnic Russians in the fleet are fearful of returning to Russia because of the severe housing shortages there, aggravated by the return to Russia of several hundred thousand troops previously stationed in the Eastern European satellite countries.

Meanwhile, pressure continues on naval personnel to swear allegiance to Ukraine. Ukrainian officials first ordered a loyalty oath for the fleet in January. The fleet commander, Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, objected—and retaliated, by ordering oaths of loyalty to the Com­monwealth of Independent States.

More than 90 percent of all naval per­sonnel immediately did so according to a fleet spokesman. But, he added, Ukraine has continued waging an underground campaign to win sailors over to Ukraine and about ten Ukrainian officers have been demoted because of such activity.⁴

However, Ukraine officials tell a dif­ferent story, claiming that hundreds of men in the fleet have taken the oath (with two-thirds of the 300,000 ground troops stationed in Ukraine reported to have taken the loyalty oath by the end of January). And, the Ukrainian minis­ter of defense has claimed that Russian officials are waging a “purposeful cam­paign to whip up the situation.” These actions, he said,

... are at cross-purposes with laws of the independent state. Objective information coming from Kiev [cap­ital of Ukraine] over television, radio and press channels is not reaching the personnel of fleet units and forma­tions, and the state’s laws, Cabinet of Ministers’ decrees and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense documents are being ignored.”⁵

When a Ukrainian delegation visited Sevastopol in late January, the fleet com­mander allowed it to meet only with the fleet command, representatives from ships’ crews, and shore units. The dele­gation was able to go on board only one combat ship, with the permission of a Ukraine people’s deputy, Rear Admiral Viktor Nekrasov.⁶ A spokesman for the Ukrainian delegation afterwards said:

“The problem is not with the sailors, but with the fleet command. Had it permitted the oathtaking, we are cer­tain that over 80 percent of the ser­vicemen would have taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Many of them frankly told us that they would rather serve on the northern shore of the

Black Sea than the southern shore of the White Sea.”⁷

The situation is further complicated by i the large number of nationality groups , within the boundaries of the former So- | viet Union and the military services. Fot ^ example, the destroyer Skoryy has a cretf of some 300 officers, warrants, and en­listed men representing 21 nationalities' (There were more than 100 nationality groups in the Soviet Union.)

Meanwhile, reports continue of sailofS and marines taking the Ukrainian oath, among them a brigade of security craft a* - a major Crimean naval base and the ^ fleet’s naval infantry (marine) brigade. I^fl describing the marines’ action, a jour- j nalist wrote that they took the oath “With unconcealed joy because the naval if" (• fantrymen are tired of listening to the dis^- _s information of Coastal Troops CommaB' -j der General Romanenko . . . on th^e j. serious consequences of taking th^e Ukrainian oath. . . . ”⁸              p

Beyond the ships and aircraft of th^e ^ Black Sea Fleet, the area’s shipyard* _s and bases are of critical importance t" Russia and Ukraine. The Black Sea Ship' _Q yard at Nikolayev (south) in Ukraine i^s the only yard that can now build aircraf¹ _t| carriers. There are several other maj°^f    _a

shipyards in Ukraine that construct a v*' _a riety of surface combatants and large me^f' _a chant ships, although none as large as th^e _c carrier yard.⁹                                                                           j,

The fleet’s bases are concentrate"                      ;_;

mainly on the historic Crimean peninsula with the port city of Sevastopol being th^c

Proceedings / July

was relieved, as were the commander of Baltic Fleet and other senior naval of­ficers. Khronopulo had commanded the Black Sea Fleet since mid-1985.

Thus, in September, then-Vice Admi­ral Kasatonov took command of the Black Sea Fleet. He immediately moved *nto the fleet commander’s office at Sev­astopol, overlooking the bay crammed with warships. It was the same office that ws father, Vladimir Afanasevich Kasatonov, had occupied from December ‘955 to July 1962.

The senior Kasatonov, bom in 1910, was a distinguished admiral of the Soviet Navy. A submarine specialist, he served in underwater craft until 1940. During orld War II he served ashore, mostly in the Baltic area and ^at naval headquarters in Moscow.

After the war, he commanded the Eighth Fleet in the altic from December 1954 to January 1956, and then took command of the Black Sea Fleet. In probably the first post­war sortie of Soviet warships into the Mediterranean, in May- ^ne 1956, Kasatonov led a cruiser and two destroyers on a ^{lsit t0} Albanian and Yugoslav ports. Next, Kasatonov be- ,^^nie dnC of the Northern Fleet from 1962 to 1964, and ^en First Deputy CinC of the Soviet Navy, from June 1964

Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Northern Fleet, during his visit to Norfolk, Virginia on 21 July 1989.

to September 1974. In the latter assign­ment, he was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet.

As an admiral, he participated in submarine operations under the Arctic ice pack, for which he was decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union—the highest Soviet military award—in 1965. The senior Kasatonov was also head of the Soviet delega­tion to the Incidents at Sea talks with the U.S. Navy, dur­ing the early 1970s. He died in 1989. As his flagship steamed toward the United States a few weeks later, the younger Kasatonov spent much of his time reviewing his father’s history of their family, a work that the son has continued, tracing relatives for five generations.

'There were 11 higher naval schools—equivalents of the U. S. Naval Academy___

in the Soviet Union.

Norman Polmar

^eet headquarters. Ironically, the Crimea ^as historically part of Russia and is in­capably linked to Russian artists and thJ^erniTlent ^^eac‘^ers- Today 67 percent of 2 ~ Crimea's population of some ^ 0,000 are ethnic Russians. In 1954 ^territ°ry was transferred to the tr _f^{,ainuin re}P^uhlic to simplify adminis- _c ^{a 10n} °f the area—to celebrate “three nturics ₀f _unj_ty b_ei_ween Russia and raine,” Soviet leader Nikita rushchev said at the time.

. t he Russian parliament voted on 21 °f th ^t0         the 1954 Soviet transfer

The ^ep^^r'^{mea t0} Ukrainian jurisdiction. fyj_Q^e Russian legislators, meeting in luti^SC0W’ approved a preliminary reso- 18 °ⁿ °" ^t*^le *^ssue hy a vote of 136 to effort™ abstentions. There is also an Crim ^Underway to have a referendum on soci r³¹¹ 'ahcpendence, maintaining as- TheT r ^W.'^td both Russia and Ukraine, ful • ^a‘ⁿian government must be care- of _th ^resP^or>ding to such efforts because Pomu B°^tent'al reaction of the Russian

Ukrai -°ⁿ '^{n the Crimea}- ^In total, si_sts Population of 52 million con- p_erc ^ percent ethnic Ukrainians, 22 otlw ^{n et}bⁿ‘^c Russians, and 6 percent _T‘ nationalities.)

‘he Bh^³^^{6 sma}“^er naval bases along and Gp ^C -^^{ea coast} °f Ukraine, Russia, ^are in th^¹³ ^°^St ‘b^e f‘^eet’^s air bases airfield ⁶ *“^r'^mea> including the Saki cility Tk Principal naval air research fa- hhkolav ^{6 LeVanski}y aviation school at ized nn ^CV| ^(m Tihraine) provides special-

i«5 “ ^,rai"^inE-

’ ^{ln s}°me respects these ship­yards and bases are more important than the fleet’s ships and aircraft. At the time of the Soviet breakup, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of the 2 Moskva-class heli­copters carriers, approaching the end of their service life, 6 modem missile cruis­ers of the Kara and Slava classes, about 15 mostly outdated destroyers, 6 large and some 25 light frigates, and 30 sub­marines, plus a large number of mine, pa­trol, and amphibious ships and craft—in total some 475 units. The submarines are all diesel-electric propelled (SS/SSG); no nuclear-propelled units are believed ever to have operated in the Black Sea.

The Fleet’s air arm numbers about 450 aircraft of various types, but only about half are combat types. The others are training and utility aircraft.

Still another issue is that of nuclear weapons. Although there were no strate­gic weapons in the Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva-class helicopter cruisers and other missile cruisers were armed with nu­clear ASW weapons, and some of the submarines probably had nuclear torpe­does. Ashore, the fleet air arm had nu­clear air-to-surface missiles and ASW weapons.

All nuclear weapons have probably been taken off the ships by now. Some, and possibly all, may have been returned to Russia, in accordance with agreements between the republics. However, that issue is also not completely clear.

As this column went to press the im­passe, continued despite indications that increasing numbers of servicemen are tak­ing the Ukrainian oath. But the subject of sovereignty over the Crimea—if Rus­sia does claim the peninsula—would make the current controversy even more complex. In the future, naval forces will be important to the former Soviet re­publics, but just how the Black Sea Fleet will play in the future is far from being resolved.

Soviet submarines that operated in the Mediterranean came from the Northern (Arctic) Fleet, as the Mon- treux Convention of 1936 prevents submarines from deploying into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea ports.

Reported in Celestine Bohlen, “Yeltsin, in Rebuff to Ukraine, Lays Claim to Black Sea Fleet,” The New York Times (10 January 1992), p. 1.

'Anatoliy Smetanin, “The Fleet is Indivisible,” Vech- emiy Kiev (29 January 1992), p. 1.

‘Celestine Bohlen, “In Russia-Ukraine Fight Over Navy, Crimea Lies at Heart of Struggle," The New York Times (31 March 1992), p. 6.

’Address by Col. Gen. Konstantin Morozov, "Respect Human Rights and Personal Dignity: Ukrainian Min­ister of Defense Address to Black Sea Fleet Navy- men." printed in Narodnava Armiya (1 February 1992), p. 1.

‘Nekrasov was listed in 1991 as a vice admiral and Chief of the Black Sea Political Directorate; thus, he may have suffered a demotion after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

’Igor Skachko. "Better the Black Sea’s Northern Shore than the White Sea’s Southern One: People’s Council Demanded Resignation of Admiral Kasatonov, Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet,” Nezvaisimaya Gazeta (24 January 1992), p. 3. •M. Sevastyanov. "Mutiny at Kazachya Bay? Not at All. Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantrymen Have Sim­ply Decided in an Organized Manner to Take the Oath to Sovereign Ukraine. Who is Opposed?” Nar- odnaya Armiya (6 February 1992), p. 1.

•For a description of Black Sea shipyards and bases see N. Polmar. Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5th Edition (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991) pp 413-430.