Comment & Discussion

The future of Navy mine countermeasures (MCM) depends on first-rate equipment, well-trained people, (here, a sailor works on a Mk. 105 Mod. 2 magnetic minesweeping system), and the designation of MCM as a full-fledged warfare specialty.

things, and national interests are always best served by that design which takes into account national priorities. U.S. Navy mine-countermeasures (MCM) ships— Particularly the new Avenger (MCM-1) class—designed for a very different sce­nario, were rushed to the Gulf for Desert Storm with developmental systems and engineering problems common to new ships. However the operational record of the Avenger and the USS Guardian (MCM-5) in the Gulf War is, by ^any measure, enviable. The clear superiority of U.S. mine-hunting sonars, particularly the new SQQ- 2. and the capabilities of the ad­vanced mine-neutralization vehi­cles were operationally validated.

Couple these capabilities with pre- ^Clse integrated navigation sys­tems and EOD units, and you ^ave a mine-countermeasures combat system second to none.

Cnly time will tell, but the U.S. ships currently in production, the 'V’enger and the Osprey (MHC- 1) classes, will most certainly P^rove to be at least as capable as ^any other platforms. By compar- js°n, the Royal Navy Hunt-class CM ships, which did excellent ^W°^r*^c in the Persian Gulf, had ^c°^rrected most of their tech meal bugs during Operation _s ^arnest Will, but still took some ^even years to reach operational certification.

I must take exception to other -p^0|nts Mr. Brown makes as well.

₍,^Wlce in his article, he indicates ^at minesweeping is of little value; I sub- ¹ that it is a very necessary component Th ^any comprehensive MCM program. ^ere are many other scenarios besides ^reP^eat °f our Persian Gulf experience, _0r no matter how good the conditions _at ^Sonar performance, the prudent oper- ^r must always assume that some mines

are undetectable. In order to achieve a high level of clearance, hunting and sweeping must nearly always be com­bined. His assessment of U.S. airborne MCM does not take into account the proven capabilities of the MH-53E heli­copter. With the addition of the AQS-14 sonar and Global Positioning System, the aircraft is extremely useful for much more than precursor sweeping.

His historical examples are incorrect

as well: for example, Farragut cried “Damn the Torpedoes!” but he had been minehunting for a month before he stormed Mobile Bay. Mines were used centuries before 1855. There were ab­solutely no casualties of any kind to MCM helicopters at Haiphong (or any­where else) from ordnance set off by rotor noise. And lifting eyes are not re­quired for heavy lift of U.S. Navy MCM ships. In addition, remote-control minesweeping also has proven merit and is currently being tested to determine fu­ture utility; certainly these systems are nowhere near the size or cost of any MCM ship.

I am, however, fully in agreement with his opinion concerning the Royal Navy’s concept of MCM support with the for­ward support units—HMS Sir Galahad and other supporting ships—and portable magnetic and acoustic ranges. They were extremely valuable during the Persian Gulf War, particularly in supporting U.S. MCM forces. The need for similar support within the U.S. Navy is one of the key lessons learned in this operation.

Finally, his placing of the suc­cess or failure of MCM opera­tions on the shoulders of career MCM specialists is right on the mark. The problem is much more difficult than the U.S. Navy has ever been willing to admit. If the U.S. Navy had a cadre of trained specialists, pro­fessionally appreciated and pro- motable, who could devote a great portion of their careers to solving the many complex prob­lems of mine warfare, it would go a long way toward making long-overdue improvements in MCM. Until the Navy actively supports mine countermeasures as a viable warfare specialty, it won’t be able to solve the personnel and lead­ership problems that have, throughout its history, made MCM difficult.

Our recent operational experience in Desert Storm constituted the first major live minefield clearance by the U.S. Navy since 1952. A lot was learned, and now

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V________________ / the lessons are being evaluated. But one more fact must never be forgotten. If we predicate national needs based on the ex­perience of one war or on another nation’s experience—rather than on our own his­tory-—the Navy will not be prepared for the future. Two major U.S. warships were severely damaged by mines in the Persian Gulf War, and one during Operation Earnest Will—constituting 75% of the major casualties of the U.S. Navy in re­cent years. Had the more capable influ­ence mines sown by Iraq during the Gulf War been live, or had the Iranians sown influence mines in the late 1980s, the losses would have been far greater, and the lessons learned by all navies would have been radically different. □

“Centurion: The Changing

Future of the Force”

(See P. K. Peppe, pp. 60-64, April 1992

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Bart A. Vinskey, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy—Commander Peppe brings up many valid points, but his belief in the submarine as a “do-all” platform is in­valid. That is what killed the Seawolf. The Navy made it a large, do-everything submarine and eventually priced it out of existence. Face it, if the Seawolf and its BSY-2 combat system were not so com­plicated, they would not be so expen­sive—and would be under construction and in production.

The Navy needs to return to basics and build capable—and affordable—weapon systems. What the submarine force needs is a boat to go in harm’s way: a small submarine with four torpedo tubes, space for 24 weapons (cruise missiles and tor­pedoes), a 30-knot top speed, and rela­tively simple communications, electronic- support-measures, and sonar equipment.

The submarine service doesn’t need to invent new roles or cross over to other communities’ roles. Ten years ago, after the Argentine Navy cruiser General Bel- grano was sunk by a British submarine, the rest of the Argentine Navy stayed in port—while British amphibious forces re­took the Falkland Islands. That’s the role for us—sinking enemy submarines and surface ships—and that’s what we should be building submarines to do. □

Harold C. Hemond—Commander Peppe wrote very convincingly of the charac­teristics that must be incorporated into the next generation of nuclear-powered attack submarine, the Centurion.

However, except by implication, he overlooked probably the most important characteristic. If the Centurion is to avoid the fate of the Seawolf\ it must be dras­tically less expensive. If the Centurion is half the price of the Seawolf, it may get favorable attention in the Congress. To ensure congressional support, the goal should be more like one-third the cost of the Seawolf.

The Navy and its suppliers are not ac­customed to cost as a dominant charac­teristic in weapons procurement, but this is part of the changing future of the force. The Centurion must be everything Com­mander Peppe catalogues, but it must be affordable—or it will never exist. □

“Save The Tailhook Association”

(See J. Towers, p. 26, January 1992; S. Hunt, pp. 27-28, March 1992; B. Tillman, pp. 19-20, April 1992; R. J. Kelly, p. 17, June 1992 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Clifford A. Skel­ton, U.S. Navy—Mr. Tillman is missing the point. First, he should not presume to speak for all members of the Tailhook Association, especially if, as he put it, “The Secretary of the Navy can’t cut my hair and send me to Iraq.” Second— and most important—he skews the issue in the wrong direction, away from the true principles of leadership and ac­countability and toward a position cloaked in the disguise of camaraderie and esprit de corps.

As a carrier aviator yet to vacate the cockpit in 14 years of service, I endorse the fact that esprit de corps and cama­raderie are essential to our particular specialty. However, as naval aviators, we must put the good of our service and our reputation above all else.

Assuming that the “combat-zone” an-' tics were offensive—ask yourself if you would have been comfortable with your I wife or sister there—we are then faced with two questions: Should the Tailhook Association and senior Navy leadership be held responsible for the offensive acts committed at the 1991 Tailhook sympo­sium? Was the political response by Sec- j retary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett I III and various U.S. senators appropriate? j Responsibility is a partner of author­ity. Just as commanding officers are ac­countable for the actions of their com­mands, so, too, the Tailhook Association is accountable for the actions of its mem­bers. Our leaders—including the Tailhook Association’s—must fix the problem' With better supervision and coordination by well-intentioned volunteers from the Tailhook Association and the units that sponsored the suites, the disastrous out­come of Tailhook 1991 could have been avoided. Individually, not a single one of

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cuss, or denounce the charges lev-

US wearing wings of gold could have stopped what we observed—collectively, we should have.

By aggressively condemning the ac­tions and immediately—yet, I hope, tem­porarily—withdrawing Navy support, Secretary Garrett exhibited the foresight necessary to stave off the permanent de­struction of our Tailhook Association. The power of public opinion over the mil­itary is tremendous. After Tailhook, the reputation of the Navy in the eyes of the U-S. public was at stake. Along with the grievous acts committed by the very few, the political side effects needed to be ad­dressed as quickly as possible. Therefore, I commend Secretary Garrett and those Present and former naval aviators who enacted new policy immediately. Debriefs nre much more pleasant when we discuss °ur mistakes before our superiors have ^a chance to discuss them for us. □

Senior Chief Photographer’s Mate Robert L. Lawson, U.S. Navy (Retired), and for­^mer editor of The Hook—In recent months, much has been written regard- mg the events of the 1991 Tailhook Sym­posium. A great deal has been said about Bte suspension of Navy support of the Tailhook Association by Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III; descrip­tions of it as “political scapegoating” and knee-jerk reaction” are commonly heard, recriminations abound over who is to ulame and many wonder aloud if senior Navy officials are attempting to avoid re­sponsibility for the conduct of naval of­fers at Tailhook 1991. Finger-pointing ^ls the name of the game.

As a card-carrying member (Charter .Timber #17, and Life Member #211) of ailhook since 1972—and a worker bee P^r it since 1970—1 must ask one ques- !°n: Why have we heard nothing from ^e Tailhook Association’s board of di- metors on this matter? With the excep- '°n of a few remarks by Captain Wilbur ⁿutson, U.S. Navy (Retired), the chair­man of the board, published in The Hook ^e nng the membership that all is well and '^Ve are smoothly sailing along, I have not seen or heard of—any action on the part ?. ^,^^le board to refute, defend, explain

I against the Association. Where is the adership of this organization and what ^ls it doing?

_w,^^erbaps an even better question is th ^{6re WaS} Tailhook’s leadership during _p ^e Planning stages of Tailhook 1991? ofN ^events that led to the withdrawal avy support took place at the parties ated to Tailhook 1991—they were not any way related to the Tailhook Sym­posium. However, the behavior at the par­ties was nothing new—this conduct has been going on as long as I have been with the organization. For many years, a large number of Tailhook members expressed their dismay over these antics and voiced their concern that, one day, the party peo­ple would get the organization into trou­ble. These pleas went unheard.

With the exception of a few, half­hearted admonishments to commanding officers of the units sponsoring the “admin suites” to ensure their people be­haved themselves, little was done to get the party under control. (I’ll admit that, at one time, I was part of the problem— but we all must grow up sometime.)

In defense of the Tailhook Associa­tion, it must be remembered that the “admin suites” are not sponsored by the association—they are rented and operated by individual Navy commands. Further­more, the vast majority of the people jam­ming these rooms are not Tailhook mem­bers; they neither attend the symposium nor contribute anything positive to the event.

However, these facts do not absolve Tailhook’s board and senior Navy offi­cials of their responsibility for not hav­ing worked closely together to get con­trol of the situation years ago. Instead,

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the party mentality prevailed and those in the positions to make changes preferred to wink and look the other way—until it was too late.

Ultimate responsibility lies with those in charge—it’s the Navy way. I do not presume to advise the Navy on what ac­tions to take regarding its leaders. How­ever, it is time for the board of directors of the Tailhook Association to stand up and be counted, to accept responsibility for their inaction and inadequate leader­ship. In short, they should resign.

Then, how do we fix the problem? Form a committee of senior naval avia­tors (active duty and retired) and quali­fied volunteers from the Tailhook Asso­ciation. This committee could get things back on track. The real Tailhook Asso­ciation is a professional organization that is important to the Navy. It is time to press on with the program. □

“The State of Orderly Liquidation”

(See J. P. Clancey and J. G. Hayashi, p. 13, April 1992 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Michael J. Eisele, U.S. Naval Reserve—Mr. Clancey and Mr. Hayashi correctly pointed out, that

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the U. S. Merchant Marine is headed rapidly for extinction. For a number of reasons—primarily tied to labor costs and government regulation—U.S, ship oper­ators have higher operating costs than their flag-of-convenience competitors. For decades, these higher costs were largely offset by direct government subsidies, which have since become politically un­popular. Remaining indirect subsidies— primarily cargo-preference requirements and cabotage restrictions—may prove in­sufficient to maintain a viable fleet. More­over, indirect subsidies only shift the cost of maintaining a U.S. merchant fleet from the government to shippers and, ulti­mately, to the public. Because shippers historically form a more vocal con­stituency than ship operators, the mar­itime industry cannot rely on indirect sub­sidies forever.

Assuming that it is necessary, perhaps even vital, to maintain a U.S.-flag mer­chant fleet for our military and economic security, it is clear that Congress must act to eliminate the disadvantages faced by U.S. ship operators in global competition. Unfortunately, a number of these disad­vantages cannot be erased. Certainly, Congress would be reluctant to restore U.S. competitiveness at the expense of safety, or by permitting the economic ex­ploitation of foreign seamen on board U.S. merchant ships. Accordingly, our challenge is to overcome these obstacles by developing the kind of innovative approaches to ocean transportation for which Sea-Land and American President Lines are known. The government’s role in this process must be to foster innova­tion and competitiveness through sup­porting research and development, pro­viding economic incentives, and using common sense in regulation.

The restoration of the U.S. merchant fleet will be a long and difficult process. There is, however, one small step Con­gress might take right now to help restore U.S. competitiveness in ocean shipping— eliminate outdated provisions of U.S. law that permit crewmen to file lawsuits against American ship operators for per­sonal injuries. Based on a historical anomaly, the law permits injured seamen to have claims against their employers re­solved by a jury, instead of receiving scheduled benefits under a workman's compensation scheme like almost all other U.S. workers. Replacement of the current system with a no-fault compen­sation scheme, similar to that adminis­tered by the U.S. Labor Department for longshoremen, would have the immedi­ate effect of relieving U.S. ship operators of a substantial—and largely unpre­dictable liability virtually unique to the

U.S.-flag merchant fleet. Because col­lective legal fees in a contested case might easily exceed the compensation ac­tually received by the injured seaman, a compensation scheme also would result in substantial savings in litigation costs. Although seamen would give up their right to a lump-sum recovery, they would benefit from the assurance that compen­sation is not based on fault, and would continue as long as any disability persists.

Of course, implementation of a com­pensation scheme would be—and has been—vigorously opposed by lawyers who represent injured seamen on a con­tingency-fee basis. Personal-injury lawyers understand that jury trials can produce spectacular awards, and that the threat of a jury overly sympathetic to a plaintiff can compel companies to settle questionable claims. Unfortunately, the renowned largess of U.S. juries results in substantial cost to U.S. ship operators; thus, reducing the competitiveness of the U.S.-flag fleet in an industry that exists on very thin margins. Given the bleak fu­ture described by Mr. Clancey and Mr. Hayashi, it is time for a sweeping reform of this archaic and inefficient system. O “World Navies in 1992”

lSee N. Friedman, pp. 104-133, March 1992 Proceedings)

“The Commanders Respond”

(See J. R. Thompson et. al., pp. 32-39, March

1992 Proceedings)

Colonel R. Menon, Republic of Singapore Army; Director, Public Affairs, Ministry * of Defense, Republic of Singapore—Mr. Friedman is free to express his opinions about the performance of the Victory- class missile corvettes of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). There is, how­ever, no basis for his claim that the RSN proposes “a new series of 12 [fast-at­tack boats], officially [italics mine) to counter a Malaysian program of 18 OPVs [offshore patrol vessels].”

In “The Commanders Respond” fea­ture of the same issue, Commodore Teo Chee Hean, commander of the Republic of Singapore Navy, points out that Sin­gapore’s regional policy is “consonant with the view of the Association of South East Asian Nations [which includes j Malaysia], that regional resilience is best ensured by having strong national re­silience.” Contrary to Mr. Friedman's claim, Singapore views Malaysia’s plat¹ to build 18 OPVs as contributing to na­tional and regional resilience, and, there­fore, welcomes the program. □

“Just Say No!!”

(See T. S. Downing, pp. 45-46, February 1992;

T. C. Stewart, p. 12, March 1992; G. P.

Crandall, P. Cornell, pp. 14-19, April 1992; L.

Y. Draude, pp. 19-20, A. G. Van Sant, pp. 19­20, May 1992; Editor’s Note, pp. 14-15, June

1992 Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) Elizabeth P. Cronk, U.S. Navy—I am assured by wore dispassionate readers, and now in the June Proceedings by the editor, that Commander Crandall’s letter about women in the Navy was literary tongue- in-cheek. The humor is difficult for me to see and impossible for me to appre­ciate: I regularly hear the outrageous at­titudes espoused in Commander Cran­dall’s letter put forward with straight-faced seriousness.

I chafe at seeing them in print in the Navy’s professional journal just as peo­ple of color would chafe at finding a racial slur on its pages. Would Proceed- ^mgs have published a letter—regardless °f its intent—arguing that racial minori­ties do not belong in the military and We should return to the not-so-long-ago days of segregation? I think not.

There is nothing even remotely funny ^about sexual discrimination. Commander Crandall’s letter did nothing to advance the discussion. It made the work of the Professionals at the Naval Academy and ^ln the fleet who are striving to abolish discriminatory barriers a great deal more difficult.

Proceedings has allowed Navy women t° be insulted. The Navy Times reports that Vice Admiral Ronald J. Zlatoper (deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Man­Power, Personnel & Training]) is willing t° adopt the “Not on my watch, not on Wy ship, not in my Navy” policy against ^Sexual harassment. Is Proceedings ready t° support such a policy? □

Offer Service Members a Leave °f Absence”

(See N. L. Golightly, p. 97, October 1991; P. E. Wilson, p. 14, December 1991 Proceedings)

Chief Cryptologic Technician Harris M. ^ustin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The prob- ^em of personnel sometimes needing a reak would not exist if the Navy did a orough background check into each re- j^uit’s reason for enlisting. More than ^,kely. the Navy would discover that the Prospective sailor wants a break from a ^uh and monotonous civilian life. Today’s recruiting procedures should ^art with a psychological profile to dis- °^ver a person’s ability to cope with men- and physical stress, to weed out those who seek to use the Navy as a stepping stone to a better position in the civilian world. The G.I. Bill and any of its off­spring should be abolished and long­term service schools should be offered only to those who contract for a six-year hitch after graduation from the school. (The Navy has poured billions of dol­lars down the drain training people who are not committed to the Navy.)

It is unthinkable to have recruits go through all the training necessary to be­come proficient in their chosen fields only to lose them to some “agreed-upon hia­tus” or “temporary deactivation.” Where does the relief crewman come from? In this age of constant changes in armament and equipment, what assurance do we have that those returning to their billets will be able to tackle them without yet another term at school?

The Navy needs people who are con­tinually using their skills and aiming to climb the ladder to top enlisted status— or beyond. The Navy cannot afford to waste money on those who interrupt their service but keep the same privileges as those who stand by their enlistment oath. Why spoon-feed shirkers with on-base privileges, commissary and exchange, as well as medical benefits? The Navy should instead toughen up and take only those who can cut the mustard. In short, recruit warriors—not wimps. □

“Resignation in the Canadian

Navy”

(See N. F. Caldwell, pp. 85-90, March 1992

Proceedings)

Major Thomas E. Charbonneau, Cana­dian Armed Forces Reserve—While Commander Caldwell’s article is well written and adroitly reflects the present state of Canada’s navy, I must take ex­ception to the caption accompanying the photograph of three members of the Canadian Rangers. The Rangers are not Eskimo home guardsmen armed “with ri­fles and a toll-free [telephone] number.” While not seen as soldiers per se, they are considered to be scouts much the same as natives were in the 19th-century American West.

The Rangers’ military accoutrements are not identical to the rest of the Cana­dian Forces and they are drawn from a unique cultural group. Nevertheless, they are readily identifiable as members of the military. The Rangers have two roles. First, there are those missions—such as coast watching—that can be carried out as part of their day-to-day activities. Sec­ond, because of their knowledge of the environment, they also are in great de­mand for supporting military exercises and operations (e.g., the Rangers played an important role in the reporting of ra­dioactive debris from the crashed Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 in 1978). For the latter services, they are paid accordingly. The Rangers also receive basic military training in map reading, first aid, and other related subjects, which enables them to function as part of the Canadian mil­itary infrastructure.

Some Ranger patrols are under the aegis of Maritime Command and their principal duty is coast watching; the vast majority of Canadian Rangers, however, are located in the north and are under Northern Command’s control. We should not downplay the role of Rangers in southern latitudes, but it is in the north where the attributes of the Rangers—their deep knowledge of the environment, their preservation of a unique way of life, their ability to work and survive in a harsh cli­mate, their hunting instincts, and their profound respect for nature—are most valued.

Contrary to Commander Caldwell’s implication, the Canadian Rangers are not an instrument of sovereignty. The De­partment of National Defense’s policy is not to make the Canadian Rangers into a military fighting machine, but rather to keep them as they are: a highly special­ized pathfinder force of which the Cana­dian Armed Forces is justly proud. □

“Verifying Fleet Survivability with Empress II”

(See T. M. Wilbur, pp. 106-108, October 1991 Proceedings)

Richard K. Bott—Commander Wilbur’s narrative on full-scale testing of ships for vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) raises several very important and not-so-subtle points about weapon-sys­tem acquisition. Every system is designed to meet an operational requirement; how­ever, many of these systems never un­dergo testing to assess their ability to withstand expected threats—and still live up to those requirements.

The Empress II seagoing EMP-gen- erating system was developed with the specific goal of subjecting a ship oper­ating in its natural environment to EMP. Many weapon systems never receive this type of full-scale testing. Testing a few individual subsystems within the sterile environment of the manufacturer's labo­ratory provides little data on now highly integrated subsystems may interact after receiving battle damage. Subsystem test­ing does not account for interaction be­tween systems and the additional hazards such synergistic effects may pose for a ship, aircraft, or land vehicle in combat.

Many weapon systems are far too costly for destructive testing. Comman­der Wilbur pointed out that EMP testing was conducted at increasingly higher energy levels until system abnormalities occurred, at which point testing was dis­continued until the affected systems could be temporarily hardened or disconnected. Unfortunately, this kind of non-destruc­tive testing may not always provide ac­curate interpretations of interactions that occur when systems are damaged but still operating.

In an attack aircraft flying normally, redundant flight-control computers take electrical signals from a number of sources—pilot, airspeed indicator, angle- of-attack sensors, and accelerometers— and decide what inputs to provide to the control-surface actuators. If the aircraft’s flight control computer is hit, errant sig­nals course through it and out to the ac­tuators. However, backup computers will recognize a problem, outvote the dam­aged computer, and take it off line—not, however, before a twitch has occurred at the control surfaces. Flying at 20,000 feet, a pilot might be able to recover; fly­ing on the nape-of-the-earth, it would be too late.

Without ballistic testing of the entire aircraft, it would be impossible to deter­mine what would happen if its flight com­puter were hit in combat. If only the com­puter were tested, there would be no reaction of the actuator and hydraulic sys­tems—hence, no twitch. If the computer were not supplied with electrical power, there would be no arcing and consequent smoldering or fire. If there were no fuel in the tank adjacent to the avionics bay, the spalling of the computer would not cause a fuel fire. The possibilities are complex, and nearly endless.

Fortunately, many people have seen the value of realistic testing for the sys­tems our troops must have to defend our country. Congress passed legislation in 1986 that required vulnerability and lethality testing of selected major weapon systems prior to full-scale production. The law—referred to as the Live Fire Law— initially addressed only new acquisition of wheeled and tracked land vehicles; however, in 1987 it was expanded to in­clude other major land, sea, and air sys­tems. In 1988, the law was further amended to include upgrades and modi­fications to existing systems.

The Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army have been performing subsys­tem ballistic-vulnerability tests on many tactical weapon systems for years under the Defense Department’s Joint Live Fire

(JLF) program. The Navy and Air Force will soon be applying the knowledge and facilities they have developed through the JLF program to perform full-up testing of the F/A-18, AV-8B, and F-15 aircraft. The Army has completed extensive full- up testing of its Bradley armored fight­ing vehicle and Abrams M-l tank. All of these full-up tests are designed to fill the voids from previous testing, as well as identify the failure modes associated with cascading damage from system interac­tion. The value of this type of testing is indisputable.

But even destructive testing is not enough to assess a weapon system’s over­all survivability, because each test pro­vides only one data point for a specific threat traveling at a specific velocity im­pacting a specific component at a specific angle. Computer models and analyses must be used to complete the statistical assessment. They must also be relied upon for two other areas. One is the sus­ceptibility of the system to acquisition, tracking, and engagement by enemy weapon systems. The other is the simu­lation of complete weapon systems that are too expensive to test destructively, e.g., a submarine or an Aegis cruiser. These models and analyses require initial and recurring sanity checks through re­view, testing, upgrading, and incorpora­tion of data—four areas requiring im­provement by all four services and by private industry, as well. □

“Stalking the Enemy’s Coast”

(See S. Edwards, pp. 56-62, February 1992; J

Stockdale, G. Matlock, pp. 20-23, April 1992

Proceedings)

Commander Robert Laske, U S Navy (Retiredj—I would like to substantiate Admiral Stockdale’s version of the events of 4 August 1964. As the com­munications officer of the Military As­sistance Command Special Operations Group (MACSOG) that night, I was in the group’s communications center, monitoring maritime operations and re­lated signal intelligence traffic with the chief of the group, Colonel Clyde Rus­sell, U.S. Army. We wondered what could possibly be going on with the DeSoto (electronic intelligence) patrol when signal intelligence indicated that there were no North Vietnamese boats at sea. Colonel Russell’s assessment was, “The Navy is shooting at whales.”

Time and time again, I have seen ref­erences to signals intelligence that sup­posedly confirms North Vietnamese ac­tion on the night of 4 August. From my vantage point, there is no such evidence

If this episode in history is to be clari­fied—which it should—it will be neces­sary to have full access to the relevant signals intelligence. Unfortunately, the National Security Agency’s policy of pro­tecting “sources and methods” prevents such an examination. □

John B. Dwyer—In discussing the estab­lishment of the Military Assistance Com­mand Special Operations Group (MAC­SOG), Mr. Edwards states that MACSOG controlled “maritime operations code­named 34 Alpha.” This was the desig­nation of the operational plan authoriz­ing a number of covert actions against North Vietnam. On the organizational chart in the MACSOG command history, maritime operations are listed as “07” and later, as the Maritime Studies Group, des­ignated OPS-37.

Over the length of its missions, the Special Operations Group operated a total of 26 fast patrol-torpedo boats (PTFs) of which 16—not 14—were of the Nor­wegian Nasty-class. PTFs 17-26 were ei­ther U.S.-built copies of the Nasty by John Trumpy & Sons, or 95-foot Os­prey-class PTFs built by Seaward Seacraft. Contrary to Mr. Edwards’s de­scription of the Nastys as being “made of marine plywood,” they actually had dou­ble-planked mahogany hulls.

Mr. Edwards’s description of the Da Nang-based U.S. Naval Advisory De­tachment (NAD) is somewhat in error. Actually, the NAD was the cover name for the Special Operations Group’s mar­itime operations. It was comprised of a 12-man SEAL mobile training team and a Marine Corps force reconnaissance el­ement, as well as boat training and repair and maintenance teams from Mobile Sup­port Team-1, commanded by Lieutenant Burton L. Knight, U.S. Naval Reserve.

As for Mr. Edwards’s statement that General William Westmoreland, U.S. Army, commander of the Military As­sistance Command-Vietnam (MACV), re­quested DeSoto patrol coverage of SOG sabotage targets in early July 1964, the MACSOG command history states that: “In July, MACV set up July-August DeS­oto [electronic intelligence] patrol coor­dination procedures, indicating OPLAN 34-A MAROPS compatibility, providing MACV always had accurate knowledge of the patrol’s whereabouts.” (Italics mine.)

When the 31 July DeSoto patrol en­tered the Gulf of Tonkin, SOG operations had to be scheduled no sooner than 36 hours after the passage of the DeSoto ship in any specific area. That is hardly what Edwards is saying. □

“Conception Is the Place”

(See S. W. Mitchell, pp. 77-78, February 1992; A. Molander, pp. 23-26, April 1992 Proceedings)

“The Landfall Is Samana Cay”

(See }. Judge, p. 78, February 1992; A. Molander, pp. 23-26, April 1992 Proceedings)

“Watlings Island Is San

Salvador”

(See S. L. Morison, p. 79, February 1992; A.

Molander, pp. 23-26, April 1992 Proceedings)

Keith Pickering—It is amazing that ad­vocates of the many (there are at least nine) landfall theories pay the most at­tention and give the greatest weight to description of the features of the landfall in Columbus’s log. These features-the lake, the reef, the harbor, and the little peninsula-are so common in the Bahamas that almost any island can be—and has been—seen as a perfect match to the log. At the same time, many of these same advocates have discounted, ignored, or even rewritten those descriptions in the log which are the most specific and quan­tifiable: the distances and directions from one point to the next.

Dr. Mitchell’s article is a case in point: Columbus has written “leagues” in the log; Dr. Mitchell reads “miles.” It is nec­essary to realize the Diario speaks in two voices: during the passage through the Bahamas, Las Casas quotes Columbus’s log directly, “in the very words of the Admiral.” The remaining 88% of the Di­ario was composed by Las Casas him­self, using Columbus’s log as a guide; in these abstracted portions, Las Casas speaks of Columbus in the third person. This is an important distinction, because in the directly quoted section not once does Columbus use miles as a measure­ment for either speed or distance. When directly quoted, he uses leagues exclu­sively. It is true that out of the 444 mea­surements of distance or speed in the Di­ario, there are 12 instances where Las Casas strikes out “leagues” and substi­tutes “miles.” However, there is not a sin­gle instance of the reverse which is pre­cisely the pattern one would expect if Las Casas were translating into miles from an original manuscript that used only leagues. It makes no sense at all if, as Dr. Mitchell supposes, Las Casas were con­verting from miles into leagues.

In order for Dr. Mitchell’s theory to make sense, one has to accept not only that Columbus wrote miles in the origi­nal log, but also that Las Casas misquoted Columbus’s measurements in five spe­cific places, while quoting him accurately in three other specific places. The best that can be said of this scenario is that it is highly unlikely.

Samuel Eliot Morison was apparently well aware of this problem, since he re­jects using miles altogether. The track from Conception and the track from Watlings are largely similar, and there­fore share the same weakness: Rum Cay is far too small to be Columbus’s Santa Maria Island. Morison solved this prob­lem by inventing the “alongshore league,” which he placed at 1.5 nautical miles— less than half the size of the league he used elsewhere. The alongshore-league theory requires belief that Columbus used the same measurement in two different ways in the same document, and some­times within the same sentence. Once again, Columbus’s words have been twisted to fit a theory.

Mr. Judge—and Gustavus Fox before him—therefore deserve great credit for showing us a track that fits the log per­fectly without such awkward mental gym­nastics. By choosing the Crooked-Ack- lins group as Santa Maria, all discrepancies with the distances recorded in the log disappear. The problem with Samana Cay, as Mr. Morison correctly points out, is that Columbus went north- northeast along San Salvador, and Samana has no such coastline.

None of the three authors mentions that there is only one place in the log where Columbus tells us the direction that San Salvador lies from any other point. When Columbus arrives at Santa Maria on the 15 October, he says of the island: “I found that the face which is in the direction of San Salvador runs north- south, and that there are in it five leagues.” In other words, San Salvador lies due east of a north-south coastline five leagues long. This description does not fit Conception, it does not fit Watlings, and it does not fit Samana. The only place in the central Bahamas that fits this description is Plana Cays, lying due east of Acklins at the correct distance described by Columbus.

The idea of Plana Cay as the first land­fall was first put forward by Ramon Di- diez-Burgos in 1974, but since he wrote in Spanish, his theory has not gained wide exposure in this country. Of course, Plana Cay has the requisite lake, reef, harbor, and peninsula. The track from Plana] like the track from Samana, fits the log perfectly without assuming any farfetched errors in transcription or interpretation. But unlike Samana, Plana has a coastline bearing north northeast. And unlike any other island, Plana faces a coastline five leagues long running north-south, at a dis­tance of five to seven leagues—just as

Columbus described. Plana Cay is thus the only landfall site that is a perfect match to the log in every respect. □

“Naval Institute/Kodak 30th Annual Photo Contest Winners”

(See J. Debevec et. al., pp. 65-81, April 1992

Proceedings)

Commander Strafford Morss, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired) and Project Manager, Battleship Texas Restoration Project, May 1987-July 1989—While the First Prize photograph-the Texas (BB-35) in dry dock—is grand, I must take some ex­ception, however, to the accompanying caption.

The Texas started her career as a mu­seum ship—and a memorial—in Hous­ton, Texas, on 21 April 1948. The ship was operated by a state commission until 1 September 1983 when the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department assumed cus­tody. By the early 1980s, leaks from above and major flooding from below— I always mixed with oil—made it appar­ent that the ship had materially deterio­rated beyond the capabilities of the commission to deal with her problems.

In 1987, a bill—sponsored by the Texas congressional delegation and providing nearly $5.1 million from Navy operat­ing funds to dry dock the ship—was passed.

To move the Texas to a shipyard, she j had to be floated, her navigational draft minimized, her stern area strengthened, _t and her watertight integrity improved.

A consortium of Houston Ship Channel companies, under the leadership of the Shell Oil Company, volunteered to assist Texas Parks and Wildlife in trying to float the ship by providing the equipment to remove, transport, and dispose of the water-oil mix that was flooding the Texas. Eventually, more than 2.6 million gallons of the mix would be handled.

The Texas began to float on 2 Octo­ber 1987. The tone for the next 15 months was set that day, when the barge _| to which the water-oil mix was being j transferred folded in the middle.

The Texas herself often seemed recal­citrant, unwilling to be saved. On 13 De­cember 1988, she resisted the efforts of seven tugs to pull her from her berth, fi­nally coming free after eight hours. Mov- ! ing her to the dry dock in Galveston, Texas, took more than ten hours and was , a race against rapid flooding. But the ! Texas finally was settled on the blocks of the “Big T” dry dock at Todd Shipyard in Galveston. In spite of the flooding, block clearance was achieved—thanks to an increase in water salinity from her San

Jacinto Battleground berth to Galveston.

The photograph shows the ship at the completion of the initial hull survey. The white markings of the hull are plate thick­ness readings and some plate removal has started. The prominent foremast house has been removed for major work and set on the dry dock tanktop, forward of the ship (in­cluding the rigging, moving the foremast house was a 42.5-ton tandem-crane lift).

The superstructure, mast houses, and mast platforms required more extensive work than expected, and the underwater hull was in far worse shape than had been believed.

The Texas has 92 fuel tanks; many had leaked and there was fuel oil everywhere—

258 tanks, voids, and compartments required gas freeing (30 tanks had been cleaned be­fore she arrived in Galveston). In the gaso­line flasks located in the bow, 5,000 gallons of 100-octane aviation gasoline were discov­ered. The tank com­partment had been flooded since 1948.

The gasoline had been there since 1945 ^and should have been removed prior to the Texas' s 1946-48 lay-up.

Out of 68,000 square feet of shell and blister plating, 14,100 square feet had to ^be replaced. More than 43,000 leaking or ^sUspicious rivets were ring-welded in the ^ship’s bottom.

The old wood deck had been removed Prior to installing a concrete deck on the rnain and 01 levels in 1968. The wood deck had been bolted through the steel deck. When the concrete was installed, the bolts were not removed nor were the ^air holes plugged. It was obvious that ^water coming through these holes ac- eounted for much of the main-deck leak­^age. A new wood deck was installed after the Texas left the shipyard.

More than 3,000 square feet of main deck plating was replaced as was 1,100 square feet of inner-bottom plating in the ^engine room bilges.

Re-creations of the antiaircraft gun and director sponsons and shields, removed ^bV the Navy in 1948 to minimize main­tenance, were installed. Ten 40-mm quadruple mounts—most of them re­moved from the USS Missouri (BB-63) during her reactivation—were mounted in their appropriate 1945 locations (four 1.1-in. gun quadruple mounts were re­moved). A reproduction of the ship’s SK- radar antenna was built by the Parks and Wildlife Department and set on the main­mast. The weight of the reproduction an­tenna was within 100 pounds of the orig­inal antenna, blown away in a 1960s hurricane.

The entire exterior of the ship was cleaned to bare metal and painted. Above the waterline, the Texas was repainted in Pacific Blue, as she was in 1945.

The prize winning photograph was taken in late August 1989, with the Texas ready to undock. She went alongside until February 1990, when she docked again for repair of some relatively minor leak­age and bottom touch-up. More work was done at a temporary berth in the Hous­ton Ship Channel at a pier at Green’s Bayou. Finally, in September 1990, the Texas moved into her newly refurbished, fully floating berth at the San Jacinto Monument, and was reopened after a two-year hiatus.

It is apparent that the money from the Navy did not come close to covering the entire cost of restoring the Texas. It is es­timated that the total price tag for the job was more than $18 million. Many might question the wisdom of expending so much money on a museum ship.

The Texas is important for many rea­sons. Commissioned on 12 March 1914, she is the sole survivor of approximately

A diamond in the rough—the Texas (BB-35 ) awaits her multi-million dollar, 26-month restoration in Galveston, Texas.

135 dreadnoughts built between 1906 and 1922. As the only surviving early dread­nought. she exemplifies the international competition in battleship construction— a factor in the arms race that has been deemed a major cause of World War I. The Texas's construction was the result of the cooperation between the U.S. Navy and U.S. steel companies in the devel­opment of the specialty-steel industry in this country. Her two steam-powered, four-cylinder, triple-expansion main en­gines, a National Engineering Landmark, make her an important relic of not only world naval history, but of world indus­trial history as well.

The Texas is a National Historic Land­mark and is properly considered an in­ternational treasure of which people of the United States—particularly, the state of Texas—-are the trustees. □