CI: The New Linchpin

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By Robert David Steele

From the Marines’ perspective, one call should get it all— command, control, communications, computer, and intel­ligence support to deny the enemy of the same. Today, following the con­cept of aggregate usefulness, the Marine Corps should better equip, train, and organize, based on that premise.

Th,

Electronic: Warfare, or SEW) is Vice Admiral J. O. Tut- c s Copernicus concept.' During the war game, the

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Last October ten Marines, including six colonels, par­ticipated in an extraordinary wargame—’’Technol­ogy Initiatives Wargame 1991”—sponsored by Vice Admiral J. G. Reynolds (Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements, Office of the Chief of ^aval Operations) that focused exclusively on command, Control, communications, computer, and intelligence !^⁴1) concepts, architectures, doctrine, and technologies. ^e centerpiece of the Navy’s version (called Space and

arines aggressively represented the Marine tactical au- °mated command-and-control system (MTACCS) and ex­peditionary Cl requirements and capabilities.

No-notice” combat operations in the next 20 years are going to move away from traditional engagements be- een forces and the present focus on key terrain. Ma­neuver warfare has been part of the evolution. Now, concepts such as “relative advantage” are emerging, and highlighting a decline of ground troops as the automatic first choice in power projection. Instead, much of it may take the form of carefully targeted single-missile attacks against precisely defined deterrence objectives. Disrup­tion, rather than destruction, will be the norm. Cl nodes, rather than troops or equipment, will be targets of choice. Warning shots, especially in the deterrence or precon­flict stage, will consist of long-range precision weapons guided either by national imagery or by small units of spe­cial covert or clandestine forces with a “dial-a-weapon” capability. Or electromagnetic bursts may seek out spe­cific band widths or communications and computer ca­pabilities. Even in a broader conflict, Cl and Cl coun­termeasures will have the capability—and therefore the status—of a separate maneuver element.

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year 1994-1999 Program Ob­jective Memorandum cycle. This is necessary for several reasons, not the least of which is the requirement for full joint and coalition in­teroperability. It is also nec­essary to develop and inte­grate new and unanticipated capabilities with correspond­ing concepts, doctrine, train­ing, and equipment. What we can and cannot do with C⁴I should influence how we train, equip, and organize in all other mission areas.

► Reorient existing forces and equipment to achieve a capability to deal with peo­ple and conditions, rather

According to a 1989 study, only 10 of 69 areas of interest have complete map coverage. A greater emphasis on integration and adaptation of different computer programs and databases—such as these mapping and vehicle identification models from the Marine Corps Intelligence Center— should begin closing that information gap.

Where does this leave the Marines, who field the world’s finest forcible-entry, self-sustaining, combined- arms team? In no way does this reduce the requirement for an effective combined-arms capability. It simply places our potential for creating the greatest amount of vi­olence in the smallest possible space in the context of a much broader world view—one that sees C⁴I and its countermeasures as both an alternative to combined-arms warfare and an integral part of it, when forces are finally committed.

A Four-Part Approach to Aggregate Usefulness

At a minimum, the following should be undertaken:

► Establish a new “focus of effort” on C⁴I in the fiscal

than enemies and combat. Recognize what intelligence anal^ys^is and common sense are telling us about the like- ¹ oo of employment in various stability and limited-ob­jective missions, and recast our structure to provide for t e necessarily more robust engineering, medical, military po ice, public affairs, and civic action capabilities within eac division-wing team. Noncombatant operations have entirely difterent C⁴I requirements; we need to institu­tionalize our capabilities in these areas.

> Draw heavily on the Marine Corps Intelligence Center an its new-tound ability to provide strategic generaliza­tions about the military capabilities, operational geogra­phy, and civil factors that characterize the expeditionary environment and reorient the research-and-development program. The advanced amphibious assault vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft are clearly suited to this environment, while much of the heavy ground equip­ment is not. The Marine Corps should downsize all of its ground systems (including tanks and artillery prime movers) to the point that no single unit weighs more than a manageable 25 tons. Given what early strategic generalizations have told the Corps about constraints on ground mobility, it needs to place more emphasis on vertical lift as both a fire-support and transportation/lo- gistics capability. Since the issue of affordability is para­mount, and the Marine Corps often cannot support a do­mestic procurement without the Army as a partner, the Corps should support Army interest in smaller, lighter equipment, while also looking closely at foreign equip­ment designed for expeditionary environments and Third World operations.

^ In order for everyone to understand these concepts, the Marine Corps must establish two priorities for offi­cer and staff noncommissioned officer manning—the Fleet Marine Force and joint billets. To provide continuity dur­ing a time of radical change, the tour lengths of both should be four to five years (with at least two command °r staff billets and a related training year integrated into the single tour). The Marine Corps should triple the man­ning of joint billets, with emphasis on Department of the Navy and Department of the Army staff positions, De­partment of Defense program management positions, and key C⁴I billets in each of the unified and specified commands.

Focus of Effort on C⁴I

Several diverse but related conditions guide this rec- •Anmendation:

^ First, the Marine Corps has gone out on a limb, build- ^lng many complex weapon systems—including aviation Platforms with extremely limited loiter times (and much !ess range and lift in Third World hot weather than ad­vertised, because they were designed for warm-weather flying). In addition, we do not have the mapping, chart- ^lng, and geodesy data—or the related precision-targeting data—for most of the Third World. According to one i^89 study of 67 countries and two island groups of in­terest to the Marine Corps, 22 have no maps and would require rapid exploitation of multispectral imagery with grid overlays. Mexico, Surinam, Bangladesh, Greece, and I urkey fall into this category. An additional 37 have only ^a few 1:50,000 tactical maps, generally covering the major Ports and cities, and generally outdated (i.e., showing no ^r°ads, airfields, or other man-made features established ^ln test ten years or so). Colombia, most of Central Amer- ^lca, Peru, and most countries in Southwest Asia, Africa, ^at,d Asia are in this category. Only ten of our 69 areas ⁰ interest have complete 1:50,000-scale map coverage, ^aod that is old, generally by at least ten years. Our ortage of precision-targeting data (e.g., precise loca- ^l0ns of specific buildings, floors, and rooms or electronic equipment suites) is even more severe.

• Second, the inherent danger in a necessary but risky strategy of reliance on commercial communications and computer equipment—to transmit much of our operational, logistics, personnel, and even intelligence information around the globe—exacerbates the targeting-data and map­ping shortfalls. The Marine Corps is off the limb and in free-fall when it comes to the vulnerability of our C⁴I links. Outside of government-owned satellite links—and even those are vulnerable to disruption by some governments— our reliance on commercial satellites and ground switch­ing stations leaves us wide open to total shutdown of our communications, and complete penetration of our ad­ministrative and logistics computer systems by any skilled hacker. Without greater emphasis on C⁴I as a whole, this aspect—the weakest link in the entire Marine Corps—will continue to be neglected.
• Third and more positive, however, C⁴I is coming into its own as a major warfare area, one that can achieve power projection through disruption of C⁴I nodes rather than destruction of forces, installations, or noncombatants. Information embargoes, pinpoint destruction of key com- mand-and-control nodes, and short-term disruption of hos­tile commercial transactions are all going to become weapons of choice. In the next century, the President of the United States is not going to be asking, “Where are the carriers?” or “Where are the Marines?”, but “How do we degrade his command-and-control?” or “What com­munications nodes can we hit without disturbing our al­lies?” The Marine Corps does not have the concepts, the doctrine, the target data, or the equipment to carry out this kind of precision-disruption warfare. If it does not begin to develop these capabilities now, it will be left behind. The Corps needs to emphasize quality at all levels in the communications, computer, intelligence, and signals-in- telligence fields; the focus of effort should not be just a matter of dollars, but of people, as well. The quality of thought and follow-through that gave us amphibious war­fare—and then vertical envelopment and maneuver war­fare—will be critical in mastering the multidimensional time, space, and electromagnetic-spectrum aspects of C⁴I warfare, and in translating these capabilities into changed concepts, doctrine, and requirements for each of the other mission areas.

Dealing with People and Conditions

The Marine Corps and the other U.S. and allied forces met the challenge in Southwest Asia. But after the first six months, during which the Marine Corps proved its su­perior ability to get self-sustaining forces into the crisis area, Marine forces on the ground just as easily could have been other service or Coalition forces. And our forces at sea, which achieved the objective of strategic deception, could in the future be simulated—through sophisticated “virtual reality” projection.

All other Marine Corps operations during the same time frame—Sharp Edge in Liberia, Eastern Exit in Somalia, Provide Comfort in Turkey and northern Iraq, Sea Angel in Bangladesh, Fiery Vigil in the Philippines, the alert for

Haiti, and the numerous mobile training teams and other operations—show clearly that in a “peacetime’’ environ­ment, the Marine Corps excels in bringing to bear self­sustaining sea-based forces that can support and protect noncombatants by providing them with food, clothing, shelter, and security.² This is common sense—not esoteric intelligence insight—but it has implications, both for what we need in C⁴I to deal with nongovernmental organiza­tions and what we need to have forward deployed. We could be even more effective by adding a hospital ship

In the sights most often in the future will be the enemy’s means of communication. By tak­ing out Iraq’s ability to maintain command and control—here a facility once used by the Iraqis in Kuwait during Desert Storm—Coalition forces impeded Iraq’s entire prosecution of the war.

and a civic-action ship to our maritime-prepositioning force and beefing up our engineering and other civic- action capabilities on the active side of our structure. ^us-^A,RF°^HOE«

Those who correctly point out that the perishability of many medical and food supplies constrains application of this concept might wish to consider the value of regular offloads of medical and other perishable portions of the maritime prepositioning fleet by active and reserve forces, in a repetitive cycle of structured and scheduled military Peace Corps-type exercises.

Research and Reality

Procurement cycles are too long, and the requirements process is not only pro forma, but a self-validating dream divorced from the realities of terrain, climate, and C⁴I or logistics supportability. The Marine Corps—as a small and austere force—needs to get healthy faster. It can do that through the proper application of strategic-intelli­gence generalizations, which the Marine Corps Intelli­gence Center can orchestrate. To whatever extent our leadership and those responsible for the concept-based requirements system are better informed about the real­ities of our world by the Intelligence Center, C⁴I has im­pacted on our structure.

The M1A1 tank is a classic example—Southwest Asia notwithstanding—of the wrong weapon system being cho­sen for the wrong reasons. Clearly, we need the M1A1 right now; in combination with the maritime preposition­ing force concept, it is the only decent thing we have to throw into Korea or Southwest Asia in the first 30 days.

In justifying the M1A1 as the best means to meeting the requirement for a tank-killer, however, the primary pro­ponents of this system focused on the worst-case threat and best-case terrain, and they completely ignored the re­alities of combined-arms (infantry-friendly) requirements and constraints on cross-country mobility, intervisibility, bridge-loading, and logistics supportability. The Marine Corps did not have its own model for integrated analy­sis, such as the Intelligence Center has created in the past two years. Therefore, the Corps had no basis for disput­ing the Army’s threat as­sessment, and no basis for recommending alternative means of satisfying the re­quirement while avoiding the mobility and logistics problems inherent in an ex­tremely heavy, gas-guzzling vehicle.

The M1A1 has con­sumed as much as 50% of the Marine Corps’ entire procurement budget in its best years. It has introduced the concept of gallons-per- mile; it fries any infantry in its proximity (and therefore negates aspects of the fire and maneuver potential of the tank-infantry team); it is too heavy to get ashore under many conditions; it displaces too many light armored vehicles if taken afloat; and it is virtually useless in most Third World countries.

This is all significant because cross-country mobility (in this case, defined as being able to get from the beach to the capital city off-road) was simply not achievable in 60% of the 69 countries studied in 1988-1989 and was se­verely constrained in another 20%. Adding the supposi­tion that most Third World bridges can handle 20 to 40 tons on average—the advance in Panama was stopped at one point by a ten-ton bridge—then the concept of an “ex­peditionary’ 70-ton tank is clearly ludicrous—and ex­tremely expensive, considering the marginal value of its firepower under most expeditionary conditions. We need the capability the M1A1 provides, but not its baggage. This shows how better strategic-intelligence generaliza- dons thoroughly integrating operational geography and civil factors—can dramatically impact all aspects of con­cept-based requirements and program objective memo­randum cycles, through which we program our future.

That the light armored vehicle (AG) would cost the same as the M1A1 is an important point. The cost of the alternatives should be evaluated in relation to their rela­tive utility under a wide variety of expeditionary scenar- ios—thoroughly integrating lift and ground mobility re­alities not just on the basis of a technical firepowef quotient.

We should use the next ten years—a likely lull pe- to accelerate research and move rapidly toward the

substitution of mobility and accuracy for weight and lethality. Mobility and accuracy require major increases in C⁴I capability—increases not now programmed, par­ticularly in the intelligence-database and tactical-dissem­ination areas. Vertical envelopment replaced amphibious assault as the entry/mobility concept of choice in the 1960s, and it is still relevant, especially in those vast areas with undeveloped lines of communication. The Ma­rine Corps needs to expand the concept to lift even more °f its fire support into the air, while remaining able to

deal with large numbers of _________

refugees and other disaster re­quirements, and with the likely need to move many small spe­cial-purpose-force elements fre­quently and simultaneously.

Kosher Joint vs. Jury-Rig Joint

to Be Done?

The Marine Corps seems to have fallen short in its participa­tion with Navy and Department of defense staffs, particularly in the Planning-and-programming arena.

A token colonel or two just does ⁿ«t cut it. And a company-grade officer—the more common as­signee—while better than no one at all, is simply not going to pro­ject the service influence necessary at these high levels. To be inter­operable and willing to engage in Joint activities after the fact is not enough. If the Marine Corps does ⁿ°t help actively to plan and pro- §^ram joint capabilities, then by de­ntition it is going to be jury-rig- 8'tg its jointness and not exercising truly joint capabilities.

. °r this reason, the majority of jts field-grade officers should be integrated into every military de­partment and defense staff of con­sequence, ensuring that expeditionary requirements are thoroughly understood, and that the other service capa­cities necessary to support expeditionary forces are Planned and programmed. The Marine Corps, with more tan 200 years’ experience in precisely this kind of war- ^are and constabulary action, has much to offer the other Services in terms of perspective. If ever there were a time ^to shift field-grade emphasis from the Fleet Marine Force ^to joint billets, now is that time.

What Is

These phases are at best statements of what the Marine ^0rPs’ intent should be over the next ten years. A more ^eveloped campaign plan would include such things as oubling military analysts in the Marine Corps Intelli- 8^ence Center (still a smaller number than needed to man

one rifle platoon) and the establishment of intelligence support cells within major staff elements at Marine Corps Headquarters and within all organizational elements of the concept-based requirement system. The Marine Corps In­telligence Center must step out smartly to change the world view and the strategic perspective of those responsible for training, equipping, and organizing forces for the future. At a minimum, the Marine Corps needs a detailed and ne­gotiated concept of operations for intelligence support to every stage of the concept-based requirement system

The “weakest link in the entire Marine Corps” is its reliance upon commercial and multiple-access commu­nication satellites—here, one launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. More concentration on C⁴I will help prevent any outside “skilled hacker” from tampering and disrupting transmission.

process, with a great deal more emphasis to be placed on support to concept development.

At the same time, the emphasis on C⁴ supporta- bility apparently is not being integrated into the system, either. It is not enough to provide pipeline communications and dedi­cated databases for indi­vidual weapon systems— the process must provide for communications sizing, redundant computer sup­port, interoperability down to the data-entry level, and integrated, reliable C⁴I support to the entire battle area, in a surge mode. As it continues to lose personnel, the Marine Corps cannot afford to have different aviation communication and navigation systems training and ca­reer pipelines for every single aircraft in the inventory; systems need to be structured for optimal C⁴I support with minimal manning, and this requires some serious attention at the occupational sponsor level. That, in turn, assumes that tables-of-organization sponsors and mission- area sponsors are willing to listen and trade-off CT ca­pability for structure.

The Navy has three vice admirals focused on space and electronic warfare and may add a fourth. The Marine Corps has one major general and is extremely thin in colonels devoted to C⁴I. Two brigadiers from the Fleet Marine Forces should move into that arena. Many superb colonels

are available for the more traditional warfighting areas and could fill in for those two brigadiers. C⁴I, by contrast, is changing dramatically, in ways no one has anticipated. It is also an area that will have an impact on concepts, doc­trine, training, and equipment requirements in all other mis­sion areas. Taking all of this into account, a strong case can be made that Cl is much more than a one-general job. Now would be a good time to devote one of our best brigadiers to improving intelligence capabilities and an-

Even though it is currently “the only decent thing we have to throw into Korea or Southwest Asia in the first 30 days,” the M1A1 Abrams tank is “the wrong weapon for the wrong reason.” What the Marine Corps needs is M1A1 capability, minus the baggage— mobility and accuracy instead of weight and lethality.

other to accelerating implementation of the Marine Corps tactical automated command-and-control system and thus influ­encing the Navy’s Copernicus.

Even if an increase in general-officer presence at the service level is deemed inappropriate, the Marine Corps should place one at the Space Command and another at a representative unified command (e.g., the Atlantic Com­mand) where that general can develop, test, and imple­ment Marine Corps concepts for expeditionary and joint C⁴I warfare. There should be a direct relationship be­tween these two general officers and the Marine Corps’ assistant chief of staff for CL Realigning general offi­cers is one of the few direct and immediately effective ways the Commandant has to reorient the Corps. C⁴I in­side the Marine Corps—and Marine Corps influence on Cl outside the Marine Corps—desperately need in­creased general-officer attention.

The Army Technology Base Seminar Wargame in 1990 looked at Cl programming in the Army and concluded:

“The problem with [Cl] is not one of low visibility or funding, but the challenge of an overall architecture for sensors, processing, and communications. Such an architecture exists for Division and above, and for in­dividual weapon systems, but the intermediate struc­ture is extremely diffuse. The key to Air Land Battle Future (ALBF) is the efficient delivery of information, tailored to the recipient, wherever it is needed. Current approaches focus on automating existing manual processes, and linking those processes that have always communicated. ALBF may require the Army to alter this paradigm.”

Paradigms, as more than one Commandant has learned, are difficult to implement in a single tour. Cl is at the center of the vortex created by the declining defense bud­get, the restructuring of defense intelligence, and the com­petition over roles and missions. It is both a showstopper and a potential force-multiplier and force-substitute. In terms of capabilities for dollars, it appears to offer the Ma­rine Corps the best possible return on investment, if only those dollars are invested wisely and in consonance with the Copernicus concept and other joint activities.

The objective here has been to focus attention on the changing nature of power-projection requirements—away trom combat and toward noncombatant stability opera­tions and the increasing importance of Cl as a founda­tion for how we fight. If it is to be a foundation for the way we fight, then perhaps we had better make it the linch­pin for the way we train, equip, and organize.

ee t. Cdr. Michael S. Loescher, USN, “Copernicus Offers a New Center of L^e "I™”®- Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1991, pp. 86-96.

^ee.' ¹                           Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer

Espionage (New York: Doubleday, 1989) and Katie Hafner and John Markoff, Cy erpun . Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier (New York: Simon St Schuster, 1991).

' See: Adam B. Siegel, “An American Entebbe;" Capt. Robert A. Doss, USMC. “Off - ^{Afnea: Rescue} from Mogadishu;” Lt. Cdr. Dana C. Covey, MC, USNR< Offering a Helping Hand in Iraq;" Lt. Gen. H. C. Stackpole III, USMC, “Angels A T? ^Sea;" ^{and Lt}- Cdr. Kevin M. Mukri, USN, “Fiery Vigil—Out from the Ash, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1992, pp. 96-119.

r. Steele is the Marine Corps management analyst for the National oretgn Intelligence Program, with emphasis on the General Defense ntelligence Program. He works for the assistant chief of staff. Cl, ^a* Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.