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By Lieutenant Janies R. Tague III, U.S. Navy
Pulling for their own programs, advocates of particular aircraft—most notable recently, the supporters of Tomcats and Hornets— threaten to tear naval aviation apart. What is needed—and now—is a plan that makes sense and will sell.
If the naval aviation community took a marketing class, it would fail. Somehow, every recent Navy aircraft proposal has faced cancellation or delay. With setbacks in the A-12, the P-7, the F-14D, and the E-2 follow-on programs, the future of naval aviation appears bleak. And given the current trend, the carrier air wing of the next century could resemble a vintage floating museum. Our leaders are justifiably creating an uproar in which terms such as "Death Spiral” and “The End of Naval Aviation” are not uncommon. Unfortunately, no one outside the Navy is listening. Where did we go wrong, and how can we correct this problem before such dire predictions come true? A crash course in Marketing 101 may hold the key.
A simple principle of marketing states that “before you can sell an idea, you must have an idea to sell.” This calls for a well-conceived plan of action built on concrete ideas. Even though the priorities of naval aviation are crystal clear, a strong, viable, long-term plan has yet to materialize. The vague, nebulous proposals that do exist are unmarketable to a fiscally tight Congress.
The Dilemma
The current predicament trails directly to the cancellation of the A-12. Two years ago, a sensible procurement strategy placed the A-12 as naval aviation's number-one priority. Other programs on the priority list included the P-7, the naval advanced tactical fighter, and the advanced tactical systems aircraft. For one reason or another, all of
these programs began to fall. The P-7 felt the ax for gross mismanagement, and fiscal reality made the Navy version of the stealth fighter a very remote possibility. Undaunted, the Navy pressed on with the A-12 program. The A-12 was billed as the future of power projection. Thus the program’s cancellation caught the Navy totally unprepared.
Without a cornerstone, the future of naval aviation crum- j bled. Then the F-14D was deleted from the budget and remains caught up in congressional haggling. The advanced tactical systems aircraft has been delayed indefinitely. The scramble to fill this void has led to a flurry of new plans, some bordering on the ridiculous. Bitter community rivalries persist; witness the feud between the F-14 and F/A- 18 communities. Pick up any professional military, aviation, or aerospace journal, and read some of the claims. , Each community is busy trying to pass themselves off as the interim replacement to the A-6.
The truth is, neither aircraft will qualify as an advanced , medium-attack all-weather bomber. Unfortunately, this petty squabbling threatens the future of the A-X, the only 1 viable replacement for the A-6, and the cornerstone of our future air wing. Without a united front by all involved, . we will never formulate a concrete plan to present to Congress. And until we do, funding for any program will be impossible. It is time for everyone to replace traditional community rivalries with a common-sense, united approach to our aircraft needs.
A Plan for the Future
Even though every community wants an upgrade, new avionics, or a new aircraft, fiscal constraints render this impossible. Our needs must be set in order of priority- 1 Once we set the targets, we must devise a long-term budget plan. The result will be a viable market plan capable of clearing the various funding hurdles set by Congress. Simple logic quickly reveals naval aviation’s most obvious needs and their priorities.
The first priority is the A-X, where the future of power ,
projection lies. Without it, the very existence of naval aviation is threatened. We cannot expect our current fleet of aging A-6s to take the fight to the enemy for the next 20 years. Nor can we afford any short-term replacement. As of this writing, five aerospace teams have been funded to initiate studies and are vying to win the A-X contract. Although this is a start, funding continues to plague the program. Funds were allocated from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1991, but the program has been zero-funded for fiscal year 1992. An accelerated schedule of design, development, and procurement is mandatory to ensure rapid introduction into the fleet. But the mistakes of the A-12 must not be forgotten. The studies funded by the Navy must seek a modest blend of stealth, maneuverability, survivability, and avionics. The A-X is the future of naval aviation and the most urgent budgetary requirement.
Our second priority is the advanced tactical system aircraft, the proposed follow-on to the E-2. It has also been recommended, with modifications, to replace the EA-6B that mission effectively. It will be overweight, slow, and beyond the point of being upgraded. A new airframe is mandatory. The E-2 will remain capable throughout the coming decade, however, funding for research and design for the advanced tactical system aircraft is required, with the eventual development and procurement scheduled for the beginning of the next decade.
Although it is the subject of a raging debate, our third priority should be an eventual replacement for the F-14. Unfortunately, a solid proposal is nowhere in sight. The F-14D, the F-14 Super 21, and the Navy advanced tactical fighter are all under consideration. Even an F-14 advanced strike aircraft, similar to the F-15E Strike Eagle, has been proposed and exists now on the drawing boards. Should naval aviation continue to insist upon having them all, it will end up with nothing.
The Navy cannot afford a stealth bomber and a stealth fighter, nor can it truly justify the requirement for the latter. The stealth fighter was conceived and designed to fight
ar>d the S-3, which begins to resemble the grandiose claims c°ncerning modifications to the A-12. Trying to design an aircraft that can do everything could eventually lead to an°ther budget-busting program, something the Navy can 'U-afford. But the fact remains that the Navy requires a replacement for the E-2.
Increasingly sophisticated threats require the latest technology in radar detection. A new, jam-proof, long-range radar capable of operating both over land and water is nectary. It should be able to detect small, low-observable 0Ejects such as cruise missiles. New technologies such as airborne phased array or low band radars show promise, ut these cannot be retrofitted to the E-2C platform. Fur- hcrmore, today’s modern battlefield requires a system Wlth tremendous command, control, and communication CaPabilifies.
. The E-2 was crucial in coordinating many aspects of J'^nt service operations during Desert Storm, yet in a few short years, today’s E-2 will be incapable of performing over the dense and heavily defended skies over Central and Eastern Europe in a NATO conflict. Stealth is not a primary concern when defending the carrier group against an incoming bomber attack, nor will it make or break an air battle against a Third World country. The Navy advanced tactical fighter should not even be pursued, given the chances that it could divert funding from other needed aircraft. The F-14 advanced strike fighter could directly compete with the A-X and could be used to delay or cancel this important program. We should abandon this proposal immediately.
Procurement of the F-14D must be continued in order to replace the aging F-14 As. The F-14D will be a strong and potent fighter for the next 10 to 15 years. As the F- 14D series nears completion, serious consideration should be given to the F-14 Super 21. This aircraft, coupled with the new advanced air-to-air missile, will be capable of defeating any air threat in the early 21st century. The F-14 with these modifications represents a strong, fiscally viable approach to maintain the superiority of the fighter fleet.
Our fourth priority is an upgraded version of the F/A- 18. The F/A-18 is fast, agile, and multimission capable, a fact that has won it a great deal of support (which has not been lost to the F-14 community), leading some of its most ardent boosters to envision air wings composed almost entirely of F/A-18s. The truth is, this aircraft will never be able to provide the fleet air defense of the F-14 and its Phoenix missile system. Nor will any modified version replace the A-X or even the A-6. As a stand-alone, it will significantly reduce the air wing’s capability to defend itself and deliver ordnance. The aircraft, however, deserves priority because of its unique flexibility. The F/A- 18 is a deadly force multiplier. When combined with an air wing composed of F-14Ds and A-Xs, it would be an inexpensive and potent way to ensure flexibility and superiority. Plans for the F/A-18/2000 or the F/A-18E/F merit serious consideration. Both versions are modifications to the existing airframe which will give the F/A-18 the range it deserves. Modifications also include upgrades to avionics.
Still other aircraft will require attention. The EA-6B, which proved so capable in Desert Storm, will eventually need to be replaced. A follow-on, or at least an upgrade to the P-3 also must be considered. The helicopter community will need a replacement for its aging fleet of SH-2s and CH-46s. The V-22 Osprey remains a strong possibility, but it might be prudent to let the Marines fight this battle. Should the above proposals be approved, the carrier air wing of 2010 would consist of:
>■ Two F-14D/Super 21 squadrons
- Two F/A-18E/F/2000 fighter/attack squadrons
- One A-X all-weather medium-attack squadron
- One advanced tactical system aircraft electronic war- fare/command, control, and communication squadron
- One S-3B antisubmarine/antisurface/electronic surveillance squadron
- One EA-6B electronic warfare squadron
- One SH-60F/V-22 helicopter squadron
This “Air Wing 2010” would be potent and capable of
meeting and defeating any threat well into the mid-21st century. It would also allow a single large-deck nuclear carrier to fill the role of two of our smaller conventional carriers. Thus, the Navy could draw down to 10 or 12 carriers and support ships without a significant loss of power projection capability.
Funding the Plan
When the Air Force lobbied for the C-17, the advanced tactical fighter, and the expensive B-2 bomber, many critics laughed, and budget cutters sharpened their knives. Today the C-17 is in production, the advanced tactical fighter contract has been awarded and funded, and the B-2 is still alive. Notice how the Air Force never proposed interim measures or alternatives to any of these aircraft. No community factionality weakened its overall efforts. Attempts by industry to promote alternatives to various programs were vigorously opposed. The Air Force’s publicity in Desert Storm (and our supposed lack of it) had nothing to do with its success. The truth is, the Air Force understands marketing as does no other service.
Marketing the Plan: A United Approach
Until naval aviation stops crying and starts working, our needs will continue to fall upon deaf ears. As long ' as we proceed with vague, ambiguous plans, funding will | be negligible, and the future will remain bleak. A plan such as “Air Wing 2010” must be implemented. A strong, united effort, supported by all, can spur Congress into action. It is time to take a strain and chart a course for / the future, a course with direction and purpose. Should j we continue to chart a random course, disaster will soon be upon us, and we will have only ourselves to blame.
Lieutenant Tague is a naval flight officer currently assigned to the Naval Recruiting District San Diego. He recently completed a three-year tour | with VAW-116, an E-2C squadron. He graduated and was commissioned in 1986 through the NROTC unit at the University of Florida. I
Waste Not, Want Not
Early in 1945, the USS David W. Taylor (DD-551) was in San Francisco, completing repairs from mine damage to her bow section. As the ship’s first lieutenant, I was presented with an unusual problem by the supply officer: Someone had added a zero or moved a decimal point during requisitioning; we had been billed for 100 cartons of toiler paper; and 1,000 cartons were waiting for us on the dock. The supply officer’s spaces were crammed. What did I want him to do with the extra toilet paper?
After I choked back the obvious reply, my hoarder's instincts took over. Why leave this windfall lying around for anyone else? We found room for the remaining cartons. Furtunately, they were light and didn’t affect the ship’s stability.
Arriving back in the Western Pacific, and still under way, we received an urgent message from the fleet commander. One of the large aircraft carriers had suffered a severe outbreak of diarrhea, and spare toilet paper was desperately needed. Our reply dripped with compassion—“What do you have to trade?”
For the rest of that operation, the Taylor’s destroyermen lived like carrier sailors—with ice cream every day.
Captain Vincent I. Colan, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)