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CDR M. W. Danielson, USNR
The role of Naval Air Reserve C-9s changed significantly after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The Air Force immediately mobilized all of its Reserve and Air National Guard airlift components to aid in what had become the most massive airlift in history—far surpassing the Berlin Airlift— before the end of summer.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to mobilize four Naval Air Reserve C-9B squadrons, to support the increasing military airlift requirements for Desert Shield. A few days before Christmas, the squadrons were directed to deploy overseas immediately after the holiday.
Although the decision to mobilize these reservists was difficult, it did not come as a particular surprise. The C-9 mission is to provide the Navy’s only heavy-airlift logistics support capability worldwide. Naval Air Reserve C-9s, operating under the management of Commander, Fleet Logistic Support Wing, have been providing this service exclusively 24 hours a day, 365 days a year since 1974. There is always one C-9 deployed to the Mediterranean theater and another in the Western Pacific. Desert Shield, however, provided a first for Naval Reserve C-9s: entire squadrons had never been mobilized and deployed overseas with an indefinite return date.
Finding a base from which to operate was difficult. It had to be within range of the Desert Shield theater of operations and able to accommodate large aircraft. During the Desert Shield buildup, overseas ramp space became a precious commodity, as hundreds of transports and cargo aircraft began a non-stop shuttle operation. Nevertheless, bases were found. Transport Squadron (VR)- 55, home-based at Naval Air Station Alameda, California, and VR-57 from NAS North Island, California, deployed to Sem- bach, Germany; VR-59, home-based at NAS Dallas, Texas, deployed to Bitburg, Germany; and VR-58, home-based at NAS Jacksonville, Florida, went to Naples, Italy.
The squadrons departed the United States on 27 December 1990. The normal chain of command changed to reflect the situation. The German-based squadrons received mission tasking from the Navy Air Logistics Office Detachment Alpha, which worked with the Air Force’s 322nd Air Lift Division; the squadrons used Military Airlift Command call signs. VR-58 got its tasking directly from the Air Service Coordination Office, Mediterranean (ASCOMED).
The squadrons began operations on 1 January. With little guidance, VR squadron personnel began asking their Air Force counterparts if they needed anything special before going to Saudi Arabia. They quickly discovered that they lacked the chemical- and biological-warfare training and equipment required to conduct operations. Since the Navy had not previously provided the VR community with any such equipment or training, the Air Force—on New Year’s Eve—provided the minimum training and equipment that would permit the squadrons to °perate. The Air Force went out of its way to work as a team in this operation.
Getting paid also was a problem. Squadron administrative personnel were on the phone during the entire deployment, trying to fesolve pay problems with Navy Finance Center—and the difference in time zones did not help.
Training was another major obstacle. While these reservists had provided worldwide logistics support for the past fifteen years, they had never been involved in providing combat support in locations that used communications-security equipment, had a real threat of chemical and biological warfare, required safe passage routes, and had an unclear definition of staff responsibility because of the mobilization structure.
Because the aircraft were no longer officially under the cognizance of the Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, it was sometimes difficult to determine whose lead to follow—the Military Airlift Command (MAC) or the Naval Air Logistics Office (NALO). Gradually, operations began to run smoothly. It was evident from the beginning of Desert Storm that while the Navy’s C-9B community was capable of providing global heavy airlift support, it lacked specific training and equipment to meet
Naval Reserve C-9Bs mobilized for the Gulf War hauled troops during Desert Shield and then shifted to cargo during Desert Storm. This VR-59 loadmaster sits atop bombs slated for Air Force B-52s, attacking Iraqi positions from Spanish bases. The reserve C-9s are running out of service life but there is no money to replace them; upgrades may be the only solution now.
the demands of logistics operations in a combat zone.
Mission tasking was yet another problem. All tasking for MAC missions originated at MAC headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, near St. Louis, Missouri, and was passed to Air Force theater operations commanders. The German-based Navy C-9B squadrons who received their tasking from MAC, routinely experienced significant delays in receiving flight orders. Air Force staff officers had to divide the requirements between the Air Force and the Navy, and then pass the Navy tasking to the Navy’s Detachment Alpha, which would then assign specific missions to the squadrons. This system was less than optimum, but it was the best one available considering the enormous scope of the airlift operation.
Through the month of January, the C-9s were primarily involved in airlifting troops into Saudi Arabia and Turkey in support of what had become Desert Storm. VR-58 continued to operate from Naples and also established a one-aircraft detachment at NAF Sigonella, Sicily, to support operations in the Red Sea. VR-58’s primary fleet resupply base was at Hurghada, Egypt.
The three German-based squadrons began a rotational main-
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Desert Storm
tenance detachment out of Bahrain. This detachment served primarily as a crew-change point for squadron personnel and permitted 24-hour operations. As the terrorist and Scud missile threat in Bahrain increased, the detachment was moved to Souda Bay, Crete. The need for fleet support in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman increased, and a rotating two-aircraft detachment consisting of aircraft and personnel from the three German-based squadrons began to operate from A1 Fujayrah in the United Arab Emirates, while the remaining four aircraft continued their operations from Germany.
By February, the majority of the C-9 tasking had shifted from personnel transportation to cargo resupply, and the aircraft were reconfigured to an all-cargo rig capable of handling eight pallets of cargo. C-9s began daily flights carrying bombs and fuses to resupply the B-52s based in Spain, which were striking Iraqi positions. Because of the importance of these missions, Navy C-9s were often given takeoff priority over other MAC flights— which experienced ground delays of up to 90 minutes. The tempo of operations increased to the point where C-9 auxiliary power units were shut down only for servicing. Crews changed once a day to accommodate the 24-hour flight operations; aircraft averaged nine hours airborne daily. As the war intensified, C-9s began flying Eastern European routes to provide support to Coalition forces in Turkey. For the first time since World War II, Western military aircraft began flying from Germany to Incirlik, Turkey, overflying Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania.
The Naval Air Reserve C-9s proved invaluable in moving troops and supplies, flying out of bases in Saudi Arabia, England, Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy, Crete, Turkey, and Sicily. Record flight hours were accumulated by all four squadrons— each averaged more than 700 hours per month, nearly twice the normal monthly rate. During the three-month period from 27 December 1990 to 27 March 1991, these 12 aircraft flew a combined total of more than 700 scheduled missions and accumulated 6,442 flight hours; nearly 18,000 passengers and 7.5 million pounds of cargo were airlifted.
While the 12 deployed C-9Bs played a significant role in the Gulf War, the Navy’s stateside air logistics support continued with only one-third of its peacetime capability. Compounding the problem, not all the Navy’s C-9s are C-9Bs with extended overwater and cargo capability. The Navy has 30 C-9 “type” aircraft, but only 15 are C-9Bs—the remaining 15 are actually commercial DC-9-32 airliners. Twelve C-9Bs were supporting Desert Storm and this left 15 C-9 “types”—three C-9Bs and 12 DC-9-32s—in the United States.
Of the aircraft in the United States, one was dedicated to Western Pacific deployments, three were undergoing an extensive maintenance midterm inspection and did not return to service until late January 1991. Eventually, nine C-9 types—three C-9Bs and six DC-9-32s—were available in the United States.
Some of the six available DC-9s had cargo doors but others did not even have airstairs aft. Most still required major airframe and avionics upgrades to be compatible with the C-9B mission. Four of these were not overwater-capable, because they lacked life rafts or inertial navigation equipment, and could be configured either as all-passenger or all-cargo (no mix); one was overwater-capable but could be configured for passengers only; and the final aircraft was neither overwater- nor cargo-capable.
The Gulf War marked the first time that the lack of overwater cargo-passenger C-9Bs had a serious detrimental effect on the Fleet Logistics Support Wing’s ability to meet Navy airlift requirements. NALO was forced to decline the majority of the airlift requests because of insufficient assets. Nearly all Naval Reserve airlift requests were turned down, and many reservists could not reach their drill sites. This alone virtually paralyzed the Naval Reserve’s training capability.
One cannot look at the C-9’s involvement in Desert Storm without considering the impact on the Navy’s future in constantly expanding United States airlift requirements. Based upon current data, it is apparent that the Navy is totally dependent upon the C-9s for air logistics support. Although these aircraft are owned and operated by the Naval Air Reserve Force, the Reserve community receives only a small fraction of the airlift support. During fiscal year 1990, the total C-9 effort was allocated as follows:
- Commander in Chief, Atlantic—51%
- Commander in Chief, Pacific—22%
- Naval Reserve—16%
- Chief of Naval Training and other organizations—Tl%
In the case of pure passenger airlift support, CinCLant was again the principal user at 39%, while CinCPac received 21%, and the Reserve nearly 20%. Unlike MAC, the Navy does not charge the requester for its services, because the Naval Reserve’s mission is to train its people while providing airlift support. Providing such support while training aircrews has saved the Navy more than $410 million during the past four years alone— compared to buying commercial tickets or using MAC. In an average peacetime week, U.S.-based C-9s airlifted approximately 10,000 passengers and 275,000 pounds of cargo.
Constantly growing aircraft requirements—in the face of budget cutbacks and aging aircraft—are a problem. Since 1983, the number of passengers airlifted by U.S.-based C-9s has increased 380%; cargo has increased 450%. The gap between requirements and capabilities continues to widen.
The Gulf War validated estimated war requirements and capabilities. This included the 1986 Center for Naval Analyses study, which determined that the Navy has a high-speed, medium-airlift requirement for approximately 50 C-9B-type aircraft.
A summary of lessons learned from the C-9 involvement in the Gulf War concludes that:
- Chemical-biological training and equipment are inadequate.
- Selected Reserve air intelligence officers played a key role in ensuring the safety of logistics operations into combat zones.
- The Navy has a sustained requirement for heavy-airlift support, to include tactical aircraft such as the C-130T to transport engines, helicopter blades, and ordnance. Although the C-9 provides much of this capability, it cannot operate out of the short runways or unimproved surfaces that would be common to combat zones.
- The Navy requires high-speed, medium-airlift support to transport small numbers of personnel of cargo without having to schedule a valuable C-9. The Gulf Stream C-20F, which can carry cargo or 26 passengers, could have handled many of the Desert Storm missions, thus freeing larger aircraft to transport bombs and supplies.
- The Naval Reserve should perform realistic mobilization training periodically. Such training may entail combining active duty periods from several squadrons to participate in a joint logistics exercise.
- The chain of command for mobilized C-9 squadrons must be clarified.
- The Naval Reserve pay system could not cope with the mobilization; pay problems directly affect retention.
The Navy’s air logistics support capability has been a growing evolution since World War II. Time and again, experience in peace and war has proved that the Navy must maintain its own airlift capability.
Commander Danielson is the aviation safety officer at Naval Air Station Dallas- Texas. He was assigned to the staff of Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, from October 1988 to November 1990.
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