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By Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, U.S. Navy (Retired)
This department in Proceedings began exactly six years ago, just after Mikhail S. Gorbachev established himself as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). By that time, he had announced a policy of glasnost (openness) to stimulate change and foster the perestroika (restructuring) of the Soviet political system and the rebuilding of the Soviet economy to ensure the survival of the U.S.S.R. as a great power.
The goal of this department was to take advantage of that openness to report, in their own words and with a minimum of commentary, Soviet views on maritime issues. The hope was that U.S. naval professionals would compare those Soviet views with their own, to gain a better understanding of the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Soviet approaches to the naval profession.
The first column described the circumstances surrounding the relief of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov, by Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir N. Chernavin. It also described the Soviet view of the threat in the Pacific from the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the threat from the NATO alliance in the Atlantic.
,In the intervening six years, the glas- n°st of Gorbachev has stimulated unirnaginable changes in the Soviet Union and its views on naval matters. Contrary to its intended purposes, glas- n°st fostered the destruction of the So- yiet system, the collapse of the Soviet economy, and the breakup of the So- v'et empire. It also has permitted Admiral Chernavin, now about to retire, to visit the United States, something inconceivable six years ago.
During that visit, Admiral Chernavin told students at the U.S. Naval War College,
“. . . [OJnly a few years ago . . ., I can say that... I could never have imagined a situation in which I, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, would find myself in the United States.”
When discussing the threat, he did not mention the United States, but did indicate that,
“ . . . 11 It is a bit premature to speak of the elimination of a military threat to the renovated Union. Right now, there is increased danger of the eruption of local conflicts on the basis of territorial, interethnic, religious and other strife.”
In the face of that continuing and total disintegration, the fate of the Soviet Navy is now in question. That navy, viewed as a strong, modern, blue-water lorce when it was inherited by Admiral Chernavin six years ago, is now scrapping ships, declining in readiness, and staying close to home waters. To what authority Admiral Chernavin will relinquish his command on his retirement, and the kind of navy he will leave, are now open-ended questions.
Admiral Chernavin is optimistic. During his presentation at the U.S. Naval War College, he told students that, despite all the change,
“[the Navy’s] structure will remain intact: four fleets, the Caspian Flotilla, and the Leningrad Naval Base, though within that framework, we envision serious changes due to a significant reduction in the composition of naval forces. . . . We are trying to create a smaller navy that is more mobile and modern, of a better quality, and with better military characteristics.”
Other views have not been quite so sanguine. For example, in September, Admiral Chernavin himself was less optimistic about the future of the Baltic
Fleet, saying,
“The Baltic Fleet will not cease to exist, but the independence of the Baltic Republics will have a most considerable effect upon its operational efficiency, combat readiness, and day- to-day operations. . . . The Baltic Fleet’s fate must be decided . . . not in haste and on the basis of both the long-term interests of the Baltic Republics and the armed forces.”
Then, in an October interview with Red Star, Admiral Vladimir G. Yegorov, the new Baltic Fleet Commander, noted,
“The independence of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania is a fact, and the leaderships of these sovereign states have already raised the question of the presence of Baltic Fleet forces on their territory. And we cannot fail to respect the will of the Baltic parliaments and peoples. The fate of the fleet’s forces in this region will undoubtedly be decided within the framework of interstate agreements. But we live in a world of realities .
. . the reduction in the forces of our oldest fleet is taking place within a planned framework.”
Others had different ideas, which, if they prevail, will cause even that schedule to be speeded up. In October, the press secretary of the Estonian government said that the government wanted to see, “the bulk of the forces withdrawn during 1992,” but that “there will be a separate schedule for the withdrawal of naval forces.” Lithuanian President Vi- talis Landsbergis took an even harder line, saying, “The withdrawal of Soviet forces should begin immediately.” Nevertheless, as late as 10 December, the commander of the naval base at Tallinn, Estonia, advised the Estonian government that, “Soviet naval exercises in the northwestern Baltic Sea are planned for July and August 1992. Baltic Fleet units [from his command] will take part in those exercises.”
At the same time in the Black Sea, independence sentiment within the Ukraine was threatening the fleet. Ukraine Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov said, “because Ukraine is a maritime state, I think she should have her own naval forces.” In response, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Igor V. Kasatonov, argued,
“The Black Sea Fleet is stationed in four Union republics, so that it would be, at the very least, foolish to split it up . . . the Navy was created by Russia and then by the single state of the U.S.S.R. ... In a word, the Black Sea Fleet will remain a part of the joint strategic forces.”
Yet, in early November, Moscow radio reported that,
“The Red Banner Black Sea Fleet is soon to have another naval base. It will be situated on the territory of Krasnodar Kray [in Russia], This decision is needed because the fleet’s main base, Sevastopol, is now on the territory of the sovereign Ukraine.”
The next day, Admiral of the Fleet Ivan Kapitanets, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy and acting commander while Admiral Chemavin was in the United States, squelched the rumor by stating, “I know nothing about the plans.”
Nevertheless, some new arrangements will have to be made regarding the Black Sea Fleet. On 26 November, Red Star reported that, during a visit with Black Sea Fleet sailors, Leonid Kravchuk, then the leading contender for the presidency of an independent Ukraine, stated, “[The] Ukraine has no pretensions to the entire Black Sea Fleet, but speaks of nationalization of only a portion of it.” However, following the early December referendum on independence, his election as president, and the sudden formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Kravchuk declared himself commander- in-chief of all Soviet troops stationed in the Ukraine and signed a decree bringing all conventional forces stationed in the republic under direct Ukrainian control.
Throughout December, Ukraine continued to hold that position. On 27 December, the Russian press reported that Defense Minister and Marshall of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Igor Kasatonov, had gone to Kiev to negotiate on the future of the Black Sea Fleet. Reportedly, their proposals for a division of the fleet between central and Ukrainian control were turned down by Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov.
Eventually, the question of control over the Black Sea Fleet was deferred by the agreement signed by the 11 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 30 December. In that agreement, it was specified that the former Soviet Navy would remain under "central control" as part of the "forces of strategic designation." The agreement stipulated, however, that the composition of those strategic forces would be the subject of a separate protocol to be developed later. Negotiations were to resume in February 1992.
But command arrangements and basing rights were not the only problems facing the Black Sea Fleet. By 3 December, Red Star reported that,
“Now it seems that ships will not be leaving Black Sea waters at all. Not because of a dearth of hard currency, but for another more serious reason— the absence of fuels and lubricants, because centralized deliveries have stopped.
“The Black Sea Fleet staff has received an order from the Main Navy Staff that all surface craft and support vessels are to return immediately from the Mediterranean. All the main forces will be withdrawn from the Mediterranean before the end of December. ”
On 6 December, in an attempt at clarification, Red Star summarized,
“The question of the possible transfer of the ships of the Navy from bases located on the territory of announced sovereign republics to Russian ports already has been discussed in the mass media. Recently, comments regarding the [forward-deployed] operational formations of the Navy have had their turn...as though the squadron in the Mediterranean were being folded up. For clarification, the editors turned to the Main Naval Staff.”
The flag officers with whom the editors spoke tried to put a positive spin on the Mediterranean drawdown.
“The composition of the squadron was never permanent, and, especially of late, the number of ships under its command has constantly dropped. . . But, this does not mean that the cutbacks in the fleet and our economic difficulties, even the shortage of foreign currency to pay the crews, will
inevitably entail eliminating the Mediterranean squadron today . . .
“Some of the squadron’s ships are actually not in the Mediterranean, but in the Black Sea. But, it must be realized that it is only a matter of a day’s transfer to the destination. . . .
It [also] has under its command ships transferring between fleets.”
Despite these optimistic words, by the end of December, Western press reports had confirmed that all Soviet combatants and most support ships had left the Mediterranean. There were at least some Soviet naval officers who probably thought it was a good move. In August, a Red Star correspondent reported that a Soviet naval officer serving in the Mediterranean “ . . . said, with a contemptuous wave of the hand, ‘If the enemy wanted, he could sink the entire armada in no time at all. It’s a Potemkin village.’”
The Northern and Pacific fleets are based wholly within the territory of the Russian Republic and, thus, do not face the same command and control problems or the threat of displacement. Yet, they face equally serious support problems. As Red Star reported on 6 September, after discussions with the Chief of Combat Training for the Soviet Navy,
“ . . . [T]he cut in funding for defense has produced a growing wave of problems. The Navy was not pampered, even in the past, with ship-repair services, and the periods between repairs now have increased even more. There is not enough oil, fuel, and paint. . . . They have to worry about even emery paper, not to speak of sets of spare parts, instruments and accessories, targets, simulators, and different technical and other equipment essential for combat training.
“ . . . The ships are no longer dispatched to sea to practice some individual combat exercise. A system of in-base exercises has been introduced, for example....There is a shortage of simulators at the bases, however.”
In an October news broadcast, Moscow j television reported that a Japanese visitor to Vladivostok, the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet,
. . said that he counted no fewer than 20 warships [that] were completely rusty. ... He was amazed to see a rusted missile cruiser, which had only entered service in 1980, He also saw the aircraft-carrying cruiser Minsk
in a mooring, swathed in [deperming] cables. It clearly had not been to sea for a long time.”
The broadcast noted, perhaps hopefully, that, “... he did not see the pride of the Pacific Fleet, the cruiser Frunze, the aircraft-carrying Novorossiysk, or the heavy cruiser Chernova Ukraina. ... It would appear that we are still keeping some of our powder dry.”
In December, the U.S.S.R. Defense Ministry announced that, over the “. . . last year, the Northern Fleet was reduced by 18 ships and 25 submarines. . . . Over that period, not a single ship has been given to the Northern Fleet, except one aircraft-carrying cruiser.”
Thus, at the end of 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the once- powerful Soviet Navy faced being split into parts, had returned to home waters, reduced at-sea training, deteriorated in material condition, and declined in size. There seemed to be only one bright spot—the acquisition of the first aircraft carrier.
On 3 December, the central government newspaper Izvestiya reported that the “. . . heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser.
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, uneventfully exited the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and Dard- enelles on 2 December.” On the same day, Red Star reported the movement of the “. . . Kuznetsov and the escort ship Pytlivyy, which will be accompanying it to the Strait of Gibraltar. The Kuznetsov will be making the 20-day voyage to its permanent station with the Northern Fleet.”
On 4 December, Izvestiya continued its coverage with an article describing the characteristics of the ship and giving her crew as 200 officers and 1500 sailors, along with a photograph of the ship. It reported that the ship had not left the Black Sea “ . . . because of threats to its security or subordination . . . but to go to its long-planned duty station with the Northern Fleet.” Further, the article discussed the Soviet designation of the ship as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” rather than an aircraft carrier as necessary to get around the Montreux Convention. But the author also cited a more important reason.
“. . . [Aircraft carriers carry air- attack armament intended to be used
against sea and land targets; specifically bombers and attack aircraft. The Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov is armed with fighter aircraft. It is common knowledge that they can perform only defensive functions—and, therein, lies the basic difference.”
As all this was happening, however, the Moscow paper Soviet Russia was preparing to publish an article on aircraft carriers. At the conclusion of that article, the editors added,
“While this material was being prepared for the press, a letter arrived in the editorial office indicating that it is planned to stop the construction of aircraft-carrying ships and to fulfill orders for foreign firms. We contacted Rear Admiral V. Polenskiy, Chief of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding of the Navy. He confirmed the information.”
Perhaps, at this time, there is no good news for the Navy.
The Kuznetsov Up Close
By Norman Polmar, Author of Guide to the Soviet Navy
The Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov has departed the Black Sea and Mediterranean, passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, and sailed into an unknown future. The Kuznetsov, the largest warship ever built in a Soviet or Russian shipyard, was at anchor at Severmorsk on the Kola Peninsula when this article was written. It is not known when or if the ship Will go to sea again. Nor is it known if a sister ship, the Varyag,
Will go to sea, or if a third, larger carrier, the nuclear-propelled Ul’yanovsk, will be completed.
Although seemingly small in comparison with the USS Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carriers, the 65,000-ton Kuznetsov is the largest Warship to be built by any country °flter than the United States since die end of World War II. Further, she is one of the most heavily armed warships afloat. Beneath the ski ramp at the forward end of the flight deck are vertical launching Cells for 12 SS-N-19 antiship mis- stles. These are supersonic mis- stles with a range of some 300 nautical miles, carrying a warhead of about one ton. While Western sources credit the SS-N-19—aptly named “Shipwreck” by NATO intelligence—with nuclear capability, a 1989 Soviet broadcast stated explicitly that the ship would not carry nuclear weapons.'
More ominous is the ship’s defensive armament: 24 vertical launchers for the SS-N-6 missile, with 192 missiles in the below- deck launchers. Eight multiple launchers—called CADS (combined air-defense system) by Western intelligence—are provided for the SA-N-11 short-range missiles. Each launcher has rails for up to eight missiles, as well as two 30-mm. Gatling guns (with six barrels each). Unlike previous close-in gun systems in Soviet ships, the CADS has autonomous search-and-track radars (similar to the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx). There