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By Lieutenant Commander Truman J. Best, U.S. Navy
U.S. submariners must be innovative to succeed in engagements with quiet submarines like this Akula.
Summer, 1995. Renegade submarine crews have commandeered two Akula- class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and are threatening to fire nuclear cruise missiles at Alaska unless Mikhail Gorbachev is returned to power—and massive financial aid is given to the former Soviet Union.
The U.S. President orders the Akulas destroyed, and the Navy gets the mission. Intelligence reports indicate that the Aku- jas are hiding under the Arctic ice to evade just such an attack. What tactics can be Used for this search and destroy mission? Clearly, the objective is to destroy both Akula SSNs with minimum loss to the United States, but this cannot be achieved Us'ng antisubmarine tactics outlined in current naval warfare publications (NWPs).
The submarine approach-and-attack manual has not changed significantly since !ts initial publication. The basic guidance ls still passive search, approach, and attack. This worked against older submarines whose radiated noise signature was significant, but it is no longer effec- hve against modern, quiet submarines.
U.S. Navy torpedo exercise results indicate that only about 10% of all firings result in hits outside the minimum desired tange. This means that only one out of ten Passive-only torpedo attacks destroyed the target without destroying the attacker. The 'gures are based on a target SSN that is n°t using any torpedo countermeasures. If c°untermeasures were employed, the hit Percentage would probably be lower.
here must be a better way to gain tactiCal advantage over the potential adversary.
Many submariners believe that the only Way to achieve stealth when attacking a modern SSN is to use passive sonar ex? usively. Passive sonar is the bread and utter of the submarine force, but over- upendenee has turned it into a liability, sh 11,6 5eaw;o//(SSN-21)-class submarines _°uld be the ultimate in stealth—a suburine that cannot be found by passive j. eans- It may be less than ten years be- re a potential adversary develops a suburine with similar stealth capability— h" what then? If the potential adversary us a submarine similar to Seawolf how SSNWC now" Akula-class
s are probably not as quiet as the ^eavvolf class, but they are quiet enough ^ at they cannot be accurately tracked out- e the minimum desired attack range
using passive sonar systems. The U.S. Navy has a problem—how can present- day U.S. submarines destroy Akula SSNs without killing themselves?
Range errors constitute the single biggest reason for unsuccessful attacks against a quiet submerged contact. The error is inherent when using passive tracking against a quiet adversary, but there is a way to reduce it—use the active sonar. Submariners must be proficient in employing all available sensors in SSN versus SSN encounters to arrive at an accurate target solution, and proper use of active sonar does not necessarily mean compromising covertness. Some active sonar modes can validate a target SSN at ranges greater than the minimum desired firing range while maintaining the desired accuracy. Submarine tactics should provide for using the active sonar to verify the range prior to firing.
The U.S. submarine force should continue to develop stealthy active sonar, and nonacoustic detection devices such as magnetic anomaly detectors.
Moreover, submariners should practice using active sonar and nonacoustic devices.
Submariners should be more innovative in tactical exercises. Rather than confining their tactics to NWP requirements, they should try their own tactics. Certainly, the NWP requirements must be known to all submarine officers, but the experienced submariner should have freedom to develop tactics, use them in exercises, and shareThem with others. This was the very lesson learned at the cost of many lives at the beginning of World War II—that the commanding officers’ innovative use of his equipment and personnel in abnormal situations was the key to success.
Most submarine exercises are too restricted; commanders are told what to do in advance. Such canned exercises may be necessary to train junior officers, but they do little for experienced submariners. Submariners should take a tip from naval aviation and conduct one-on-one combat— one submarine wardroom against another. This is the way to cultivate that sixth sense that is so critical in close encounters.
Prospective submarine department heads are told at the submarine officer advanced course that the guidance in NWPs is in fact just that—and should be used literally only in the absence of other tactics. Too often though, when these officers report to their submarines, they are told to follow the book because that book was written with someone else’s blood. The result is that submarine tactics are developed at the office, rather than at sea.
Assuming: current submarine tactics;
each encounter is an independent event; and the U.S. submarine always fires first— it would take on the average six encounters with an Akula SSN to achieve a kill probability greater than 50%. No submariner can feel comfortable with these figures. Modified tactics should allow the use of active sonar or a nonacoustic devise such as magnetic anomaly detectors. Training should emphasize using covert active sonar for attack and cultivating the tactical sixth sense that will enable submariners to survive close encounters.
Commander Best is assigned to the Submarine Training Center, Pacific, at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He served on board the USS Hawkbill (SSN- 666) from 1983 to 1986, and was the navigator on the USS Birmingham (SSN-695) from 1988 to 1991. He has a masters degree in operations analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California.
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0ceedings / August 1992