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Doing the
a Smaller Fleet
By Admiral Paul David Miller, U.S. Navy
Proceedings / April 1992
k
The loneliness of command cuts most deeply when resources are diminished.
This creates a catalyst for change, bringing with it the risks of innovation.
No sweeping solutions exist, but there are ways to whittle the problems down to size.
The structure that houses it has no windows. Nevertheless, the view from the Atlantic Fleet Command Center is impressive. Information flows into that building from all parts of the world—mountains of data that paint an ever-changing picture, keyed to the concerns °f the fleet commander-in-chief. He is responsible for the training and readiness of a wide array of operating forces—some half a world away.
Dramatic changes are appearing. The former Soviet Navy has virtually ceased operations—at least for the time being. Its warships no longer patrol the Mediterranean; its intelligence collectors no longer loiter off our coasts or °n the periphery of our training exercises. One by one, the red symbols that have marked the progress of former Soviet units back to the motherland are dropping from the Plot. Without their familiar red counterpoint, the blue symbols of the U.S. Navy now appear to fill the screen. There is an unavoidable feeling of incongruity.
The tidal wave of change now engulfing the world car- r'es the promise of reduced international tension. We may be entering an era of relative peace—but we still must Proceed cautiously, for we are in unfamiliar waters. Age- °ld ethnic, religious and political conflicts have intensified. Demographic and economic pressures are mounting. Drug trafficking is a persistent problem. Those destabilizing factors, combined with weapons proliferation, could threaten U.S. interests around the world.
Our nation has a new military strategy that reflects the changes taking place in the world. Clearly, it is geared toward implementation by a smaller force; unsurprisingly, 'ts demand for naval forces remains high. During this period of uncertainty, the unified commanders want naval forces deployed and on station, to underwrite U.S. interests and maintain readiness for crisis response. Challenges to our interests will continue to generate legitimate requirements for forward-positioned forces—particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf.
Concurrently, our nation’s fiscal balance sheet—and the reordering of national priorities to reflect a changing World—call for discriminating reductions in defense spend- •ng. The Navy will grow smaller during the coming decade. Indeed, we have already started down the glide slope toward a smaller fleet. This takes us to the heart of the matter—a question on the lips of every sailor from the deckplates to the flightlines: “How will we do the job with a smaller fleet?”
Part of the answer will be found in Washington.
To accomplish our mission, as we grow smaller, we must continue to improve our combat capability. The vision of a smaller, more capable Navy is realistic and achievable. The Department of the Navy 1992 posture statement highlights the commitment of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to build on the high quality of our current force. They declared strongly their determination “that naval forces in America’s future will not be the dangerously inadequate ‘hollow forces’ that have inadvertently resulted from some defense realignments in the past.”
Our leaders, from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on down, are committed to preserving both the quality of our forces and quality of life of our people. It will not be easy, but we have learned many lessons from past drawdowns. We are optimistic that our Navy and Marine Corps will enter the next century more than equal to any challenge.
Maintaining a quality force on a reduced budget however, means that ultimately there will be fewer ships, submarines, aircraft, and personnel in the fleet. So even with the best platforms, systems and personnel, we still will have to find innovative ways to get the job done. The fleet commanders-in- chief will have fewer resources to satisfy the requirements of the unified commanders. To maintain a realistic quality of life for our people and retain the surge capability needed to respond effectively to crises, we will have to tailor our forces better, deploying fewer ships in peacetime. But to satisfy customer demand (i.e., of the unified commanders) the forces we deploy still must be able to do the job.
To meet that challenge we will have to change the way we do business in the fleet. We must transform our training, maintenance and operating procedures to keep pace with a changing environment. The process of change and continuous improvement is already under way. Some of the ideas outlined below are already being implemented. Others are in the formative stage. Together they highlight the primary near-term focal points of change.
Fleet Standardization
As a fundamental step in the transformation, Admiral Barney Kelly and I are working continually to standardize procedures between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. For a variety of reasons, procedures have diverged increasingly over the years. The impact of those differences became apparent in the late 1970s, when the two fleets began to share Indian Ocean commitments. Since then, we have become more and more aware of the inefficiencies that can result.
Standardization is a key element in doing the job with fewer ships. With a smaller fleet, there will be fewer units positioned forward. Those forces must be able to respond to crises in any theater—not just the site of their initial deployment. The standardization process is well underway. One goal is to make it easier to shift forces between unified commands when required—to participate in joint and combined operations anywhere, regardless of home fleet. Another goal is to reduce training time and costs. Standardization will help our people as they transfer between fleets.
We have been reviewing procedures that cut across the fleets. The first major milepost was agreement on a joint instruction that established uniform criteria for propulsion- plant examinations. Standardized operational-message formats and a standard training plan are not far off. Significant progress also is being made in the areas of logistics and communications, with more to come.
Tactical Training Process
The Chief of Naval Operations has highlighted training as his top warfighting priority. Tactical training also tops the list of fleet-standardization issues.
Modem warfare is becoming increasingly complex. Our sensors and weapons have longer ranges, speeds are higher, and reaction times are shorter. Technological in-
novations have improved weapon accuracy and lethality— ours and theirs.
These changes place a premium on tactical training. Tactics and techniques have become as important as firepower. To maximize our capabilities, we are focusing increased attention on doctrine and procedures—not just hardware.
Because there will be less time and money available for training, we are concentrating efforts on the tactical training process itself. We are looking for ways to add value to training, without adding cost.
The first step has involved a thorough review of the capabilities the unified commanders want built into the forces in their theaters. The goal is to focus the training for deploying naval forces on the specific tasks they will be expected to perform, once on station. The second step has identification and realignment of responsibilities for basic, intermediate, and advanced tactical training.
- Basic training is individual and unit-level training required to achieve minimum proficiencies essential to battle group and joint tactical operations. Basic training will be coordinated by type commanders and readiness squadron commanders. To help them do the job, we are establishing an Afloat Training Organization (ATO)- The ATO will become the single point of contact for training assistance during the basic phase. It will provide mobile training teams in engineering, combat system, damage control, seamanship and shipboard administration.
- Intermediate training encompasses initial integration of units—carriers and air wings, amphibious ships and Marines, for example.
- Advanced training involves full-scale joint power-projection exercises, built on realistic scenarios for the regions in which the forces will operate, once deployed.
The Second and Third Fleet commanders will have primary responsibility for both intermediate and advanced tactical training.
Force Packaging
Recently, much attention has been focused on the use of alternative naval force packages to satisfy the unified commanders’ requirements. Most such discussions evaluate possible substitutes for the carrier battle group (CVBG) or the amphibious ready group with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU). With a smaller force, there will be fewer such traditional task groups. Since many missions do not require the full capabilities of either type, it will be possible to satisfy some requirements with innovative force packages. These discussions are useful, and encourage new thinking, but they sometimes overlook two key points:
- Every mission does not require an aircraft carrier: but when a carrier is needed, there can be no substitute. Our carriers are tied no longer to traditional deployment hubs, where key U.S. and Soviet interests coincided with likely points of crisis. Unified commanders can now position deployed carriers where best to support American interests in their regions. A crisis requiring the presence of a carrier battle group will find one on scene or en route.
- The unified commanders have been using alternative force packages to meet specific mission requirements for many years. The numbered fleet commanders and the commander of naval forces for the Central Command—as joint tactical commanders working for the unified commanders—will continue to do most of the force packaging.
The unified commanders have become adept at mixing,
hatching and tailoring force packages from available assets, which include Air Force, Army, and allied forces. That trend will accelerate. The job of the fleet commanders-in-chief will be to ensure that the forces they provide have the right mix of training and capabilities to tackle the broad range of requirements that confront the unified eommanders.
Using our Assets
During this period of transition, it is natural to wonder what the Navy of the future will be like. Actually, that is a relatively easy question to answer—if we agree to limit °ur horizons to the next two or three decades.
Ships now under construction and on order will have useful service lives of 35-45 years. The Ticonderoga (CG- 47)-class cruisers, Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers, Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines, Wasp (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ships, and Nimitz (CVN- 68)-class aircraft carriers now building will be in their Prime around 2010. Most of the ships and aircraft in the fleet today will serve well into the next century. We will not have the option of scrapping those assets and replacing them with new platforms, designed for the specific challenges of a rapidly changing world. There is no reason we should want to. But to get the job done, we will have to become even more adept at making smart use of the assets on hand. For example, the multimission capabilities of our primary antisubmarine warfare platforms show great promise in adapting to new tasks.
We no longer need large numbers of maritime patrol aircraft to monitor closely the daily activities of a once- global Soviet submarine force. Some of those aircraft will be tailored to support drug-interdiction operations. Others should be specifically outfitted to locate and neutralize quiet diesel or air-independent propulsion submarines
Attack submarines are already operating with battle groups, exploring enhanced roles in power projection and special operations—here, a SEAL swims along a line rigged to a submarine’s hull.
operating in shallow water. Some patrol squadrons might be outfitted for surface surveillance in support of maritime interdiction operations. The ongoing maritime interdiction campaign against Iraq will certainly not be the last one we conduct. A number of T-AGOS ocean-surveillance ships also will be reconfigured, to support counter-drug operations. Some antisubmarine helicopters will be armed and shifted to a primary antisurface warfare role. Attack submarines are already operating with our battle groups, and are exploring enhanced roles in such areas as power projection and special operations.
Changing circumstances also make it possible for us to examine the potential of embarking a small (150-300-man) Marine Corps special-purpose force in each deployed aircraft carrier. Navy helicopters can be shifted from the carrier to surface combatants, when needed to free deck spots for Marine helos. This initiative combines the carrier’s speed and firepower with the flexibility and responsiveness of small Marine task organizations. Such forces could support a variety of operations: e.g., noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, hostage rescue, and embassy reinforcement. The goal is to spread out our ability to respond quickly to the kinds of crises we will confront in the coming decade.
Streamlined Organization
To get the job done with fewer people we have begun streamlining fleet organization. We are reducing layers of staff and bureaucracy and consolidating functions, wherever it makes sense to do so. The goal is to align fleet organization with functional responsibilities.
In the past, Atlantic Fleet battle group commanders have reported to their respective type commanders, but all battle group commanders and the amphibious group commander now report directly to the Commander, Second Fleet. This change aligns command relationships with responsibilities for operations and advanced tactical training. Tactical destroyer squadron commanders also report to Second Fleet. Permanent battle group assignments are being put in place for all carriers, air wings, tactical destroyer squadrons, cruisers, and destroyers. In addition, two attack submarines will be aligned with each permanent battle group. Finally, responsibilities for readiness— and unit-training oversight for both surface ships and submarines—are being consolidated into fewer readiness squadrons reporting directly to type commanders.
These initial changes make sense, but they should not be viewed as any final solution. Organizational changes now under consideration in Washington will almost certainly require further adjustments in fleet organization. We will encourage changes in joint doctrine and procedures to redefine the way in which we train and package forces for deployment. Such innovations would likely call
for parallel modifications in the Atlantic Fleet, to bring about training and employment of forces.
New Maintenance Strategies
To get the most from our investment in modern, high- tech warships requires that we heighten both the combat capability and their availability for training, surge, or deployment. These two objectives have come into increasing conflict, as the pace of technological development continues to accelerate. Keeping combat and engineering systems fully capable and up-to-date has required us to take ships off line for long periods of overhaul, repair and modernization. To do the job with a smaller fleet, we must find ways to reduce the amount of time ships spend in overhaul and other major maintenance availabilities. We are looking for innovative ways to maintain and modernize our ships, while increasing the percentage of the fleet available for employment on any given day. Three maintenance strategies—now being implemented or updated— promise significant improvement:
► The phased maintenance concept (PMA) applies to most ships. Procedures and nomenclature vary by ship type and class. With few exceptions, regular overhauls are eliminated. Repair and modernization are completed during a series of shorter planned availabilities, scheduled throughout the employment cycle. Regular maintenance for these ships will become more centered on reliability concerns. >■ A small number of ships—primarily the FFG-7 and MHC-51 classes—will employ the progressive maintenance concept (PROG). That strategy supports reduced manning and limited organizational maintenance. A key element is the use of rotatable pool components, removed, replaced and repaired by intermediate maintenance activities.
>• Maintenance for aircraft carriers, large amphibious ships, nuclear submarines and certain other complex ships will be planned and scheduled using an engineered operating cycle (EOC). Because those ships require closer management, regular overhauls will accommodate required maintenance and planned modernization at specific points in each ship’s life cycle. New ships are being engineered for reduced maintenance. For example, nuclear-powered warships being built today will likely require refueling but once during their active service life—if at all.
To manage these strategies better, we are working to consolidate the numerous organizations involved in ship maintenance and support, under a single fleet-maintenance command. This new organization will manage ship maintenance throughout the employment cycle.
The goal of phased maintenance is to sustain readiness and to maximize both combat capability and the amount of time a ship is available for employment during its life-
I Phased Maintenance Periods
Advancet Intermediate Warfare Training Training
-Ready Fleet-
-Deployment—■
CINC Scheduled Exercises and Operations
-Refit-
CHOP to
2nd or 3rd Fleet
CINCLANT/PAC
CHOP to supported CINC
time. Every 300 °r so combat- ready ship days saved by more efficient maintenance have the same effect as adding another combatant to the fleet.
Having more ships ready for sea does not mean that each ship will spend more days williamj. cupson under way. On the contrary, part of doing the job with a smaller fleet will mean learning how to sustain readiness despite fewer days at sea.
Evolving Employment Cycle
The fleet improvement programs just outlined come together in the employment cycle. As envisioned here, every ship, submarine and deployable aircraft squadron would nearly always be in one of three clearly identified phases of the employment cycle. For planning purposes, we have called these phases Refit, Ready Fleet, and Deployment (See Figure 1). Regular or refueling overhauls would constitute a fourth phase, whenever required.
* Deployment is the clearest, most easily understood phase of the cycle. Because of the significance and impact of deployment—and because each deployment has a well- defined start—all hands know when a unit enters that Phase. Deployment begins on the day of departure from home port (currently for 57 days or longer) and ends on the day of return.
^ Refit begins shortly after return from deployment. During refit, units will complete individual and team training, requirements in preparation for refresher training, and other basic training milestones at sea and ashore. Refit units will sustain a specified minimum readiness level and complete °ne or more maintenance periods.
^ About six months before deployment—after satisfactory completion of basic training, required inspections and maintenance—units will enter the Ready Fleet stage. As Ready Fleet assets they will be under the operational control of the Second Fleet commander, and will be available tor operations and exercises close to the continental United States. The Ready Fleet will also constitute the surge force, available for deployment within 4-10 days, in response to a regional crisis.
The fleet commander will be responsible for ensuring that Ready Fleet units achieve and maintain surge readiness, while en route to full readiness for deployment. The fleet commander, training group commander, and deploying commanders will work together to complete tailored intermediate and advanced tactical training. Ready Fleet training will focus on specific requirements the unified commanders expect those units to meet during the forthcoming deployment. The final phases of advanced warfare training may be completed during the outbound transit, possibly as part of an exercise scheduled by the Atlantic Command.
One or two additional
phased-maintenance periods will be scheduled while ships are assigned to the Ready Fleet. Those periods will be geared toward enhancing full readiness for deployment. At least one additional maintenance period will normally be scheduled during deployment, to ensure that required readiness is sustained.
One goal of a more clearly defined employment cycle is to heighten the sense of awareness and importance of each phase. Another goal is to enable the unified commanders to meet all requirements for peacetime exercises, forward positioning, and readiness for crisis response— with deployed forces only.
Since we will deploy fewer forces, achieving the second goal will require close cooperation between the unified and component commanders. Schedules and requirements will have to be coordinated even more carefully. It will be increasingly necessary to share deployed forces across the geographic boundaries of unified commands. And perhaps most significantly, the component commanders will have to ensure that the forces they provide have the right mix of training and capabilities to tackle whatever hard requirements confront the unified commanders at any given time.
Continuous Improvement
The process of change is never easy. Sometimes it will occur only when no alternative exists. The prospects of a smaller fleet and reduced funding have been an immediate catalyst for many of the changes outlined here. These ideas—and others like them—have been around for years. Most are clearly worth implementing on their own merit, no matter what the size of the fleet or the budget. No one has been standing still, but we sometimes find it easier to stick with time-tested ways of doing business than to take the risks associated with innovation. Now that the process of change is well under way, it must continue—until we have transformed the Navy and the Marine Corps to meet the challenge of the next decade and beyond. As long as the process of improvement continues, we can do the job with a smaller fleet.
Admiral Paul Miller is the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.