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Contents:
FFG-7: Smaller Is Better—14 Just Say No!!—14
Equality: A Step Backward—14
Save the Tailhook Association—19
Stalking the Enemy Coast—20
Conception Is the Place—23
The Landfall Is Samana Cay—23
Watlings Island Is San Salvador—23
NFOs-LAMPS III Left-Seaters—26
Patrol Wing Commanders: Neglected Assets—26
Reservists Are Ready for Submarines—28
A Measure of Success—29
An Old Alliance Comes to Life—30
Break Some Rice Bowls—34
Mine Warfare Problems ... and a Solution—34
Naval Aviation: Time to Fold ‘Em—34
For Dear Life—28
“FFG-7: Smaller Is Better”
(See J. J. Kieley, p. 44, January 1992
Proceedings)
Chief Radioman (Surface Warfare) Timothy S. Newman, U.S. Navy—Captain Kieley’s comparison of the performance characteristics and costs of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates and the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers provides some interesting food for thought, but offers a somewhat misleading perspective. He neglected to mention that the Ticonderoga class possesses an extremely sophisticated ASW suite that— like the Oliver Hazard Perry class—includes two embarked SH-60 LAMPS- III helicopters. The Ticonderoga class has gas-turbine propulsion and is a fast and exceptionally maneuverable ship—again, like the Oliver Hazard Perry class.
Captain Kieley also maintains a Ticon- deroga-class cruiser can be “too much warship for the job.” How can the captain of a U.S. warship ever have too many assets at his disposal? The unfortunate reality is that the full potential of the Ticonderoga class will probably never be realized as long as thousands of highly skilled sonar technicians sit idle behind millions of dollars worth of ASW equipment while their ships perform antiair warfare duties.
As for Captain Kieley’s remarks concerning “the captain of a Ticonderoga- class cruiser receiving too much information and taking the word of the people who are giving him that information,” I can only say I was fortunate enough to have a captain who not only trusted my judgment, but the judgment of all the officers and crew of his ship. □
“Just Say No!!”
(See T. M. Downing, pp. 45-46, February 1992; T. C. Stewart, p. 14, March 1992 Proceedings)
“Equality: A Step Backward”
(See A. DiLucente, pp. 46-48, February 1992 Proceedings)
Commander G. P. Crandall, U.S. Navy— It’s about time someone spoke up against the silly notion of women in the combat forces. Lieutenants Downing and DiLucente must be commended for striking out against the politically correct movement to let women have the choice to go
into combat! But these fine young officers don’t even know the half of it. I am stationed at the epicenter of the quivering jellyquake of Correctthink: the U.S. Naval Academy. What’s worse, being in the English Department, I have to listen to my supposedly erudite colleagues mouth the very pap that the femino-lib- eral axis has been perpetrating against the U.S. public: that women have the requisite abilities to perform in combat forces.
Lieutenant Downing points out how far the mighty Academy has fallen since women arrived—plebes no longer have to chop, do rates, go to come-arounds, etc. But that’s only the tip of the iceberg- They don’t salute any more; they have optional classes, sports, and drill. They are openly contemptuous of authority; and we need look no farther than the 110 record of the 1991 Navy football team (the victory against Army notwithstanding) to see the horrific changes that women have caused at the Academy.
His reference to the majority of midshipmen who resent women here is bespoken in everyday events, to wit, the total lack of civility between the sexes here. The men actually slam doors in the faces of women, just to prove that courtesy has no place in today’s society. To note that last semester’s Brigade Commander was a woman who did a good job only serves to obfuscate the fact that women just don’t belong here.
I fully agree with his statement, “The armed forces should be permitted to decide about women in combat—based on such intangibles (my italics) as esprit de corps, morale and cohesion.” That’s the American way! Weigh those intangibles and let the chips fall where they may!
Ms. Lieutenant DiLucente, a credit to her sex, also correctly intuits that, “Women’s rights should not be allowed to escalate to such a level that they infringe upon the rights of others.” Most notably, mine as a man to not put up with women messing up the combat information center with all their gossip, cosmetics cases, and soap operas. Sure, some women are as smart as men, but we all know that women are subject to raging hormonal influence and can’t be trusted in times of crisis. She is so right when she cites the real reason that women shouldn’t be in combat: WAR IS A MALE BONDING THING! Women just get in the way of our methodical and pre-
c'se eradication of enemies.
Let’s get back to the days when ships Were wooden and men were men, and women were where they belonged—look- lng pretty in the Administration office. □
Commander P. Cornell, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer, Helicopter Combat Sup- P°rt Squadron-11 (HC-ll)-As the executive officer of an aviation squadron that has female pilots and maintenance Personnel (despite the impression Lieutenant Downing may have given, there are more than just pilots in a squadron) Perhaps I can bring a new perspective to this issue.
Esprit de corps is certainly important; owever, it is built through hard work, edication, professionalism, and a shared ethic of the ideals of the organization; none of which depend on locker-room nrnor or childish initiation rites.
As to evolution of the U.S. Naval Academy, most of the changes that Lieutenant Downing attributes to the arrival °f women were actually instituted before Women arrived. As for the survey indicating that most male midshipmen resent tte attendance of women—similar surVeys, taken when I attended, would have Revealed resentment toward company of- lcers, short hair, electrical engineering c°urses, and parades.
If Lieutenant Downing is truly interred in an informed opinion about Women in naval aviation, I recommend that he get out of the locker room and '"to the real world, a world where women ar*d men are working together to build the Navy of the future, rather than wallowing in the prejudices of the past. The helicopter community is benefiting from the talented members of the half of the Population that Lieutenant Downing Would have us ignore.
To imply that doubling the selection Pool will mean lower standards isn’t logical—nor has it happened in squadrons With women. With women in our s9uadron, our combat effectiveness has 8°ne up. The sky is not falling and the Job is getting done better than ever. And lhat’s the bottom line. □
wronged by Navy officialdom.
I not only attended the 1991 Tailhook Convention—I also wrote the symposium report for The Hook. But, like everyone else, I became aware of the accusations about a month after the event.
Naturally, the Navy Department denies any connection between Anita Hill’s appearance during Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s confirmation hearings and the official reaction to charges of sexual harassment in Las Vegas last September. But how else to explain the abrogation of any semblance of due process?
Navy traitors like the Walkers received their full legal rights, but the mere allegation of harassment proved enough for Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett (who gave the Tailhook banquet address) to declare the accused guilty as charged. Without even an inquest, the Navy abruptly banned all dealings with the Tailhook Association, preferring to punish an innocent organization, rather than hard-to-identify individuals. In short, a firing squad was formed, without bothering with the formality of a jury.
How does the Navy’s top leadership
“Save the Tailhook Association”
(See J. Towers, p. 26, January 1992; S. Hunt,
Pp. 27-28, March 1992 Proceedings)
Barrett Tillman—Since the Secretary of lhe Navy can’t cut my hair and send me to Iraq, I’ll presume to speak for 16,000 decent men and women of the Tailhook Association who have been outrageously
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imagine its junior officers will assess the headlong rush to punish thousands who had no part in the offensive acts? How much confidence will the junior officers have in their civilian and uniformed leadership after this panicky response?
In conversations with both active and retired naval aviators, the theme is constant: disgust with the Navy hierarchy and those U.S. senators who once wore wings of gold. Instead of calling for evenhanded treatment, these influential men either have stood aside mutely or actually joined the chorus condemning the Navy’s relationship with the Tailhook Association. The most charitable of many assumptions that can made is that they do not understand the nature of that relationship.
Other serious damage has been done. At least one entire squadron resigned en masse from the Tailhook fraternity— whether from conviction or fear, I don’t know. Some aviator admirals now are reluctant to contribute editorials to The Hook, and advertising support for that superb publication—the only one of its kind—has fallen off.
The fact is that the Navy is cutting off its nose to spite its face. In trying to put out a political brushfire, the Navy has inflicted long-term damage upon itself. Naval aviation needs the unique forum that is Tailhook, and if our annual symposium didn’t exist, there would be every reason to invent it. Nowhere else can fleet operators, flag officers, political leaders, and industry representatives engage in such open and informative surroundings. The benefits of that event, not to mention the unifying forum of the magazine, have been proven over three decades.
How might the Navy have better handled the situation? Well, instead of a stampede toward political correctness, why not a reasoned statement such as: “The Navy Department is investigating the alleged misbehavior of suspected officers in Las Vegas during the annual Naval Aviation Symposium. If the allegations of sexual harassment are substantiated, severe disciplinary action will be taken.” What in the world is wrong with that?
I won’t deny that most of the alleged incidents actually occurred. So, identify the guilty and punish them. But let’s quit sniveling about the still-unproven actions of a tiny number of besotted jerks. Instead of making perfunctory statements condemning sexual harassment, the members of the Tailhook Association should state our own larger grievance— if anything, the Secretary of the Navy owes 16,000 of us an apology. It’s time for us Tailhookers to stand up for ourselves—because if we don’t, it’s unlikely that anyone else ever will. □ “Stalking the Enemy’s Coast”
(See S. Edwards, pp. 56-62, February 1992
Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James Stockdale, U.S. Navy (Retired) and co-author, In Love and War (Naval Institute Press, 1990)—Mr. Edwards obviously relied on the same bad data that Edward Moralda used in writing the Naval Historical Center’s second volume on the Vietnam War, because he repeats the errors, big and small, of that book. In the case of the big errors, the Navy’s bad data came from bad ethics.
There were three phases in what has gone down in history as the Tonkin Gulf Affair in August 1964—each of which had an air action. I was the commanding officer of Fighter Squadron-51, on board the USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14), and overall strike leader on all three of them. The first was the flight of four F-8 Crusaders that defended the USS Maddox (DD-731) from attack by three North Vietnamese PT boats on the afternoon of 2 August. The second strike— consisting of one F-8 Crusader (I was i® I the cockpit), two A-4 Skyhawks, and two r A-l Skyraiders—was summoned by the I Maddox to take station over her and the I USS Turner Joy (DD-951), in order to 1 ward off another North Vietnamese PT' I boat attack in the early evening of 4 A®' I gust. On 5 August, 17 aircraft fleW I against the oil storage facilities in Vinh. I North Vietnam as a reprisal for the sup' I posed attack the night before (the first K bombing of targets in North Vietnam). I
I doubt Mr. Edwards read my de- I scription of the action on the evening of I 4 August in In Love and War because ho I puts the on-scene arrival time of the I Ticonderoga's aircraft one hour late and I the arrival time of the aircraft of USS I Constellation (CVA-64) one hour early-1 He does, however, describe the weather I correctly—2,000-foot overcast with in-1 termittent thundershowers. What hap' ® pened the night of 4 August can be best described as a “Chinese fire drill”—lots of false targets, lots of shooting (including my own), and no North Vietnamese boats. What can a person see from ® fighter airplane on a rainy night at sea? Well, at the altitude I held for an hour and a half, below the clouds, usually just at masthead height except in haze where I topped it, unencumbered by a wingman I and with all external lights out, you can see every bit as well as you can from the bridge of a destroyer—maybe better. (I know because I stood watches at sea in destroyers for more than two years.)
In the pre-dawn hours of 5 August, both the Ticonderoga and the Constellation—who also had launched planes to support the destroyers—reported that no boats had been seen. Captain Herrick, leader of the destroyer unit, reported no boats sighted and no damage—and warned against reprisal, because of the lack of evidence. The President decided to launch anyway, mainly on the basis of reported intercepts of North Vietnamese tactical radio traffic, describing some sort
°f air-sea battle supposedly in progress.
he North Vietnamese intercepts bore n° resemblance to what I had seen on the n>ght of 4 August. Years later, when I read them, I easily identified them as ^broadcasts of my 2 August attack on 'he PT boats.)
Where do the bad ethics come in? As the dust cleared from the successful reprisals of 5 August, the Joint Chiefs °f Staff, realizing that they had no Western Pacific (WestPac) verification of the ■stated provocation for the reprisals, sent a flash massage to all WestPac senior commanders (plus Maddox and Turner °y)> saying that there was an urgent need for “proof and evidence” of the 4 pugust attack that “would convince the United Nations . . . that the attack did occur.” They urged the “redebrief’ of sttch participants in the events as might he persuaded to change their story.
Well—as any person who has come up through a chain-of-command organiza- hon would expect—that got results; vol- nnteers came forward. After eight years in a POW camp, I discovered that one of the pilots in my flight that night—with- °ut mentioning it to me or my second in command, Wes McDonald—had been redebriefed” and “for the moment suddenly decided” that he had, after all, seen PT-boat gunfire.” When I confronted hint a couple of years ago, he said apologetically that he guessed he mistook my gunfire, under him and on the deck, for the “PT-boat fire.” His name is in footnotes all over the literature on the incident. So, on this subject, the Navy data base at the Naval Historical Center and elsewhere is polluted. Since it is from such sources that history is written, accounts like Mr. Edwards’s are sure to pop UP. every now and then. □
Gerald Matlock—On 2 August 1964, I was the guided-missile division’s flight deck safety petty officer on the USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14). One F-8 Crusader—I don’t remember from which squadron—landed with all its external ordnance fired. After the pilot shut down the aircraft, I asked him if he had shot down a MiG.
With a grin and a chuckle, he replied, “No.” He continued to say that he was so excited when he engaged the target that he must have selected ‘SALVO’ because his Sidewinder air-to-air missiles fired with his Zuni air-to-ground rockets—and he did not hit the PT boat. So, to the inventory of weapons fired that day, add two Sidewinders. □ “Conception Is the Place”
(See S. W. Mitchell, pp. 77-78, February 1992 Proceedings)
“The Landfall Is Samana Cay”
(See J. Judge, p. 78, February 1992
Proceedings)
“Watlings Island Is San
Salvador”
(See S. L. Morison, p. 79, February 1992
Proceedings)
Arne B. Molander—The three Columbus landfall candidates advocated are further proof that this debate can’t be settled by self-serving rationalizations. Mitchell, Judge, and Morison all misread Columbus’s leagues as miles, invent unrecorded sailing directions and untenable anchorages, ignore conflicting evidence, and are highly crtitical of their counterparts’ congruences with the details of Columbus’s Journal—but are remarkably tolerant of their own.
One glaring deficiency shared by the three proposed landfalls is that they all lie at least 90 nautical miles south of the latitude revealed by simply summing Columbus’s transatlantic components. To explain these large latitude discrepancies, their advocates must invent the concept that Columbus maintained latitude by inaccurate dead-reckoning and totally ignored the elevations of Polaris and the circumpolar stars.
Every independent navigation expert acknowledges that, in 1492, latitude sailing (LS) was the standard method of maintaining latitude while crossing large expanses of ocean. This lengthy list includes several who might be expected to propose dead reckoning navigation, such as Gustavus Fox, Samana Cay’s first advocate; Tim Severin, a frequent National Geographic contributor, and Samuel Eliot Morison.
In LS navigation, a pilot first sailed to his destination latitude, then, guided by compass, headed westward along the fixed latitude. Course was adjusted whenever changing star-elevation angles warned that compass variation, currents, or leeway were driving him off latitude (all of which Columbus did), and any course changes from latitude were recorded. (Columbus did so on 7 October when he made his first course change “to follow the birds.”)
It was far more accurate to maintain latitude by this method than by dead reckoning. Two of Columbus’s contemporaries, Andres Bernaldez and Ibn Majid, declared that it would be disgraceful for a pilot to miss his latitude by as much as 20 or 30 miles on an ocean crossing.
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Samuel Eliot Morison attributed transatlantic latitude sailing accuracies of 3 or 4 miles to John Cabot and Jacques Cartier.
If Columbus performed LS navigation as accurately as his contemporaries, then he entered the New World through North, East Providence Channel and made landfall near the northern tip of Eleuthera. This 25°30' landfall latitude derived from his Journal is confirmed by the only two contemporary latitude measurements— the 26° latitude of his “discoveries” in Columbus’s letter to Santangel, and Ponce de Leon’s precise recording of 25°40’ during his 1513 layover at the island of Guanahani.
After his landfall at 2 a.m., Columbus stood off until dawn at the entrance to the channel (the only “gulfo” near any landfall candidate) before following the reef westward to its first break at Egg Island (a true “isleta” of 250 acres) where he found a good anchorage (Conception has none where required.) The next day he mentioned the large central “laguna” covering 25% of Egg Island (Samana Cay has no large central lagoon and Watlings Island has too many lakes) and then appropriately described the northern part of Eleuthera, across the shallows, as “bien grande” (no other candidate can resolve this “isleta-bien grande” conflict). On Sunday, Columbus rowed “the length of the island to the north-northeast to see the other part to the east, which it has,” in perfect congruence with Egg Island’s east coast and Royal Island’s location only 300 yards to the east (both Samana and Watlings fail “length” and “north-northeast.”) He accurately described Royal’s beautiful harbor as “quiet as a well” and its 30,000- acre outer roadstead as “large enough for all ships in Christendom.” (Watlings Island lacks the quiet inner harbor, while the other candidates fail to meet both descriptions.)
On Monday morning, Columbus “sailed SW” (not south from Samana Cay to Crooked Island) for Rose Island, delayed until noon because the “tides were against me” (3-6 knot tides flow all along the course from Egg to Rose, but are totally absent on the other routes.) From Rose Island, he saw a “larger island” (New Providence) to the west (Rum Cay is solitary) and anchored near its western cape (Rum Cay lacks this anchorage.) Tuesday morning an Indian canoe came out to his anchorage “from another cape” (Clifton Point) also miss- i ing at Rum Cay.
That morning Columbus sailed exactly “8 leagues” (Rum Cay is too close to Long Island) across the Tongue of the Ocean (a “gulfo” lacked by all others) to Mastic Point on Andros, a cape precisely satisfying Columbus’s unique description that “this cape and all this coast where I came runs NNW-SSE.” Other important features unique to Andros Island are a fronting reef 3,000 yards from shore (“two lombard shots”), mostly “beach’ (Long Island is mostly limestone cliff)- slightly “more than 28 leagues in length” (Long Island is less than 20), “mastic trees” and “water” (absent along the east coast of Long Island), “a shallow harbor like the mouth of a river, 2 leagues from the end” (precisely a depiction of Conch Sound), and an alternative north-northwest route through deep water to Cuba, a clue that even Samuel Eliot Morison admitted made absolutely no sense at Long Island.
On Wednesday afternoon, a strong norther forced Columbus to turn south and test the shallows below the Tongue of the Ocean. By Friday morning, he arrived at the northern end of Long Island’s west coast which runs almost “12 leagues” to “Cabo Hermoso, all in deep water,” an apt description of Long Island’s glistening south cape while even Morison admits his candidate is “ugly” and only 5 leagues away. Other important features unique to Long Island are “two isleos” at its northern tip, and a “large cove”, located “halfway” down its
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west coast and “oriented towards the NE”.
Independent sources also support a northern route. The Chaves Rutter from the 1530s, which was tightly controlled because of its detailed descriptions of the New World, correctly locates Spanish Wells 6 nautical miles northeast of Gua- nahani (Egg Island), and identifies New Providence as Columbus’s second island. In 1601, the Spanish court historian described “Yuma” (now universally accepted as Long Island) as the fourth island visited by Columbus. In 1734, the first accurate Spanish mapping of the New Providence region labels Eleuthera as “San Salvador,” an important association confirmed by Alcedo’s highly-regarded 1786 Geographic Dictionary. □
Editor’s Note: The 1992 Annapolis Seminar will include a debate on Columbus’s landfall moderated by William F. Buckley, Jr.—see page 108.
“NFOs-LAMPS III Left-Seaters”
(.See 1. J. Durkin, pp. 84-86, February 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander L. A. Lollar, U.S. Navy—Commander Durkin’s proposal has been talked about for years in the
LAMPS-III community, but it has not been taken seriously because of the insidious view within the naval helicopter community that naval helicopter pilots cannot fly singly.
However, naval flight officer (NFO) training has evolved over the years, and includes hands-on pilotage skills, including landings. A progressive community such as LAMPS III should take advantage of these changes in order to increase its tactical prowess through an expanded talent pool and crew specialization.
In 1986, a S-3 NFO visited Light Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron-42 for a week to learn more about the LAMPS III system. His comment was that there was more to do on board an SH-60B during any one of its missions than on board a S-3. A good way to evaluate this proposal would be to send two S-3 Viking NFOs to a LAMPS III squadron for a disassociated sea tour in order to evaluate it under operational conditions.
In the February Proceedings, Vice Admiral Dunleavy addressed the credibility of naval aviation. What kind of credibility can the helicopter community expect to have if we are unwilling to seriously examine this proposal. Our pipeline-selection standards and rotarywing training system have been tasked. How will we respond? □
“Patrol Wing Commanders: Neglected Assets”
(See M. T. Peters, pp. 84-85, December 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander B. A. Ross, U. S. Navy—Commander Peters highlights a valid problem: Despite tremendous enhancements to the P-3 Orion’s capabilities over the last decade—particularly in antisurface warfare (ASUW) and over- the-horizon targeting—its non-ASW capabilities are largely unappreciated and consequently underused by the fleet. But, the suggested solution—to integrate the patrol-wing commander in the battle group as either the ASW or ASUW commander—would hamstring the wing commander’s operational effectiveness and undermine his broader responsibilities.
Committing the patrol wing commander to a single aircraft-carrier battle group (CVBG), much less a single warfare command, would necessarily limit his attention to his other mission requirements- Furthermore, stationing him on board an aircraft carrier would remove him from his sources of strength: his shore- based 100-man staff, his data-manage- ment and communications capabilities, and the direct links to his squadron commanders and aircrews, none of which can accompany him to the ASW module, combat direction center, or flag plot on board an aircraft carrier.
Tethering patrol wing commanders to aircraft carriers would also undermine their broader role in expanding and integrating the role of patrol aviation in non- ASW missions. In the midst of strong budgetary pressures to downsize the active force, and the precedent to relegate purely ASW forces to a reconstitutable capability, it is imperative that the patrol aviation community impress upon the rest of the fleet the indispensable role of the P-3 in other warfare areas. Commander Peters correctly points out the Navy has relied on the aircraft-carrier battle group for forward presence since World War II, but as the size of the fleet—and the number of aircraft carriers is declines, alternatives to the CVBG—such as surface- ship battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and even deployed U.S. Air Force air combat wings—will emerge. If the future of patrol aviation is staked on the future of the CVBG, further cuts in active P-3 squadrons must be expected.
Acting as both resource advocate and coordinator, a patrol wing commander should advertise the full scope of his aircrafts’ capabilities to all task group com- I manders in his area of responsibility, and work for greater employment and integration of patrol aviation assets in those
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task group organizations. Instead of integrating the patrol-wing commander as a warfare commander, he should be a warfare coordinator, much as the captain in an aircraft carrier acts as the air-element coordinator in the CVBG’s composite warfare command. As the patrol air element coordinator (PAREC), the patrol wing commander would respond to patrol requests from all warfare commanders of each battle group in his area of responsibility. Instead of a patrol squadron-liaison officer (a lieutenant or lieutenant commander) being assigned to the ASW commander, a PAREC liaison officer (a lieutenant commander or commander) would be assigned to the battle group commander’s staff. The battle group benefit from the greater experience of the liaison officer and broader integration would be served by the liaison officer’s role on the battle group staff instead of the ASW commander’s staff. Traditional “green request” procedures for patrol aviation missions would be streamlined by using the direct relationships between the wing commander and his embarked liaison officer.
Commander Peters raises important issues for the future of patrol aviation. But tying the patrol-wing commander to a
CVBG and locating him on an aircraft carrier is not the right answer. A much broader role is required throughout the fleet. Integrating the patrol wing commander as the PAREC, instead of a warfare commander is a more viable alternative. Patrol aviation is valuable to all but indispensable to none, and, unless every potential user of the P-3’s broad range of capabilities is acquainted with them—and the fleet view of the Orion solely as an ASW asset is changed—the number of active P-3 squadrons will be further reduced, and the P-3s valuable non-ASW contributions to the active fleet will be lost. □ “For Dear Life”
(See T. Thompson, pp. 38-39, January 1992
Proceedings)
Seaman Christopher A. Fuss, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—While the photographs of the Coast Guard lifeboat were outstanding, there was an error in the caption. The motor lifeboat pictured is 44 feet long, not 41. This can easily be determined by looking at the service numbers on the bow of the boat. The first two numbers on all Coast Guard boats (vessels under 65 feet in length) designate its length.O
“Reservists Are Ready for Submarines”
(See A. K. Hayashida, pp. 82-84, December
1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant David E. Stampfli, U.S. Naval Reserve—Since leaving the Navy in April 1991 after six years of active duty—three of which were on board a fast attack submarine—I have been considering joining a Naval Reserve unit. Judging from Commander Hayashida’s description of typical reserve officer duties—as well as information from friends currently in the Naval Reserve— it appears that the present reserve structure does not allow submarine officers to remain current with existing technologies and that administrative responsibilities to justify a unit’s state of readiness occupies a large percentage of available time.
More specifically, Commander Hayashida’s article brings into question whether any Naval Reserve submarine officer program is justified. In the three years I served on board a fast attack submarine, I cannot recall a single underway when a Naval Reserve officer was on board. How can these officers remain abreast of the latest developments in the Submarine Force if they are not allowed to deploy on operational submarines?
I must disagree with Commander Hayashida’s point that existing shipboard manning levels are inadequate without reserve augmentation. During the Gulf War, it was very clear that all commitments could be handled by the active duty forces and that there was no need to use the Naval Reserve. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, we cannot realistically expect any future conflicts to require more submarine participation than did the Gulf War.
Perhaps a more realistic and economical approach to the Naval Reserve submarine officer question would be to rely more heavily on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is the least demanding Naval Reserve commitment and requires no drilling. Officers in the Individual Ready Reserve also receive no compensation and, therefore, are not a burden to the Navy’s budget.
Because the IRR does not drill, how would overall submarine force readiness be affected? I have yet to come across information that indicates that weekend drill time makes reserve officers any more knowledgeable of submarine operations than someone like myself. In fact, most
°f the activities conducted during a drill weekend have very little to do with the operational tasks demanded of submarine officers.
I appreciated Commander Hayashida’s accurate description of the Naval Reserve. He made several excellent points which caused me question the usefulness of Naval Reserve programs for submarines. So- until the existing programs change, I think I’ll be sitting this one out. □
“A Measure of Success”
(See L. E. Eddingfield and J. G. Stavridis, pp.
80-81, February 1992 Proceedings)
Captain W. A. Nurthen, U.S. Navy, Surface Team Leader, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet TQL Team—I am puzzled as to why this article appeared in the TQL Forum; a more appropriate section would have been the “Microman- agement/Inspection Forum.” The divi- sion-in-the-spotlight program suggested may fit the TQL model of Captain Eddingfield and Commander Stavridis; but, it bears no resemblance to the Dem- Ing method which the Navy has decided f° follow.
The division-in-the-spotlight program strives to achieve quality by inspecting a division in minute detail for everything from personnel qualification standards to valve maintenance. This contrasts sharply with the third of Deming’s points which advocates ending dependence on mass inspection to achieve quality. Quality must be built into the process, not inspected into the product. Inspections by the Command Quality Team (CQT) will do nothing to improve the quality of the product; the quality—good or bad—is already in. All the CQT can do is identify defects, and at a tremendous cost when one considers all the manhours involved.
The division-in-the-spotlight program focuses on results recorded by the CQT and retained for two years. The Deming method focuses on systems, and particularly the relationship of systems and processes within them. Point 5 of Deming’s 14 points urges constant improvement of the “system of production and service.” Constant process improvement will lead to improved quality which reduces costs and increases productivity. This is the essence of the Deming chain reaction which has proved successful regardless of whether an organization produces goods or services. In this era of inevitable reductions in forces, the innovations necessary to accomplish our mission in the future will be financed by the savings we harvest through process improvement today.
Management-by-results equates to management by objectives, numerical goals and quotas which Deming (in points 11a and 1 lb) urges us to eliminate. Management-by-results fails to provide methods to achieve quotas or any understanding of what the system or process is capable of producing. This inevitably will lead to frustration, demotivation, fear, and reduced productivity.
Deming advocates driving fear out of organizations. Requiring junior officers to present themselves before their superior officers, other officers, and senior enlisted personnel to account for their divisions’ performances as part of a recurring cycle of inspection will do little to drive out fear in our junior officers, especially if their fitness reports depend on the results. Focusing on division performance instead of processes also reinforces barriers between competing divisions and departments, rather than breaking them down.
Captain Eddingfield and Commander Stavridis said nothing about the creation of an Executive Steering Group (ESG) to develop a unit’s mission, vision, and guiding principles. Nor did they discuss the formulation and training of crossfunctional teams composed of mid-level managers with a stake in the mission-relevant processes selected by the ESG for improvement. The mid-level team often referred to as a Quality Management
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There is tremendous fleet-wide interest in TQL; however, the Navy has not yet developed the courses in fundamentals, implementation, tools, and team skills to meet the demand. Given this environment, there is a danger that many will rush to imitate the division-in-the- spotlight model as the proven way to implement TQL. Such imitation likely will end in frustration, fear, false starts, and failure. The disillusionment certain to follow could derail the TQL transformation at a time when its full implementation is so critical. □
Editor’s Note: The authors did not call their manuscript a TQL piece; the editor slated the “Measure of Success ” for the Proceedings’ new TQL Forum, which alternates with the Leadership Forum.
“An Old Alliance Comes to Life”
(See D. Zakheim, pp. 66-71, December 1991 Proceedings)
Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy, U.S. Representative, Military Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization— Dov Zakheim performed a commendable service by updating readers on the Western European Union (WEU) and by underlining the experience of the Union in orchestrating its members’ naval activities in the Persian Gulf. While I agree with the thrust of his article, I believe there are several areas that deserve a slightly different emphasis, especially in light of recent developments.
It is not fair, for example, to charge the United States with “paying lip service” to the notion of a European pillar. It would be truer to say (as Dr. Zakheim does in a subsequent passage) that our European allies’ quest for a common security policy has confronted the United States with a puzzle: how to endorse these efforts—which are a natural part of the more general progress toward closer political union—while protecting the competence of NATO, an alliance that all agree remains indispensable to the common security. Solving this puzzle has meant not hypocrisy, but subtlety. President George Bush forcefully expressed U.S. policy in this regard at the NATO Summit in Rome last November:
“The United States has been, is, and will remain an unhesitating proponent of the aim and process of European integration. This strong American support extends to the prospect of a political union—as well as the goal of a defense identity. . . . Even the attainment of European union, however, will not diminish the need for NATO—as far as we are concerned, and as far as we can see. We do not see how there can be a substitute for the Alliance, as the provider of our defense and Europe’s security. We support the development of the WEU because it can complement the Alliance and strengthen the European role in it. It can help Europe and North America face together threats to shared vital interests outside of Europe. But we do not see the WEU as a European alternative to the Alliance. Our premise is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European union. . . .”
As Dr. Zakheim points out, there are legal and historical differences between NATO and the WEU in terms of their ability to act out-of-area. I believe, however, that NATO’s disabilities in this respect are easily exaggerated. In any event, the notion of out-of-area may soon have to be redefined. NATO is transforming itself dramatically, adapting to the new circumstances in Europe and the former Soviet Union. A key part of this transformation is the Alliance’s maintenance of contacts with its former adversaries, including regular meetings of foreign ministers and ambassadors in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. As U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans Genscher indicated in their statement of 2 October 1991, this extraordinary partnership is meant to promote a Euro-Atlantic community extending from Vancouver east to Vladivostok—and you can’t get much farther out-of-area than that, without starting back in again.
Dr. Zakheim is correct in saying that the WEU is likely to have other missions; the problem becomes one of ensuring that these missions do not duplicate what NATO is already doing or restructuring itself to do. A major U.S. concern is ensuring that the evolving WEU maintains a transparent mode of operation that would keep all European Community members and all NATO members informed of WEU plans.
Informed attention—like Dr. Zakheim’s—to the development of the WEU and of a European security identity will continue to be valuable. Particularly important issues for the future include the links between the WEU and the newly established Franco-German army corps, the effects of the anticipated move of the WEU secretariat to Brussels, and, most important, the character of the relationships between the WEU, NATO, and the European Community. We must trust our allies to develop answers to questions like these in a way that does no damage to the authority of the Alliance or to the crucial role of the United States in European security. The key factor that will determine the long-term viability of the WEU is not how the U.S. reacts to this European question, but whether Europe will develop a closer political union with enough consensus to employ its own security identity. Without this political consensus, the secretariat of the WEU will be pulled in too many directions to be effective. □
“Break Some Rice Bowls”
(See D. A. Wills, p. 82, November 1991; K.
Curtis, p. 14, January 1992 Proceedings)
Captain Grant Carson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Curtis expects that his idea of merging of amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with carrier battle groups (CVBGs) will be labeled “doctrinal heresy.”
Well, he is right.
Captain Curtis reasons that, because CVBGs and ARGs would likely respond together, they should operate together. There are three arguments to the contrary;
- Amphibious forces do things that battle groups don’t—and vice versa. The evacuation of Phnom Penh in 1975, for example, was in a relatively benign environment, where a CVBG would have
- been useless. On the other hand, if an amphibious force had accompanied the aircraft carriers that raided Libya, it would have been an albatross around their necks.
- If a combined CVBG/ARG had to go somewhere, its speed would be limited to that of the slowest amphibious ship— optimistically, 17 knots.
>■ Amphibious forces are task-organized for their missions, as they should be. Amphibious ready groups, on the other hand, are conveniently deployable presence units. Amphibious operations shouldn’t be dictated by the size of a conveniently deployable presence unit.
Captain Curtis also makes the point that ARGs have well-documented warfighting deficiencies, apparently implying that they should be integrated with battle groups for their protection. I would go further: amphibious forces have almost no warfighting capabilities except to put Marines upon a hostile shore. Of course, amphibious forces should be protected by CVBGs and other forces—but this still does not require that the forces be integrated.
The argument is offered that integrating the amphibious forces into the composite-warfare-commander (CWC) organization would: negate the need for a commander amphibious task force (CATF) and his staff; “finally solve” the CWC problem; and facilitate the retirement of older amphibious ships.
The implicit argument is that the CWC organization is good—and if amphibious warfare presents problems, then the amphibious organization should change to conform. I unequivocally reject this argument. The CWC organization is appropriate for battle group operations, and little else. Indeed, one could argue that the CWC organization is too inflexible to coordinate disparate types of forces and should be replaced. Furthermore, the idea
of a CVBG commander in charge of an amphibious operation is as unsettling as is the idea of an ARG commander leading a CVBG’s operations. Both types of operations are incredibly complicated and take many years of experience to master.
As to the retirement of older amphibious ships, the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union suggest strongly that we will need more amphibious lift to respond to worldwide contingencies. Retiring older amphibious ships now, without a firm commitment for replacement, would only guarantee less lift in the future.
The final suggestion—that Marine fixed-wing aircraft should be integrated into carrier air wings—was actually tried long ago. The only time Marine aviators should fly off aircraft carriers is when the Navy cannot afford enough aircraft to fill the aircraft carriers’ decks (which is why the concept was once tried).
All that said, I really enjoyed Captain Curtis’s letter. He is thinking about amphibious warfare from the Navy point of view, and cares enough to express an opinion. □
“Mine Warfare Problems . .. and a Solution”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 105-106, December 1991;
J. D. Pearson, pp. 18-20, February 1992 Proceedings)
Colonel W. C. Gregson, U.S. Marine Corps—Mr. Polmar states that the proposal to transfer mine-countermeasures (MCM) forces to the Marine Corps is impractical. Is it any more impractical than the current practice of pulling amphibious-warfare ships away from their primary duty? The practicality of the current approach to MCM was proved when the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) hit a mine while recovering the helicopter that was supposed to find it first.
Mr. Polmar also asserted that the U.S. Coast Guard “is oriented toward defensive operations—unlike the Navy, which stresses the offensive.” What offensive do we stress now? Against what? If there is no blue-water, big-navy threat, but we continue to fear World War II-era mines—not to mention the modern types soon to hit the market—we will in fact be viewed as an expensive, irrelevant force. The analogy is an army that is able to defend its rear-area supply depots, but unable to close with the enemy because it cannot negotiate an obstacle.
Mr. Polmar is absolutely right. If the Navy refuses to solve this problem, the responsibility and the resources should be given to those who will. □
“Naval Aviation; Time to Fold ‘Em”
(See C. E. Myers, pp. 37-41, July 1991; A.
Coward, p. 12, September 1991 Proceedings)
Commander R. S. Dearth, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron- I 95 (VA-95)—Mr. Myers’s theory that I “the carrier exists for the care and feed- I ing of air superiority fighters—and ev- I erything else is secondary” is a nice one, I but what about the actual employment of I aircraft carriers during the past 40 years? I Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Libya, and I Iraq are places where an air-superiority- only carrier would have been useless, much as the ASW carriers (CVSs) were, j Furthermore, it is folly to consider the |
While carrier-based attack aircraft may change, the importance of the Navy’s mission of projecting power ashore—and carrier aviation’s role in that mission—will not.
as the Navy’s only deep-strike weapon. TLAM is a great weapon for the right targets, as are laser-guided bombs, homing anti-radiation missiles (HARMs). Harpoon missiles, cluster weapons, and, yes, even 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound general- purpose bombs. But, TLAM is definitely not the right weapon for every target.
Destroying command, control, and communications systems and knocking out enemy aircraft on the ground is the best way to obtain and maintain air supremacy—and that’s what naval aviation did in the Gulf War.
Air supremacy is essential to the Navy’s mission of keeping the world’s sea lanes open. Of equal importance, however, is the Navy’s other mission of projecting power ashore and that’s best done through deep-strike interdiction. □