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J D DAVIS
The Honorable Andrew Card,
Secretary of Transportation
Proceedings: In the current economic climate, some say the outlook for the U.S. merchant fleet is bleak. What is your outlook, and what can be done to save it? Secretary Card: The U.S. merchant fleet, indeed, is facing a bleak future. Without reform of our archaic maritime laws, America’s foreign-trade merchant fleet may be virtually extinct by the year 2000. The privately owned U.S.-flag merchant fleet currently numbers 393 seagoing vessels; forecasts indicate that by the year 2000—barring any changes in maritime policy—the fleet will shrink to 117 ships, with a carrying capacity of 5.9 million deadweight tons, down from nearly 20 million today.
A new and comprehensive maritime policy can arrest the decline of our merchant marine and maritime industrial base. Such a policy must contain two key elements.
Lower foreign wage rates and direct and indirect subsidies by foreign governments mean that U.S.- flag operators presently require federal support to compete. Our
Contingency Retainer Program (CRP) proposal would provide payments for up to 74 vessels for seven years, beginning at $2.5 million per ship for the first two years and phasing down to $1.6 million per ship in the final year. The program will encourage efficient, cost-conscious
operations that will lead to reduced dependence on federal aid. Participating U.S. operators would be required to keep vessels in active commerce under the U.S. flag, improve their productivity and operating efficiency, and make them available in times of emergency.
We must permit U.S. operators to replace obsolete ships with more modern ships at competitive costs. We propose to allow Capital Construction Fund (CCF) deposits to be used to acquire or lease vessels in the worldwide market for operation in international trades and to acquire U.S.- built vessels for the coastal and inland waterways trades.
Use of CCF tax-deferred funds to acquire or lease vessels built in excessively subsidized foreign yards would not be permitted.
In order to avoid penalizing U.S. operators who exercise initiatives to modernize their fleets, we propose to eliminate the three-year waiting period for foreign-built, -U.S.-flag vessels before being eligible to carry preference cargoes. Foreign-built bulk vessels—constructed after the enactment date of new legislation and registered under the U.S. flag—also should be immediately eligible to carry preference cargoes. In addition, foreign-flag feeder vessels should be eligible in conjunction with U.S.-flag line-haul vessels to carry preference cargoes.
U.S. citizenship requirements for ownership and control of U.S.-flag vessels participating in the CRP should be brought in line with current Coast Guard documentation standards in order to attract more foreign equity capital and make it easier for U.S. operators to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies.
Proceedings: After a less-than-perfect record during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm what plans are in the works for improved maintenance and manning of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)?
Secretary Card: I will have to take exception with your characterization of a less-than-perfect record. After the initial activation problems were overcome, the Ready Reserve Force performed as well as any commercial or
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military fleet of ships would be expected to under continuous operating conditions.
As far as plans for improving RRF readiness, Congress appropriated $440 million for fiscal year 1993 that will allow us to acquire 10 or 11 priority roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro)-type ships, increase our level of maintenance and repair, expand our tent activation program, and place Ro/Ro ships into reduced operating status with ten-person crews and available in four days and put two-person retention crews on all five-day ships.
Proceedings: Since only 79 of some 140-plus Ready Reserve ships were used during the Gulf War, might we have too many, and if so, how many would you say is enough? Secretary Card: Although your figure of 140-plus is correct for the planned size of the force in 1999, there were actually 95 ships at the time of Desert Shieid/Desert Storm. Thus, more than 82% of the ships were activated and employed. As a result of the lessons learned and our analysis, it became evident that we were lacking in roll-on/roll- off ships, and these are a priority in our current acquisition plans. In addition, although no tankers were required in the Desert Shield/Storm situation—because of the availability of local fuel sources—additional tankers are still being planned for other contingencies, where fuel supply would be a major problem. Another aspect to consider in the overall number of Ready Reserve Force ships used is that the modern port facilities in the Persian Gulf are among the most sophisticated in the world, and the size of the RRF is geared to support sealift worldwide, even where port facilities may be less modem.
Regarding the size and makeup of the RRF, the Department of Defense recently completed a comprehensive Mobility Requirements Study, which is the basis for the 140-ship RRF planned by 1999.1 concur with its findings and assessments.
Proceedings: Another problem identified during the mobilization for Desert Shieid/Desert Storm was inadequate port facilities—particularly in Savannah, Georgia—for such an extensive sealift effort. What provisions are being made to address this bottleneck?
Secretary Card: I am certain that there were not any serious inadequacies at Savannah, even though it was the first port to receive deployment cargo. If there had been, the Military Traffic Management Command would have reported the situation to the department, since the department closely coordinated with them during the entire deployment. Had there been an inadequacy, the Department of Transportation had the authority to issue an immediate order that would have relieved the situation. No such order was ever needed in Savannah. Incidentally, the one order that was issued took less than two hours to remedy a situation at a repair facility in Portland, Oregon.
Although we did not need to activate them, 53 Federal Port Controller contracts were in place at U.S. ports at the onset of Desert Shield. These made it possible to have senior port executives trained to act as government agents at their respective ports. Savannah is such a port. The contracts have been updated to include lessons learned from the Gulf War.
Future deployment ports have been identified, and their top managers have met with Military Traffic Management Command and Maritime Administration senior planners to assure that a future mobilization will proceed smoothly. The results of these discussions will be formalized using existing Maritime Administration authorities.
Proceedings: According to some sources, the Gulf War buildup could have been expedited if containerships had been implemented to move some of the cargo that was embarked exclusively on roll-on/roll-off ships. What is your opinion?
Secretary Card: The Gulf War buildup moved relatively smoothly in all stages, despite some delays that resulted primarily from factors other than the type of vessels used. In addition to U.S. roll-on/roll-off ships, break-bulk and other types of ships in the U.S.-flag commercial fleet and the Ready Reserve Force were used to meet Department of Defense surge sealift requirements for the buildup. Foreign-flag ships also were readily available for charter as a result of the international support for the President’s deployment of forces. Adequate sustainment sealift was available through the use of container and general cargo ships operated by U.S.-flag liner companies.
U.S.-flag containerships could have been outfitted with sealift enhancement features, such as seasheds and flat- racks, to accommodate wheeled and tracked equipment that was transported primarily on Ro/Ro and break-bulk ships. The availability of suitable U.S.- and foreign-flag capacity, however, eliminated the necessity for such containership modifications. Nevertheless, sealift enhancement features were employed to increase serviceability of certain types of ships; flatracks were used on at least 14 voyages involving 11 individual ships.
Proceedings: Since the leading contractors in the U.S. merchant shipping field—which conduct 80% of the business—are incrementally moving out from under the U.S. flag in response to the recession and the defense drawdown, how will we be able to count on them in future emergencies?
Secretary Card: Two large U.S.-flag shipping companies have indicated that they intend to begin to reflag in 1995 if comprehensive tax, manning, and operational policies are not changed. The Maritime Reform Act of 1992, introduced in Congress in July 1992, included a number of provisions relating to those policy changes. Other desired changes that do not require legislation are also under consideration. While the Maritime Reform Act was not passed in the 102nd Congress before its adjournment, we are confident that maritime reform proposals will be passed in the 103rd Congress. We also are confident that the industry will participate in the programs that are enacted, and the reflagging suggested by the leading U.S.-flag companies will be averted.
Proceedings: How do you rate the response time and the general performance of military relief efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, and what are the most important early lessons learned?
Secretary Card: The military has again demonstrated its responsiveness, professionalism, and humanity in response to Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki relief. The services have proven they have the ability not only to respond to military conflict, such as a Desert Storm, but also to humanitarian needs. I was moved to see combat- trained troops making kids who had lost their homes happy and secure. All the services should be saluted, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard.
Proceedings: The oil industry has recently formed the Marine Spill Response Corporation to cope with marine pollution. Safeguarding the environment is also shared by the Environmental Protection Agency and its state-level counterparts. How does the Coast Guard fit into environmental protection?
Secretary Card: The Marine Spill Response Corporation is one of a multitude of private-sector interests considered by the on-scene coordinators in the development of the overall response coordination strategy. Its limited charter is to prepare for and respond to oil-spill incidents occurring offshore and involving member-company vessels.
On the other hand, the Coast Guard has a long tradition as the lead federal environmental agency in the marine transportation arena. The Coast Guard has primary authority and responsibility for pollution prevention, preparedness, and response involving any vessel and/or any marine transportation-related waterfront facility located anywhere in the country. This environmental authority extends worldwide in relation to U.S.-owned vessels through international agreements.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan divides the nation into coastal and inland zones. It recognizes the Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as coequal partners in maintaining our national spill response system.
The Coast Guard serves as vice chair of the National Response Team. It provides cochairs for each regional response team established to support pollution response at the local level, maintains a National Strike Force of highly
trained pollution-response personnel and equipment for deployment anywhere in the world. Few people know that we are partners in bilateral agreements with Canada, Mexico, Russia, and Japan, relating to pollution-response activities. Most critical of all, the contingency plan requires the Coast Guard to provide 47 on-scene coordinators throughout the coastal zone of the United States. Each is charged with coordinating all preparedness and response activities of all government and private-sector interests related to oil and hazardous substance discharges or releases.
In addition to pollution preparedness and response, the Coast Guard has primary responsibility under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Act to Prevent Pollution From Ships for creating, maintaining, and enforcing pollution-prevention regulations for marine transportation-related facilities and for vessels throughout the entire country.
Internationally, the Coast Guard is the lead agency in representing the United States at the International Maritime Organization’s Marine Environment Protection Committee proceedings. In this role, the Coast Guard has been instrumental in developing the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its various protocols and more recently the International Convention on Pollution Preparedness and Response.
Proceedings. A perpetual question seems to hang over the Coast Guard—namely, where is it going? Some have observed that traditional Coast Guard missions—such as search and rescue—are clouded by shifting mission emphasis. In your opinion, on what missions should the Coast Guard focus?
Secretary Card: The Coast Guard must be responsive to changing national priorities. It must be willing to explore new areas of endeavor and seek a balance in response to its traditional missions in support of national security, law enforcement, maritime safety, and environmental protection.
All the while, it must also remain committed to continuous improvement of its performance as the world’s leading maritime humanitarian and safety organization.
Vice Admiral Francis Donovan, USN (Ret.)
Former Commander, Military Sealift Command
Proceedings: In your opinion as the outgoing commander, what is the most pressing issue facing the Military Sealift Command today?
Admiral Donovan: Two issues are particularly pressing. One is meeting the requirements of the Mobility Requirement Study, which was conducted under the auspices of the Joint Staff, to identify future needs for sealift. Moving heavy armored equipment from the United States to the scene of a regional crisis in the future will require some building and/or conversion.
We also ought to be looking at the interim years. New
developments won’t take effect until late in this decade and early in the next century. We should be looking right now at what we have in hand, at what we would need for another Desert Shield or Desert Storm in the next five years, before the first of these new construction or conversion programs come on line.
The study requires, either through new construction or conversion, the equivalent of 20 big ships totaling about 380,000 square feet each and designed primarily to carry armor and mechanized infantry.
Included in that study is also the procurement of addi-
tional ships for the Ready Reserve Force, which would be somewhere in the vicinity of 18 roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro) ships. We ought to be getting our hands on those ships right now, because we don’t have sufficient lift of that type under the U.S. flag, either in the Ready Reserve Force or in the commercial sector.
In the 20-ship program are 11 big ships, which would supplement the eight fast-sealift ships we currently have and nine dedicated to prepositioning. We have eight big former containerships that have been converted into Ro/Ros. They are capable of 30-plus knots and have 150,000 square feet of rolling stock space, plus some container space. These were the heart of our rapid deployment. They were the ships designed to deliver a unit like the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division to the other side of the world, in a hurry. From Savannah, Georgia, they were alongside the pier in the Persian Gulf 13 days later. That’s 33-plus knots in the open ocean—27-plus knots average overall, including the Suez Canal. That’s a tremendous accomplishment.
The ships we’re planning to produce as a supplement to them would be Panama-Canal-maximum: 950 feet long, 105-1/2 feet on the beam.
We’re talking about fitting the new design into those same dimensions, but these ships will carry significantly more rolling stock. They’ll be diesel-powered so they won’t have that same speed, but they’ll get the flow in motion.
Proceedings: The speed requirement for these ships now stands at 25 knots. Is that fast enough?
Admiral Donovan: Actually, the speed we’re talking about is 24 knots, because you cross a line at that speed with diesel engines, pushing a hull or a ship the size we’re talking about. As it turns out, 24 is about the speed we need to meet the requirements to get to where we’re going, and it’s also about what the ships can handle, without adding significant extra power, which would change the cost and manning requirements. I’m comfortable with 18- to 21- knot ships, the speed of most Ready Reserve Ro/Ros. Once you get the flow going, ships of this speed fit in and do very well. They did a fine job during the war, and we need more now. I think you heard the term “Steel Bridge.’’ General [H. Norman] Schwarzkopf used it when he spoke at the Naval Academy graduation in 1991. On 26 December 1990—our peak day—we had enough ships at sea that if we had spaced them from the United States through the Mediterranean to the Gulf there would have been a ship every 50 miles. Now that’s a significant flow.
Proceedings: Having executed the largest military sealift operation in history, what aspects of the operation came as the most positive surprises and which ones failed to live up to your expectations?
Admiral Donovan: For the high point in the deployment, I go back to something that 1 say at every opportunity. Back in the early ’80s, some forward-looking and very bright people sat down and put together the sealift package that we have today—the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), the Afloat Prepositioning Force, the Ready Reserve Force, the hospital ships, and the aviation support ships. They all came out of that package, and we needed all of them.
The single biggest success was the maritime prepositioning ship program, the MPS squadrons. We have a squadron in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; we have one in the Pacific; and we have one in the Atlantic. The two squadrons from the Pacific and the Indian Ocean were ordered to sail on 7 August. There were no material deficiencies. The equipment in them was in tremendous operating condition. They sailed on the 8th. Eight days later the first MPS ship was offloading in Saudi Arabia. By 20 August, the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) had
flown out from Twentynine Palms in California, had married up with its equipment, and was combat deployed on the desert. That’s a tremendous success story. Some people say, and I challenge them every time I hear it, “Well, we’re fortunate that Saddam gave us six months to build up.” Saddam didn’t give us six months to build up. We had the 7th MEB— a very effective, very well- trained, U.S. combat unit— deployed on the desert by the 20th. The 1st MEB, which came from Hawaii and matched up with the Guam Squadron, was right behind it. And, of course, we also had the carrier battle groups offshore to provide close-air support, had anything started. It would have been a very difficult situation for our people, but the fact is that Saddam knew he was looking south at two very effective combat units supported by carrier air and augmented by Amphibious Group Two and the 4th MEB offshore in an amphibious posture. That’s what gave us six months.
The next, of course, were the fast-sealift ships—just magnificent. We did have a boiler casualty in one of them. She had to be taken out of the rotation early on. But the other seven ships carried just about 10% of all the cargo for the war. We had 66 dry-cargo ships from the Ready Reserve Force, and they carried just more than 20%. So you can see the effectiveness of those big, quick-turnaround fast-sealift ships.
The Ready Reserve Force I also categorize as a great success. Some people would disagree; a few magazine articles referred to it as the Rusty Reserve Force. Some of the ships had difficulty in getting lit off and under way— no question about that. But when you look at all of the ships we had involved in that effort, the overall reliability ran about 94.5%. Some of the ships had been idle for about 13 years without ever having been broken out or having their engineering plants lit off. Anyone familiar with marine engineering recognizes that a steam plant allowed to sit idle for 13 years is not going to light off and sail in four or five days.
Maintenance had been delayed on those ships, funds had been reduced, and we paid in time and in money as we lit them off. Some of them came out and ran beautifully. The ones that had been used in exercises in the interim came out readily and did very well. The Cape Inscription is a big roll-on/roll-off ship in the Ready Reserve Force, and she was right behind the fast-sealift ships. By the time the shooting war started, she had completed five or six trips out and back. So the Ready Reserve Force was a success. It did what it was supposed to do and ended up hauling more than 20% of the cargo.
I should mention the response from the industry—the unions, the operators, the mariners, and the ship repair yards. These folks responded admirably. I have to give a great deal of credit to this country’s private maritime industry for its support.
Proceedings: Did anything fail to live up to your expectations?
Admiral Donovan: Some elements of the Ready Reserve Force fell short of my expectations. I was five months into the job when the war started. It was obvious to me, as it would be to any sailor, that those ships weren’t going to be able to come out and go as rapidly as we expected. I think the system already had false expectations in saying that a large number of them could break out in five days. Captain Warren Leback, the Maritime Administrator right now, and I have gone over this extensively. As a result, we’re planning to do such things as placing the roll-on/roll- off ships of the Ready Reserve Force in reduced operating status with a reduced crew that can still light off machinery and check engine operating parameters to ensure readiness.
The ability to man the Ready Reserve Force is something we have to think about. We stretched the pool considerably during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We had folks in their 70s—I’m even aware of at least one fellow in his 80s who came back and sailed. And they did a magnificent job. The thing is, though, when you’re sailing with people in their 70s and 80s now, who will take their places in an emergency years from now? That is something we have to think about.
We did find a number of licensed mariners out there— very capable younger men and women. But we had no programs for merchant mariners similar to the Naval Reserve. They had no protection, no job reemployment rights. So that’s another thing Captain Leback and I have talked about—how do we produce a program by which a mariner can come out and sail with us and make several trips to the Gulf and back and not have to worry about going home and starting all over again.
I'd say those are probably the two significant areas where expectations were not fully met.
Proceedings: Considering the near-perfect port facilities available in the Gulf, was Desert Shield/Desert Storm an aberration?
Admiral Donovan: You’re hitting another area that I think is very significant. We offloaded at two of the most modern ports in the world. If we face a situation with lesser-developed ports—or maybe no ports at all—we really have to be giving some thought to our ability to handle the cargoes on the other end. The Navy and the Marine Corps have worked this problem, and we can offload MPS in the stream. We can always go over the beach from our amphibious ships; that’s our specialty. But we just don’t have the same capability to offload Army heavy equipment—armor and the like—from an open roadstead. We talk a lot about logistics over the shore, but it’s not developed to the same level as the Navy-Marine Corps team. If we ever go somewhere where those ports and those facilities aren’t available, we have to be prepared to go elsewhere at a longer distance and somehow come overland or come over the beach. And that’s an area of concern for me.
Proceedings: Do you think amphibious lift should be expanded to meet that possibility?
Admiral Donovan: It’s not so much amphibious lift capability as it is our ability to get logistics over the shore, whether it’s an Army, Navy, or a joint effort. We have to assess where we could have to go, what could be our shortcomings if we get there and find no port facilities, and how we move this huge amount of equipment ashore. There s a significant difference between landing Marines and an Army corps by sea. In the Army’s case, you’re talking heavy divisions and all kinds of support. If you don t have the ability to go over a pier, you’d better have looked at the larger equivalent of that ship-to-shore movement—what the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps do very well.
Proceedings. Military Sealift Command ships are essentially unarmed. Are there any provisions besides traveling with a carrier battle group to protect them in possibly hostile waters?
Admiral Donovan: What I see developing is not so much the business of storming the North Atlantic, as we have been practicing for years. We no longer face such opposition. What I really see are regional scenarios wherein we are able to transit the Atlantic or the Pacific and form a convoy closer to our destination, similar to the way we did in the Gulf War. We really have to back off from the way we’ve been practicing for 40 years. We must now look at a team that can form up a convoy, say 400 or 500 miles from the destination, rather than 8,700 miles away. We need to have the escorts there and have them ready to go so we can move that convoy into position. I see that situation fitting into the world scenario that
we’re looking at in the 25 years ahead. The Military Sealift Command has programs for convoy commodores and control of shipping to ensure that we can handle these convoys.
The regular Notice to Mariner- type traffic as we got into the air war and then into the ground war was advising ships to stay out of the Gulf. But our ships, of course, had to keep going.
And we not only had U.S. government-owned and U.S. privately owned ships, we had foreign-flag ships. So we had to be able to assure them that the U.S.
Navy ships in there under Vice Admiral [Stanley] Arthur were aware of where these merchant ships were, had some track on them, and that these ships would be passed along under the protection of war ships all the way up to their port of debarkation. We were able to do that.
Proceedings'. If one of those sealift ships had been attacked during Desert Storm, was any insurance policy in place to ensure that the sealift would have continued? Would other shipping have been willing to go into hostile waters?
Admiral Donovan: That certainly would have raised another level of concern for us. We provided war-risk insurance and 2d Seaman’s insurance. In other words, the government insured ships and crews so that owners would continue to sail their ships. This protected ship owners and mariners against high premiums or where it was not available at all. Once our ships entered an area of concern— the Red Sea, for example—the Navy knew who was coming and when they were coming. And every one of those ships—U.S. flag or foreign flag—was being monitored carefully. We always had a good feel for whatever the threat condition was. Everybody had to be well aware of who they were and where they were, because they didn’t look a lot different from ships that were being stopped and boarded for contraband. Everybody in the gray hulls and in the Coalition navies had to know who was coming. And that was a system that we worked out with the Navy.
Proceedings'. Could you comment on the performance of some of the foreign-flag ships?
Admiral Donovan: Virtually all of the ships we had performed very well for us. We had one foreign-flag ship under MSC’s control that did not go into the Gulf. Her crew decided they would not go. We downloaded that ship in a port on the northern Arabian Sea. Another foreign- flag ship that had just exited the Gulf picked up that cargo and delivered it.
As the war started, we had a couple of other ships that slowed down en route. But after discussion with the owners and the operators, the ships finally went in and delivered their cargo. I felt very good about the performance of those people. In fact, I got a letter from the master of one of the foreign-flag ships at the end of the war. He stated that he felt it a privilege to participate in an event that was so important to mankind.
Proceedings: Is that something that we should be depending on in the future?
Admiral Donovan: No. My thought has been—as I’ve said on many occasions—to add right now to our Ready Reserve Force another 15 to 18 ships to double what we have to get that initial surge moving. You can derive that figure by sitting down and working out square feet in a detailed study, or you can look to history. In the first 30 days the MSC chartered 19 roll-on/roll-off ships to help carry heavy and out- sized cargo. I would like to have those ships in the Ready Reserve Force in that initial month.
You can always fill in any holes with charters. As I see it, just by adding some ships right now—some ships that could deploy in ’93, or ’94, or ’95, or ’96—if we had something like Desert Shield or Desert Storm, we would be reducing the need significantly for having to go off to foreign charters and perhaps not find them readily available. I can easily separate the fine performance of foreign- flag charters during Desert Shield and Desert Storm from my desire to depend on them less and be able to use our own assets.
Proceedings: Because airports are often unavailable and not easily defended in many parts of the world, how do you regard the significance of troop sealift as a requirement?
Admiral Donovan: The concept is that we’re going to deploy troops by air, because you can get them there faster and match them up with their equipment faster.
Some have suggested that we should look to take troops by sea. But that requires a tremendous, steady flow. Air is the most efficient way to round up the troops and get them over there. In the future, we will see troops on board ship, but these will be riding in the ship for either maintenance or security purposes as their equipment is transported. The vast majority will still go by air.
Proceedings: Some would say the weakest link in the whole sealift concept were not so much the ships, but a dwindling pool of mariners. Because there are not as many jobs and not as many people go into the maritime industry, will we have enough mariners in the future? Admiral Donovan: Secretary [of Transportation Andrew]
Card has made proposals to ensure that we maintain the U.S. flag merchant marine as a viable force, the fourth arm of defense, which is what it’s always been called. And that means we’ll have mariners employed and we draw from this source in time of emergency. I also feel very strongly about the need to continue operation of the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point and the state maritime schools. Through a proper reserve program, we will attract younger people who will sail in time of need. One of the key aspects of retaining a viable U.S. flag merchant marine is the personnel.
Proceedings: Could you elaborate on some of the things that should be done to maintain a viable U.S. flag fleet— beyond personnel and material?
Admiral Donovan: Part of that is in the Secretary’s proposals. For example, we talked about surge shipping, and heavy and outsized rolling stock—tanks and other heavy equipment—traveling on roll-on/roll-off ships. Uniforms, food, repair parts, and other items of that nature move very well in containerships. that is sustainment shipping. I see the requirement and the ability to do more with containerships than we did in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The ground commander wanted to know that his equipment and provisions were all there and prepared to move with him. Because he could have been on the ground and in combat very quickly, his concern was to have it all accounted for right there. I see us having ability to take the tanks and the heavy fighting vehicles in roll-on/roll- off ships, while some other elements with lighter rolling stock could be carried in containers. I know we can do it, because I’ve been through it with industry. We can move more equipment in containers and in flat racks— flat racks being container-shaped with open sides. Repair parts can also go in boxes, and we can put them in a containership rather than on the deck of a Ro/Ro where deck space is valuable. What we’ve done is demonstrate the need for a U.S.-flag containership fleet. It is a readiness issue. U.S.-flag containerships have a larger role to play than we demonstrated during the Gulf War.
We carried a tremendous amount of ammunition to the Gulf in break-bulk ships. I’m not downplaying the role of break-bulk ships, because someday, somewhere, when we go to a less-sophisticated port, it could be the break- bulk ship that can get alongside the pier and handle his cargo himself. To move a huge amount of ammunition at one time, however, we should be using containers. It takes a long time to load and unload ammunition in break- bulk. It's so much better to have dedicated space or dedicated ships where your ammunition comes containerized from inland, comes right to the port, and gets picked up in a matter of hours, then delivered efficiently at the other end—the destination.
Proceedings: The U.S. Navy is not building as many ships as in the recent past. The U.S.-flag shipping companies are holding off from building ships, because we simply don't need them. What suggestions do you have for bolstering the ailing U.S. shipbuilding industry?
Admiral Donovan: I have a couple of suggestions. Ships are being built around the world. What we have to do is i demonstrate in the commercial shipbuilding industry in this country—and this falls on the Shipbuilders Council of America and the individual builders—that we can build a competitive ship at a competitive price and produce it j in the time required. If we can do that, I think we could rejuvenate the industry. A lot needs to be done, though, to get to that point. I think we have the right people concerned and thinking about it now. I have spoken with shipbuilders on the Gulf Coast who produce very fine, smaller ships—up to 300 feet—for overseas buyers and are doing it very efficiently and effectively. It certainly appears to be a viable industry with potential to grow.
We will be building some new ships for the government—the fast-sealift ship supplement. The replacement ship is going to be 380,000 square feet. It’s going to fit the dimensions of a Panama Canal-capable ship, but it’s ! going to be a 380,000-square-foot roll-on/roll-off ship. That’s a tremendous amount of square footage. The fast- sealift ships are 150,000 square feet, so you’re talking almost two-and-a-half times internally. I have a concern, and I’ve expressed this many times, about a ship that big coming to an unsophisticated port; 1 have a concern about offloading a ship that size in an open roadstead, our capability to do it, the cranes to handle it, the deck openings, the side openings, and the amount of time required.
A Ro/Ro carrying tanks—I’d like to have that ship downloaded in 18 hours and under way again. I would not like to have it sitting 16 to 28 days in an open roadstead, trying to offload 380,000 square feet of rolling stock.
We re talking about converting or building 20 of those.
I also know—and anyone who’s ever been in and out of ports knows—we won’t always be going to Dammam and A1 Jubayl. Many ports in the world can’t take a ship that size. The ideal ship size, according to port operators, is 200 meters, 650-some feet. We’re planning our newest principal carrier to be a ship 950 feet long, with a proportional draft and beam. My recommendation has always j been to build forty 200,000-square-foot ships in the 200- meter category rather than twenty 350,000-square-foot ships. If we’re really talking about enhancing the shipbuilding industry, what better way to do so than to build 40 instead of 20, and spread those out to employ more people, train artisans, and improve construction/produc- j tion methods while becoming more competitive. We j would also have a more versatile ship with more port ac- i cess and carrying a more reasonable amount of cargo, should it be damaged, delayed, or stopped en route.
If we had purchased Ro/Ro ships for the Ready Reserve Force—say 15, with 10 from under a foreign flag—a year- and-a-half ago, we would have 12 to 15 roll-on/roll-off ships in U.S. yards right now being reflagged. That’s not a major conversion—just reflagged. You’re talking approximately five million dollars per ship in an American yard.. A package like that—for 12 to 15 ships—in some 1 of our smaller repair yards keeps a lot of artisans em- I ployed and busy. What better time than right now? What we need to do is get on with a balanced buy-and-build program to meet interim and long-term needs and to produce ships of realistic size and larger numbers.
Admiral James B. Busey, USN (Ret.)
Former Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Proceedings: What effect did your years in the Navy have on your operational philosophy in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)?
Admiral Busey: What comes to mind first is my knowing what buttons to punch within the government to get things done. I oversaw 50,000 people and had the responsibility to control all of our national airspace. From a military aviation standpoint, I knew basically how the system worked. Many of the FAA professionals are former military people, so the operational environment—the ethical background, the paradigms—was very similar to naval aviation. So I was comfortable moving from 37-plus years in the Navy to the FAA. And the FAA professionals accepted it very easily. I think a former military person can bring more to the FAA administrator’s job than someone from outside the industry who really has no knowledge or awareness of how government works.
Proceedings: Since the Persian Gulf War was the most recent wartime experience, it will serve as a bellwether. From an aviation point of view, what worked during the Gulf War buildup and what needs to be improved? Admiral Busey: The key thing in my mind was the success of the civilian reserve air fleet (CRAF) operation. We’d had this in place for more than 40 years, but we had never used it. In this program, the Defense Department gets the various commercial airlines to agree to commit passenger and cargo-carrying aircraft to defense needs. In return, the airlines receive funds to upgrade the aircraft to Department of Defense specifications. The department also pays other subsidized fees in return for the future use of these airplanes. All this is run by the Military Airlift commander—now Commander-in-Chief, Transportation (CinC- Trans). Even though we have never used it before, the program worked magnificently from day one. And our relationship with CinCTrans and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to coordinate the movement of all these aircraft through U.S., Atlantic, and Mediterranean air space, all coordinated with other controlling agencies.
So it worked. More than 85% of the personnel were moved on CRAF aircraft. Every airline was involved in it. Many of the cargo-haul and independent aircraft or airlines were involved, as well.
This effort worked in conjunction with the Military Airlift Command. Their C- 141s and their C-5s moved the essential people and high-priority cargo. Air-to-air missiles, sophisticated air-to-ground weaponry, all of that went by air. And it worked beautifully. There were problems, ot course. What we learned is that dedicating commercial aircraft to the military mission had a real financial impact, and that’s probably unavoidable.
Other problems also came to the fore. When civilian 747 aircraft went into a military deployment base to pick up troops and/or supplies, we quickly found that we did not have all the required ground-handling equipment, cargo-loading equipment, and conveyor systems. These are the kind of lessons that come out of any major deployment, and they won’t happen again. We know now that we need to have this ground-handling equipment available for us, both on continental United States deployment and on the receiving end.
Proceedings: How do you think this relationship would have been affected if the airlines had been fired upon? Admiral Busey: The relationship would clearly have been affected. We were fortunate, because we were operating in a situation of air superiority, where there was little or no threat.
Another interesting sidelight came out of this that those of us in the military weren’t aware of. We certainly became aware of it, from an FAA standpoint. It was the insurance issue. The FAA has the responsibility to provide U.S.-guaranteed insurance—liability insurance—for U.S. carriers. The airlines cover their own insurance for operation within this country. And, of course, there was no threat here, so the insurers had no problems with that part of the operation. But for the overseas and terminal portions going into the Middle East and landing at the staging bases in Saudi Arabia, the insurance rates went sky high. So the FAA then had to step in and provide U.S. government-backed insurance at competitive premiums for these carriers. Initially—of course, when we thought there was a viable, potential threat in the Middle East, we carried those insurance premiums higher than we did later, once we got into the routine of the operation and realized that we could handle it. As a result, insurance programs are being strengthened. The Department of Defense has asked Congress to pass legislation that will make insurance available in time of CRAF activation in the future. Congress must actually appropriate the funds. If we had lost an airplane, the entire repository that Congress had previously appropriated would have been wiped out with one loss. Fortunately, we didn’t have any.
Proceedings: One more Desert Storm question. The conditions for airlift in the Gulf were nearly ideal. How can we cope in the future with situations in which time is more limited, runways are too short, and the surfaces are generally unimproved?
Admiral Busey: That’s going to be a very difficult problem. I would agree that conditions were almost ideal in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm case. We had long runways; we had air superiority; we had excellent modem facilities with a few of the problems that I mentioned.
One can speculate on other places in the world where we might have to operate, where we won’t have prepared airfields and sufficiently long runways to handle a fully loaded 747. And that’s a tough nut to crack. That’s why
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I think the Air Force and the Military Airlift Command are working so hard on the C-117 program. We need that capability, because in some areas of the world, a short- takeoff-and-landing aircraft will be the only thing available to us to land high-priority people and cargo. If we ever had another Southeast Asia situation, where you don t have airfields that could handle a C-5 or 747, then we would have to rely on short-takeoff-and-landing capability. We learned all those lessons in the early stages of the Vietnam War. And I hope we don’t lose that vision and that knowledge, because we’re not always going to have ideal situations as we did in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
Proceedings: What future applications do you see for the V-22 Osprey?
Admiral Busey: Let me say
up front, I’m a strong proponent of the V-22. I was the commander of our Naval Air Systems Command when we were in the process of negotiating that contract. I was intimately involved, and I continue to be a strong proponent of the Marine Corps mission. There’s a mission in the Navy; there’s a mission in the Army; and there’s a mission in the Air Force, too.
We’re suffering still, in my judgment, from decisions that were taken by higher authorities— six, seven, eight years ago—that limited the number of aircraft and directed fixed-price research and development.
We argued from a Navy standpoint
that that wasn’t a prudent way to go with this new technology. There were still too many unknowns to go for a fixed-price program.
The V-22 technology is exciting from the military standpoint, but equally so from a civilian point of view. And as FAA administrator, I could see this even more clearly than I did a few years before, as a bluesuiter.
Our airspace is becoming more and more choked around high-density airports in the United States. We actually
control the capacity and limit the number of aircraft that can land and take off at the major metropolitan airports. That’s going to continue to be a problem in this country. Right now we have commuter aircraft, other light planes, as well as heavy international and transcontinental carriers, operating from the same airports. The V-22 would give us the capability to move people in that type of technology—vertical-takeoff-and-landing technology—in the 300-to-500-mile range, thereby taking that burden away from congested airports and freeing them up for long- range international flights. That would mean we wouldn t have to build new airports and make new runways—an effort that is increasingly more difficult in this country, considering our environmental concerns. So the V-22 is exciting technology. And it will never make it into the commercial arena unless it is tried and proved to be a viable carrier for the Department of Defense.
We’re on the leading edge of this technology, and we need to follow through. We made an investment. This has
not been a case where our continued investment would be throwing more good money after bad. Let’s finish the job, let’s get it into operation, and let’s prove the technology so that the commercial demand will build. If we don’t do it, the Japanese will, and they’ll sell it back to us at twice „ the cost.
Proceedings: What other promising technologies in aviation are on the horizon? Admiral Busey; Just off the top of my head, exciting avionics advances have come out of military research and development, using infrared technologies, night-vision devices, and heads-up displays. All of these technologies are now finding their way into the commercial aviation field. Another big militarily developed program absolutely essential to our commercial aviation world right now is simulator technology. The military demand led us to state-of-the-art visual simulators. These are used extensively now in the commercial world to qualify flight crews for new types of aircraft. A new pilot moving from right seat to captain’s seat in a commercial fleet will now spend several hours in a simulator and actually get
his flight certification there before he ever steps into the real aircraft. It’s more economical, it’s a superb training capability, and we can do things in those simulators that we can’t do in any other device. Heads-up displays are being used now by Alaska Airlines to improve their ability to operate in bad weather, both in the Pacific Northwest and into Alaska. So a lot of military technology is moving in avionics.
Even more new technology will continue to flow from the military into the commercial aviation world—new engine technology, new low-cost efficient fuels, and fireproof materials for cabin interiors. Much of this has come out of the military and the NASA space-development programs.
Proceedings'. Part of controlling cost and refining technology for commercial use has traditionally involved the military. With a shrinking defense budget and a shrinking military, how is the commercial aviation industry preparing for this uncertain future?
Admiral Busey: I think some changes are inevitable. For example, NASA’s research-and-development budget has been cut successively over the last several years. The FAA would work in partnership with NASA, leveraging the small R&D account we had to work with NASA for new aerodynamic and engine developments, which would plav off the military experience.
Even though we’re downsizing the military and drawing down the defense budget, all of the services and the Joint Staff are fighting to keep a good healthy R&D budget. We recognize that technology is our strength and always has been. And in order to keep technology coming, we’ve got to keep funding R&D, not only in the defense budgets but also in the civilian sector. The FAA's research-and-development budget is increasing. I think the new administrator of NASA is going to succeed in keeping the NASA budget growing. As long as we continue to operate in partnership among all the civilian and military R&D facilities to make sure we’re not reinventing the wheel, I’m not concerned that we’re going to have to make any major changes. Technology will flow naturally from military aviation developments—from engine, avion ics, and aerodynamics—into the commercial sector.
Proceedings. It’s been said recently that a new generation of supersonic air transports could do for the Paci ic airline market what the jetliner did for the Atlantic market. What problems would be encountered and what benefits would be derived from building and operating a new
generation of SSTs? f~ST comes
Admiral Busey: Before a new generation of SMs comes along, one has to be comfortable that it is economica y viable. The French and the British learned that it s very expensive to develop an SST. Of course, the oncor e is still flying—beautiful technology, 40 years old now or more and still operating very well—but it’s not economically effective. It has to be subsidized by both countries. For that type of development to happen in U.b. industry, it would have to prove itself to be economically viable at the bottom line. And no one has been able to
demonstrate that yet. Aerospace plane technology already under way—with new engine developments, aerodynamic developments, and the partnership of the Department of Defense and NASA and other civilian agencies— may help make a supersonic transport economically viable.
But unless and until that happens, we’re not going to see it.
Let me make another point. From all forecasts, the future of aviation is in the Pacific. And aviation is going to double again in passenger capacity and numbers of aircraft between now and the year 2005. It’s doubled in the last ten years; it’s going to double again in the next ten years or so. The most significant part of that growth is in the Pacific rim. When one goes to the Boeing plant that manufactures 747s, 757s, and 767s, every airplane there is in the colors of a Pacific-rim nation. That’s where the growth is. The air carriers operating the Pacific market right now, with today’s technology, are economically viable. But it’s still not clear that a new supersonic transport would be economically viable in that market.
Proceedings: To stave off criticism that Japanese industry tends to take and not give back much, except at a higher price, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry is bringing on four foreign companies to help out with the development of a hypersonic transport engine. What are your thoughts about that effort?
Admiral Busey: I think it’s a natural evolution for Japan, but it’s a technology paperwork process right now. Japan has no industrial capability to develop, and manufacture in-house, that kind of an air vehicle. Right now, they're in a partnership with Boeing to build certain parts for Boeing products now and in the future. So they are trying to develop an aviation industry.
You’ve read about the McDonnell-Douglas partnership arrangement with the Taiwanese government. There’s a lot of concern in Congress about that kind of an arrangement, because that’s technology transferred. Business competition on an international scale is something that we have to be concerned about. But I’m pretty comfortable today that the United States will continue to be the leader not only in military aircraft production capabilities but also in commercial aircraft production capabilities.
Proceedings: As is our custom in interviews, if we haven t covered something that you’d like to project to the readers of Proceedings, we invite you to have the last word. Admiral Busey: The business of moving things and people by aircraft has grown by astounding leaps and bounds over the last several years. The U.S. air earners today are hurting financially. They’ve lost more money in the last two years than they have earned in all the previous 50-some years of commercial air travel. But that s going to turn around. The demand is there; more people are flying at a more competitive and less expensive rate today than ever. That’s going to continue. Deregulation made that possible. The demand will continue to grow as more of the world opens up to commercial air travel. And the challenge for us will be to continue to stay on the leading edge of the technology and not give away our aviation production capability.