Among the five armed services of the United States, the Coast Guard has been assigned specific responsibility to conduct land- and water-side security operations within critical overseas embarkation ports. For this tasking, the Coast Guard has trained three Port Security Units—consisting entirely of reservists—for mobilization and rapid deployment to strategic combat supply points. Activated for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, these reserve commands were the first to be called to active service in the 50-year history of the Coast Guard Reserve program, and they were deployed to the theater of operations just 46 days after the invasion of Kuwait. (See “The Coast Guard Patrols the Persian Gulf,” Proceedings, April 1991, p. 100.)
Following Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, the U.S. Central Command began receiving classified message traffic from its Middle East headquarters, requesting mobilization of a Port Security/Harbor Defense Command. The mission of this joint military command was to establish comprehensive surveillance and port security activities in support of large-scale logistics operations in two strategic Persian Gulf ports of embarkation—Al Jubayl and Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia. An additional tasking called for security operations at critical command-and-control facilities and for nearby vessels at the port of Manama, Bahrain.
Message traffic was monitored at Ninth Coast Guard District Headquarters in Cleveland—parent command for Reserve Port Security Units at Milwaukee, Buffalo, and Cleveland. Because the traffic indicated that mobilization of Port Security Reserve forces was imminent, volunteers from all three units were solicited to attend one-week refresher training sessions at the National Guard training facility at Camp Perry, Ohio. To prepare for this activity, personnel of the Ninth District Reserve Branch worked with instructors from the Yorktown, Virginia, Coast Guard Reserve Training Command to develop focused instructional components for two six-day periods of premobilization training.
Ohio Units Provide Exceptional Support. In support of this training, various Ohio militia and National Guard commands provided personnel and expertise. The Ohio National Guard Command at Camp Perry arranged for subsistence, as well as facilities and equipment for berthing, training, medical, and administrative activities. They also provided instructors and training activities in automatic and heavy weapons use and in chemical-biological-radiological equipment, techniques, and responses. The Ohio Naval Militia provided assistance throughout the training period by assigning boats and personnel to position targets for automatic-weapons fire and to establish offshore security zones during firing exercises. Other members of the militia were assigned as ready boat coxswains and crew members for additional security patrols or to provide emergency responses and potential search-and- rescue resources.
Reservists Volunteer for Training. in response to the call for I volunteers, 140 Ninth District reservists reported for the initial I training session on 19 August 1990. In addition, 165 personnel volunteered for a second session initiated on 9 September. Training activities—called Exercise Flame River 90—were conducted on subjects including command and control, Middle East customs and culture; chemical, biological, and radiological readiness and response; automatic-weapons and small-arms familiarization and firing; patrol-craft security tactics; outboard engine maintenance and repairs; and maritime security patrol organization and techniques. In addition, a variety of administrative procedures required for activation of the reservists were completed. Coast Guard Reservists working as attorneys in civilian life volunteered to draft wills and powers-of-attorney and to act as consultants concerning the Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines Relief Act and other dependent rights and benefits.
A 24-hour tactical exercise concluded each of the week-long training evolutions and included numerous problems to test and refine the communications, command-and-control. and operational skills that would be required during deployment.
Mobilization. At 1735 on 14 September 1990, mobilization of Reserve Units was ordered and preparation for overseas deployment moved into high gear. The Ohio Air Guard 180th Tactical Fighter Group responded to a Coast Guard request and provided loadmasters, flatbed trucks, and dedicated personnel to palletize, transport, and load unit equipment, personal gear, and six transportable port-security boats on board Air Force C-141 transport planes. During these around-the-clock loading operations, members of the 180th Tactical Fighter Group went out of their way to assist with media relations and to provide comfortable facilities for Coast Guard personnel awaiting deployment.
Each unit spent an additional three days at Camp Perry for final outprocessing, gear issue, and training. Just prior to deployment, support from higher commands also was integrated within the mobilization sequence. The Master Chief of the Coast Guard and the master chiefs of the Atlantic Area and Ninth District Commands met with the chief petty officers of mobilized Reserve Commands to emphasize the important role of senior enlisted personnel during military operations and in a combat environment. Each mobilized Port Security Unit designated a Command Enlisted Advisor (CEA) who received the CEA emblem from the three senior enlisted advisors. In addition, Vice Admiral Howard B. Thorsen, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, Atlantic Area, flew to the deployment site to assure reservists of his personal commitment and support for all mobilized personnel and their dependents.
First to be activated was the Milwaukee Port Security Unit (303), which was deployed for Port Security operations at Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia, on 16 September 1990. The Buffalo unit (301) was mobilized next and was airlifted to A1 Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on 21 September. The Cleveland unit (302) departed for Manama, Bahrain, on 21 November, one day prior to Thanksgiving. Each unit required three C-141 aircraft to airlift 6 boats, 8 pallets of equipment, and 93 personnel to its eventual destination.
Settling In. Once the airlift carrying each Port Security Unit touched down, Coast Guard Reservists had little time to adjust to the 125° daytime temperatures or to the high humidity levels. Each unit was transported quickly to its work area, where start-up operations were the only priority. Large amounts of cargo had to be unpacked, organized, and prepared for land- and water-side security operations. Watch sections were organized and deployed, and interservice communications nets were established.
The first units to arrive were housed in warehouses or in work camp quarters, which were substandard at best. As the campaign unfolded and the threat increased, all unit commands deployed most of their personnel to tent or warehouse berthing, close to their operations centers.
Early in the campaign, food quality and sanitation and consequent intestinal disorders were problems for two units. However, with guidance from Coast Guard medical personnel, host-nation food-handling procedures were improved or food providers were changed. During periods of highest operational commitment and demand, Meals, Ready-to-Eat, provided an average of one meal per day.
All three units were able to have boats under way within three days, and they began familiarization patrols within five days. Boat crews consisted of a coxswain, engineer, crew member, and a host-nation representative of the Saudi Frontier Force or the Bahrain Coast Guard. Host-nation representatives provided translations during all vessel challenges and initiated all boardings, with support and supervision by Coast Guard personnel.
Harbor Defense Organization. After arriving, each Port Security Unit joined forces with a U.S. Navy Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) unit and Explosive Ordnance Mobile (EODM) unit to form a Port Security Harbor Defense Group. Navy MIUW units used a wide range of electronic detection capabilities to deploy Coast Guard Port Security boats and patrols, while EOD units responded to reports of floating or bottom-anchored sea mines, land mines, potential booby traps, and other explosive devices.
Each Harbor Defense Group reported to the U.S. Naval Harbor Defense Command for its operational missions and tasking. For specific tactical responsibilities, however, each group reported to a rear-area logistics commander, who had overall responsibilities for supply and security operations within a specific Persian Gulf military port. At Al Jubayl, the Harbor Defense Group reported to the U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Supply and Support Group; at Ad Dammam the group reported to the U.S. Army 7th Transportation Group; and at Manama it reported to Commander, U.S. Naval Logistics and Support Forces.
Varied and Challenging Duties. In each port, water- and land-side security responsibilities were immense, because of the volume of shipping and the extensive water- and land-patrol sectors defined by the operational mission. Each port was able to accept 12 to 20 vessels-—each of which carried large quantities of munitions and equipment—at any given time. Because of the openness and exposure of each port, sea walls and surrounding landmasses provided little protection for the 22-foot Boston Whaler port security boats. As a result, boat crews experienced seas up to eight feet, wind gusts up to 30 knots, and extreme temperature variations. Respiratory illnesses and skeletal or soft-tissue injuries were commonplace among crew members and required each command to begin in-theater boat-crew qualification programs for land-side security personnel. Boat-crew members then could be rotated ashore until they could recover, and all personnel became more proficient in port-security skills and tactics.
Boat-crew duties included establishing water-side security zones around offloading cargo ships, security patrols at pier heads, ship-channel surveillance, and vessel escort for ships moving to port from anchorages. In addition, boat crews intercepted and boarded numerous fishing and cargo vessels and pleasure craft that were unidentifiable or operating in a questionable manner. Land-side operations included the staffing of hardened security positions in defense of strategic command posts, electronics, and communications centers; and providing security check points and sentries for piers, equipment, or supply depots and housing areas. Because each Port Security Unit reported to a rear-area commander of another military service, tactical responses to land-side security threats had to be adjusted to incorporate the tactics used by other services. Nevertheless, each unit accomplished this task in a brief time and became a vital component of the integrated land security force within each port. In addition, officers stood Command Duty Officer watches, with responsibility for decisions and recommendations about the number of boats or security personnel deployed for a particular watch or in response to various threat assessments.
Communications also provided a significant challenge because Coast Guard force components had to establish communications with Navy units, using one mode of communications equipment, and with rear-area commanders using different equipment. Maintaining security, repairs, and inventory for this volume and variety of equipment was a challenge for Coast Guard repair technicians, who did an excellent job. The U.S. Coast Guard Maintenance and Logistics Command at Governors Island also provided parts, communications, equipment, and technical guidance.
Scud Attacks. Because of the proximity of all three ports to front-line combat areas and strategic military airports, Scud missile attacks were a continuous threat. At Al Jubayl, a live Scud fell into the waters adjacent to the ship- and munitions-handling facilities. At Ad Dammam, shrapnel fell on the port and housing areas as Patriot air-defense missiles intercepted Scuds intended for nearby Dahrhan Air Force Base. Still other Iraqi missiles, intended for U.S. and British facilities on Bahrain, were intercepted and exploded close to the Port of Manama. As a result, Coast Guard personnel became proficient in responding to the eight-second window for donning gas masks and then quickly getting into full protective clothing.
Outstanding Achievements. The effectiveness of Coast Guard and Navy port security and harbor defense operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm can be seen in the summary of operations for the period 20 September 1990-1 April 1991. During that time:
- 25,000 vessels were monitored and tracked.
- 1,500 vessels were intercepted.
- 400 vessels were boarded.
- 40 vessels were seized.
More important, all of this occurred with no disruptions of port activities, no incidents of sabotage, and no serious injuries or loss of life to Coast Guard or Navy personnel.
Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, initially deployed Port Security Units were replaced by volunteer Coast Guard reservists who were trained and organized by Coast Guard instructors at Camp Blanding, Florida. These units conducted security operations for the redeployment of equipment and munitions to U.S. supply and storage centers between March and June 1991.
While many lessons learned will aid in training future Port Security Units, perhaps the most important lesson was that Coast Guard Reservists could mobilize quickly, deploy rapidly, and perform an assigned mission with expertise. More encouraging was the fact that these achievements were accomplished despite the fact that Coast Guard Reservists had never been mobilized previously. These civilian sailors were ready when the call came and responded with a level of dedication and performance that is in keeping with a proud 201-year tradition of the U.S. Coast Guard: Semper Paratus - Always Ready.
Captain Fitzgerald currently is Commanding Offi- cer/Group Commander, Air Station/Group, San Diego. During Desert Shield anu Desert Storm, he was Chief, Readiness and Reserve Division of the Ninth Coast Guard District in Cleveland, responsible for the training and mobilization of the three Coast Guard Reserve Port Security Units. Captain Olson is 9th Coast Guard Distiict TQM and Technical Assistance Supervisor for Reserve Programs, which was mobilized to conduct port security operations in the Persian Gulf in September 1990. While in the Gulf, he served as Coast Guard Liaison Officer and Port Security Operations Advisor to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, at Manama, Bahrain.