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OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301 PLEASE NOTE DATE
No. 1072-02 (703) 555-0192 (info)
(703) 555-3189 (copies)
IMMEDIATE RELEASE 1 July 2002 (703) 555-5737 (public/industry)
AIR FORCE PROVIDES ALL
EARLY WARNING FOR NAVY
On 1 July 2002, the Secretary of Defense formally announced the signing of an agreement by which the U.S. Air Force will provide all early warning requirements for U.S. Navy ships at sea. This announcement underscored the major cost considerations that had earlier halted the Navy’s planned development of its follow-on platform for the E-2C Airborne Early Warning Aircraft. This new mutual support agreement further highlights the U.S. Defense department’s move toward a joint military force that began more than a decade ago. A spokesperson for the Navy stated that the remaining fleet of aging E-2C aircraft would be gradually phased out by the year 2005. As a side note, the Navy related that this decision had been under consideration for several years since the closing of the E-2C production line in 1995. Noting also that cutbacks in defense budgets associated with the decline of the Soviet military in the 1990s, the Coast Guard’s pullout of the E-2C program in 1992, and a lackluster performance by the E-2s in Desert Storm had also been contributing factors. An Air Force general Present at the news conference praised this new joint program, entitled “Ocean Umbrella,” as a true coalescing of U.S. space-based and airborne assets into a unified system fully able to protect any Navy ship, anywhere in the world, at anytime.
-END-
% Commander Philip S. Pritulsky, U.S. Navy
Not quite anticipating this press release, are you? Take a closer look at the carrier airborne early- warning (VAW) community of today, then decide. Jke all naval aviation communities, it is sensitive to the Present doomsday press reports proclaiming the imminent . erri|se of naval aviation. E-2 “Hawkeye” aviators are anx- l(jUs these days about their future, knowing that no new " al'°rm is on the drawing board, and the purse strings are tightening quickly. Still, the Hawkeye community con- Jtues to place most of its hope in a new aircraft, possi- . y to the detriment of other proposals to improve the ,avy’s airborne early-warning ability. But what if the new aircraft never appears? What can be done now to improve Ur early-warning capabilities?
Memories of the Navy’s successful participation in Operation Desert Storm are beginning to subside, but not for Hawkeye squadrons, whose accomplishments were fewer and less rewarding. They will not quickly forget. The Gulf War subjected the Hawkeye to its most rigorous test to date, and this was the place where air crews and battle group commanders alike became acutely aware of longstanding shortfalls in the airplane.
The E-2C was operating out of its element. The open- ocean warfare for which it was designed was not an option. Extreme flying distances and grueling time-on-station requirements did not permit either the E-2 crews or the aircraft to participate fully. Some advocates still tout the merits of the E-2’s overland capability, but this needs to be tempered with a much more commonplace reflection by one E-2 naval flight officer, who observed dryly, “during the war we were trying to fly with Air Force airborne early warning (AWACS), but they weren't trying
Rather than counting on a new airframe to replace the E-2C_______ here, two from
VAW-113 fly over Diego Garcia Lagoon and the Constellation (CV-64)—the Navy’s early-warning community must take a good look at its current capabilities and fit them to current needs.
to fly with us.”
During the Gulf War, AWACS and the Aegis guided- missile system were the mainstays in the antiair warfare arena. The E-2’s shortcomings in crew size, communication suite, and flight limitations restricted its role in the larger offensive air war. Instead, crews focused on specific Navy support missions by serving as a limited antiair deconflic- tion asset and as the Navy’s specific strike support coordinators. E-2 crews fulfilled these two functions adequately, with more success in the latter role than in the former. As a tactical action officer (TAO) from the forward Aegis positive-identification radar-advisory zone ship noted, “the E-2s primarily served as the Navy representatives in executing the bureaucracy of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) for the strike packages.”
The Gulf War focused on the expanding methods, procedures, and demands on early-warning assets. In addition to antiair warfare missions, airborne early-warning platforms must be able to support the strike warfare commander in several mission areas:
- Long-range, deep-interdiction strikes
- Close-air support and battlefield air interdiction
- Signal intelligence support
The continuing presence of AWACS with the carrier battle group has significantly altered the E-2’s mission priorities, since the AWACS can simultaneously perform its designed offensive overland strike missions and also support a defensive role for the battle group. For the E-2 the shift from a primary airborne early-warning and fighter- control platform to serving as antiair deconfliction coordinators, disseminators of surveillance information, and directors of antisurface warfare operations is a direct function of technological capabilities. And even in their traditional bread-and-butter role as the fleet’s Link-11 communications provider, E-2s are now noticing the change. The war further brought to light the many differences in Link-ll’s symbology and navigational accuracy among AWACS, E-2s, Aegis, the new threat upgrade, and the nuclear-powered carrier’s automatic identification systems. To help reduce these conflicts and respond to the coming of age of these newer, surface-identification capabilities, E-2s are now being relegated to reporting only those contacts not already reported by AWACS or Aegis.
In the Gulf War’s early-warning arena of considerable breadth and complexity, E-2s were relegated to handling the leftover morsels, both defensive and offensive. Satellite communication, a more precise radar, better computerized tracking, more flight endurance, and an improved electronic surveillance system would have made a substantive difference in the E-2’s participation in the war. But even with these system additions,-the E-2 could not have assumed the AWACS role. Although jointness should not have been a foreign term to a force integrator and battle force management platform such as the E-2, it was. And Hawkeye crews, whose mission leads many people to view them as the Navy’s jointness experts, found their true shortcomings in joint training during this war. Just as the F-14 community was caught off guard by the value of carrying bombs, the E-2’s ominous lack of preparation for jointness was evident during Desert Shield/Storm. It goes much deeper than just being able to communicate with another service.
Was the E-2 in the wrong environment? Is it wrong to ask more of a platform designed primarily for fleet defense? History shows that the typical E-2 squadron achieved its present shape based on Cold War preparations for a Soviet-style conflict. After years of outer-air- battle grids, not until the mid-1980s did a fighter pilot’s article (see Lieutenant Commander J. A. Winnefeld, Jr., U.S. Navy, “Winning the Outer Air Battle,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1989, pp. 36-43) state what E-2 crews had long complained about: If a Soviet-style raid did occur, the E-2 would not be the battle group’s preeminent early-warning platform, but only a coordinator for fighter aircraft acting as scouts. These scout air- J craft were doing the actual early warning.
The E-2C’s advanced radar-processing system had emerged in the mid-1970s and leap-frogged the state of airborne early-warning technology. But technology did not remain static, and by the mid-1980s, advances i11 propulsion and guidance had pushed Soviet missiles beyond the E-2’s detection range. To defeat this threat, j E-2s came to rely on the sensors of the fighters they controlled to provide early-warning detection that the enemy s arsenal of weapons seemed to negate.
As a result of these weaknesses, however, all carrier air
52
Proceedings / July V&
Aew
wing aircraft began to interact and help provide the defensive shield of the battle group. This also opened the door for increased jointness, but it did not necessarily involve practical interaction of forces. Rather, it was only a one-way dispersal of indications and warning information derived from national sensors, with the E-2 becom- mg the critical node for disseminating such information to the fleet.
Considering the E-2’s mission, what can be done now with its crews and aircraft before the last airframe retires to mothballs sometime after the turn of the century?
First, the Navy urgently needs a replacement for its E-2s. Flag officers still praise it and demand an organic Platform for their early-warning and communication needs. By asking if satellites, space-based radars, Navy-owned AWACS, land-based over-the-horizon radars, or even blimps could perform the E-2’s airborne early-warning nission adequately, one faces the same economic hurdles as the proposed advanced tactical surveillance platform designed to replace the E-2 and other Navy aircraft.
In view of present fiscal realities and the Navy’s established list of acquisition priorities, both the advanced strike aircraft (AX) and the advanced tactical fighter (ATF) have carved out their respective slots in the pecking order already. What is left now for a multimission hybrid aircraft, which is supposed to be an airborne tanker, an electronic jammer, a mail hauler, and an airborne early- warning platform? Even if technology could create such an aircraft, would taxpayers and their elected officials be Wl|ling to pay for it? And what support would the fleet c°mmanders give it?
We need to keep this proposal hot, but we should also give equal time to other issues. This seems to be a major missed lesson from Desert Shield/Storm. Thoughts about new airplanes are certainly more exciting than advancing die concept of the Navy’s airborne early-warning mission and changing parochial attitudes toward training. And neither of these propositions is particularly glamorous or career-enhancing. But they just might be best for the Navy ln the long run.
Training Initiatives
We should start with the premise that a new aircraft is coming sometime, but not in the near future, and that Jiioney to correct the E-2’s structural problems will con- mue to take precedence over improved avionics. Only the aviators themselves have the answer:
. First, establish a new carrier-based airborne early-wam- lr,g squadron in support of AW ACS. The Navy need not Purchase any new aircraft—E-2s nor others—but it should 'ght to piggyback on existing AW ACS assets. Man this j^uadron with a post-command commanding officer and tont-running pilots and naval flight officers headed for 0re assignment. Give them joint-service credit, and di- ect their mission to become proficient in U.S. Air Force U-S. Army early-warning, satellites, datalink, and com- and, control, and communication systems. Everything apable of interacting with the Navy’s own early-warning ^abilities—from the Joint Surveilance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) to Star Wars—should be considered. AWACS certainly is the natural starting point for such an initiative. Now, with more nations in possession of the E-3 aircraft, why not take advantage of this equipment? If the Navy cannot afford AWACS, should it not at least exploit the aircraft’s capabilities to its best advantage? For years the E-2 community has maintained only a token presence in the AWACS program, reluctantly sending small cadres of naval flight officers to shore duty at Tinker Air Force Base and NATO. But an unspoken, yet well-understood warning always went along with this tour: “You may learn a lot and enjoy yourself, but it may cost you your career.” And while first-tour AWACS crews were being sent to train at Naval Air Station Miramar for a two-week Navy orientation course, their carrier counterparts would receive only a two-hour lecture to teach them about AWACS. The first real exposure to joint training a young fleet nugget might acquire would come from a single opportunity to fly in an AWACS during his fleet tour.
>- Second, create a team of aviators within this squadron similar to an airborne command element, ready to forward deploy on a moment’s notice with a Navy battle group, as needed. Certainly, the Navy carrier’s role as a strike warfare platform and the designation of carrier air group commanders as strike warfare commanders bore fruit in Desert Storm. The notion that land-based, long-range, strike aircraft will always be available, whatever the contingency or type of conflict, is simply a dangerous assumption. Carrier-based strike aircraft will always be required. As Captain Jim Sherlock, Commander, Carrier Air Wing Seven, noted, “to fully support the strike warfare commander of the future will require an accommodating and flexible AEW effort which is fully joint-service-capable and whose services are transparent, regardless of the type of platform or service affiliation of its crew.” Onboard assets are most desirable, but an airborne early- warning and command-element team might provide a much-needed resource.
To this end, openings for such teams should be secured with U.S. Air Force, NATO, British and French AWACS, and with U.S. Coast Guard early-warning drug interdiction aircraft. The movement of a Navy carrier battle group to any location that warrants non-organic airborne early warning should include a Navy crew in support. These Navy teams could respond to crises anywhere in the world, with expertise in joint technology, geographical and cryptological considerations, and understanding political implications of the rules of engagement implications. With their knowledge of Navy tactics, they could join up with the assigned battle group AWACS and with the deployed E-2 squadron, to lend their expertise.
► Third, open up more overseas exchange billets with our allies. Expanding this view, consider opening new billets anywhere that airborne early warning is conducted as a military warfare specialty. France, England, NATO, Israel, Japan, Egypt, and Singapore all have such a capability that could provide increased Navy jointness into the expanding realm of allied and combined operations. The cost in dollars for supporting such a proposal probably
How About an Aegis Tour?
Those who are wrestling with whether or how to apply the principles of Total Quality Leadership (TQL) to the operating forces should simply go down to the waterfront and ask the operators. The possibilities are endless. For starters, we should look no further than Dr. W. Edwards Deming’s ninth point—break down barriers between staff areas (departments, warfare communities, services, etc.). With a few paradigm changes, plus a willingness to ignore bureaucratic impediments and inbred parochialism, we can begin at least to ask some interesting questions. If the primary mission of the Aegis ship is antiair warfare (AAW), why don’t we have an AAW officer billet on the ship? And from a battle group perspective, wouldn’t it make a lot of sense to have an experienced E-2C naval flight officer in a billet on board an Aegis or new threat upgrade cruiser? And if we are going to fight in a joint environment, wouldn’t it be great to have an Air Force airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS)-experienced officer in the combat information center coordinating with the Air Force and working to establish the data link between the AWACS and the AAW Center? From a customer’s (operator, if you must) perspective, there is no, repeat no, down side to
By Captain E. B. Hontz, U.S. Navy
answering these questions in the affirmative. If every Aegis ship had a fleet-experienced E-2C naval flight officer permanently assigned as the AAW officer, the benefits would accrue to both the surface and the aviation communities, as we all learn how to work in an integrated battle environment.
As the sponsor for the Aegis program from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in the mid- 1980s, I proposed establishing such a billet on the Aegis cruisers for an E-2 officer. But the time was just not right. Neither the surface nor aviation leadership was receptive. Times have changed, however.
When I recently submitted a proposal to establish an Air Force exchange billet at the Aegis Training Center for an Air Force captain with AWACS experience, the request was enthusiastically endorsed at every level. The Personnel Exchange Program billet is approved, and we are now waiting for our AWACS back-seater to show up. When he arrives, he will go to school for a while, he will ride a ship, and then he will prepare to become an Aegis weapon system instructor. When he leaves after several years, he will be an expert on shipboard friend-or-foe identification. data links, identification doctrine and the SPY-1 radar. And the rest of us at the training center
will be smarter about Air Force procedures, the use of minimum- risk routes, and perhaps even the intricacies of the infamous air tasking order that we all contended with in Desert Storm.
The Marines long ago figured out how to integrate their aviators into infantry commands. To get an aviation billet on an Aegis cruiser should be no more difficult than it was to establish surface officer billets on aircraft carriers. Those aviators who perceive a tour on a surface ship as a career-stopper should talk to Captain Bunky Johnson, an E-2 naval flight officer who is currently commanding officer of the USS Forrestal (CV- 59), who was operations officer on the staff of the Commander, Seventh Fleet, during the Gulf War, and who served as navigator and combat information center officer in the USS Farragut (DDG-37) a lieutenant.
The time is right to make some bold changes. Read the lessons learned from Desert Shield and Storm, reread the principles of TQL, and then head to the waterfront and ask the operators what ought to be done!
Captain Hontz is former commanding officer of the Aegis cruiser Princeton (CG-59) and now heads the Aegis Training Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.
would be less than it would be in terms of lost careers. Before the push for joint training, any officer who left his community—or the Navy itself—was viewed as having committed professional suicide, as many fallen officers can attest. Undoubtedly, such a proposal would require a new vision on the part of the Bureau of Personnel to send the best and brightest aviators and not only the fallen and adventurous—which has seemingly been past practice. It would also necessitate continued support for these young leaders in their careers. Can the community itself support such a proposal? Certainly not. Only if tactical fleet leaders call for an improvement in our airborne early- warning doctrine will such policy change.
Fourth, expose junior pilots and naval flight officers to joint training earlier and more often in their careers- Establish a week-long fleet readiness squadron joint training course for all air crews, while they are still it1 their first fleet squadron. After completing a single cruise, most operationally experienced aviators would benefit from a course to help them better understand the joint piC' ture. This course should complement and build on a much-needed introductory course on Aegis and AWACS systems. Every nugget should be taught at the fleetreadiness level before he arrives at his first airborne early- warning squadron. The concept of waiting to reach midgrade before being introduced to joint concepts is puzzling
Proceedings / July
with
hel
an eye for offensive and defensive requirements can P to keep the focus of new emerging technologies on
to a junior aviator flying an early-warning mission in support of combined operations, interacting with a joint data network, and communicating to numerous multiservice aviators.
Fifth, foster better community awareness of the Navy’s billets—both joint service and worldwide—involved in airborne early warning. Publish an annual directory with toe names and billets of all carrier-based airborne early- warning officers, to help expand the average fleet lieutenant’s awareness beyond Naval Air Stations Norfolk and Miramar about the evolving aspects of naval airborne early warning. As the Gulf War revealed, thinking in terms of one’s own battle group is myopic. All future joint operations—from individual strikes to large-scale campaigns— will necessitate doctrine and tactics that transcend the traditional operations of individual units. What better community to coalesce and execute such doctrine than the command-and-control E-2s?
Sixth, open permanent billets for top-quality pilots and naval flight officers assigned to shore-duty flying billets, using U.S. Coast Guard and Customs aircraft. If national focus and funding in support of the war on drugs continues to escalate in the foreseeable future, the Navy’s early-warning units should be essential elements in this tocus. The Hawkeye community should be maintaining a continual presence in the early-warning arena of this war. Currently, such continuity appears to be lacking.
Seventh, place more officers already schooled in fleet defense into space and electronic warfare (SEW)-related shore billets. The fictionalized opening press release is entirely plausible. At key assignments—from Dahlgren to Cheyenne Mountain—the need is great for naval of- ticers with tactical air and airborne early-warning perspectives and should receive strong community support. Equally important is their presence in the Pentagon and toe Navy’s SEW directorate, OP-094. Regrettably, many Junior officers are not exposed to this environment. If ju- ntor-officer billets in OP-094 are not available, institution °f a program similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff internship might be feasible. The goal should be to make ju- n'°r officers aware of the various services’ space and command, control, and communication directorates at the Junior-officer level. Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle’s leadership (he headed SEW until becoming Assistant Chief of \toval Operations, Air Warfare [OP-05] in June) in ad- tossing the SEW issue and new command, control, communication, and intelligence strategies and architectures ls tailor-made for the airborne early-warning community, hich deals operationally across the entire spectrum of ls warfare area. Experienced tactical air operators rack for the future.
before casually dismissing these proposals as unnec- t,Ssary> we should take one last look at the handwriting on tle Wall. The currently deployed Arabian Gulf carrier bat- ,(e group spent Desert Storm in hurried preparations for jQS deployment, shuttling bumper-to-bumper from Fal- luf ^evada< to the fleet. In this compacted training evo- l0n, several important lessons learned were being passed to E-2 crews here. First, carrier air wing emphasis was on overland and near-land airborne early-warning detection, with a strong emphasis on terrorist or Third-World attacks on the battle group. Second, the central theme throughout their training was joint warfare, with emphasis on de- confliction of forces and joint command and control. Third and most notable, Air Force or NATO AWACS were there at each stage of their entire workup cycle. Undoubtedly, that presence can only increase, as this same battle group has confirmed in its last months in the Gulf.
Whatever course the earner-based airborne early-warning community decides, it should begin pursuit immediately. The best forum to initiate this action is the semiannual Operational Advisory Group meeting (the East Coast meeting to be held in July and sponsored by VAW- 120). Unfortunately, for years now, this group seems to have spent an overwhelming amount of its time focused on developing the replacement E-2. Several of these options have already been considered and even endorsed by previous such groups, but they lack the support necessary for progress. Historic dominance of this group by the platform sponsors from Washington should now be preempted with a new view toward addressing alternative means for improving airborne early warning today. If the E-2 advisory group also took a tactical approach to expanding the present mission along other avenues in the absence of a new airplane, cost-effective improvements to Navy airborne early warning might well result.
The Navy has committed itself to supporting a joint war-fighting concept, but it needs more joint warriors. And the Hawkeye community should be at the forefront of this evolutionary development in joint warfare. This nascent concept needs to be fostered by leadership and implemented at the aviation-community level. The Navy carrier battle group’s preeminence as a global maritime force has in the past been built on our technology and ability to deploy worldwide. Any future successes will require more than being able to sail into harm’s way: being able to do so in unison with others. The time lag for immediate battle-group integration into any future coalitions can only decrease. Desert Storm highlighted the foothold the joint forces air component commander concept has secured in the warfighting structure. Undoubtedly, this embryonic concept will be evolving in the future, and its presence afloat is inevitable. Having a worldwide force of aviators skilled in the needs of these battle forces—datalinks, cryptology, and tactics—will be essential in supporting this structure. These cannot be token players lacking in credibility. They must be experienced operators able to walk in and explain to other operators how best to perform in a particular theater. They must understand the capabilities of our allies and their technology and tactics equally well. We should take the steps necessary to have a force of aviators ready and prepared to handle the early warning needs of the future, whenever this new platform arrives.
Commander Pritulsky is currently serving as Executive Officer of VAW- 121 on board the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69).