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By Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy
u Thy are we deploying with so many torpe-
\/V/ does? We need more Tomahawk cruise ▼ V missiles.” This is what I am hearing from the skippers of our submarines.
There is a fundamental change taking place along the waterfront in our submarine home ports. It involves a major shift in submarine warfighting thinking away from deterrence of global conflict to support of U.S. national interests in regional conflicts— from ASW-oriented thinking to roles that highlight the superb multi-mission capabilities of today’s nuclear attack submarines. Antisubmarine warfare has been foremost in the minds of both military and civilian leaders. But in regional conflict, the Navy must emphasize the ability to project power ashore with minimum risk to our own forces.
Those who must plan for future regional conflicts should recognize the historical role of the submarine as a force multiplier. Submarines have operated in support of nearly every regional conflict or crisis faced by this nation in the past 50 years, including the Korean War, Vietnam, Grenada,
Lebanon, and Libya, as well as Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
The most striking example of this force-multiplier effect, however, was the use of submarines in the Falklands War. After the British nuclear- powered attack submarine Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, uncertainty about the number and location of British attack submarines kept the Argentine carrier and surface navy in port for the duration of the conflict. The Royal Navy established regional sea supremacy with a single attack.
The foundation of our national defense consists of forward presence, deterrence, crisis response, and reconstitution. These four basic pillars of our military strategy are likely to endure. The submarine force will perform several critical roles in the implementation of this defense agenda.
Forward presence is a key peacetime mission for the Navy. Submarines contribute to this mission through combined exercises and operations, port visits, and forward deployments—to strengthen alliances, foster regional stability, and influence events in all regions of the world.
This is not a new role for either the Navy or the submarine force. What is new, however, is a need to enhance visibility of the submarine in naval forward-presence operations. This is a departure from the past but a requirement of the present. In an era of fewer forward-deployed forces and reduced number of overseas bases, submarines, operating with joint task groups, will underscore credible naval presence.
In the past year submarines have conducted more than 200 port visits to more than 50 cities around the world, and operated with the naval forces of a number of nations. These visits and operations have clearly demonstrated U.S. commitment to and interest in many regions of the world. Both the visible presence of submarines in port and the invisible presence of submarines in naval exercises are unmistakable syrn-
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bols of U.S. commitment to regional peace and stability.
The normal peacetime role of the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) will continue to be nuclear deterrence. As long as a substantial nuclear strike capability against the United States still exists, deterrence of nuclear attack will remain the highest defense priority. The SSBNs are the most survivable and the most cost-effective elements of the nation’s strategic deterrent triad. Not as well known is the attack submarine’s contribution to nuclear deterrence, through its abil- dy to hold threatening missile submarines at risk and—indirectly—as one of several means to verify arms-control agreements.
No longer faced with the challenge of global antisubmarine warfare, the submarine force will expand its contribution to conventional deterrence by becoming the ubiquitous threat, either against maritime threats or targets ashore. Any potential adversary will be uncertain about the location of U.S. submarines, but will be certain that a submarine can deny use of the seas or conduct precision strikes against targets ashore.
As important as it is to maintain a visible overseas Presence, some missions require more subtle interven- bon. The submarine’s covertness makes it an ideal surveillance platform. The submarine can transmit realtime information to the National Command Authority aud joint task force commanders in time to avert or mitigate crises. The value of information derived from submarine surveillance operations will increase as available Earning time grows shorter.
The third pillar of national defense, crisis response, is where the role of the submarine has changed the most. In- V|sible to the enemy, the submarine has the freedom to go where deterrence is required aud to apply direct pressure Where needed. If deterrence ails and a regional conflict de- Vel°ps, we must effectively establish local sea superiority and deny the use of the sea to jm opponent. Submarines will e the first to fight in a conest for regional sea control jjud are an important enabling °rce for other naval expedi- °nary forces entering a region.
A principal use of submarines in regional conflict °uld be the early application of force, acting in consort j. ltn other U.S. forces, to keep an adversary’s maritime rces in port, or to deliver an attack that destroys his will
to fight. Submarines can operate in contested areas where risks to friendly surface and air forces are unacceptable, to minimize loss of American lives. In crisis situations that have escalated to conflict, the preeminent capability of the submarine for antisurface and antisubmarine warfare would be exercised to clear the area of threat maritime forces and keep them clear.
The task group of the future might be a carrier battle group, but it could just as easily consist of smaller maritime action groups comprised of two or three cruisers, destroyers, or frigates, and one or more submarines. No matter what the composition of our forces, the missions remain to establish local sea superiority, provide forward presence, and project power in smaller regional crises.
The accuracy and effectiveness of submarine-launched cruise missiles, as demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm, have highlighted the submarine’s precision-strike role. The submarine can strike targets within 650 nautical miles of the coast with cruise missiles. The submarine’s striking range will increase significantly with the introduction of the improved Block III Tomahawk. This places about 75% of the earth’s land mass and most of
the important potential targets within the submarine’s range.
Submarines will not replace traditional carrier aircraft heavy-strike ordnance, but submarine-launched cruise missiles could be the vanguard element that attacks air-defense, early-warning, and communications facilities to reduce the threat against follow-on aircraft. Submarines can reach attack positions without alerting or provoking the intended adversary. Just as important, the submarine can exploit the element of surprise by launching the attack along an undefended axis. Submarines contribute significant flexible offensive capability, remaining on station for weeks or months at a time and responding quickly to launch directives and targeting changes.
The ability to operate covertly close to hostile coastlines is essential in a world of terrorism and regional hot spots. Submarines allow small groups of special-operations forces to be inserted with the elements of surprise and secrecy essential to their missions. Once ashore, these forces can perform critical tasks in support of amphibious assaults or ground campaigns, including gunfire spotting, forward air control, target designation for air strikes, and tactical intelligence. A single submarine can carry a
53
lnRs / June 1992
Because it takes 12 years to design and build a nuclear attack submarine, reconstitution is the most difficult pillar of the nation’s military strategy for the submarine community to support. Here, the Haddock (SSN-621) departs San Diego to be decommissioned earlier this year.
limited number of personnel, and recent exercises have shown that several submarines acting together can deliver up to 75 special-warfare operatives ashore.
The final pillar, reconstitution, is the most difficult to support. It takes 12 years to design and build a nuclear attack submarine.
Even with the earliest predicted warning time, the submarine force on hand at the beginning of the crisis is all we ever will have. Therefore, it is essential that we maintain adequate force levels in submarines, to handle any envisioned crisis (or combination of crises). We also must preserve a key national asset—our nuclear industrial base.
As stated by Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-inChief, Pacific,
“Among forward deployed forces in the Pacific, submarines demonstrate our commitment to regional stability in a unique and powerful fashion. No other U.S. or allied platform can operate with near impunity throughout the region, independently and for prolonged periods.”
The challenge to submariners who must fight and resolve the crises of the future is to determine how best to use the submarine’s capabilities in future joint maritime operations. We must develop and hone the tactics now to exploit these capabilities fully, and put the planning in place to ensure success in protecting our vital national interests.
Admiral Bacon is the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare.
ARLEIGH BURKE ESSAY CONTEST
The U.S. Naval Institute is proud to announce its ninth annual Arleigh Burke Essay Contest, which replaces the former annual General Prize Essay Contest.
Three essays will be selected for prizes.
Anyone is eligible to enter and win. First prize earns $2,000, a Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute. First Honorable Mention wins $1,000 and a Silver Medal. Second Honorable Mention wins $750 and a Bronze Medal.
The topic of the essay must relate to the objective of the U.S. Naval Institute: “The advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the naval and maritime services, and the advancement of the knowledge of sea power.”
Essays will be judged by the Editorial Board of the U.S. Naval Institute.
ENTRY RULES
- Essays must be original, must not exceed 4,000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
- All entries should be directed to: Publisher, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035.
- Esays must be received on or before 1 December 1992 at the U.S. Naval Institute.
- The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank, branch of service, biographical sketch, social se
curity number, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and motto.
The identity of the essayist will not be known of the judging members of the Editorial Board until they have made their selections.
- The awards will be presented to the winning essayists at the 119th Annual Meeting of the membership of the Naval Institute. Letters notifying the award winners will be mailed on or about 1 February 1993, and the unsuccessful essays will be returned to their authors during February.
- All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 'A x 11”. Submit two complete copies.
- The winning and honorable mention essays will be published in the Proceedings. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The writers of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
- An essay entered in this contest should be analytical and/of interpretive, not merely an exposition, a personal narrative, or a report.
Deadline: 1 December 1992
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Proceedings / June 19^