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Contents:
Why Seawolf Now?—14
It Could have Been Worse—14
Mine Warfare Problems ... And a Solution—16
A Strategy in the Navy’s Best Interest—20
Experience: Handle With Care—20
The Navy Should Take Back the Arizona Memorial—24
Does Stealth Really Work?—27
Reconstitution Is the New Game—27
Guadalcanal Was a Long Time Ago—28
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings. Please include your return address and a day-time phone number.
“Why Seawolf Now”?
{See W. J. Holland, p. 13, December 1991
Proceedings)
Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY)— Admiral Holland’s argument ignores budget realities at the Navy's peril. The Centurion, not the Seawolf (SSN-21) represents the future of the U.S. Navy's attack submarine community.
The commentary derides those who consider the SSN-21 to be “too big” and “too costly,” but consider the following from the Centurion's “Mission Needs Statement”: “There is a need to reduce the cost of submarines with adequate capability to perform . . . [covert strike/mine, anti-submarine/surface, electronic, and special warfare] missions against all threats. By making these submarines affordable, adequate force levels can be achieved (emphasis mine).” The cost concerns raised by Congress are clearly shared by the Navy's leadership.
The Centurion concept design has been funded by Congress (Reports #102-154 and #102-328), and the current schedule calls for lead ship contract award in Fiscal Year 1998. If the Navy is able to sustain procurement of one Seawolf per year through 1997—a very big “if’—the two programs should overlap nicely. This will preserve our fragile submarine industrial base.
Two final points. Stealth technologies can be retrofitted. That Toshiba came close to being a household word is proof of that. Our own Los Angeles (SSN-688)- class has benefited substantially from retrofits. As for relative costs, 1 Seawolf equals 18 Avenger (MCM-l)-class minesweepers or 28 F-14Ds—not “3 or 4” or “4 or 5.” □
time for ships to sortie and get beyond the sight of Oahu—and even then we could have easily been found. It is interesting to speculate whether we would have sought action with the Japanese strike force or tried to avoid it if we had been warned at 0100. It is odds on that our leaders would have tried to close with the enemy, for that is how we were trained. In any event, we would have first have had to find the Japanese who launched their attack about 230 miles
Then-Ensign Taussig was on board the Nevada during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Wounded so severely that he eventually lost a leg, he helped get the Nevada under way. Once Secretary- Treasurer of the U.S. Naval Institute, Captain Taussig continues to serve as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy (Safety and Survivabilty).
“It Could have Been Worse”
{See J. R. Van de Velde, pp. 44-46, December
1991 Proceedings)
Captain Joseph K. Taussig, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—The very title of James Van de Velde’s article echoes what I concluded almost immediately after the attack. In fact, it could have been much, much worse.
Historians can play “what if’ forever, based on such vague ideas as “adequate warning.” If we had known of the attack at 0600, it still would have taken
from Pearl Harbor. It’s a big ocean out there.
And what if we had found the Japanese? In a straight surface battle, it would have been no contest, in our favor. On board my ship—the USS Nevada (BB-36)—and throughout the fleet, there was great confidence in our main and secondary batteries. It made little difference what the target’s course and speed were or what our course, speed, roll, and pitch were—we consistently shot well. Even our antiaircraft batteries scored well against surface targets.
However, the Japanese probably would not have been foolish enough to take on the Pacific Fleet’s battle line with the two battleships, three cruisers, and eight destroyers that escorted the strike force. They would have attacked us from the air. Even the combined air power of the USS Enterprise (CV-6), the USS Saratoga (CV-3), and the USS Lexing-
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ton (CV-2) would have been overwhelmed by that of the six Japanese aircraft carriers. As for the battle line’s air defenses, suffice it to say that on board the Nevada, we had considerably less confidence in our antiaircraft gunnery than our surface gunnery.
The plain truth is that ships damaged—or even sunk—in 40 feet of calm water have a better chance of ultimate survival than ones damaged in 1,000 fathoms of open ocean with the problems of damage control heightened by rolling and pitching. There would have been many more ships and men (including me) lost if the U.S. Pacific Fleet had clashed with the Japanese off Hawaii.
Commander Robert G. Smith, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Dr. Van de Velde mentions that many of the U.S. aircraft in Hawaii were “obsolete.” It is shamefully true that in the early days of World War II the U.S. armed forces were flying aircraft already proven incapable of surviving in the skies of Europe. In addition, they faced other equipment woes: obsolescent battleships; ships mounting only a few .50-cal. antiaircraft machine guns, instead of bristling with 20-mm. Oer- likons and 40-mm. Bofors; defective and outranged torpedoes; and, on our aircraft carriers, severely limited firefighting capabilities.
One of the most valuable lessons of Pearl Harbor is that our forces must never deploy with anything less than the best equipment our country can provide.
Commander Robert E. Bublitz, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Van de Velde’s article was disappointing, filled as it was with minor errors and major misinterpretations.
For example, Dr. Van de Velde cites the destruction of the USS Arizona (BB- 39) accounting for “most” of the day’s 2,400 military dead. The men killed on board the Arizona made up the majority of the Navy and Marine Corps casualties, but not the majority of the total. He also says that the Arizona's complement was 1,400; while in an accompanying article by Paul Stillwell the complement is listed as 1,511 men. And I am sure that the crew of the USS Enterprise (CV-6) would be surprised to learn that they had launched 11 B-17s on the morning of the attack.
Dr. Van de Velde states that on 7 December 1941 10 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 24 destroyers were at sea and that 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 27 destroyers survived the attack unhurt. He then concludes that “the attack disabled several of the U.S. destroyer, battleship, and cruiser forces of the Pacific ....” Of the Pacific Fleet’s 18 cruisers and 51 destroyers, however, only 3 cruisers and 3 destroyers were damaged in the attack. It’s true that the bat- tlewagons were hard hit, but saying that the cruiser and destroyer forces were “disabled” is unwarranted.
One of Dr. Van de Velde’s theses— that the Pacific Fleet was lucky that it didn’t find the Japanese strike force—is probably correct, and the others he presents may be as well. It is unfortunate that he did not support his contentions with accurate data and much more precise analysis.
Editor's Note: Every once in a while Murphy visits our offices, and although errors published in this article were spotted early on—we failed to eradicate them. Our apologies.
Charles W. Marino—Dr. Van de Velde states that the USS Arizona (BB-39) was destroyed as “the result of one torpedo hit that ignited the ship’s magazine.”
The idea that a single torpedo—some say passing under the USS Vestal (AR- 4)—detonated the Arizona's forward magazine has been widely discounted. Most researchers agree that an armorpiercing aerial bomb triggered the explosion. In fact, Imperial Japanese Navy bombardier Petty Officer Nomburo Kanai is credited with dropping the fatal bomb. The National Park Service’s publication Submerged Cultural Resources Study— USS Arizona Memorial and Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark states that “site examination of the port bow [where the torpedo would had to have to hit to ignite the magazine] reveals no indication of torpedo damage ... no sign of buckling of the metal at the silt line or other indications of torpedo damage.”
Editor’s Note: Copies of the NPS publication mentioned above are available from: National Park Service, Southwest Regional Office, Submerged Cultural Resources Staff (ATTN: Fran Day); 1220 South St. Francis Drive; Santa Fe, NM 87501. □
“Mine Warfare Problems . ..
And a Solution”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 105-106, December 1991
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral John D. Pearson, U.S. Navy, Commander, Mine Warfare Command—Norman Polmar’s perspectives on any subject are always interesting, intriguing, and entertaining—and his take on U.S. mine warfare was no exception. Portraying the Navy’s postwar mine warfare efforts as indicating little promise for the future, he suggests that the U.S. Coast Guard take over the mission. Among his reasons for this transfer are: the Coast Guard’s experience in operating small boats; the capability of mine-counter-
measures (MCM) ships to be used for patrol duties as well; and the Coast Guard’s orientation toward defensive operations.
First, the two main classes of Navy MCM ships—the oceangoing Avenger (MCM-l)-class and the Osprey (MHC- 51)-class coastal minehunter are, respectively, 244 feet and 188 feet long—certainly not small. Also, the minesweeping MH-53 helicopter is the largest in the U.S. military inventory and to fly a number of them sufficient for effective mine- countermeasures operations requires a big-deck U.S. Navy amphibious ship. All of these mine-warfare assets employ highly sophisticated mine-warfare systems and require highly sophisticated training and support infrastructure.
The suggestion that Coast Guard-controlled MCM ships would do double duty as patrol boats implies that training and readiness for mine warfare are not fulltime jobs—they most certainly are. Using MCM ships for other duties would degrade their performance of their primary mission. The Coast Guard is already hard- pressed to perform its present missions— marine safety, law enforcement, and environmental protection, to name a few. Is there any doubt that mine-warfare training would suffer?
Furthermore, a focus on regional conflicts will mean less emphasis on MCM in U.S. harbors and sea approaches and greater emphasis on forward offensive mine warfare to support U.S. sea control and power projection efforts. Minelaying and/or strike-warfare operations against mine inventories and minelayers will deny an opponent the opportunity to challenge our control of the seas and mine countermeasures will clear the Way for battle groups and amphibious forces. The organization that can best deploy and support the present and future forces and personnel to perform these missions as well as develop new mine- warfare technologies and doctrine is— and should remain—the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Contrary to Mr. Polmar’s assertion, the Navy's attitude toward mine warfare is n° longer “Ignore it, perhaps it will go away.” The Navy understands the mine- Warfare threat and has marshalled con- s*derable resources—in research and development, acquisition, training, Maintenance, and support—to apply the Critical mine warfare lessons we learned during Desert Storm and other operations In the Persian Gulf.
We have begun a comprehensive cost- effectiveness analysis of our surface and airborne MCM forces that will enable us to create the proper force mix and level
for regional MCM operations. Plans are being made to enhance mine-warfare training and readiness and acquire the resources and platform to lift, support, and control forward-deployed mine warfare forces. We are accelerating the research and development of new MCM technologies and tactics, such as remotely controlled vehicles, with special attention to countering the mine threat in the very shallow water—40 feet to the high water mark—where landing craft operate.
Our most far-reaching initiatives deal with the reorganization of mine warfare within the Navy’s operational command structure. The Chief of Naval Operations has already approved the two principal aspects of the plan: placing all mine
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warfare forces under the operational control of a full-time flag officer—Commander, Mine Warfare Command—and providing MCM group commanders and staffs, trained and equipped for rapid deployment in response to mine crises anywhere in the world, with sufficient forces under their command.
Bringing the Navy’s mine-warfare community together under one roof will not only revitalize it, but also facilitate a much greater coordination and integration of tactical development and training.
These endeavors will succeed only if there is a continued commitment to mine warfare excellence from senior Navy leadership. I am absolutely convinced that the commitment is there. Throughout the Navy, there is an unquestioned recognition that mine warfare will be a vital part of sea-control and power-projection missions. Since assuming command of Mine Warfare Command (MineWarCom) in August 1991, every echelon of command above me—including the Chief of Naval Operations—has encouraged and supported our efforts to improve. As a signal of his support of the mine warfare community, Admiral Kelso spoke at the MineWarCom change-of-command ceremony last August. He is actively and personally pushing the Navy’s mine-warfare capability toward being the best in the world.
So, with appreciation for the fine job the Coast Guard does daily and for Mr. Polmar’s valuable insights, I must disagree with him: there is no need to consider the Coast Guard option for the future of the U.S. mine warfare. □
“A Strategy in the Navy’s Best Interest”
(See J. L. George, pp. 114-123, May 1991; S. J. Tangredi, pp. 14-16, July 1991; G. McGiffney, p. 26, October 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Terry A. Bickham, U.S. Coast Guard—Now that the Gulf War has ended, many Navy officers like Lieutenant McGiffney will try to resurrect the effort to involve the Navy more in the drug-interdiction mission. So far, the correct response of the Coast Guard and the Congress to that effort has been, in effect, “Thanks, but no thanks.”
It takes a certain mindset to be involved in law enforcement. Most law-enforcement professionals are well aware of the limits placed on their conduct by the Constitution and subsequent legislation. They work and train with those limits in mind. As a result of more than 200 years of being the law—upon the seas and in other public-service-oriented missions—that mindset is institutionalized within the Coast Guard (at least on law- enforcement matters).
The Navy, on other hand, breeds professional warriors with a different set of institutionalized, mission-oriented values—and rightly so. Any Coast Guard law-enforcement detachment officer can relate many tales of wardroom discussions with his Navy hosts where their prevailing attitude was, “Why don’t we just find the boats suspected of carrying drugs—and blow them out of the water?”
During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, I helped Navy ships deploying to the Middle East prepare for maritime interception operations. It soon became obvious that the battlefield mentality of killing the enemy on sight does not correlate well with law enforcement. Much of my time was spent emphasizing the need for restraint to potential Navy and Marine boarding team members. Many were appalled that they could not use deadly force unless they themselves, or a member of their team, were threatened with deadly force first. It simply contradicted their training for facing a known enemy.
The Navy should concentrate on being full-time warriors. Their current support of the drug-interdiction effort—supplying intelligence, tracking suspected smugglers, and providing platforms for Coast Guard detachments—helps them hone their warfighting skills, is welcomed by the Coast Guard, and is as far as it should go. Placing the Coast Guard under the Department of Defense for the sole purpose of creating a greater “jointness” in drug interdiction is wrong—legally, politically, conceptually, and practically. The different institutional mindsets of the Navy (and the rest of the armed services) and the Coast Guard, such a move would only cause confusion and inhibit the effectiveness of all concerned. Modem warfare and law enforcement on the high seas are separate missions, and it is in the nation’s best interest to keep it that way. □
“Experience: Handle With Care"
(See M. T. Hopgood. pp. 81-82, October 1991 Proceedings)
Commander (select) David P. Biega, U.S. Naval Reserve—General Hopgood asserted that intelligence, particularly human intelligence (Humlnt) did not work well during Desert Storm. Furthermore, he states that “deficient Humlnt dissemination [my italics] remains the Achilles’ heel of intelligence.”
In addition to the hundreds of detailed human intelligence reports produced by the Joint Interrogation Facilities, our team at the West facility originated scores of synopsis reports. We provided summaries of the very things the general found lacking—things he and other warfighters need to know.
Those reports, dated from early to mid- February, included the information he was missing on “enemy intentions and willingness to do battle” and foretold “the number of Iraqi soldiers who surrendered without a fight and the rapidity of their capitulation.”
There was a plethora of information collected—and reported—in the 60 days the Joint Interrogation Facilities operated. There is something critically wrong with an information management system that neglects the Deputy Director for Operations of the Joint Staff.
1 he rapid collapse of the Iraqi Army no surprise to lower-level intelligence officers and front-line Marines. So why didn’t high-level commanders get the word?
Major M. D. Kuszewski, U.S. Marine Corps—As the intelligence officer of a Marine regiment that was in Southwest ^sia from 25 December 1990 to 16 May '^91, my perspective of shortcomings in lhe intelligence system differs considerably from General Hopgood’s.
At the tactical level, the most significant factor hindering the collection of human intelligence (Humlnt), especially as it pertained to enemy intent and willingness to fight, was not a deficiency in the intelligence system but an operational restraint imposed by higher headquarters. The only way to gain appreciation of an enemy’s willingness to fight is to engage him in ground combat, however limited its scope might be. When my regiment was operating on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from 8-19 February, we were refused permission to conduct reconnaissance operations into occupied Kuwait. Even a modest reconnaissance effort into Kuwait at that time would have confirmed what numerous Iraqi prisoners had been telling us—that Iraqi morale and will to fight were low. I don’t know of any compelling reasons at the theater or national level for this restraint; I do know that against a more aggressive opponent, such restraint would have effectively surrendered the initiative to the enemy.
. The lack of fighting spirit and the rapid collapse of the Iraq soldiers were not surprises to us at the tactical level. The Iraqis were almost completely passive in their ground reconnaissance effort and counterbattery response to our artillery raids. It was well-known that the Iraqis had never been under serious attack from the air, much less a three-to-six week, highly accurate, around-the-clock bombardment. From 8 February onward (and especially after the Khafji battle), it became readily apparent that the Iraqis were unwilling to lock horns with us, and that one of our most significant problems would be that of handling massive numbers of prisoners.
Those of us who thought that the ground campaign would be short did not keep our opinions to ourselves. It was the subject of daily conversation with commanders, operations officers, and other intelligence officers. I even presented my estimates to the commanding generals of the I Marine Expeditionary Force and the 1st Marine Division. No one who I know of predicted a four-day campaign, nor do I think anyone could have done so. Most informal estimates that 1 recall ranged from one to three weeks. In any case, the regimental-level conventional wisdom called for a tough breaching operation with little determined resistance thereafter and a lot of prisoners right from the start. It is surprising that Central Command apparently did not even consider this a possibility.
General Hopgood also cited lack of Humlnt as a reason for not locating the
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main ammunition and supply dumps in the Iraqi III Corps area until they were uncovered by the Marines. First, the most reliable information, and certainly the best targeting information, for those types of installations would come from aerial imagery, not Humlnt. As an analyst, I would consider information from any other source as merely a cue and would request confirmation by imagery. Second, the major dumps were located, at least in my regiment’s zone of action. Before we left the United States, we had numerous such installations plotted on our enemy situation overlay; more were added after we arrived in the Gulf region. These plots proved to be reasonably accurate when we used them for artillery targeting (we were rewarded on at least two occasions with secondary explosions). As we advanced through Kuwait and uncovered the dumps, their locations generally matched up with what we had plotted. The officer-in-charge of Marine imagery interpreters in the Gulf has said that several of the Iraqi corps- level ammo depots were targeted for air strikes before ground operations, and were repeatedly re-validated as targets through imagery intelligence.
The Secretary of Defense’s paper, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, correctly characterizes intelligence support as a “success story.” There were problems (and the report enumerates them very well); nevertheless, the highly creative campaign that we executed owed a large measure of its success to the massive intelligence effort. As we strive to correct our identified intelligence shortcomings, we should keep in mind that uncertainty is the essence of war, and intelligence will never reduce uncertainty to zero. The most intelligence can do is provide commanders with an acceptable level of comfort with respect to risk, before and during an operation. To expect anything more in what has been described as the most complex of all human activities—war—is to build one’s hope on sand. □
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“The Navy Should Take Back the Arizona Memorial”
(See R. L. Herschkowitz, p. 79, December 1991 Proceedings)
J. Scott Harmon—My initial reaction to Commander Herschkowitz’s article was an emphatic “Right On!” The Navy has the money to do things right at the Arizona Memorial. The National Park Service (NPS), on the other hand, struggleS along from year to year with barely
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enough (actually insufficient) funds to keep the place afloat. My reaction is ironic, because I am a naval historian with the Park Service. (1 should add here these views are mine alone and not those of the NPS.) For the past ten years, I have been the NPS exhibit planner at the Memorial and have traveled to Pearl Harbor a number of times. Because of my Navy background (U.S. Naval Academy ’64 and a destroyerman), 1 have tried to blend Navy and Park Service in my work at the Memorial.
Commander Herschkowitz is dismayed that the Memorial is run as a tourist at
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traction. However, the Memorial is a national park and the NPS administers and interprets it the same way it does the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, Andersonville Prison in Georgia, or the Statue of Liberty—all areas sacred to American memory. Interpretation is the key word; it means translating the significance, the meaning, or history of a site and challenging visitors to discover more. If you think the Navy can do this better than the NPS, match any park ranger against the Navy tour guides on the CinCPac VIP tour of Pearl Harbor or on board the USS Constitution. Ask these
latter a question, and if the answer is not in their memorized spiel, they will give you a blank stare. These sailors are nice, intelligent young men and women, but they are not trained as interpreters.
How would Commander Herschkowitz enforce the proper atmosphere on board the Memorial? There is no admission fee. One was proposed once, but there was widespread vocal opposition and the proposal was dropped. Does the Navy have a way of weeding out those persons who will not behave as he would like? Perhaps the Marines who would guard the Memorial would serve double duty and escort undesirables back to the boat. Imagine the flap that would create!
I am also curious as to why Commander Herschkowitz and his wife were rushed through their visit. Visitors do not have to return with a group; they may stay as long as they want, until closing time. My suspicion is that Commander Herschkowitz was part of a tour group which had to get back to the bus, so they could rush through the other popular attractions on the island. This is a fundamental problem with the Memorial. Many visitors to the Memorial are vacationers who have signed up for a guided tour of the island. The Arizona Memorial is, for better or worse, probably the biggest tourist attraction on the island. Since admission is free, it is a great deal for the tour companies. They dump their customers at the front door, and announce a departure time. Get there, and get back. This creates the circus atmosphere that is incompatible with the reverent attitude that Commander Herschkowitz would like to see. But don’t blame the Park Service for it; blame the tour companies that treat people like cattle.
On the whole, the NPS does a commendable job, but it could do better—if it had increased staffing and funding. Perhaps under Navy administration those needs could be addressed. Which brings up another point: the Memorial, the ship, the property, and the visitor center already belong to the Navy—they don’t have to be taken back. The NPS merely administers the site and provides interpretation through exhibits, films, and personal services. This arrangement was reached amicably years ago. Presumably, the Navy could do any of the things Commander Herschkowitz would like to see, but has decided not to, for very pragmatic reasons. Commander Her- schkowitz’s problems really aren’t with the NPS, but with the people who go to Hawaii for a vacation. Good luck in changing their attitudes.
i
‘Does Stealth Really Work?”
(See N. Friedman, p. 124, September 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Getchell, U.S. Air Force, former commander, 415th Tactical Fighter Squadron—Dr. Friedman’s conclusions about the effectiveness of stealth technology during Desert Storm are apparently based on anecdotal evidence—that HMS Gloucester and HMS London not only detected an F-l 17 A during Desert Storm, but were able to track and lock the aircraft with their Sea Wolf missile systems. In the September Proceedings, Dr. Friedman deduced that stealth technology would be ineffective against naval targets because radar energy deflected from the F-l 17A’s facets would bounce off the water and back to the receiver.
This argument makes sense—until you think about it. Radar systems determine range to target by measuring the time from pulse transmission to pulse reception. At worst case, a radar pulse which deflected straight down from an F-l 17A flying at 24,000 feet and subsequently bounced off the water and back to the receiver would indicate over four miles of range error. Similarly, target elevation is usually calculated on the basis of antenna elevation triangulated with computed range. It is unclear from the information presented how the Gloucester could determine that the return coming from a near zero elevation was from a high-flying F-l 17A and just as unclear how it could guide a Sea Wolf missile at the reflected energy and even come close to the F-117A.
A “carefully researched assessment” of this incident should have uncovered unclassified information released by the Air Force in press interviews and technical observations published in magazines such as Aviation Week and Space Technology. Those sources readily reveal that the F-117A is flown in three basic configurations. In non-combat situations, the aircraft is flown with red flashing beacons and radar reflectors attached to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization requirements and ensure safe flight in congested civil airspace.
In a combat theater, these devices are removed. However, close to friendly airspace, F-117As use standard identifi- cation-friend-or-foe (IFF) and radio contact with radar controllers to avoid collisions with other aircraft. Only when he needs to avoid enemy radars will the F-117A pilot truly get stealthy.
The Gloucester probably identified an F-l 17A using IFF and then switched off IFF to see what the raw return looked
Now you see it... The only sure way to see a stealth fighter is to catch it on the ground.
like. This is also probably what happened in the two other instances when a F-l 17A has been spotted on radar—by an air-traffic controller in Nevada and the operator of a Super Fledermaus radar at a base in Saudi Arabia. In view of the aircraft’s non-stealthy configuration at these times, it is not surprising they saw something somewhere on the scope.
What do these anecdotes really tell us about the combat capabilities of the F- 117 and the potential for the B-2 and other stealth weapons systems? Probably nothing of any real value. If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the true capability of a weapon can only be proven in combat. While we should all wait for knowledgeable analysts to give us a definitive measure of success, the preliminary evidence indicates that stealth aircraft achieved unprecedented survivability and weapons delivery accuracy against relatively sophisticated, densely arrayed defenses. Downtown Baghdad may not have been as tough as downtown Moscow, but as Peter Arnett will vouch, it was a very dangerous place to be.
So, what’s the point? There are two, actually. First, postwar analyses of weapon system or unit performance need not be a zero-sum game. F-l 17As can be claimed to have been extremely valuable assets without denigrating the importance of cruise missiles, and vice versa.
Finally, at a time when extensive cuts in our force structure are both necessary and inevitable, national leaders (and the taxpaying public) are looking for accurate analyses on which to base their tough decisions. If we cloud our recommendations with hype and parochialism, we will do our leaders, our country, and ourselves a disservice. □
“Reconstitution Is the New Game”
(See S. J. Tangredi, pp. 58-61, September 1991 Proceedings)
Captain Theodore P. Jakaboski, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander
Tangredi completely misses the fact that no predetermined set of principles is going to help determine naval strategy in the uncertain future. His seemingly intellectual reference to what may be deemed little more than politically correct, or worse, politically driven concepts—strung together with citations of “authoritative” figures—would seem to be straight from the pages of the old Soviet Navy’s Morskoi Sbornik. His presentation of ill-defined concepts, combined with an apologia for someone’s “party line,” is a bunch of bilge that has no place in Proceedings.
Worst of all, this manipulation of shallow concepts contains no original or clear thinking, and little forethought as to what the future will bring.
It would be far better to recognize that in the future all bets will be off. We cannot predict future adversaries; in fact, there may be no superpower adversary at all. We cannot calculate the weapons mix we may face; nor can we assume what mix of platforms, forces, and reserves the budgetary processs will allocate to the Navy.
There are only a few principles that can be extracted from the present uncertainty, and Commander Tangredi sees none of them. In all likelihood the Navy will have reduced forces; the most-likely future conflicts will be with smaller, “renegade” powers with few modern weapons; and seldom will there be a need to commit large U.S. land forces—with the corollary that in virtually every conceivable conflict there will be local forces that we will be supporting with our high- tech systems.
Absent a superpower competition, we might even dispense with our type of strategic intelligence, which has been a costly failure in most cases, and rely instead on the short-range intelligence available from diplomatic sources. When conflict erupts, we will need tactical, not strategic, intelligence. The money saved could be used to buy ships and planes.
The bottom line is that the Navy will have to fight with whatever assets it has on hand, much the same way as in 1812, 1898, and 1917. We must learn to live with this truth. No amount of hunting for pretty solutions will save us from this reality. In addition, we can generally expect to be supporting less-capable friendly forces in most discernible conflicts. Consequently, we must plan for multi-purpose, flexible, survivable, and high-tech ships, planes, and systems. But if there are no friendlies, no ports, and no airbase infrastructure—then maybe we should consider not going in at all. □
“Guadalcanal Was a Long Time Ago”
(See J. J. Kratz, pp. 70-71, June 1991; J. W. Graham, pp. 23-26, October 1991; M. E. McBride, pp. 20-21, November 1991; C. E. Mundy, M. P. Stolzenberg, J. B. LaPlante, and D. M. McLaughlin, pp. 14-20, January 1992 Proceedings)
Captain James W. Wilhelm, U.S. Marine Corps—I agree with Colonel Kratz that Desert Storm provided some excellent lessons for operating in a joint forces environment. Nevertheless, based on my experiences as an F/A-18 pilot serving as a forward air controller (FAC) with an infantry battalion in Desert Storm, I disagree that elimination of the F/A-18 from the Marine Corps inventory is one of them.
Contrary to Colonel Kratz’s assertion, the Hornet is not too costly for the Marine Corps. No other aircraft provides such capability and flexibility for about $30 million. The unscheduled maintenance man-hours per flight hour for the F/A-18 are significantly lower than those for any other aircraft in our inventory. The F/A-18’s survivability, maintainability, and reliability have all been proven in combat and lend greatly to the aircraft’s cost-effectiveness.
Colonel Kratz leaves the impression that the AV-8B Harrier is the aircraft best-suited to act in the traditional close- air-support role. Marine Hornets had a minimum of 30 minutes on-station loiter time and provided deep-air support as well as close-air support. They also flew “double cycles”—rearming and refueling at A1 Jubayl in 30-45 minutes and flying another mission before returning to their base in Bahrain. Not one Marine Hornet was shot down; the four that received battle damage all flew home safely and were combat-capable again in less than 36 hours (including those requiring new engines). The lesson here is the survivability of a two-engine aircraft.
The F/A-18s, flying battlefield preparation missions 24 hours a day, played a crucial role in paving the way for the ground forces. For the six months prior to Desert Storm, F/A-18s provided the 24-hour combat air patrol that was certainly essential to Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) success. Marine Hornets further demonstrated their versatility by suppressing enemy air defenses using homing anti-radiation missiles (HARMs).
Colonel Kratz states that the Air Force and Navy would relish performing air defense, offensive antiair warfare, deep air support, and electronic warfare missions for the Marine Corps. But, since both services’ assets are increasingly limited and needed to support their current mission requirements, this is a dubious assumption.
Colonel Kratz asserts that we should reduce the requirement for Air Force tankers by reducing the F/A-18 fleet. But only while conducting Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) combat-air-patrol missions did Marine Hornets use Air Force tankers. Marine Hornets on close air support and battlefield area interdiction missions did not tank, and fast forward-air-control (FASFAC) F/A-18Ds and their F/A-18 escorts refueled from Marine KC-130s.
Cutting the number of Hornets will not cut the need for substantial command- and-control assets. Even with the MAGTF aviation complement Colonel Katz advocates (AV-8B, MV-22, C-130, F/A-18D, and helicopters), the Marine Corps would still require almost all of the current command-and control manpower and equipment.
During the five months prior to deployment to Southwest Asia, my infantry battalion rarely trained with artillery units, and I know of only one battalion that actually did so on a regular basis. Conversely, Marine aviators, assigned to infantry battalions as air officers and FACs, live, work, and train with the infantry every day. Every infantry battalion, including light armored infantry battalions, practice close-air-support with fixed-wing aviation on a regular basis every month.
Colonel Kratz’s use of the death of eight Marines in a light armored vehicle (LAV) in an air-related friendly fire incident to “point the way for Marine aviation” is particularly upsetting, especially since his information is incorrect. The Air Force A-10 involved was requested by the unit and controlled by a Marine FAC on the ground. An enemy vehicle and the LAV were in close proximity to one another and an attempt to get the pilot’s eyes on the target at night by using an airborne flare failed. The lesson learned here is the need for better identification of friend or foe in night close-air support. Furthermore, there were no deaths caused by Marine aircraft performing close-air-support missions.
The Marine Corps should not reduce its interest in joint operations; they are here to stay. Joint operations do not represent a threat to Marine aviation’s support of Marine ground forces. In Desert Storm, as Colonel Kratz correctly states, Marine ground commanders were concerned about the availability of Marine air once the ground offensive began. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, the commander of the I Marine Expeditionary Force’s air component—Major General Royal N. Moore of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing— agreed with Lieutenant General Charles C. Horner, U.S. Air Force, the JFACC, that Marine air would primarily support Marines on the ground. So, even in an overall joint environment, Marine air was dedicated to its traditional mission.
The Marine Corps will continue to need its Harriers and their unique fighting abilities in the rare situations where runways, expeditionary airfields, or highway strips cannot be built or used. However, the F/A-18 is the platform of choice when Marines on the ground need air support—particularly from a payload, range, accuracy, and time on-station standpoint. Why eliminate our best aviation asset—the F/A-18 strike fighter— when it is economical, combat-proven, and extremely capable? That kind of backward thinking could undercut the Marine Corps’s hard-won role as the nation’s most adaptable fighting force. □