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By Captain Patrick D. Moneymaker, U.S. Navy
In the summer of 1950, a group of Japanese engineers invited a U.S. expert on statistical quality control to visit their country and share his views on productivity improvement. Japan’s industrial base lay in ruins after World War II, and a made-in-Japan label in the world mar-
As Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Frank Kelso (right) has strongly endorsed the total quality management maxims of Dr. W. Edwards Deming and prescribed them for Navy-wide application. As tenets of total quality leadership, they can succeed brilliantly in the operating units—but changes in mind-set will be Squired.
ket was synonymous with negative net "'Orth. There had to be a way to make ■^panese products competitive, priming jj*e pump of export trade. When Dr. W. Edwards Deming accepted the offer, the s°lution to their economic ills was at hand.
Deming’s method focused on the con- bnual analysis and improvement of the 'Manufacturing process, to yield higher quality. As quality began to increase, Manufacturing costs would decrease . wer failures at final inspection requir- ln8 rework, fewer delays, less scrap material, more efficient use of machinery), ®Md increased productivity would follow, uming used statistics to evaluate the per- °rniance of the process, a practice that had all but disappeared in postwar U.S. industry. But in Japan, Deming’s method was spreading new hope in the minds of its industrial leaders. After a summer of lecturing, Deming had planted the seeds of success at every level of Japanese industrial management.
Meanwhile, in the United States, industry was struggling to keep up with demand. Having the only intact industrial base at the end of World War II, the United States had no competition in supplying the world with products. Emphasis shifted from quality to quantity with this uncontested dominance of the world market. U.S. culture slipped into a complacent inefficiency that would not be challenged until the early 1970s.
Between 1950 and 1980, Dr. Deming continued to refine his philosophy. In Tokyo, he was heralded as the man whose work brought about the rebirth of Japanese. industry, but in the United States, he was virtually ignored. Deming was the first American to be awarded Japan’s Second Order of the Sacred Treasure. In Washington, D.C., however, economic officials on President Jimmy Carter’s staff had never heard of him. On 27 June 1980, Deming appeared in a television documentary, “If Japan Can . . . Why Can’t We?” and the publicity gave him access to the American public, by then eager to embrace his philosophy. Deming now had more business than he could manage— and, this time, it was American.
The federal government, recognizing the need for improved service within government agencies, established a Productivity Improvement Program in 1986. It languished for the next two years; something was missing. After comparing notes with the private sector, it became clear that quality had to be linked with productivity if improvement was to be realized. The program was revised in 1988, by Executive order 12637, thus beginning the era of total quality management (TQM). The principles outlined by Dr. Deming provided the basic structure of TQM, although other experts like J. M. Juran and Philip B. Crosby also were represented.
Today, as the Navy implements its version of this concept, total quality leadership (TQL), the use of these principles will spread from the bureaucratic sector to the operators in the fleet. But the mental adjustment in stepping from the pier onto the deck of a warship is a large one. Methodologies that have management in their titles and phrases like “customer satisfaction” in their definitions almost always draw a jaundiced eye from the fleet commander. The arena of command- at-sea is steeped in traditions of leadership. and the buy-in pace for TQL could be slow.
The Deming philosophy must be studied and embraced by fleet operators, as well as by desk-bound bureaucrats, if we are to make best use of shrinking defense dollars. With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the revolutionary change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the argument for a strong U.S. defense will enjoy declining credibility. With a declining budget, we must work smarter to maintain adequate readiness.
TQL offers the needed redirection for our efforts, but it will realize its full potential only when it is linked to .effective leadership. The U.S. Navy has the most concentrated environment of effective leadership in the world today. For TQL to prevail, all that is required is a recognition of the need for constant improvement—and an open mind.
A TQL Primer for the Fleet Sailor
Total quality leadership is mostly common sense. Like common sense, TQL has universal application, but it goes beyond telling us what should be; it tells us how to get results. Dedication to continual improvement is a mind set that will enhance unit readiness and increase the command’s ability to execute its mission— this is common sense. Scrutinizing the process in our operations gives us the less obvious "how"—this is TQL.
> TQL is a long-term commitment to continuous improvement. Once understood, it should be absorbed into a person’s lifestyle and become permanent.
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The old TQM, as defined by the Federal Quality Institute, is a strategic, integrated management system for achieving customer satisfaction that involves all managers and employees and uses quantitative methods to continuously improve an organization’s processes. The fleet version of the new TQL would read: a strategic, integrated method for achieving combat readiness that involves the commitment of all hands and uses quantitative methods to continuously improve a unit’s performance.
The word continuously is important. Questions might arise: “How long must we do this? At what point are we good enough?” The answer is, “We never stop, because we can always find a better way.” As long as we face competition— as long as we are operating with limited national resources.
>■ TQL is a journey, not a destination. TQL is a mind-set, rather than a temporary discipline to be discarded when the fad dies. Conversion to TQL is meant to be deliberate and steady, depending on the command’s momentum. There is no set schedule for implementation. There is, however, much room for innovation. Blended with the solid, combat-tested principles of leadership in the fleet today, the industry-tested methods of TQL provide a complete formula for success.
Fleet leadership and TQL complement each other. A comparison of axioms of naval leadership and TQL will help illustrate their mutually interactive roles.
Naval Leadership Know yourself and your stuff Know and care for your people Champion a worthy goal Lead by example Listen
Total Quality Leadership Focus on the customer Make continuous improvement Give everyone responsibility Make fewer inspections
Reflecting on these attributes, notice that the items under naval leadership promote attitude and atmosphere, whereas the items under TQL quantify action.
Applying the axioms to a hypothetical fleet problem will sharpen the picture.
Problem: A carrier air-wing team prepares for battle-force workups. At the presail conference, the foreign-object-damage (FOD) rate is identified as a priority for improvement during the next period at sea. The admiral states how dramatically engine FODs affect total readiness; the captain pledges a clean flight deck;
and the ship FOD god reads the statistics from the last at-sea period. The message is clear.
Solution T. After the presail conference, the air wing commander (CAG) invites all squadron COs to his stateroom for a strategy session. Hangar deck housekeeping, FOD walkdown schedules, and the new fastener-control program are discussed. The command environment within the wing is healthy. The CAG lays out his expectations and gives his COs free rein to solve problems within their squadrons. At quarters, every CO stresses the need for FOD awareness, reviews the new fastener-control policy and sets the operational goals. Everyone is excited about the coming deployment; everyone is doing his best.
Two weeks later the wing flies aboard. Spirits are high as air crews requalify in carrier landings. As the battle force gears to the next phase of workups, the CAG and the COs are heads-down, planning strikes. Suddenly there is a rash of FOD incidents, all seemingly unrelated. All hands are working hard, doing the best they can. There is another COs meeting with the CAG. The pressure is on. The FOD walkdowns now will be three times a day, with a CO or XO leading the charge. Night check quality assurance (QA) will conduct an additional mini- FOD walkdown on any discrepancies worked off on the flight deck after dark. The deployment continues, with everyone working hard, but the FOD rate remains a disappointment.
Solution 2: The presail conference agenda takes a different approach to the FOD rate priority. The FOD god briefs new initiatives that have been suggested by maintenance personnel. Certain procedures appear to generate more FOD than others. Over the next two weeks, the QA shops of all squadrons will survey all work packages performed with the sole intent of collecting and analyzing the material remaining after the job (safety wire, broken fasteners, used consumables). These findings will be compared with the FOD material collected during walk- downs in the first three days at sea. The CAG holds his COs meeting to further discuss strategy, and the CAG's maintenance officer further refines the efforts to fight FOD at the source. The COs preach FOD awareness at quarters and commend the efforts of the work centers in identifying FOD-generating processes. The technicians are recognized as the best sources of ideas relating to maintenancegenerated FOD. Preparations for deployment continue. The focus that QA gave to each work package heightened the
awareness of FOD as a priority—an attitude that would pay dividends when the squadrons loaded aboard ship.
Two weeks passed quickly; the air wing flew aboard and operated with increasing intensity as the battle force improved in proficiency. The FOD rate for the deployment was half its normal rate. Self-confidence grew at the deck-plate level as each FOD-free day passed. COs were still at walkdowns, leading by example. Everyone knew that the fight against FOD would continue as long as jet engines powered aircraft, but they were headed in the right direction.
It is natural for Americans to focus on the immediate problem (FOD in this case) rather than the source or process that generated it. For the past 40 years, our national mandate has been to produce. The product is the priority. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Atwood remarked that, “the Japanese spend twice as much on manufacturing processes as they do on product development, but in the United States, the reverse is true.” Our instincts are influenced by our culture. It is unnatural for us to look introspectively to the source of a problem, especially when j the process that generated it is not clear. TQL, however, offers a proven method of reorienting our thought processes.
There are countless examples in the fleet where a flourishing command environment would support and encourage continuous improvement by quantitative method. Applications abound in administration, safety, operations, maintenance, ) and, yes, tactics. TQL offers fleet commanders a tremendous new power in a climate where it performs the best: in solid leadership.
Much of Deming’s philosophy is not contained in TQL—e.g., his acknowledgement of the intangible effects of high i quality. He contends that the positive effect of a happy customer cannot be quantified. This effect, in fact, overshadows all measurable TQL spinoffs. Similarly, the spirit of our armed forces, enhanced by personal conviction that they are continually improving, is our greatest asset dedicated to national defense.
Conveyed by effective leaders, Dr. Deming’s teachings promote a level of stewardship that transcends the common responsibility-accountability relationship and exalts the dignity of man. This is as it should be.
Captain Patrick D. Moneymaker is Commander of Carrier Air Wing 14 at Naval Air Station N1ir.nn:l1 in San Diego. Most recently, he commanded if11- Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron, the Blue Angels.
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