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By Commander Steve Froggett, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The Tomahawk missile—here, launched by the USS Princeton (CG-59)—was one of the success stories of the Persian Gulf War. But we still must add to the Tomahawk's operational flexibility and capabilities through the deployment of an integrated strike-planning system—coordinating TLAM and TacAir roles—and enhance the missile's effectiveness with an upgraded missile- guidance navigation package.
On 17 January 1991 between 0100 and 0200, Persian Gulf time, more than 100 Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs) were launched at Iraqi targets from ships in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean. The San Jacinto (CG-56) in the Red Sea fired the first missile, followed a few minutes later by the Bunker Hill (CG-52) in the Arabian Gulf. The Navy had fired 216 TLAMs by the end of the second day of Desert Storm. A total of 288 TLAMs—from nine cruisers, five destroyers, two battleships, and two submarines—were launched during the war. The Fife (DD-991) fired 58 altogether, setting the record for the most cruise missiles
launched by a single ship.
The only weapons sent against the heavily defended but critical targets in Baghdad were TLAMs and F-117 “stealth” fighter-bombers. TLAM targets included nuclear and chemical weapon facilities, surface-to-air missile sites, command-and-control facilities, and Saddam Hussein’s palace. About 85% of our missiles hit their targets. This speaks highly of the cruise missile.
The Persian Gulf War provides a prototype for contingency actions that we may continue to expect in the coming years. Our forces faced a large and well-armed adversary that they defeated decisively, owing to the initiative of our commanders, the skill of our soldiers, the support of our citizens, and the technological edge of our weapons. Action of this magnitude is probably exceptional, but the suddenness with which the crisis developed and the efforts to control it effectively—with minimal loss of U.S. and allied lives—were typical.
Despite the thaw in the Cold War, the potential for regional conflict remains high. Third World countries have a history of violent relationships and perpetual distrust of their neighbors. They are well armed with state-of-the- art weapons and are often willing to violate taboos against use of weapons of mass destruction—witness the use of poison gas during the Iran-Iraq War. The Soviets are still interested in the Third World. Soviet arms sales are continuing in Central America, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, among other places.
In some ways, perestroika has worsened this aspect of international trade. The Soviet defense industry cannot be turned around quickly to produce consumer goods, and arms sales offer the most reliable source of hard currency available to the Soviets. Consequently, Soviet arms manufacturing plants remain in high gear, and we now are witnessing the sale to Third World countries of advanced weaponry (e.g., SA-10 surface-to-air missile systems) that previously the Soviets would have reserved for their own forces. These trends—and the success of Tomahawk missiles and other smart weapons in the Persian Gulf War—argue for a prominent cruise-missile role in the U.S. Navy of the coming decades.
Currently, there is a debate under way in Washington about the usefulness of TLAM versus manned tactical aircraft (TacAir). This is a spurious debate, because there is no issue of TLAM versus TacAir: they are complementary weapons. TLAM's place is against heavily defended targets that pose a risk of TacAir attrition. TacAir’s role is to deliver the ordnance required to destroy the primary targets, then come back for another mission. Other significant benefits of cruise missiles derive from the fact that they are unmanned—removing the possibility of prisoners of war—and that they are carried by ships other than the aircraft carriers, which means that the United States does not have to use a carrier to cover every hot spot around the globe.
This may be part of the leverage that will allow the United States to protect its interests with a smaller fleet, operating in a more dispersed manner. On the other hand, a cruise missile in flight cannot be recalled, and it cannot exercise a pilot’s judgment to refine the targeting solution or to engage a target of opportunity. The complementary natures of TLAM and TacAir are illustrated by the number and timing of TLAM strikes during Desert Storm.
Figure 1 charts the number of TLAM missions and Navy TacAir strike and defense suppression sorties from 17 January through 7 February. The implication of the figure is that TLAM was employed early, before target defenses had been reduced, and later in coordination with TacAir. Each has its own capabilities; together, they get the job done with minimal TacAir losses.
Two carrier battle groups (CVBGs) bring about 100 combat aircraft to the theater of operations. A TacAir attrition rate of 5% losses on each strike would reduce the air wings to 60 aircraft in ten days—seriously degrading the CVBGs’ offensive capabilities. Even a 1% attrition rate will reduce the air wings to 70 aircraft in 35 days.
Obviously, TacAir attrition must be avoided. This is a key purpose of cruise missiles in modem strike warfare. Navy combat losses in Desert Storm included one F/A- 18, four A-6s (one returned but was damaged beyond repair), and one F-14. The F-14 was hit by a surface-to-air missile; the remainder, probably, by antiaircraft artillery fire. These losses represent an overall campaign attrition rate of about 2% of the Navy aircraft involved in 16,899 sorties. Losses were expected to be higher—and probably would have been, had cruise missiles not been available. With F/A-18s costing about $31 million each, and F-14Ds priced at almost $72 million, it is clear that we cannot afford to replace large numbers of aircraft lost in combat.
Despite the Tomahawk’s success in the Persian Gulf War, it does have shortcomings that may limit its utility and operational flexibility. Some are obvious: its limited reach, for example, dictated that launches from the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Mediterranean had to be made at or near maximum range. Other shortcomings are less obvious, and are linked to the way the missile navigates to the target and, in a larger sense, to the entire mission- and strike-planning process.
Tomahawk missiles use an inertial navigator, updated by reference to terrain elevation maps and visual reference scenes near the target. The terrain contour maps (Ter- Coms) contain a matrix of elevation data over a specific area. The missile samples the terrain profile over the maps, compares the profile with the stored data, and calculates its actual position. The corrected position is used to update the inertial navigator, and course corrections necessary to regain the preplanned route are calculated and implemented. Although the basic elevation data needed to construct the TerComs are generally available at the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), creation of the map itself still can be a time-consuming process.
This can cause an increase in mission-planning time, if TerComs are not immediately available. In other cases, the selection of mission routes is constrained by the need to overfly TerComs.
Under some circumstances, this can be tactically undesirable. As the missile approaches its target area, it must define its position more precisely than it can with TerComs. The missile accomplishes this by observing the
scene on the ground through an optical camera. This is compared with a reference scene stored in the computer’s memory, for necessary course corrections. In order for this to work, the observed scene must correlate with the stored reference scene. If it does not correlate well enough, there will be no navigation update and some degradation in terminal accuracy may occur. Therefore, the Tomahawk could be sensitive to substantial visual changes along the portions of its route to the target that are used for navigation reference scenes. To ensure that the stored scenes and observed scenes match sufficiently well, scenes that remain stable over time are chosen, and sophisticated processing techniques are employed within the guidance system to reduce or eliminate the impact of changes to the scene. When possible, missions are planned using imagery taken under conditions similar to those under which the mission will be flown.
This adds to the mission-planning and intelligence-gathering burden. When the missile overflies the visual map, >t calculates its actual position with a degree of accuracy limited, for practical purposes, only by the accuracy of the reference map itself. This error is small for most purposes—typically less than 18 meters—but too large for targeting accuracy. To remove the error in the geographic coordinates, the missile flies to a target position measured relative to the visual scene, since the relative position of °tie point to another can be measured far more accurately than the geodetic position. This results in a terminal profile that is as accurate as can be achieved using this navigational concept, and it is good enough for most stationary targets.
The missile, however, does not see the actual target, recognize it, and fly to it. The missile flies to a point in space and blows up. The missile’s navigation process is designed to refine continually the accuracy of its position with respect to that point as it flies toward the target. While we can be confident the target is near that point in space, we also know there will be some error involved. Furthermore, attaining acceptable terminal accuracy with this navigation concept requires significant mission planning time, sophisticated equipment and reference material, and skilled mission planners.
The complexity of the planning process is such that Tomahawk missions are planned ashore in advance of their actual need—using contingency target lists, DMA-produced mapping, charting and geodesy data, and intelligence information. They are provided to the shooters on magnetic storage media prior to deployment, or electronically while the ship is in theater.
This centralized planning concept is suited for operations against a well-known, long-term adversary about whom a great deal of information has been collected and stored over the years. It is not as well suited to deal with fast-moving, fluid situations in geographic areas where
accurate mapping and intelligence information may be difficult to obtain. This limits the Tomahawk’s ability to respond to tactical changes and emergent battlefield conditions. Obviously, it worked in Iraq—but we had months to prepare.
The Tomahawk mission-planning capabilities will move afloat when the afloat planning system (APS) is deployed.
together with the TLAM Block III Upgrade—which adds a satellite global positioning system (GPS) navigator to the missile. These advances will shorten planning time and provide a capability dedicated to the battle group commander’s specific, localized interests. However, it will not improve the missile’s terminal navigation abilities or its accuracy at the target. And it will not expand the types of targets it can successfully engage. It will, however, allow mission routes to be generated over areas where no TerCom exists, further expanding the number of targets at risk.
Strike planning is as critical as mission planning. The objective of strike planning is to provide force-level direction for integrated employment of multiple weapons and platforms. Mission planners construct detailed routes and sequences of events unique to a specific platform. Strike planners, on the other hand, are concerned with:
>- Identifying specific targets whose destruction will meet the objectives of the mission
>- Defining the constraints under which the strike will be executed, such as minimum acceptable probability of damage, acceptable probability of attrition, and collateral damage limitations
- Selecting the forces to be employed
>- Identifying weapons likely to be effective against the target set
>■ Pairing weapons and delivery platforms >- Defining the support requirements, including defense suppression missions, fighter support, electronic warfare support, search and rescue plans, refueling requirements, and others
>• Deconflicting in time and space the strike and support element missions
- Establishing required timing and dependencies among strike events
>- Assessing the probable effectiveness of the strike
Strike planning was conducted centrally during Desert Storm, using essentially manual methods, by a group of approximately 300 officers (six of whom were Navy) at the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s headquarters in Riyadh. Strike tasking was provided to the Navy component in the form of the Air Tasking Order (ATO), which identified the strike platforms, targets, and time- on-target requirements.
What little automated support the Air Force had was incompatible with Navy systems. This, together with the high volume of communications traffic, resulted in slow delivery to the fleet each day of the several-hundred-page ATO. Late delivery of the tasking reduced even further the already limited time available to complete the strike plan and develop individual mission plans for each strike element. Lack of appropriate automated support hampered the strike-warfare commander’s ability to develop support missions, deconflict strike elements, and evaluate probabilities of success. Compounding the difficulty of the problem were the specific concerns related to cruise-missile employment.
In the end, it all worked. Thousands of TacAir sorties were conducted daily, and there were no blue-on-blue engagements. It was a benign environment, however; our
only difficulties were those we created for ourselves.
The Tomahawk performed well, as expected. Its characteristics were understood beforehand, and Desert Storm provided no surprises—but it did serve to underscore both the capabilities and the limitations of the weapon system. These limitations are most apparent in strike-mission planning and missile guidance.
Strike planning today is a manual process. It can be tedious and difficult when worked out with stubby pencils, paper maps, and fill-in-the-blank worksheets. But a well-prepared strike plan is the vehicle that will ensure the effectiveness of strikes by employing the fewest assets needed to defeat a coordinated defense, and is the key to integration and deconfliction of friendly forces.
Cruise-missile mission planning needs to be simplified. The complexity of the planning process is driven principally by the missile guidance concept and design. Current design requires large quantities of accurate mapping and intelligence information, plus sophisticated processing capabilities. But even when that is provided, the missile still does not seek the target; it seeks a latitude and longitude. Even though it is widely recognized that mission planning is too hard and takes too long, the solution has been to take the shore-based theater-mission planning centers to sea—not to solve the basic problems. When APS is deployed, its great benefit to the Navy will be in terms of the operational flexibility it gives the on-scene commander to respond to local tactical changes, and to plan missions tailored to a particular set of contingencies.
Mission planning will remain a complex activity until the missile’s navigation and guidance package is replaced with an integrated electronics suite that includes an imaging sensor—or, more precisely, an imaging sensor that does not require sophisticated three-dimensional target imagery or detailed information unique to that Particular target. Even then, the possible simplification is not in the planning process per se, but in the data required to support the planning.
Selection of the appropriate sensor—there are several Potential candidates—may reduce planning-data quality and quantity requirements to the point that, for certain classes of targets and tactical situations, they can be effectively accomplished in near-real time by the launch platform.
The question now facing the cruise-missile program is how to upgrade the existing inventory of Tomahawk missiles. The Naval Air Systems Command cannot envision a new slate, even though that may be what is needed. In particular, the missile needs a faster processor, more data storage, a fiber optic bus, a terminal sensor, an integrated navigation and guidance system suitable for both antiship and land-attack missions—but it is too hard to make these kinds of changes in existing missiles. On the other hand, it appears that the airframe is good enough; survivability was not an issue in Desert Storm and probably will not be in other Third World scenarios. The airframe fits the launchers well, is common to ships and submarines, and, if the electronics were repackaged, would provide enough fuel space to achieve greater ranges.
There are glimmerings of a TLAM Block IV upgrade gathering speed as a result of Desert Storm successes (and limitations) and the death of the Long Range Conventional Standoff Weapon (LRCSW) program. Although TLAM Block IV requirements have not been defined. Block IV appears to be developing as an evolutionary upgrade of the Block III missile. Block III improvements addressed pieces of the missile, including the engine, terminal navigation capabilities (primarily data-processing improvements), mid-course guidance with the addition of GPS, and a new booster adequate to lift the heaviest variants out of the submarine vertical launcher while at depth. Block IV would address another piece. No one, however, appears to be addressing the whole missile.
The greatest potential for near-term improvement to cruise-missile operational capabilities lies in two developments: deployment of an integrated strike-planning system that supports coordinated, synergistic TLAM and TacAir employment, and integration of a missile guidance-navigation package that can be satisfied with a simple launch-platform-based planning system supported by readily available data bases. Off-the-shelf prototype systems exist to satisfy both requirements.
Commander Froggetl works at Tiburon Systems, Inc., in Arlington. Virginia. Before his retirement from the Navy in 1988. he was assigned duties as Deputy Program Manager, Ship Launched Cruise Missiles Program. Previous duty included tours in cruisers and destroyers and with the Seventh Fleet staff.
Jack of All Trades
Seaman Gabelli had been aboard the submarine for two years and had served passably, if not conspicuously, in every department. Each time an advancement examination cycle came around, however, he decided he wanted to try a different rating and declined to take the exam. Since his performance was always satisfactory, he was allowed to move to a new department.
Following one such move, a discussion took place among the officers concerning Gabelli. It was noted that he was qualified as a diesel engine throttleman, battery-charging electrician, torpedo room watchstander. sonar watchstander, and even as a cook. While he did none of these things well, he at least did them to the minimum standards. Summing up the discussion, the executive officer said. “Okay, Gabelli is a ‘jack of all trades and master of none,' but what are we going to do with him?”
At that point, one of the officers suggested, “We could always send him to Officer Candidate School.”
Commander Ed Ransom, U.S. Navy (Retired)