The U.S. Navy in 1990

Pending the final analysis of Desert Storm, Admiral Kelso said, the Navy will ^top to a force of 12 deployable carriers ^by this October with the scheduled retire- toent of the Midway (CV-4I). The Inde­pendence (CV-62) will relieve the Mid- "VV in Japan. The Constellation (CV-64) '''ill be in the service life extension pro­advanced procurement funds are not se­cure.

Also a worry, fiscal-year 1992-93 force structure cuts have forced revision of some of the naval aviation plan, instru­mental in fashioning the offensive punch of a CVBG. The fiscal-year 1992-97 six- year defense plan (SYDP) calls for air-

Elements of the Saratoga (CV-60), John F. Kennedy (CV-67), and Amer­ica (CV-66) carrier battle groups— here supporting Desert Storm—show the Navy’s top warfighting priority: power projection. But what happens when the carriers are cut to 12?

The Office of the Secretary of Defense last summer reduced the annual Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) buy from five to four. The Navy has also shelved plans to outfit them with helicopter hangars.

decided to split the fiscal year 1991 four- ship contract award, giving two ships each to Bath and Ingalls. In the fiscal 1992-93 budget, $4.3 billion is going to fund procurement of five of the Arleigh Burkes in fiscal 1992, and another $3.5 billion will go to the program for four DDG-51s in fiscal 1993. The two ship­yards will probably continue to split 50/50 the annual buy until five years later. To date, the Navy has issued con­tracts to build 17 DDG-51s. The lead ship is in sea trials, and four are in construc­tion. The six-year buy is now for 22 ships, down from 24.

Underwater

As for the Seawolf, the “major war­ship review” reduced the buy to alternate from one to two SSN-21s a year. The original Navy plan was for 29 Seawolfs by the year 2000, with three submarines per year beginning in fiscal 1992. The Pentagon scrub now calls for one sub per year in the fiscal 1992-97 SYDP until fiscal 1996, when the alternating buy will resume with two buys a year followed by one the year after.

Last year, Congress was worried by the program’s concurrency in ship de­sign, construction, and development of the BSY-2 combat system. The Navy now says that these aspects of the pro­gram are on schedule. Yet amidst con­flicting reports, some sources are saying that the SSN-21 program will stop with five or six boats. Fiscal 1992 budget doc­uments put the cost of the SSN-21 at $2.4 billion and the fiscal 1993 SSN-21 at $2.5 billion. Critics have been saying that the reduced buy will only support one shipyard. The lead Seawolf contract au­thorized in fiscal 1989 went to General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division. Elec­tric Boat is vying with Newport News Shipbuilding to get the fiscal 1991 con­tract for the first follow-on boat. As Pro­ceedings went to press, the Navy was still evaluating contractor proposals, and a decision was due shortly.

As for the undersea warfare com­munity’s other key shipbuilding program, the Trident submarine, Congress author­ized funding last year for the 18th boat. In the fiscal 1992 budget, the Pentagon decided to make that boat the last Trident, because of the decreased threat and the anticipated Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations. During the 1990s, the present mix of 34 Poseidon and Trident boats will drop to an 18- Trident submarine force. Current plans say that by the end of the 1990s eight of the Tridents will carry Trident I C-4 mis­siles, while the most recent 10, will have the Trident II D-5s. The fiscal 1992 bud­get deferred until after fiscal 1997 the D-5 backfit of first eight early Ohio (SSBN-726)-class Trident submarines that now carry C-4s.

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While the newest ten Ohio (SSBN- 726)-class submarines have Trident II D-5 missiles—here, a February 1990 test from the Tennessee (SSBN- 734)—backfitting them into the first eight has been deferred until fiscal year 1997.

Other Ships

As for other shipbuilding, the fiscal 1992-93 budget terminated the Wasp _t (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ship program at five ships. The service in­tended to buy the sixth and seventh Wasps during the SYDP. With the MEB requirement dropping from some four to two and one-half, the program lost its justification.

The Navy reprogrammed fiscal 1991 funds for a fourth Supply (AOE-6)-class fast combat support ship to complete pro­duction of the previous three. Fiscal 1992 j funding for what was to be the fifth AOE will go for the fourth instead. As a conse- j quence, said the CNO, the Navy will no longer be able to reach the goal of one AOE per battle group.

Looking at Navy warfighting, the CNO said that the fiscal 1995 CVBG , force of 12 carriers and about 150 surface combatants will enjoy a “distribution of firepower,” illustrated best by the intro­duction of cruise missiles across air, sur­face, and subsurface platforms, increas­ing the number of platforms capable of long-range striking power. Most obvi­ously, the success of the Tomahawk cruise missile enabled surface ships and SSNs to complement effectively strike aircraft in Desert Storm. Also successful in the operation was the Navy’s use of the Harpoon-derivative air-launched stand­off land attack missile (SLAM).

Admiral Kelso noted that the new im­portance for crisis response means more emphasis on joint and combined opera­tions, especially when those operations serve collective security alliances and understandings that are so central to U.S. foreign policy. With Operation Desert Storm, the ability of U.S. naval forces to integrate with other services and allies ' was key, largely thanks to the advances I in command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) connectivity since the Navy’s last major combined Persian Gulf operation, the Kuwaiti reflagging convoy mission, several years ago.

In Space

Recognizing the significance of C³I to maritime warfare, the Navy established on 1 August a fourth primary warfare mission area, Space and Electronic War­fare (SEW), as OP-094, equal to surface, | air, and undersea warfare. SEW intends to provide a coherent approach to the in­tegration, management, and tactical em­ployment of surveillance, targeting, com­munications, and EW systems.

The CNO reported progress in two key SEW programs. He told lawmakers in

February that the joint tactical informa­tion distribution system (JT1DS) has met all reliability requirements in the first Phase of operational testing. He also said that the smaller NATO version of JTIDS, the multi-functional information distribu­tion system (MIDS) for the F/A-18, has completed the program definition phase. Procurement also continues for extremely high frequency (EHF) satellite terminals.

In the Air

1990 was a year of serious setbacks for naval aviation. The unfolding scandal in the A-12 Avenger program had the most Portentous impact on how the Navy must approach its aviation future. The Navy long regarded the A-12 Avenger as its highest priority aircraft program to re­place the almost 30-year-old A-6 In­truder. With the cancellation of the A-12 >n January, the Pentagon has denied the Navy the opportunity to take a single step >nto the next generation of carrier-based aviation. Instead, it must now think in terms of a two-stage process that will in­clude an interim attack aircraft until a new long-range stealth attack aircraft becomes operational.

The Navy plan to develop an improved electron ic/fightcr (E/F) version of the F/A-18 Hornet to augment the plane’s attack capabilities means that the E ver­sion will upgrade the single-seat F/A- 18C, and the F version will upgrade the dual-seat F/A-18D. Over the next six years, $2 billion R&D funds will go for the upgrade. The Navy will reprogram some procurement money from the F/A- 18C/D program, reducing those buys, and will add those sums to amounts from the AX program. Some reports say that the Navy could buy as many as 1,700 Upgraded F/A-18s until the AX might become available in 2005.

The Navy is still looking at an alterna­tive such as the P-3H program to fulfill the long-range ASW maritime patrol air­craft requirement. This solution would upgrade some 280 P-3Cs by rewinging nnd installing General Electric T407 en­gines and a Boeing-developed Update IV avionics package. This approach, how­ever, would have to overcome limitations caused by the age of the airframe. A sec­ond alternative would be to buy from Lockheed’s current P-3 production line that is now fulfilling a South Korean con­tract for eight planes. A third alternative Would restructure the P-7A program to yield unit price benefits from possible foreign sales to Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Of the three poten­tial buyers, only Germany has a memo­randum of understanding (MoU) with the

Navy for P-7A R&D. The latter two countries simply have a maritime patrol aircraft requirement.

The V-22 Osprey

The Pentagon’s fiscal 1992 budget re­quest reiterated OSD’s highly controver­sial termination of the Marine Corps V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. Congress forced the Pentagon to fund the program in the fiscal 1991 budget with $402 mil­lion, of which $237 million was in R&D. Currently, the Navy is continuing V-22 full-scale development (FSD), drawing R&D funds from fiscal 1990 and 91. Four aircraft are in the flight test pro­gram, and as of January accumulated 360 flight test hours in 305 flights. The fifth V-22 was scheduled for first flight early this year, and a sixth is in production but may lack funds for completion. For more on naval aviation, see “U.S. Naval Air­craft and Weapon Developments in 1990,” by Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., page 160.

The People

On the defense management side. Navy acquisition will respond to OSD’s implementation of 1990 legislation that proposes to increase the professionalism of the defense acquisition workforce over the next three years. Among the regula­tions in the legislation is a requirement that by 1 October 1993 only members of a newly established acquisition corps can fill so-called critical acquisition posi­tions. The concept of the acquisition corps originated, however, in the Penta­gon’s own Defense Management Report (DMR), released in 1989. The DMR prompted the Navy and the other services to create their own acquisition profes­sionals, both civilian and military, and thereby increase the professionalism of the work force.

The fiscal 1991 defense authorization act defines critical acquisition positions as those to be filled by personnel that are Civil Service GS-14 and above or mili­tary 0-5 and above. These positions in­clude program executive officers, pro­gram managers of major and significant non-major defense acquisition programs and deputy program managers of major programs. The acquisition corps will ac­cept military candidates that reach 0-4 and civil servants at GS-13, along with industry equivalents. The corps will have only those who wish to dedicate their ca­reers to the acquisition field and thus will eliminate the “ticket punching” by the military that characterized some selection for acquisition billets in the past.

Until I October, the Pentagon will be designating these positions and develop­ing career path policy that will lead to them. The Navy will have until 1 October

1992. to identify the positions according to the Pentagon’s interpretation of the legislative criteria and must fill those positions by 1 October 1993. The legisla­tion designates 11 acquisition-related functional areas that lead to the acquisi­tion corps. The Pentagon is now creating these I 1 career paths and will set educa­tion and training policy to develop a workforce that can fill all critical acquisi­tion positions.

In order to comply, the Navy will have to adjust its own Materiel Professional Program that began with former Navy Secretary John Lehman. Its functional fields do not correspond to the 11 fields as neatly as the other two services, how­ever, and the service may have a harder time in the transition.

The new policy will give civilians more opportunity to become qualified acquisition work force professionals. OSD proposes to increase civilians in critical acquisition programs each year through fiscal 1996, although it will set no civilian quotas during the three-year transition.

The Navy still will be able to reserve some critical acquisition positions for naval officers, if required by law or com­mon sense. Beginning with the fiscal

1993. budget, the service will have to re­port annually which positions are re­served, and the number will change every year as programs come and go.

A major Navy achievement in Opera­tion Desert Shield was in military sealift. By 21 January as Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) had moved more than 13.4 billion pounds of cargo to the region including 4.4 billion pounds of dry cargo and 9 billion pounds of fuel. The amounts represent about 95% of equipment and supplies needed to sustain the U.S. forces in the operation. Said a Marine assistant MPS officer in A1 Jubayl, “It would take more than 1,000 C-141 cargo flights to deliver the same equipment as just one MPS 1 maritime prepositioning ship] ship.”

The sealift began on 7 August when MSC ordered two maritime preposition­ing ship (MPS) squadrons (MPSRON Two and MPSRON Three) to sail to the Persian Gulf. Nine ships laden with ma­teriel crossed the seas to support two Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) totalling 33,000 men. Eight days later, MPSRON Two arrived and began off­loading equipment and 30 days of sup­plies for the 7th MEB. MPSRON Three

ap/wide world

^arrived on 26 August with similar cargo for the 6th MEB. Thereafter, some ships continued sealift operations while others remained in the region as floating storage Platforms. Following the President’s 8 November announcement to deploy addi­tional troops, MSC began Sealift II, and °n 13 November MSC ordered a third NIPS squadron (MPSRON One) to sail with fuel and supplies for the 6th MEB, arriving on 13 December.

On 7-8 August, MSC had activated all ^e'ght fast sealift ships (FSSs), and except tor one ship undergoing maintenance, the activation of seven of the ships occurred Prior to the 96-hour expected schedule. The first three were ready in record time— one in 48 hours and the second two in 72 hours. These first FSSs arrived and began offloading in the Gulf on 27 Aug.

On 9 August, 10 Afloat Prepositioned Ships (APFs) laden with petroleum, Army and Air Force equipment, and a deployable Navy fleet hospital sailed to the region, with the first arriving on 17 August. The two hospital ships, Mercy and Comfort activated on 8 August.

Also on 9 August, MSC issued re­quests for proposals (RFPs) for chartered commercial cargo ships from both U.S. and foreign carriers. By mid-September, NlSC had under charter 10 U.S. dry cargo ^ships and three tankers in addition to 35 loreign dry cargo ships.

Beginning 10 August, MSC requested activation of 17 roll-on/roll-off ships Bom the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Also activated were two aviation logistics support ships carrying maintenance per­sonnel and equipment for Marine aircraft. % mid-January, 55 of the 96 RRF ships Were under MSC operational control. BRF ships are maintained, activated, and crewed by the Maritime Administration and transferred to MSC operational con- •rol once activated.

As of 15 January, MSC had 118 dry cargo vessels under charter to support

Desert Shield. MSC was operating 99 foreign dry cargo ships (breakbulks and roll-on/roll-offs) and four tankers. Seven more ships were on loan—two each from Kuwait and South Korea and three from Japan. Of U.S. ships under charter, MSC had six ships chartered prior to the opera­tion, 19 dry cargo ships and 20 tankers, along with the 55 RRF ships, 24 PPSs (13 MPSs and 11 APFs) and eight FSSs.

The Pentagon is producing a congres­sionally mandated mobility study of air­lift, sealift, prepositioning and amphibi­ous lift requirements. The Navy is developing options for additional roll-on/ roll-off capability and plans to acquire new construction and/or commercially available ships, pending the study’s re­sults.

• In a series of speeches late last year, senior Pentagon officials proposed a reor­ganization of some of the unified and specified commands into Pacific, Atlan­tic, Strategic, and Contingency com­mands. The proposed Pacific Command would have a predominantly maritime cast, and by implication its commander- in-chief (CinC) would be Navy. The plan would have the Atlantic Command, how­ever, center on heavy Army forces in Europe, implying that the CinCLant would be Army. As for the putative Stra­tegic Command, that CinC would be Air Force, but his command would include some of the Navy strategic assets—i.e., the fleet ballistic missile submarine force. As for the Contingency Command, one senior Joint Staff official described it as a “swing” command that would rely on Army airborne assets as the first units to be followed by Marines and finally Army heavy forces.
• Former Secretary of the Navy James Webb took issue with the continuing cen­tralization under the Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization and its effect on last year’s Operation Desert Shield. In 29 November testimony before the Senate

With help from strategist Edward Luttwak (right), former Secretary of the Navy James Webb testified in Congress against Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization and called Desert Shield a mistake.

Armed Services Committee, he charged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not meet with the President to give their views on the situation in the Persian Gulf. While the charge somewhat reflected muted Navy displeasure over the Chair­man of the JCS General Colin Powell’s handling of the crisis, it illustrated ser­vice reservations about the creation of the chairman as the President’s primary mili­tary adviser, to the exclusion of the ser­vice chiefs. General Powell defended himself against the allegation in 3 De­cember testimony before the Senate panel. The chairman said that he had not excluded the chiefs from any consultation and had met with them 30 times on Oper­ation Desert Shield to that point. The general, however, did not say whether the chiefs had presented their views indi­vidually and directly to the President.

• Desert Storm has meant that six carrier battle groups have been in the region at one time. The six CVBGs carried six CVWs and one significantly reinforced Marine air wing. In January, the carriers Saratoga (CV-60), John F. Kennedy (CV-67), Midway (CV-41), Ranger (CV- 61), Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), and America (CV-66) were deployed. The deployments meant that for the first time since the Vietnam War the Navy had to reduce exercises and readiness and main­tenance activities. In February, the Navy had no carriers in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. The Nirnitz (CVN-68) re­mained close to Bremerton, Washington, and San Diego, California, in January/ February, while the Forrestal (CV-59) operated off Mayport, Florida, during the same period.

The Independence was the first carrier to arrive on station in the Gulf of Oman on 7 August, five days after the Iraqi in­vasion of Kuwait. The same day, the Ei­senhower transited the Suez Canal en route to her station in the Red Sea. Two additional CVBGs arrived on station on 23 August. On 1 October the Indepen­dence became the first carrier to enter the Persian Gulf since 1974.

• From June 1990 to January 1991, Op­eration Sharp Edge with amphibious ships and Marine helicopters evacuated 2,609 people including 330 Americans from Liberia’s strife-torn capital city of Monrovia.
• On 4 January, Operation Eastern Exit

ran using Desert Shield amphibious ships and Marine helicopters to evacuate 260 people, including 51 Americans, from Mogadishu, Somalia during a civil war. The Somalia evacuation lasted less than 48 hours from execution orders. The op­eration was carried out at night when two CH-53 helicopters took off from Trenton in the Arabian Sea, flew 460 miles, achieved by the first refueling in-flight (at night) twice from Marine KC-130 tank­ers. Sixty Marines provided rear security to complete the evacuation.

► Despite last year’s progress in arms control toward enhancing global stability, the Navy position is unchanged on naval arms control. The Navy opposes Soviet and other arms control proposals for lim­iting general-purpose naval forces and operations. Says the Navy, “The U.S. need to operate naval forces, globally and unconstrained, is analogous to the Soviet need to maintain the freedom to reposi­tion armed forces within their borders.” The question of the dual-capability (nuclear/conventional) sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is important. Says the Navy, “The key contribution that nuclear SLCM makes today to the flexi­ble response capability of theater com­manders provides an essential component of extended deterrence without shore bas­ing problems.” As for future arms con­

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, who became the Navy’s 24th Chief of Naval Operations on 29 June, visits the crew of the destroyer O’Brien (DD-975) in the Persian Gulf.

trol discussions, the Navy wants to see them stick to the so-called Madrid Man­date that governs the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) talks. Among the key requirements in the mandate is that anything applying to naval activity at sea must be a part of an associated notifiable land activity on the European land mass. The Soviets had proposed a CSBM measure to require prior notification of major naval activities in European waters.

• The number of naval personnel who died in operational accidents declined almost 30 percent from 1989 to 1990, while the fiscal 1990 aviation accident rate of 1.96 per 100,000 flight hours was the lowest on record.
• Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm boosted the CNO’s recall authorization to more than 32,700. As of 7 February, the Navy had actually recalled more than 18,300 Navy selected reservists of which more than half were medical personnel to “backfill” continental United States fa­cilities. Other medical personnel went to the two activated reserve fleet hospitals and the hospital ships Mercy and Comfort (T-AH-19 and T-AH-20). '
• On 29 June, Admiral Frank Kelso II relieved retiring Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost at a change-of-command ceremony at the U.S. Naval Academy to become the Navy’s 24th CNO. Like his predeces­sor, Admiral Kelso is a submariner.

► The Naval Sea Systems Command study delivered to Congress last summer estimated that a sustained buy of only 10 ships per year would provide only a mini­mum workload for two or three major yards and three smaller yards. It also said that most Navy ships would have to be procured on a single-source basis and at higher unit costs. Currently five major shipyards and some one dozen other smaller yards build ships for the service.

• According to the CNO, “The Navy now provides over 96 percent of the in­come of the U.S. shipbuilding industry.” Especially vulnerable now is submarine shipbuilding, considering the current downturn. General Dynamics Electric Boat Division and Newport News Ship­building are currently building the last of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear attack submarines. Electric Boat has seven and Newport News, 10. With the cancellation of the Trident program at 18 submarines, the Seawolf (SSN-21) con­tract becomes crucial to both builders. Assuming that the budget plan can only allow one yard to build the SSN-21, if the award goes to Electric Boat, Newport News will still remain in business as a carrier builder. If the contract goes the other way, however, Electric Boat, which builds only submarines, could be forced to shut its gates with its last SSN- 688.
• Last April, the Navy reopened its in­vestigation of the Iowa (BB-61) disaster. In November, the service and the Sandia National Laboratory agreed to conduct more testing. A second meeting with Sandia was scheduled for January to de­termine the progress of the investigation but was postponed.
• On' 5 September, the Navy lifted the firing suspension for the Wisconsin’s (BB-64) 16-inch guns. Despite the suc­cesses of the battleship contributions to Desert Storm, this year the Navy will have to retire its two remaining battle­ships, the Wisconsin and Missouri (BB- 63) for budgetary reasons.
• Navy Inspector General Rear Admiral Ming Chang completed his investigation of overcharging by Bath on the (Arleigh Burke DDG-51) program. The investiga­tion concluded that the mischarging re­sulted from human error and not from any motive to deceive the government. As Proceedings went to press, the General Accounting Office (GAO), at the request of Congressman John Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the House Energy and Com­merce Committee, was still conducting its own investigation.
• On 14 December, Secretary of the Navy Garrett signed a memorandum to streamline Navy research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities. The new RDT&E concept includes the creation of four warfare centers and a streamlined Navy corporate laboratory structure. The new Air Warfare Center will report to the Naval Air Systems

Command. The new Undersea and Sur­face Warfare Centers will report to the Naval Sea Systems Command. The new Command, Communications, and Ocean Surveillance Center will report to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Com­mand. The Chief of Naval Research will continue to exercise command authority over the Navy corporate laboratory struc­ture.

The three systems commanders and the Chief of Naval Research submitted to the Secretary detailed restructuring plans in ^mid-April 1990. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gerald Cann led an executive review group to address broad policy is­sues regarding the implementation of the initiative.

^ The fiscal 1991 authorization bill au­thorized Navy active-duty manpower at 570,500. The Navy requested 569,721, ^and the fiscal 1992 request calls for a drawdown of 18,321, bringing the fiscal 1992 total to 551,400. Congress endorsed Navy fiscal 1991 plans to reduce person­nel levels in proportion to force level re­ductions and without resorting to invol­untary separations. Instead, the Navy will ^end strength by reducing the number of °tlicer and enlisted personnel entering the service and retiring senior enlisted Personnel under high-year tenure and of­ficers under the Defense Officer Promo­tion Management Act (DOPMA), plus selective early retirements (SERs) if nec­essary. The Naval Academy brigade of midshipmen will decrease to less than 4,000 by fiscal 1995 from the current 4,525. Naval ROTC accessions will drop from the current level of 1,600 to 1,100 the same year. Last December, the first SER board convened using DOPMA pro­cedures to select 442 officers to retire by 1 August.

• On 21 December, an Israeli-chartered liberty ferry shuttling crew members of the Saratoga capsized and sank off Haifa, Israel, resulting in the deaths of 20 sail­ors. An additional crew member was missing and was presumed drowned.
• On 29 January, the Secretary of De­fense announced that the Pentagon was considering 17 Navy bases and other shore facilities for closure, reduction, or realignment (by consolidation with other existing facilities) during fiscal 1991 and beyond. Fourteen of those installations were domestic, and three were foreign— Nea Makri, Greece (closed 17 August), San Miguel, Philippines (realigned), Ber­muda (realigned). The announcement included two naval shipyards— Philadelphia and Long Beach. Slated for fiscal 1991 consideration were Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts, and Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan.
• On 18 September, the Secretary of Defense announced that eight Navy and Marine Corps shore installations were among 151 overseas bases being planned

A floating crane raises the Tuvia, an Israeli ferry that sank off Haifa Harbor in rough seas on 21 Decem­ber, killing 21 crew members from the USS Saratoga (CV-60), here, in the background.

for closure, reduction, or realignment during fiscal 1991 and beyond, in addi­tion to those on the January list. The Sep­tember list included installations in Ber­muda (one realigned), Argentia, Newfoundland (one realigned), Okinawa (two: one closed, one partially closed), Western Australia (realigned), Naples (realigned), Cartagena (two: one rea­ligned, one to close by the end of fiscal 1991) and Guardamar (one to close by the end of fiscal 1991).

► On 25 October, the Secretary of the Navy responded to reports of sexual har­assment and sexual offenses, including incidents at the Naval Academy and at the Naval Training Center in Orlando, Florida, saying that the commands are responsible for thoroughly investigating such allegations and aggressively pursu­ing “those which are founded.” He said that the Navy and Marine Corps have zero tolerance for such cases and termed them as “degrading, to the perpetrator as well as the victim.”

Mr. Morton is a writer and editor for Report From America.