This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Colonel John C. Scharfen, U.S. Marine Corps, (Retired)
The most important Marine Corps accomplishments of 1990 were those associated with Operation Desert Shield, later designated Desert Storm, covered in detail elsewhere in this issue. No aspect of the deployment of Fleet Marine Forces, however, was more significant for the future of naval forces than the performance of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF).
The Maritime Prepositioning Force: General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps describes the MPF as “One of the most crucial capabilities that we have today. . . . What we have done here is double our capability to go to war in each ocean. That’s a magnificent capability, one of the all-time great success stories of our Corps. We need to make sure that we know how to use that capability, and that we indeed remain second to none in this whole arena.”1
In 1990, Marines took a big step toward learning how to use this capability. In August, as Iraq invaded Kuwait and the MPF was underway for the Persian Gulf, planners released an updated version of Operational Handbook 1-5, “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations.”2
The MPF evolved from a Secretary of Defense concept in 1979 to an operational success in 1990. ’ The capability is defined officially as “A rapid deployment and assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade in a secure area using a combination of strategic airlift and forward-deployed maritime prepositioning ships.”4
It has three organic elements:
- a Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadron—four to five ships
- a Marine air-ground task force
- a Navy support element
The Military Airlift Command becomes a principal supporting element of an MPF operation when it Hies Marines to meet their equipment, as was done during Desert Shield.
The definition ties the MPS to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), but the Desert Shield experience suggests that the MPF should not be limited to support of a mechanized, heavy brigade— as originally conceived. Marines can anticipate that there will soon be a doctrinal shift to configure the prepositioning squadrons to support units other than brigades.5
The three operational MPS squadrons— a total of 13 Military Sealift Command (MSC) chartered ships—are loaded with equipment and 30 days of supplies for each of three Marine brigades. The squadrons are generally forward- deployed—one to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, one at Guam, and the third off the East Coast of the United States.
All three squadrons sailed to the Persian Gulf in support of Desert Shield Marines during 1990. They gave the Marines unprecedented and much-envied support during the early, risky stages of the deployment. Three of the five ships in MPS-2 (based at Diego Garcia) arrived in the Gulf by 15 August. The last ship, which had been undergoing routine maintenance in Jacksonville, Florida, arrived on 5 September.
Despite the unchallenged success, there are lessons. While doctrine provides for a strict sequence for ship arrivals, to match the arrival of the off-loading elements, it doesn’t always work out that way. In early August, two ships from the Diego Garcia squadron and one from the Guam squadron were out of position. There were command delays in authorizing the deployment and off-loading of squadrons—the order to deploy the first squadron was not made until 7 August, five days after the Iraqi invasion. The unloading party could have been moved to the Gulf earlier.
The MPF concept itself, however, proved sound. Millions of tons of supplies and equipment were off-loaded at Saudi ports in record-breaking time and the system proved flexible enough to accommodate the unforeseen. One of the highlights of the operation was the excellent condition of the equipment and stocks that were unloaded, a tribute to the Navy and Marine Corps’s scrupulous onboard maintenance and adherence to the shore-based maintenance conducted over the past decade. The excellent Saudi port facilities were another big plus.
Challenges lie ahead for planners—the squadrons must be back-loaded and procedures must be reviewed. Nevertheless, the U.S. Marine Corps has maintained its position at the forefront in developing concepts and techniques for projecting
ground combat power across the oceans of the world.6
Roles and missions: Last year’s Naval Review reported that the services had “crossed the line of departure and clashed in the first skirmishes of what appears to be a minor roles-and-missions battle.”7 In 1990, the common enemy— Saddam Hussein—the press of military operations, the increased authority of unified commanders and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, and the admonitions of a strong Secretary of Defense, has lowered the intensity of the skirmishing. To some extent, interservice conflicts have been promoted and exaggerated by the media.8
Make no mistake, however; they are ongoing and the Marine Corps is one of the combatants. Well before Desert Storm, Lawrence Korb, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, wrote, “Whether or not U.S. forces are ultimately drawn into battle in the Persian Gulf, their leaders in the Pentagon are already locked in a bloodless but fierce engagement: the fight for budget dol- ) lars.”9
As the smoke of the Iraqi battle clears, the Army and the Marine Corps will continue to compete for budget priority as the nation’s deployable force in readiness, even though there have been some convincing disclaimers of this basic conflict. “You get a lot of people mesmerized by history and believing that the Army is going to do us away. . . . [Some people] see an Army general under every bed,” according to General P. X. Kelley, former Commandant of the Marine Corps.10
General Gray and Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono were models of non-partisan decorum when they testified at a House Armed Services Policy Subcommittee hearing on contingency forces. One of the lines in General Vuono’s written testimony that he dis- \ cretely did not deliver in his oral presentation stated that the Army was also charged to “organize, equip and provide for joint amphibious and airborne operations.”11 (Emphasis added.) The statement is, of course, true, but Vuono’s withholding the comment demonstrates
his sensitivity to controversy with the ! Marine Corps.
Other spokesmen for the two services have been less politic. General John W. boss, the Commanding General of the ' U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command puts it this way, “Some within the Marine Corps over the past have tried to make the case that they are the only force that can do low-intensity conflict. The Army has always done low-intensity conflict and will continue to do it.”12 Foss, who may qualify as the Army Point man in the conflict, said in another ■nterview, “The Army is in fact designed to do low-intensity conflict much better than the Marine Corps because [those conflicts] include special forces and all types of forces to support a nation, such as engineer units.”12 Lieutenant General Carl E. Mundy emerged as the point man for the Marine Corps when he told an interviewer, “The thing we don’t need is two Marine Corps °r two Armies. People get enthusiastic and they tend to get carried away that you i can do everything with light forces, that you can fly everywhere that you need to go. But the fact is that you can’t.”14 The Army’s case has been vigorously argued in professional journals. According to Colonel James B. Motley, U.S. Army (Retired), “The key to restructur- lng the army will be units designed for rapid deployment into areas where U.S. interests require quick support. . . . The roles and missions, particularly of the Army and Marine Corps, require serious thinking in the next few years.”15
The Marine Corps countered with an entire issue of the Marine Corps Gazette devoted to roles and missions. A 47-page extract of the issue was prepared and distributed widely throughout the defense establishment.16
Now that Desert Storm is history, the terms of the Army-Marine Corps competition for roles and missions may change from low-intensity conflict to something that more closely accommodates the Middle East mid-level war scenario. Marine Corps advocates, however, would be foolish to believe that there will be any diminution in the roles and missions controversy. General Mundy said it best: “There is a truism in Washington that the battle for roles and missions is indirectly proportional to the size of the budget . . . it’s that simple.”17
The budget: When the Commandant was asked what the most disappointing event of 1990 was for the Marine Corps, he replied, “The budget,” and indicated his concern for Marine Corps end- strength in coming years.18 In November, the President signed a $288.3 billion fiscal year 1991 defense budget. The Marine Corps share was $9.1 billion—a re-
Much of the Marine air-ground team went to the Middle East. This AH-1W, armed with Hellfire missiles, attacked Iraqi positions while supporting Marines in action near Khafji, Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm.
duction of about $140 million from the preceding year. The Marine Corps’s proposed end-strength is 177,000 by 1995, which represents a 9.9% cut from the fiscal year 1990 authorization.
The Army, however, faces an 18.8% reduction, the Navy 14.1%, and the Air Force a 21.3% cut over the same period. In light of JCS proposals to reduce Marine Corps strength to 139,000 by 1995, the congressionally mandated 177,000 figure constitutes deliverance. Congress and the administration continue to believe that Marines are a bargain. The Marine Corps costs but 4.8% of the current defense budget, yet delivers 12% of the nation’s active, general purpose divisions, 11% of the tactical fixed-wing aircraft, and 9% of the total armed forces.19
The MV-22 Osprey. The MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor—designed to replace aging CH-46s—continues to be a burning issue. The competition for dollars moved a prudent Corps leadership to shift the focus from the MV-22 to more critical
An MV-22 tiltrotor lands on the USS Wasp (LHD-1) during recent shipboard compatibility tests. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney keeps taking MV-22 money out of the budget— and Congress keeps putting it back.
priorities to guarantee that Marines maintain their status as the nation’s “force in readiness”.20
Events in the Persian Gulf further sublimated the still-real concern for the survival of the aircraft. The aircraft’s potential, fortunately, is sufficiently compelling to cause lawmakers to continue voting funds for research and development; the Congress in November approved $603 million for the aircraft.
Operations and Exercises: Desert Storm aside, there were other significant events. Marines did not completely redeploy from Operation Just Cause in Panama until mid-June when the last 600 Marines of Task Force Semper Fi disembarked from amphibious ships at More- head City, North Carolina.
Marines ended nearly two years in Panama, with much of the time devoted to providing US Embassy security, training the Panamanian national police force, conducting post-operation security sweeps, and performing a series of humanitarian services for the Panamanians.
Operation Sharp Edge saw the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) land by helicopter in the compound of the American embassy in Monrovia, Liberia, to evacuate noncombatants from that war-ravaged city. (See p. 102 for more on Sharp Edge).
The Defense Department’s participation in the anti-drug campaign is continuing. Few Marines doubt that once Desert Storm ends, they will again be required to focus their interests on the drug war.
Operation Cobra Gold—April through june—Was the ninth and largest in a series of U.S.-Thai exercises; it included joint and combined air, land, amphibious, and special operations evolutions.
During June and July, Exercise Freedom Banner tested the feasibility of using MPS ships to provide humanitarian assistance in disaster areas. The MPS ship MV Sgt. William R. Button used “critical path” back loading, which offers a better way to unload cargo selectively—less than 25% of the cargo had to be moved to reach the 15% that was needed. Planners believe that performance can be substantially improved.21
Concepts and Doctrine: Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the prevailing wisdom was that the next war would consist of low-intensity conflict. The war in the Persian Gulf will require a reevaluation of this wisdom and the Army-Marine Corps roles and missions competition, which will undoubtedly resurface, may be argued within entirely different parameters.
The war might have provided the opportunity to evaluate contemporary concepts and techniques for conducting amphibious operations but the collapse of the Iraqi forces and the speed of the land campaign precluded any requirement for a landing on the eastern flank of the battle field—although the Fourth and Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigades were ready.
These amphibious forces created what B. H. Liddell-Hart called a “strategic distraction.” Amphibious feints along the coast helped pin Iraqi defenders in southeast Kuwait while Coalition armored, mechanized, and airborne forces swept north and east to the banks of the Euphrates River—trapping the Iraqi Republican Guards and cutting off any hope of escape.
There has not been a major amphibious assault since Inchon in 1950 and the capabilities for defending against amphibious operations have undergone substantial change. In the words of Philip Gold, “The World War Il-style amphibious assault has gone the way of the cavalry charge, but the Marines have spent almost 20 years working on techniques for the era of Exocet missiles and other nasty devices. . . . Although the Corps still lacks a true over-the-horizon assault capability (which the much-canceled Osprey vertical takeoff transport would do much to provide), its new tactics and techniques may well prove effective against Saddam Hussein’s advanced weaponry. . . .”22
Three principal maneuver warfare questions are appropriate:
- Was FMFM 1—Warfighting—a realistic guide for combat?
- Was Marine Corps training up to the requirements of maneuver warfare?
- If maneuver warfare concepts had never been institutionalized within the Marine Corps, would the war have been fought differently?
The future of the MPF should be a major issue in postwar analyses. There are reports that the Army may go into the (seabased) prepositioning business.
Training and education: On 10 July, the School of Advanced Warfighting opened at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. The new school provides a second-year graduate study program of warfighting that is an extension of the Command and Staff curriculum. In August, another one- year school—the Art of War Studies—• was inaugurated with six Marine Corps officers. Future classes will include students from other services. The school is designed to prepare students to serve on the Command and Staff College faculty and fill senior command and staff positions.
Marines trained in 1990 as they did during the early days of the Corps in ship boarding/landing party operations as they prepared to assault Persian Gulf oil rigs and board commercial shipping to enforce the blockade of Iraqi ports. The Marine Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, refined training plans and exercise requirements to accommodate the needs of fighting in the deserts of the Middle East.
In May, Marine general officers participated in a two-day war game with a South American counter-drug scenario.23
There was controversy over the three- year-old requirement that Naval Academy midshipmen planning to be commissioned in the Marine Corps attend the Quantico-based “Bulldog” summer officer candidate program. “In the six years before Bulldog became mandatory for midshipmen seeking Marine commissions, the service took in an average of 168 Naval Academy midshipmen a year. After Bulldog, the number dropped to 112 in 1989, 93 in 1990 and may decline further in the class of 1991.”24 [ed. note: In February 1991, 96 Naval Academy midshipmen from the class of 1991 asked to be commissioned in the Marine Corps.]
As a possible harbinger of things to come, Congress passed legislation that required the Secretary of Defense to report why all officers (to include Academy and regular ROTC graduates) should not be commissioned into the reserves, rather than the regular establishment, and compete for regular commissions.
Manpower: Nearly 80% of the Fleet Marine Force was deployed late in 1990, mostly in the Persian Gulf, which created Unforeseen problems for manpower planners.
Schooling, transfers, training cycles, retirements, release from active duty, secessions, maintenance of recruiting standards, uncertainty about programmed reductions in end-strength—all contributed to a hectic year for the Corps’s manpower chief. About 13,000 regular and reserve Marines were retained on active duty after normal expiration of service dates under congressionally authorized stop-loss provisions.
By the end of the year the Marine Corps was approaching the threshold of 23,000 in its call-up of reserves, the max- 'mum allowed under 1990 authorizations. The first call-up authorization was for 180 days, which was extended for a second 180 days. Most of the activations Were of combat units.
The supporting establishment was also called upon to fill foxholes and cockpits 'n Saudi Arabia. Company “A” of the ceremonial guard at Marine Barracks, 8th and “I”, Washington, D.C. was deployed, marking the first time in more 'ban eighty years that guard had been committed to combat. Prior to that, units had fought the Seminole Indians in 1837 and confronted John Brown at Harpers Terry in 1859—serving under Robert E. Lee.25
By 1995, the Marine Corps and Navy Will face 14% reductions in numbers of flag and general officers (compared to 1991). The Army faces a 22% cut and the Air Force a 7% cut. The Marine Corps’s ratio of general officers to active-duty strengths is—and will remain—the lowest of all the services; the 1995 figure will be 3.4 generals per 10,000 troops. The Air Force will have the highest ratio— 6.7 generals per 10,000 airmen.
Despite the turbulence, uncertainty and hardships that Marines and sailors have endured through the last half of 1990, morale appeared high. In a tongue-incheek remark on a September visit, the Commandant told Marines in Saudi Arabia, “There will be no morale problems in the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force because I say there will be morale.”26
Marines were happy with the findings of a survey conducted by the Navy’s recruiting advertising agency, which found that American males believe the Marine Corps provides the best leadership and self-discipline training of all the services. Only 23% of those polled, however, believed that the Marine Corps offered the best opportunity for a military career (versus 17% for the Navy, 25% for the Air Force, and 36% for the Army).27
Excessive drinking concerned the commandant. He admonished the Corps that “the untempered use of alcohol will result in the deterioration of Marine Corps readiness,” and directed commanders to do something about it. “We cannot afford to carry any Marines impaired by alcohol use,” he said.28
The role of women in the armed services remains controversial. General Gray has said that there are no women Marines—just Marines. It was not en-
Women serve, but they have yet to gain real acceptance in the Corps, BGen. Gail Reals said.
couraging, however, when Brigadier General Gail Reals, was quoted upon retirement: “Many times we’re (women Marines) more loyal to the organization than the organization is loyal to us. . . .” General Reals said of equality for women in the Marine Corps, “There is still a very basic issue of acceptance. We talk about sexual harassment, we talk about all these things, but to me they’re all symptoms. To me the illness is basic acceptance.”29
Aviation: In his May aviation posture statement Lieutenant General C. H. Pitman, in a manner most politic, managed to avoid making a single reference to the controversial V-22 Osprey. He did manage to highlight the need for replacements for the CH-46Es and CH-53A/D helicopters (read, preferred alternative: the Osprey) when he stated: “I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of our medium-lift shortfall. We are prepared to move out smartly when we have the results of the COEA [Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis mandated by Congress to evaluate the merit of the Osprey vis a vis other DoD-proposed alternatives]. This program is our Commandant’s . . . number one priority,” he said.30
Radars are going into 24 AV-8B Harriers by 1993. The AV-8Bs are currently the only operational jet aircraft in the Navy and Marine Corps inventory without a radar. Spain and Italy are planning to operate radar-equipped AV-8s and are helping to pay for the development. The aircraft, to be dubbed the Harrier II Plus, will get an uprated engine with an additional 3,000 pounds of thrust. Marine Corps AV-8Bs began Hying combat missions in Desert Storm.
A provision of the 1991 defense bill mandated that the Air Force transfer to the Army and Marines the A-10 “Wart- hogs,” which have performed so well as tank-killers in Desert Storm.
Sealift: “Sealift matters even more than you planned, no matter how well you planned.”31
A joint, Navy-Marine Corps “Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC Air Support Requirements Study” that is advertised as “a totally new approach” for determining requirements for amphibious lift was published in 1990.
While a great proportion of the forces deployed to the Persian Gulf were airlifted into the objective area, 90 to 95% of their equipment and supplies—as usual—-went by sea. Sealift, whether amphibious shipping, the MPS squadrons, or the myriad other U.S. national maritime assets used in amphibious oper-
ations, is the sine qua non and life’s substance for the Marine Corps. Generations of Marines—and their Navy counterparts— have appreciated this critical requirement and lobbied for amphibious and support shipping. During the 1970s, nevertheless, for a period of about eight years, the Navy did not fund a single amphibious ship.32
One of the most promising developments is the Navy program to develop a multibillion dollar amphibious assault ship named the LX. Similar to an LSD, it would be designed to carry a Marine landing force—to include the troops, helicopters, and landing craft. The first ship of a class of 27 would enter the fleet about 2000. Without an aggressive ship building program, the current inventory of 63 amphibious ships will shrink to 38 by 2010.33
Work continued on the construction of the USS Essex (LHD-2) and the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3). Both are Wasp (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ships. Two other amphibious shipbuilding programs are continuing—the Whidbey Island class LSD-41 and an LSD-41 cargo variant.
Other Weapons and Equipment: As this was written, the battleships Missouri (BB-63) and Wisconsin (BB-64) were providing destructive naval gunfire support for Marines against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Yet both battleships in the fleet are scheduled for decommissioning. The Gulf experience could breathe new life into these venerable dreadnoughts but the odds are against it.
Faced with a serious threat from Iraq, the adequacy of the U.S. nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) protective gear was questioned during 1990. The Canadians loaned Marine Corps fixed-wing pilots 210 NBC masks and Headquarters Marine Corps made a tentative commitment to purchase the system as a standard issue.
In the planned mechanized deployment to the Persian Gulf, the Marine Corps was scheduled to have four and a half tank battalions in the area—including the 4th and the 8th from the reserves. The 2d Tank Battalion was to be equipped with MlAls, while the remaining battalions would operate M60s, equipped with reactive armor. The Corps plans to buy about 215 specially configured amphibious MlAls.
The Saudis are sufficiently impressed with the light armored vehicle (LAV) that they have ordered more than 1,000 of the LAV-25 model (armed with a 25-mm. chain gun and a 7.62 machine gun) for their National Guard.
Reflections: General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the 20th Commandant of the Marine Corps, died at the age of 94 at his home in La Jolla, California. General Shepherd, the first Commandant to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, graduated from the Virginia Military Institute, and commanded Marines in both world wars. He was wounded twice at Belleau Wood, and was later awarded the Navy Cross, the Army Distinguished Service Cross, and the French Croix de Guerre. He commanded the Sixth Marine Division in the Pacific during World War II.
General Shepherd served while the Marine Corps was emerging as a seaborne fighting force of great combat power. The amphibious forces afloat in the Gulf and the Maritime Prepositioning Force, built on this legacy, have proved stellar performers. The utility of a military presence short of active conflict should get high marks; especially since military presence to achieve political objectives became anathema to military planners after the 23 October 1983 terrorist bombing of a Marine barracks in Beirut.
Many believe, however, that it was only the token, extremely vulnerable military presence of Navy, Army, Air Force, and" Marine Corps units in early August that kept Saddam Hussein from marching across Saudi Arabia. There appears to be a consensus that the mere presence of the amphibious forces afloat in the Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf fixed a large Iraqi force threatened by amphibious assault. The performance of Marines in 1990 is an indication of a continuing requirement for amphibious forces.
'Briefing, “Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioning Force Concepts and Capabilities,” Headquarters Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., available in the HQMC Operational Division, undated.
2Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Tactical Memorandum PZ and United States Marine Corps Development Command Operational Handbook 1-5 (OH 1-5) “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations,” 15 August 1990.
3For a detailed account of the genesis and early development of the MPF, see Colonel James J. Stewart, USMC, Colonel John C. Scharfen, USMC (Ret) and Lieutenant Colonel John S. Lowery, USMC, “Maritime Prepositioning Enhances Marine Capabilities,” Amphibious Warfare Review, Vol. 2, November 1984, p. 8.
4OH 1-5, pp. 1-3.
interview with Major R. Gerlaugh, USMC, Warfighting Requirements Branch, Operations Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 18 January 1991.
6This report on the MPF was based on an 18 January 1990 interview with Major Robert Gerlaugh, USMC, of the Operations Division of Headquarters Marine Corps.
7Col. J. C. Scharfen, USMC (Ret), “The U.S. Marine Corps in 1989,“Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1990, p. 178.
8See “Semper Fi, Saddam,” Newsweek, 24 September, 1990; “Armies without adversaries,” Boston Globe, 18 July 1990, p. 14; and “Rivalries Among the Branches,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 January 1991, p. 27; “The Knife Is Out For The Marines,” Baltimore Sun, 16 May 1990, p. 11; W. Flannery, “Friendly Fire, Army and Marine Corps Fight Over Combat Role,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1 April 1990, p. 4B; L. Korb, “The War Inside the Pentagon,” Washington Post, 25 November 1990, p. C-4; and “British troops in command tussle”, Pete Almond, London Daily Telegraph, 12 January 1991, p. 10.
9L. Korb, Washington Post, 25 November 1990, p. C-4.
10J. Schwartz, “Semper Fi, Saddam,” p. 24.
"R. Ropelewski, “Low Intensity Skirmish Opens 1990 Roles-and-Missions War,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1990, p. 14.
12J. Ross and B. Schemmer, “An exclusive AFJI interview with General John W. Foss, USA,” Armed Forces Journal International, March 1990, p. 63.
13T. Donnelly, “Army, Marines butt heads over contingency role,” Army Times, 26 March 1990, p. 3.
I4E. Donovan, interview with Lt. Gen. Carl E.
Mundy, “Marines ready to defend against an Army takeover of its fast attack mission,” Navy Times, 8 January 1990. p. 25.
,5Col. J. Motley, U.S. Army (Ret.), “The 21st Century Army,” Defense and Diplomacy, July 1990,
p. 8.
l6Marine Corps Gazette, May 1990. The issue was devoted to articles focusing on missions such as Marine Corps peacetime functions, employment, and sea-based indirect warfare.
17 Navy Times, 8 January 1990, ibid.
18Gen. A1 Gray, U.S. Marine Corps, in conversation on 1 January 1991.
19BGen. P.D. Williams, U.S. Marine Corps, “In Every Clime and Place,” Amphibious Warfare Review, Fall/Winter 1990, p. 6.
20U.S. Marine Corps publication, “Concepts and Issues, 1990,” undated, pp. 1-5.
21 “New NPF Concept Tested During Freedom Banner-90,” Marine Corps Gazette. September 1990, p. 6.
22P. Gold, “The Lessons of Ear Lie in Wait,” Insight, 11 February 1991, p. 11.
23“Washington Insight,” Los Angeles Times. 16 July 1990, p.5.
24E. Donovan, “Six Weeks of Hell,” Navy Times, 5 November 1990, p. 12.
25Cpl. J. Moore, Leatherneck, February 1991, p. 45.
26D. Jehl, “There’ll Be No Low Morale, Marines Told,” Los Angeles Times, 27 September 1990, p. L 27J. Burlage, “Survey shows Navy burdened by nerd • image,” Navy Times, 30 July 1990, p. 4.
28E. Donovan, “More hard drinkers found to be Marines,” Navy Times, 26 March 1990, p. 2.
29E. Donovan, “Corps’ actions speak louder than words for Reals,” Navy Times, 18 June 1990, p. 10. | j
30LtGen. C. Pitman, “Aviation Posture Statement,” as printed in the Marine Corps Gazette, May 1990, p. 53.
31M. Polcalyko, “Desert Shield: The First Lessons Learned,” Proceedings, October 1990, p. 58.
32R. Holzer, “Navy Hopes to Land Versatile Amphibious Ship,” Defense News, 5 November 1990, p. 36.
33K. Thompson, “Is the Marine Corps the Navy’s Unloved Stepchild?” Armed Forces Journal International, August 1990, p. 56. <
Colonel Scharfen is a senior scientist at TITAN Systems, Inc., in Vienna, Virginia, and was a member of the board of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation and the Marine Corps Association. He has lectured on strategy and general war planning at the U.S. Joint Staff College, [ed. note. This is Col. Scharfen’s last column for our annual Naval Review—we will miss him.]