Two Steps Ahead

“I can’t say enough about the two Marine divisions. If I use words like brilliant, it would really be an under­description of the absolutely superb job they did ...” —General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command

Tt has been said that success has a thousand fathers;

I failure is an orphan. Battlefield success by the Marines Ain Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was attained with excellent leadership, exceptional troops, extensive training, exhaustive advance planning, a thoroughly inte­grated philosophy of warfighting, and the support of thou­sands of stateside Marines who focused their energies on providing the best possible support to the deployed Ma­rines. As units from the Fleet Marine Forces operated in the Persian Gulf—and concurrently in Liberia, Somalia, and the Philippines—the Marine Corps could also turn to a superb organization, newly designed to provide immedi­ate, responsive support for such contingencies. Before the first Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPSs) unloaded at A1 Jubayl, one of these support organizations, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfighting Center at Quantico, had already begun looking at ways to support the coming battle.

The Fleet Marine Force units performed well because of their high state of combat readiness, maintained over most of the past decade. In retrospect, however, success can be , traced directly to the Marine Corps’s philosophy of war- fighting—a philosophy which, in war and in peace, in the field and in the rear, tells us how we fight and how we prepare to fight.

Today, that philosophy—maneuver warfare-—is ex­plained in a paperback field manual, which Marines call FMFM 1. Its clear and descriptive title is Warfighting. It provides an understanding of the characteristics, prob­lems, and demands of war, and from that understanding derives a theory of war. Principles of maneuver warfare— initiative, action in the face of uncertainty, unity of effort— apply to the operating forces, and also to the supporting establishment that trains, equips, and readies those forces for duty. These principles, which establish the basis for how we wage war today and how we will prepare for war tomorrow, are the foundation upon which the Warfighting Center is built.

On 10 November 1987, the 212th birthday of the Ma­rine Corps, Commandant A. M. Gray unveiled reorgani­zation plans designed to unify and expand Marine Corps training and planning capabilities, while increasing effi­ciency in education, organization, material-requirements

identification, and concept and doctrinal development. At the heart of the Commandant’s reorganization was an ex­pansion of the roles of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) at Quantico, Virginia. To reflect accurately its increased responsibilities, the Marine Corps Development and Education Command was re­named the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Under MCCDC five separate, but functionally related, centers were established: the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Center, Training and Education Center, Intelligence Center, Wargaming and Assessment Center, and Information Technology Center.

The pivotal organization of the Combat Development Center is the Warfighting Center. As an advocate for the Fleet Marine Forces, it focuses on developing operational concepts, studies, doctrine, plans, and providing proponency functions. In its capacity as the FMF repre­sentative, the Warfighting Center works with other agen­cies at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Combat Development Center to identify and validate warfighting deficiencies, while assessing structure, doctrine, training, and materiel requirements.

Much of the Warfighting Center’s work well before Desert Shield contributed directly to the successful sup­port of that operation. Foremost among these efforts was the creation of a series of service plans that articulated the Commandant’s vision for the future: the Campaign Plan, MAGTF Master Plan, and Long Range Plan provided a unified way to determine requirements for expeditionary operations in regional conflicts. These plans looked at where we were, and stated where we wanted to be in 5, 10, and 20 years. Central to these plans were the identifi­cation of deficiencies throughout the FMF, along with measures necessary to correct them. The plans assigned priorities for these corrective actions. Many began imme­diately; others required more study. The result was a series of steps leading to a common goal: greater aggregate expe­ditionary utility for the Marine Corps.

In addition to creating service plans, the Warfighting Center took on many other activities. Warfighting publica­tions clearly affirmed maneuver warfare as Marine Corps operational doctrine while the staff studied, analyzed, and recommended changes in all functional areas. Using the Wargaming and Assessment Center, the Warfighting Cen­ter continually tested and improved operational concepts. An overriding concern was to avoid reinventing the wheel. The newly created Marine Corps Lessons-Learned System recorded and disseminated after-action reports and correc­tive actions Marine Corps-wide. Throughout, the War­fighting Center’s primary goal was to provide the Fleet

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Marine Forces with an enhanced ability to train, deploy, and fight.

With the invasion of Kuwait, the Warfighting Center quickly shifted its focus toward the support of current op­erations. Every request for assistance received immediate response, characterized by a sense of urgency to provide whatever was asked. Before the President’s decision to commit forces, the Warfighting Center, in conjunction with the Chief of Naval Operations’s staff and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), had developed an initial as­sessment of maritime options for the crisis. At the Com­mandant’s direction, the Warfighting Center initiated a battlefield-requirements study in August to determine key issues that would arise if the Marine Expeditionary Forces stayed in Southwest Asia longer than six months. This study relied upon support by the Intelligence Center, the Wargaming and Assessment Center, and other Combat Development Center organizations, as well as Headquar­ters, Marine Corps.

The study developed 36 separate issues and generated more than 100 recommendations in the areas of opera­tions, training, manpower, and equipment. The recom­mendations dealt with support of forces deployed to the Gulf and all other continuing Marine Corps commitments, world-wide. Of particular note were the recommendations that brought in the sequential activation of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and accelerated the fielding of the M1A1 tank and individual chemical- and laser-protective equipment. Even before the study was completed, more than 20 of the recommendations had been implemented. As the Warfighting Center monitored the execution of each recommendation, this study became the basis for all subsequent studies and actions.

Another major effort concentrated on in-theater am­phibious planning. The study, “The Use of Amphibious Forces in Southwest Asia,” was a lengthy and detailed undertaking, designed to provide Marine commanders with amphibious options (e.g., raids) in addition to those provided by their staffs. Experts from many backgrounds contributed to the study, which, after receiving General Gray’s approval, was delivered to Marine forces in South­west Asia.

Of immediate concern were the Iraqi minefields. A study group from the Warfighting Center, Headquarters Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Research, Develop­ment, and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) was formed to evaluate the threat and reexamine the procedures, orga­nization, and equipment for minefield-breaching opera­tions. The study validated the accelerated acquisition and fielding of several key items of equipment, including the M9 Armored Combat Excavator (ACE) and the “three- shot” line charge. These items played a key role in what General Schwarzkopf later called “a classic, absolutely classic military breach of a very, very tough, minefield, barbed wire, fire trenches-type barrier.”

In October, when forces from the United Kingdom were assigned to I MEF, the Warfighting Center established li­aison with the U.K. Ministry of Defence. The Wargaming and Assessment Center assisted Marine and British Army staffs by conducting a series of wargames in Southwest Asia, to develop common procedures.

The Marine deployment to Southwest Asia, and subse­quent operations, highlighted some deficiencies within the operating units. The Warfighting Center responded in many ways. For example, the staff updated or created more than a dozen doctrinal publications and delivered them to the deployed units. Topics included desert opera­tions and survival, as well as NBC operations. The emerg­ing lessons learned went to the entire Marine Corps, via the Lessons Learned System. The Warfighting Center also initiated the Remedial Action Program designed to correct immediately any deficiencies identified in organization, training, doctrine, and equipment. This program empow­ers the Warfighting Center to task appropriate Marine Corps agencies to correct problems expeditiously.

These supporting actions were part of a cooperative ef­fort within the Combat Development Center. The War­fighting Center, together with the Intelligence Center, the Wargaming and Assessment Center, and the Training and Education Center, were able to provide useful and timely assistance to Marines throughout Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm.

During the period, numerous Warfighting Center per­sonnel traveled to the deployed Marine forces to provide further support. These included officers and enlisted mem­bers with expertise in the Arabic language; command, control, and intelligence matters; engineering skills; psy­chological operations; aviation; fire support; and MAGTF staff planning. These Marines filled critical billet short­ages and augmented staffs where needed.

For the Warfighting Center, the end of the fighting in Kuwait and Iraq means no letup in present efforts, espe­cially those involving the collection and analysis of com­bat data. The study of these data will result in an increased ability by the Warfighting Center to evaluate and recom­mend changes to FMF doctrine, training, structure, and equipment.

The first stage of this assessment involved the dispatch of a carefully selected team of field-grade officers to the Gulf. This battle-assessment team is collecting informa­tion, interviewing key personnel, and photographing enemy and friendly equipment throughout the Marines’ zone of action. The data will range from personal accounts of combat operations to assessments of the damage to enemy equipment inflicted by specific Marine weapons. The Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, will receive a preliminary report before the team returns to Quantico to write their final report.

The completion of the final report—the battle assess­ment—should take at least two months. All the informa­tion and the preliminary reports will go into a working data base for further analysis. Appropriate elements will go into the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System for distribution to the entire Marine Corps. All original docu­ments and copies of all data bases will be sent to the Ma­rine Corps Historical Center for permanent retention.

The Warfighting Center plans to wring every drop of useful information from this collection of data. The knowledge gained will influence future decisions on orga­nization, training, doctrine, and equipment. It represents an invaluable resource for years of study by Marines, in­cluding those in professional schools at Quantico. These materials will also play a key role in writing our own offi­cial histories of the Gulf War, and, when declassification efforts permit, in study by future historians.

Not all the Warfighting Center’s postwar efforts will take place at Quantico. The Warfighting Center will play a vital role in assisting the Saudi Arabian government in expanding that country’s marine corps. This task will last at least three years.

One area that will receive further study by the Warfight­ing Center staff is combat service support. Combat opera­tions required the 1st Force Service Support Group, (rein­forced by other service support units), to deviate from the organization familiar to many Marines. Beginning with an Operational Logistics Study by the Center for Naval Anal­yses, the Warfighting Center has already started to exam­ine that experience and, where necessary, will recommend changes to current doctrine and organization.

Logistics support is already receiving scrutiny by the Warfighting Center staff. Among the areas deserving study is the retrograde of units and equipment. As a foun­dation for this effort, one reserve officer—a professor of history in civilian life—is digging into the experience of the Marine Corps at the close of the Vietnam War. The experiences of those Marines in moving masses of sup­plies and equipment from overseas locations, while reduc­ing the size of the logistics infrastructure, may contain valuable insights for the redeployment from the Gulf.

The Warfighting Center is assisting in the study of mari­time prepositioning ship operations. The study is examin­ing the success of the prepositioned ships offloading and, where needed, will make recommendations on reconfigur­ation of the loads to enhance this vital capability of quickly establishing presence in regional hotspots.

Another critical area for immediate study is the configu­ration of a residual Marine force in Southwest Asia. Since the composition of any such force would depend upon many variables, the Warfighting Center is examining a wide range of options.

The ability of Marine forces to fight and win their bat­tles has been derived from long-standing strengths, en­hanced by the initiatives of the Commandant. Deployed commanders were able to draw upon experienced staffs of several organizations at Quantico. The Warfighting Center—and, in effect, the entire Combat Development Command—served as a think tank, ready to respond quickly to short-term requirements. This eased the in­theater planning burden and streamlined the required sup­port, leaving in place an organization to examine the les­sons of the late war, so that Marines will be just as ready for the next one.

Lieutenant Colonel Green and Majors Brown, Arquette, and Flores are assigned to the MAGTF Warfighting Center, Quantico, Virginia.