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By James L. George
It’s a jump ball. With the Cold War and Gulf War over, the services are now bracing for the opening tip-off in a hotly contested debate over roles-and-missions and command reorganization. Only with a more national strategic approach can the Navy hang tough on this court.
While the world supposedly enters a new era—at least on the surface—it appears that the Navy is still using the old Maritime Strategy. Even though, by most objective measures, the capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps should predominate in this new era, both could end up the big losers. A post-Cold War roles-and-missions debate of the 1990s is sure to commence now that Operation Desert Storm has run its course. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), the powerful Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has called for such a debate, even suggesting that the services compete among themselves for roles and missions. Some disturbing signals are already evident. According to one report on possible major command reorganizations, the Army, of all services, may be placed in charge of a new Atlantic Command. Although the rationale for such a decision escapes some defense thinkers, the real culprit might be the Navy’s continuing concentration on traditional maritime, rather than national, missions. In short, it could well be the classic example of winning the Maritime Strategy battle and losing the mission-responsibilities war.
The Navy has been proud of its Maritime Strategy, as well it should be. It set the proper tone for the late 1970s and 1980s intense Cold War period, when the Soviet Navy was finally starting to build first-rate ships, including sophisticated surface combatants and quiet submarines. The
Maritime Strategy was the right answer. What might have been appropriate then, however, may not be so for the 1990s and beyond. For this new era, the Navy must shift its focus to national mission analysis.
The Importance of Mission Analysis
The underlying problem may not be that the Maritime Strategy was wrong, especially for its time, but rather that it focused on the wrong policy levels, of which there are several. Many scholars accept former Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze’s now somewhat-classic distinctions between “declaratory” and “employment” policy.1
Declaratory policies are those broad statements of political and military objectives with their intended psychological effects. Such policies as defending the homeland, containment, and even more specific military strategies— Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response and, to some extent, the Maritime Strategy itself—fall into the declaratory policy category.
Employment policy involves more concrete military objectives and plans for employing the forces to attain those objectives, down where “the rubber hits the road.”2 The specific phases of the Maritime Strategy—transition to war, for example—fell more into the employment policy category. Declaratory policy is generally considered the providence of the National Command Authority (NCA) with employment policy the responsibility of the military planners, the various commanders-in-chief (CinCs).
What is needed, however, is something in between these macro- and more micro-policy levels, or what is sometimes called mission analysis by strategists and force planning by military planners.3 These two levels are truly important for the services, and for the budget decisions that affect them. First, a mission analysis can bridge the gap between the broad declaratory policies from the Presi-
dent and other national leaders, and the employment policy of the CinCs and the forces needed for those missions. Strategists have long felt that mission analysis should come before planning force size and composition, but that has seldom happened. A primary reason is that the missions themselves have rarely changed, as reflected in the broad NCA declaratory policy guidance. For example, President Ronald Reagan’s January 1988 National Security Strategy of the United States (undoubtedly written late in 1987 when changes were just starting to appear) stated: “The fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year.”4 However, just two years later the 1990 report began: “The international landscape is marked by change that is breath-taking in its character, dimension and pace.”5 President George Bush has talked about a “New World Order.” Thus, the NCA is, in fact, signaling a declaratory policy change. The challenge now should pass to (service) mission analysis before determining force requirements.
With the major changes anticipated in the 1990s, a completely new, and not necessarily naval, mission analysis must come first. Missions are important, for they set the
tone, the framework, and the touchstone from which force planning and responsibilities flow. The Navy, however, should look not just at maritime, but at national missions as well. Traditionally, these have been, in order of importance, nuclear deterrence, the NATO World War III scenario, and finally. Third World operations. By concentrating on these national mission areas, the changes, and especially the need to increase naval responsibilities, become apparent.
The Changing National Missions
Nuclear Deterrence—Although the Navy has always played an important role in nuclear strategy, historically it was considered foremost as an Air Force responsibility, with the Army claiming a share for theater deterrence. The reasons seem clear. During the 1950s, the predominant forces were the long-range bombers from the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC). Even with the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the late 1950s, the Air Force was the predominant force in both quantity and quality. While the Navy built 41 nu-
clear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the Air Force had 1,000 ICBMs and the still quite-formidable bomber force. The Air Force controlled two-thirds of the strategic Triad with long-range bombers and ICBMs, as opposed to the Navy’s one-third SLBMs on SSBNs. And it was proper that SAC maintain control through that command and the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, which prepared the important Single Integrated Operational Plan.
The 1990s, however, will bring about four major changes that call for a complete reevaluation of nuclear responsibilities. First will be the first “real” reductions with the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Despite the intensity of the debates, both Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) were actually only freezes. While the post-START force mix has yet to be determined, the normal practice might have been simply a proportional reduction in all three legs of the Triad. Because of budget problems and other reasons, however, it appears that at least one Air Force leg, and possibly both, may simply “wither away” over the next decade. The two ICBM modernization proposals, the rail-garrison MX missile and the road-mobile single Midgetman, with costs varying from $12 to $45 billion, are all but officially dead. Without extensive and expensive updates to the aging Minuteman force, the ICBM leg of the Triad could well wither away to only the 50 MXs.
The bomber leg is also in trouble. The “interim” pene- trator B-1B bomber cannot fulfdl its mission because of faulty electronic countermeasures gear, and Congress is reluctant to fund repair. The expensive B-2 stealth bomber, now inching up toward three-quarters of a billion dollars per copy, has been cut back drastically and may be axed completely. Meanwhile, the Navy’s modernization program continues unabated. And that leads to another major change—the introduction of the new, accurate D-5, which for the first time will give an SLBM a hard target kill capability, questioning the main rationale for ICBMs. The importance of the Navy’s leg, which already contains the majority of the ballistic warheads, will continue to grow throughout the 1990s.
Finally, similar changes will occur in theater nuclear deterrence. The Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty eliminated long- and medium-range missiles, the “two zeros,” and both sides have agreed to start negotiations on the “third,” short-range nuclear forces (SNF). At one time, plans were to modernize existing weapons, produce a follow-on to the Lance, upgrade nuclear artillery, move more dual-capable aircraft to Europe, and develop a theater tactical air-to-surface missile. But now, all are either dead or in limbo. Besides, as European—especially German—strategists have pointed out, the SNF would have landed on their soil. No wonder President Bush unilaterally offered to remove nuclear artillery and commence negotiations on SNF.
Most strategists feel that a theater nuclear deterrent is still needed, at least for the immediate future. This will Probably mean reliance on Navy systems, especially the nuclear Tomahawk sea-launched land attack cruise missiles (SLCM) TLAM-N. There will still be some European-based dual-capable aircraft, but they could well be captured in a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) II agreement. Besides, even the F/B-l 11 has limited range to hit Soviet targets. An F-lll armed with tactical air-to- surface missile (TASM) could help, but that project has been delayed, and again, could well get caught up in further negotiations.
In short, throughout the 1990s, the Navy’s role will grow in both strategic and theater nuclear deterrence. Only the Navy’s leg of the Triad has been fully modernized for strategic deterrence and after the SNF talks, only TLAM- N will remain for theater deterrence.
NATO, European Defense—While nuclear deterrence has always hovered ominously in the background, foremost throughout the Cold War has been the East-West confrontation in Europe. It has dominated Pentagon planning and thinking. This front was considered so important, especially for the Army, that General Dwight D. Eisenhower came out of retirement to be the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEur), while General Bernard Rogers went from Army Chief of Staff to SACEur. The Air Force also had many forces deployed (and one SACEur, General Lauris Norstad, was an Air Force general), with the Navy also involved, but this was definitely the Army’s premier command.
Nowhere, however, has the change been greater than in Europe. A major CFE Agreement was signed in November 1990, bringing parity in East-West military equipment, and negotiations are ongoing for similar cuts in manpower. Many feel these negotiations are actually overtaken by events, with Soviet forces already scheduled to leave Germany. The Warsaw Pact has been dismantled, with the newly freed governments asking (even demand-
ing) that Soviet troops be removed within a few years. Commentators are starting to ponder whether the CFE numbers will be ceilings or floors for U.S. troops. In a very few years, U.S. ground forces could well be reduced to token numbers.
The Army’s future European command structure is already being questioned. There are renewed calls for a European SACEur, perhaps a French general to bring France back in, or a German general, to keep Germany in, or more likely, some rotation among the major European countries. This will also make naval forces and NATO navy commands such as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLant), more important. Issues such as resupply and sea lines of communication protection become crucial if most U.S. ground forces withdraw. NATO navy groups such as the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, will also become more important, at least symbolically.
Third World Operations—Nowhere has the Navy’s predominance been greater than in so-called Third World operations. Few naval analysts have failed to quote the now somewhat famous Brookings Institution’s study that concluded:
employ components of the armed forces in support of political objectives. Naval units participated in 177 of the 215 incidents, or more than four out of every five. . . .
In short, the Navy clearly has been the foremost instrument for the United States’s political uses of the armed forces: at all times, in all places, and regardless of the specifics of the situation.”6
Most of these have occurred in Third World areas. Despite the Navy’s dominant role, it has rarely technically been in charge. Instead, command authority has rested first with a Strike Command, now Central Command (CentCom) headquartered in Florida with command currently rotating between the Army and Marine Corps, with the latter making more sense (although the Navy should also be in that rotation).
Looking into the 1990s, there are two new elements which should see the Navy’s role increase. First, is the decline of U.S. overseas bases. The United States has already announced pullouts from its huge bases in the Philippines and drawdowns in South Korea. Thus, the limited role available from area-based Army and Air Forces will continue to shrink during the 1990s. Some countries such as Singapore have offered base facilities, but only on a rotating basis, not adequate for the prerequisite and usually elaborate Army and Air Force infrastructures. The United States may still have bases in Japan and Southern Europe close to Third World areas, but these host countries have been extremely reluctant to permit U.S. “out- of-area” operations.
The other new and quite disturbing element is the increased sophistication of weaponry now found in many so-called Third World areas. For a long time, anyone could purchase top-of-the-line aircraft and tanks, but in-
ventories now include long-range missiles, chemical weapons, and even some nuclear capabilities. About a dozen Third World countries are suspected of pursuing nuclear options, with several considered to be on the brink of attaining that capability. Of recent concern for the Navy is the proliferation of submarines, torpedoes, and mines. These are not the weapons usually associated with low- intensity warfare.
Thus, between the declining U.S. base structure overseas and the increasing sophistication of weaponry, the Navy’s role should grow in both frequency and intensity.
Objectivity versus Jointness
With mission analysis as the touchstone, force structure implications seem clear. In strategic nuclear forces, the Navy’s role will increase. While there will probably always be a token “Triad” of long-range bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs, only the Navy’s systems are being fully modernized. Many commentators now talk openly of a Dyad of SSBNs and bombers, but that could, in fact, become a Monad if the B-2 is not built and the B-l continues to have problems. The only theater nuclear deterrent in a few years could be the Navy’s nuclear Tomahawk. Yet, despite these rather obvious trends, according to one report, the Air Force will assume, actually continue, its responsibility for a new “Strategic Command.”
In the NATO European theater Army forces will dwindle to probably only token forces during the 1990s. This means that resupply becomes crucial and as history has shown, more than 90% must always be sealifted. Responsibilities such as convoy and sea lines of communication
The Navy proved its sealfit capability in Operations Desert Shield/Storm—here, transporting Army personnel and gear in the USNS Regulus (T-AKR-292) to Saudi Arabia. Anticipated troop reductions in Europe will call for even more ability to reinforce by sea.
protection thus increase in importance. With declining Army forces in Europe and the probable emergence of a European SACEur in a few years, the Navy’s role will increase. Third World operations, already mostly a Navy responsibility, will also accelerate. Commentators seem to agree that the area of greatest tension will remain the Middle East, where the United States has no permanent bases, thus requiring naval forces. Yet, in the proposal, the Army will be in charge of a new Atlantic Command stretching to the Middle East.
According to a report circulated by the Electronics Industries Association, the Department of Defense will pare its command structure from the current ten down to four: Atlantic, Pacific, Contingency, and Strategic Force.7 The new Atlantic Command will have a land-force orientation, focusing on Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf regions. The Pacific Command will have a maritime orientation. The Contingency Force will assume special operations and be designed for a Third World focus and, like CentCom, will probably rotate between the Army and Marine Corps. The Strategic Force will have an Air Force orientation and will include SAC and Navy strategic systems.
In other words, despite the rather obvious new mission trends, the old Cold War “jointness” structure may prevail. Jointness in many cases is absolutely necessary and in others at least understandable when splitting up that pie. However, when it starts to violate what can only be considered common sense responsibilities, roles, and missions, it must be seriously questioned. The Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Persian Gulf are all colored blue on a map, not green. Similarly, Brookings follow-up studies state that 80% of Third World crises still required naval responses. When the question of command coordination came up during a few “off-the-record” briefs by naval commanders on the Persian Gulf operations during the Iran-Iraq War, the briefer simply rolled his eyes while noting the obvious problems with a chain of command that stretched to Florida.
Maritime or National Missions?
The probable primary reasons for these command decisions is the usual “jointness” and the traditional Pentagon divvy-up-the-pie attitude. There are, however, three others. First is any service’s, especially the Navy’s, reluctance to challenge another service’s roles and missions. Second, especially with reducing budgets, is the problem of taking scarce funds from your own existing programs for these new roles. And finally, traditional service priorities also come into play.
The Navy has not fared well in service fights. It opposed the original DoD post-World War II reorganizations, fearing that the Army and Air Force would gang up
on them which, incidentally, they did. There were challenges to Navy roles, and the Army essentially wanted to eliminate the Marine Corps. The most famous incident is the 1949 Army-Navy fight and subsequent “Admirals’ Revolt.” The fight was ostensibly over the Navy’s new supercarrier and the Air Force’s new bomber, with the carrier losing. Although many scholars feel the fight was much ado about nothing, this incident and the generally military “circling of the wagons” from the “whiz kid” era of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara have made all services, and especially the Navy, extremely reluctant to challenge another service’s roles, at least outside the confines of their own room, the “tank.”
Other problems are lack of funds and service parochialism. One reason the Navy does not want to take over strategic control involves funds, which would normally come out of its own existing programs. This leads to perhaps the real problem—service priorities. Each service has its own priorities. The Air Force, for example, places the close- air-support mission on a much lower rung of its ladder than does the Army. As a result, the Air Force is planning to replace the dedicated close-air-support A-10 “Wart- hog” with essentially a fighter, an F-16 derivative, even though many feel the A-10 is today’s best antitank airplane.
For similar reasons, the Navy has concentrated on the
Maritime Strategy in lieu of more national missions. One of the clearest structural examples of this trend has been the Navy’s strategic nuclear organization. While the Navy has no fleet flag billets exclusively for nuclear systems, the Air Force has many, from one star to the senior four- star head of SAC, still considered the Air Force’s premier command. One Navy captain has called the Navy’s strategic nuclear role the “orphan” of the Navy.8 Another, now a START ambassador, while commenting that the “strategic baton” is passing to the Navy, questions the Navy’s organizational readiness.9 As a minimum, and considering the trends, the Navy should at least create flag billets for both fleets for the SSBNs and theater deterrence roles and missions to signal the changing relationship.
Some changes have occurred. The Maritime Strategy has also been described as the “maritime component” of national strategy. The recent reiteration by former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, is considerably different from the original Maritime Strategy. Admiral Trost stressed some national issues such as deterrence, but they are still placed within the Maritime Strategy.10 Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, the current Chief of Naval Operations, has also made some changes calling for new maritime policies. [Editor’s Note: The April 1991 Proceedings carries “The Way Ahead” by Admiral Kelso, Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III, and General A. M. Gray, USMC, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.] The Navy should not abandon the traditional maritime missions of naval presence, force- projection ashore, and the like, that definitely do fit into the new conditions. But these missions should be presented within the context of national, not naval, priorities.
Instead of simply concentrating on maritime missions, in this new era, the Navy should, indeed must, focus on national missions. It could even help in some of the tough budget debates. The Navy could support House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin’s call for a strategic budget for which all services would compete. If mobile, supposedly invulnerable ICBM proposals had to compete against mobile and truly invulnerable SLBMs, the winner would be clear. Because they do not compete, both mobile ICBM proposals have been funded for years, continually draining money from the decreasing budget, which leads into, unfortunately, the most important point in peacetime—control of the budget.
Since the Goldwater-Nichols changes to the organization of the military, the CinCs now have a large say in budget decisions. If, for example, the Air Force heads a new Strategic Command, ICBM modernization will probably continue, as will calls for three-quarter-billion-dollar B-2s, regardless of the merits of each. An Army general in charge of a new “Atlantic” command is bound to have different priorities than the Navy or Marine Corps. One of his priorities would undoubtedly be the continuing trend to lighten Army divisions for deployability, duplicating the already-deployable Marine expeditionary units, brigades, and forces—thereby creating further drains on a shrinking budget. In short, it might be time for another 1949-style service fight, and the Navy should not fear the outcome.
Conclusion
Whether in fact these new command structures actually become operational is still open to some question. According to another report, there will be six commands, which, besides the four mentioned here, would include Continental and Transportation commands. After all, three services divide more easily into six commands than four. One thing does seem clear, however, with changing world conditions and declining, perhaps drastically, defense budgets. A missions debate will begin, and the Navy should be prepared. The fight has, in fact, already begun. Some senators have talked about mission consolidations.11 The Air Force appears to have already entered the fray with a brief entitled “Global Power-Global Reach.”
The concern here is not with Navy parochialism, but rather a simple management principle—“he who has the largest share should be in charge.” It was proper that NATO became a major Army command. If war broke out in Europe, the Allied forces should have been commanded by an Army general, certainly not a Navy admiral. And, if ever another Iraq-type situation breaks out and the United States finds itself facing a relatively sophisticated army with thousands of tanks—again, an Army general should probably be placed in charge. But an Army general should not be in charge of a post-Cold War, post-Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement “Atlantic” command that also includes the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. Besides, no one anticipates a Soviet invasion of Europe. And fortunately, the Iraq-type invasions have been the exception, not the rule, in the more than 200 Third World- type incidents that have usually required a naval presence.
And the various-sized Marine expeditionary task forces can accomplish limited, quick, over-the-beach-type incursions.
The real problem lies in placing the service that does not have the majority forces in charge, and thus continually draining scarce funds. We see it now, with the Air Force still funding mobile ICBM proposals and the Army funding its light forces. This is not naval parochialism, but instead a waste of national assets. Thus, the Navy and Marines in this new era should start focusing on national missions in the national interest.
'Paul H. Nitze, “Arms, Strategy and Policy,” Foreign Affairs, January 1956, pp. 187-198.
2David Alan Rosenburg, ‘‘Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-68,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1986, pp. 36-37.
3Robert P. Haffa, Jr., Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988) pp. 4-6.
4National Strategy of the United States, January 1988, p. iv.
5National Strategy of the United States, March 1990, p. v.
6Barry M. Blcchman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 38-39.
7EIA Predicts Pentagon Will Reduce Command Structure From 10 to Four,” Inside the Pentagon, October 18, 1990, pp. 1-4.
“Captain William C. Green, USN, ‘‘The Navy’s Strategic Role: Orphan or Legitimate,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1982, pp. 103-5.
9Captain Linton F. Brooks, USN, ‘‘Dropping the Baton,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1989, pp. 32-37.
,0Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN, ‘‘Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,” U.S. Naval Institute Naval Review, 1990, pp. 92-100.
"‘‘Talk of mission consolidation grows in the Senate,” Navy News & Undersea Technology, May 14, 1990, pp. 1-3.
Dr. George is currently a Senior Adjunct Fellow with the Hudson Institute and the author of The New Nuclear Rules: Strategy and Arms Control After INF and START (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1990). He has served as a congressional staff member, an assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses associated with the Strategic Policy Analysis Group for the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.