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Intercepting prohibited cargoes en route to and from Iraq involves much more than monitoring a few maritime choke points. The Multinational Interception Force has had to maintain surveillance operations from the North Arabian Gulf, through the Arabian Sea, and along the full length of the Red Sea.
To carry out the tenets of the United Nations Resolution 661 of 5 August 1990 the U.S. Navy and cooperating-nation navies formed a Multinational Interception Force (MIF) to intercept, challenge, and, in many cases, visit and search merchant vessels to determine their cargoes and their last and next ports of call. From the resolution’s date until the liberation of Kuwait, cargoes from Iraq or Kuwait or destined for those countries, other than medical supplies or food that had been specifically authorized by a U.N. committee, were not permitted to proceed. The restrictions on Iraqi traffic remain in effect.
Masters of vessels carrying prohibited cargoes from Iraq are directed to return to their ports of origin. Those carrying prohibited cargoes to Iraq are given the opportunity to return to their ports of origin or select non-prohib- ited ports. In either case, if they refuse diversion, the intercepting ships are authorized, by the authority of U.N. Resolution 665, to “use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary.” The United States, as well as most other nations, interprets this authority as allowing the use of necessary and proportional force as an exercise of collective self-defense under the U.N. Charter.
Two natural geographic features aid significantly the interception of merchant traffic destined for Iraq. The first is the choke point formed by the Strait of Hormuz in the North Arabian Sea. The second, the Strait of Tiran in the North Red Sea, forms an entranceway to Iraq through the country of Jordan.
At first glance, positioning U.S. and foreign-navy ships in these areas appears to be the best way to intercept passing merchant vessels. To allow time for boarding-party preparations, to keep vessels from evading boarding by running for nearby territorial waters, and to facilitate advance coordination with other navies, however, it is necessary to extend operations beyond these specific areas. Consequently, surveillance of merchant shipping extends throughout the entire area of responsibility, from the Northern Arabian Gulf, south through the Arabian Sea and the full length of the Red Sea.
In addition to a large surveillance area, the Multinational Interception Force faced from the outset the threat of Iraqi air and surface forces, particularly in the Persian Gulf. This threat did not diminish markedly until the Coalition’s air campaign was well under way.
Before 16 January 1991, Iraq’s air force consisted of more than 700 aircraft, including French F-l Mirages and Soviet Badger bombers. The Mirage, capable of carrying the French Exocet air-to-surface missiles, and the Badger, capable of carrying Chinese Silkworm missiles, posed an everpresent antiship threat. The pilots of these aircraft had clearly demonstrated proficiency in low-level ingress/ egress techniques, electronic-emissions control, and antiship coordinated attack procedures during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. It was an Iraqi F-l Mirage using these tactics that attacked the USS Stark (FFG-31) on 17 May 1987, killing 37 sailors.
Although Iraq’s navy was far inferior to its air force, it possessed both Osa patrol boats, equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles, and fast patrol boats of the FPB- 57 and TNC-45 classes. These, too, were capable of firing Exocet missiles.
Arrayed in support of the maritime interception operation and providing antiair coverage against Iraqi forces are more than 80 ships of the Multinational Force, including two U.S. carrier battle groups, 20 ships dedicated to interception operations and more than 30 ships belonging to the cooperating foreign navies. The United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Italy, Greece, Belgium, Canada, Australia, and Argentina joined with the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar to enforce the isolation of Iraq and ensure safety of navigation in Middle East waters.
The MIF represents an impressive combination of the world’s most modem warships and weaponry. Operating along nearly the full length of the Persian Gulf, the North Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea, they bring to bear gun systems ranging from .50-caliber machine guns and 25mm. chain guns to the 16-inch guns of the USS Wisconsin (BB-64) and USS Missouri (BB-63). Antiair warfare capabilities run the spectrum from close-in weapon systems to the powerful Aegis missile system.
The U.S. interception force is under Commander Middle East Force (CMEF). Subordinate to Commander U.S. Naval Central Command (ComUSNavCent) and General Norman Schwarzkopf of the U.S. Central Command (US- CinCCent), Commander Middle East Force is responsible for the coordination of U.S. antiair defense inside the Gulf, the interception operations themselves, and the coordination of U.S. forces with the cooperating foreign navies. This chain of command was implemented shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, when the Joint Task Force Middle East staff was dissolved and the Seventh Fleet staff in its flagship, the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19), was brought to the region.
The actual interception of ships carrying commodities and supplies to and from Iraq and Kuwait was directed by USCinCCent early on 17 August 1990. Within hours of the order, the first intercept was made in the Red Sea by the USS John L. Hall (FFG-32) on a northbound Iraqi oil tanker, the Al Fao. Through bridge-to-bridge radio challenges it was determined the Al Fao had left Aden, Yemen for Yanbu, Saudi Arabia. Turned away from Saudi Arabia by port officials, the Al Fao was returning to Aden. Since the ship was obviously empty, as determined by the amount of freeboard visible, she was allowed to proceed. Just four hours later, the USS England (CG-22) was able to claim the first Arabian Gulf intercept when she challenged two northbound Iraqi Silowatt-class ships, the Al Abid and Al Byaa. Both of those vessels refused to stop when challenged, claiming that they were empty, just returning to home port, and that they had to maintain course and speed because they only had one day’s food and water left on board. Owing to their relatively small size and obviously empty condition—and for humanitarian reasons—they were also allowed to proceed. There was a complicating factor, as well: the possible unwisdom of attempting, for the first time in the operation, to stop and board these ships in the darkness that had then fallen.
Bridge-to-bridge radio challenges were now in full swing. Each merchant vessel encountered by an interception-force ship was queried about its registration, cargo, and ports of call. At first, none replied with information that would make them suspect, and thus liable for boarding and search. But the action heated up on 18 August, when the Iraqi oil tanker Al Khanaqin, was intercepted in the Arabian Gulf, heading toward the Strait of Hormuz. Transiting in Iranian territorial waters to evade board-and- search efforts, the vessels’ master stated he was carrying only “dirty ballast” to sea for dumping. The USS Reid (FFG-30) was assigned to trail the Al Khanaqin, to confirm those intentions. Later, after supposedly pumping the ship, and by now in the North Arabian Sea, the master reversed course and attempted to return to Iraq. Judging by her deep draft, the Al Khanaqin still appeared loaded. And since she was bound for Iraq, boarding and search were required. The ship’s master repeatedly refused to stop, and instead changed course to the southwest, stating he was now bound for Aden. When all efforts via bridge- to-bridge communication failed to stop the Al Khanaqin and it was obvious the ship was setting a course to enter Omani territorial waters, the Reid fired 25-mm. and .76mm. warning shots across her bow. Amazingly, the Al Khanaqin still refused to stop. This was testimony to the explicit instructions Iraqi ships’ masters had apparently received from their owners and government, prior to setting sail. After several more hours of surveillance by the Reid, tracking was turned over to the USS Goldsborough (DDG-20). In the end, the Al Khanaqin was allowed to proceed to Aden after word was received that the Yemeni government supported the U.N. resolution, and would not allow the vessel to offload her cargo.
At this point, boardings and searches began in earnest. In the Red Sea, these quickly became routine for the ships of many countries that were destined for Aqaba, Jordan. Any vessel stating her destination was Aqaba was boarded and searched, to ensure that her cargo was not manifested for delivery to Iraq. Once this was accomplished, the vessel was allowed to proceed. The same process was used for vessels in the Arabian Gulf, only the litmus test was whether their destination was Kuwait or Iraq.
In this quick, rather painless process, the norm in the Red Sea was compliance by the vessels intercepted and in the Arabian Gulf it was found that virtually no vessels were inbound for or outboard from Kuwait or Iraq. This trend had held throughout the operation. Consequently, more than 93% of all boardings have taken place in the Red Sea, with the remaining few occurring on Iraqi ships in the North Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf.
For the first few weeks of the interception operations, we encountered no significant resistance, passive or otherwise. This was partly because the vessels of member nations complied with the provisions of the U.N. resolution and also because Iraqi ships were returning to their home- ports empty. In addition, the Iraqis reduced the number of their ships under way. This circumstance did not change until 4 September, when the Goldsborough intercepted and challenged the Iraqi cargo ship Zanoobia.
The Zanoobia had left Colombo, Sri Lanka, several days before and was en route to Iraq, ostensibly with a cargo of tea. Upon initial interception and challenge, the Zanoobia was offered the option of diverting to a port other than one in Iraq or Kuwait, in lieu of being boarded and searched. The ship’s master replied that his sailing orders would not permit such a diversion, but a boarding team could come aboard to inspect the ship. At that point,
the boarding team—consisting of one Goldsborough officer, several ship’s crewmembers, and a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LeDet)—boarded the Zanoobia. The Coast Guard LeDet officer was to be the officer-in-charge. To afford security for the team, the Zanoobia's crew was mustered topside, except for a few members allowed to remain on the bridge and in engineering for ship control. Once mustered, the crew itself was docile and cooperative, but the master was noisily nationalistic in his views regarding the boarding and search of an Iraqi vessel by the U.S. Navy. The Zanoobia's logs and manifest showed that the ship was loaded with tea and the search confirmed a cargo of 1,000 tons of tea. As this would violate the U.N. resolution prohibiting commodities from entering Iraq, the master was again given the opportunity to choose an alternative port. Still refusing to
divert, the master stated he would continue on course to Iraq.
This now placed the boarding team in the position of having to take control of the ship and force its diversion to another port. Since this was the first such directed diversion of a ship during this operation, and not knowing exactly what the Zanoobia crew’s reaction might be, the Coast Guard LeDet officer requested reinforcement of the boarding party by additional Goldsborough crewmembers. Once satisfied he was in a position to do so, the LeDet officer then advised the Zanoobia's master that the boarding party was taking control of the ship. This was not initially accepted by the master, who continued to refuse vehemently to alter course and speed, nor by the helmsman who took orders only from his master. When both the helmsman and master were advised that the force necessary to make the diversion would be applied, they recognized that they had no other choice and acquiesced. The helm was then taken over by a Goldsborough sailor and the ship was diverted to a port bordering the Arabian Sea.
A number of special teams have been working with the U.S. Navy. Ordered to the Middle East on as little as 72 hours’ notice the four-man Coast Guard LeDets, led by a commissioned officer, have been invaluable in the boarding-and-search process. Familiar with maritime laws, shipping procedures, documents and ship-search procedures, nine such teams were dispatched initially. Under the overall direction of a Coast Guard captain and four officers assigned to the Middle East Force staff, these teams are distributed to U.S. Navy ships throughout the theater, bringing valuable experience gained in years of similar operations against drug smugglers.
Another key element of the United States’s contribution to the Multinational Interception Force has been the added capability of Marine special-operations teams embarked in amphibious ships. These teams, consisting of approximately ten Marines, are trained in small-unit tactics, helicopter insertion, and rapid response to contingency situations. Their ability to place a boarding team on a non-cooperative vessel via helicopter has been a significant factor in maritime interception operations.
Another important factor in the success of these intercept operations has been the noteworthy contribution of the cooperating navies, all of which operate under the control of their own national military authorities. Because of language barriers, political sensitivities, differing rules of engagement, and varying operating area constraints set by the different governments on their forces, coordinated operations might appear difficult to achieve. These multinational efforts, however, have proved to be eminently successful—a result of the professionalism of all the navies, innovative communications plans, and frequent coordination meetings. There are now about 20 navies cooperating in the interception effort. Combined interceptions of Iraqi vessels are often carried out with two or three navies assisting. Mixed boarding parties of these navies search suspect vessels. On-scene commanders for each visit, board, and search are designated in rotation. The formula has worked. To date, 30% of the more than 400 boardings have been conducted by the cooperating navies.
The first interceptions, boardings, and searches were somewhat tenuous affairs, as the teams gauged carefully the amount of resistance to be encountered, force requirements, and necessary measures to ensure the safety of boarding personnel. Operations now display a high level of proficiency. The bridge-to-bridge challenge, embarkation of the board-and-search team, and the directing of embarking teams and the intercepted ship are expeditiously and smoothly coordinated by the on-scene commander.
From these first steps in the enforcement of the U.N. resolutions, interception operations have progressed significantly. One of the best developments has been perfecting the use of SEAL and Marine teams to board and secure merchant vessels that fail to comply with directions to slow and allow boarding. This has proved to be a reliable way to get on board an uncooperative ship, review her records, and search her cargo without having to resort to
disabling the ship by gun or missile fire.
An incident involving helicopter insertion of Marines was the 28 October interception of the Iraqi Al Qadisiyah- class oil tanker Amuriyah. The 157,000 deadweight-ton vessel, almost 900 feet long, had departed Aden and was returning to Iraq. Transiting at high speed from the North Arabian Sea, the Australian frigate Darwin was the first to gain radar and visual contact on the Amuriyah, in the general vicinity of Masirah Island. Soon to join the Darwin on the scene was the USS Reasoner (FF-1063), the USS Ogden (LPD-5), and the British frigate Brazen. The Reasoned s commanding officer, as the on-scene commander, issued warnings via bridge-to-bridge radio to the Amuriyah that as an Iraqi vessel destined for Iraq she was subject to search. No response came from the Amuriyah at first, but after repeated radio calls the master finally stated that it would take two to three hours to contact the ship’s owners in Iraq to receive permission to board and search. This delaying tactic had been seen many times, and consequently the Reasoner advised the Amuriyah that she would have 15 minutes to comply with the warnings, by slowing the ship. When the 15 minutes had elapsed and Amuriyah had showed no sign of slowing, the Darwin maneuvered across her bow, trying to force the vessel to slow. Still, the Amuriyah would not slow. Faced with continuing resistance, the commanding officer of the Reasoner had no alternative but to order warning shots fired across the Amuriyah’s bow. This was done in sequence, with the Darwin first firing .50-caliber machine-gun rounds and the Reasoner firing 5-inch rounds. The Amuriyah continued on course and speed. Even low-level passes by F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft failed to convince the master of the Amuriyah to comply with the Reasoneds direction.
It was at this point that the Marine helicopter-inserted teams proved their value. With a helicopter gunship hovering over the Amuriyah to provide covering fire if needed, a second helicopter from the Ogden inserted a team of Marines that quickly secured the bridge and engineering spaces. Once the ship was under their control, she was slowed and a multinational boarding team consisting of Australian and U.S. sailors and a Coast Guard LeDet boarded the Amuriyah from small boats. After determining that the Amuriyah was carrying no prohibited cargo,
As the cat-and-mouse game escalated, the Multinational Interception Force developed new measures to counter ships’ new efforts to avoid detection and search. Night- vision scopes (here, on hoard USS Robert G. Bradley [FFG 49]) illuminated those who sought cover of darkness, and Marine teams inserted by helicopter (here, a CH-46 with distinctive markings) precluded the use of crippling force.
the boarding party departed and the vessel was cleared to proceed. Had the Marines not been there and been capable of swift insertion, the Amuriyah may well have required crippling force to enable boarding and search.
Unfortunately, as our interception techniques have been refined and polished, so too have those of Iraqi vessels seeking to avoid interception. Deceptive marking by changing paint schemes, attempts at reflagging Iraqi ships to other nations, false names on bridge-to-bridge radio at night, and concealment of cargo are some of the methods that have been used. The Iraqis have also used shipboard firefighting water cannons to wet ships’ decks, attempting to make them too slippery for helicopter insertion of boarding teams. Ships’ masters have also become more and more uncooperative, by refusing to muster their crews and by testing thoroughly each boarding officer’s resolve to search all spaces in the ship.
The sudden and decisive end of Operation Desert Storm did not bring immediate compliance by Saddam Hussein with all outstanding U.N. resolutions, and thus did not bring an end to interceptions and board-and-search operations. At the time of the initial cease fire, interceptions totaled nearly 7,000 and were continuing at the rate of 30-40 per day. Boardings totaled near 1,000 and were continuing at the rate of five to ten per day. In terms of oil revenue, Iraq was losing upwards of 30 million dollars every day that it remained in this sea-based stranglehold.
Commander Delery was the Maritime Interception Force Officer assigned temporary additional duty on the staff of Commander Middle East Force. A 1975 graduate of The Citadel, he is a surface-warfare officer with a career in cruisers and destroyers. He now serves on the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.