Norway's Coast Is Clear

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By Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, Royal Norwegian Navy

Ironically, Soviet submarine bases may hold the key to Norwegian security. The Kola bases are so important, in fact, that the Soviets cannot afford to provoke NATO retaliation by attacking Norway. Spread thinly along the coast, the Norwegian Navy is banking on that.

The Soviet Union bases most of its strategic subma­rines at the Kola Peninsula, and their protection is of vital importance. This concern bears upon Nor­way’s situation. The primary objective of most Soviet forces that serve on Kola-based vessels, submarines, and aircraft is to form a forward barrier as a link in the protec­tion of this bastion for strategic submarines and for the entire Kola complex.

An effective barrier presumes, as a minimum, Soviet control of northern Norwegian territory and the waters and airspace east of the Lofotens-Greenland line. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, indirectly advocated this position when he said that it is far simpler to seize and maintain naval control if one has control of the adjacent coasts. The adjacent coast in this case is the coast of northern Norway.

We must, therefore, assume that Soviet forces have planned to secure northern Norwegian territory under given conditions to protect their strategic submarine bas­tion and safeguard the base complex at Kola and Soviet operations in the Norwegian Sea.

As long as Norway is a credible member of NATO and NATO remains a reliable alliance, an isolated attack on Northern Norway would be most unlikely. We are, in fact, protected by the paradox formulated some years ago by Norwegian Defense Minister Johan J. Holst: “Perhaps the extreme importance of this base complex is our best guar­antee that they [the Soviet Union] will not start anything except that which would be necessary in a global confron­tation, and that they therefore will refrain from an isolated attack on North Norway.”

The paradox also implies that the Soviet Union will avoid actions that would provoke a permanent or semiper­manent NATO presence in northern Norway and adjacent waters. Indications are that the Soviet Union is fully aware of this and that it tries to show restraint in waters and land areas that are sensitive to Norway and to NATO. There­fore, a regionalization resulting from confidence-building measures at sea is a subject that is very sensitive to the Norwegian Navy.

This maritime situation prevailed in the postwar period, until November 1989. The situation today is much differ­ent. Europe is in a state of turbulent change. We have seen the east European revolution of 1989 and are now seeing developments growing from the Soviet February revolu­tion of 1990. No one can predict the final outcome of these events. The Soviet empire is in the process of being dis­solved. But Soviet military power remains intact. The Brezhnev Doctrine no longer applies to Eastern Europe. It is, instead, being applied against the Soviet Union’s own republics. The intentions of the current Soviet president are stated as perestroika and glasnost, but Soviet military capability remains ready for Mikhail Gorbachev’s un­known successors to use. The Soviet Union cannot feed itself, but its Northern and Pacific fleets continue to grow in number and quality.

Another look at the strategic picture shows that the red color in the Baltic has faded somewhat, but the red has not faded in the north. If reduced Norwegian defense budgets weaken Norwegian defense, especially the Norwegian Navy, the country could easily be pressured to make un­wanted concessions and to surrender freedom of action. Small, weak nations that share borders with a great power are quite vulnerable. It would be naive to think that the Norwegian land area bordering on the North Atlantic and the economic zone would not continue to be attractive to a great Russian power with nearly twice the population of a reunited Germany.

Strategically, little has changed, even if the world be­tween the Ural Mountains and the Atlantic seems more peaceful. The Barents Sea-Kurdistan axis must not be for­gotten in the euphoric state of peace we are now experi­encing. Therefore, nothing calls for a change in our strat­egy and naval concept.

Norway’s Security Policy

Norway’s security policy is based on a balance between security and reassurance. The Norwegian objective is to maintain low tension in the northern area and, at the same

time, safeguard its sovereignty and freedom of action. The military consequences are that no foreign troops are sta­tioned in Norway in peacetime. But in view of Norway s strategic importance to NATO and the Soviet capabilities We face, Norway must rely on timely reinforcements when We ask for them in a critical situation. The Norwegian military must be able to hold out until NATO reinforce­ments reach combat theaters.

The Norwegian problem is that northern Norway, which is the most exposed part of the country, only has 10% of the nation’s resources, and requires supplies from the south. Thus, northern Norway cannot be defended un­less southern Norway is under Norwegian control.

Norwegian Strategy______________________________

The Norwegian strategy consists of three stages. y Maintain adequate forces in northern Norway at a high level of training and readiness. This should assure ade­quate holding time to . . .

V Enable reinforcements from southern Norway to mobil­ize and reinforce northern Norway and endure until . . . ► NATO’s reinforcements arrive.

As long as this strategy is credible, we believe that we will be able to prevent war. But the strategy is based on the premise that warning time will be sufficient. For now, that warning time seems to be considerable. This of course also determines the sizing of the forces we must keep in northern Norway at any time. We must, however, make sure that we do not weaken our readiness in northern Nor­way and that NATO does not reduce its reinforcement ca­pability to the point at which an adversary might be tempted to launch an isolated attack or apply pressure

against parts of northern Norway. The Kola base paradox must be upheld as a defense mechanism against isolated attacks.

Another strategic point concerns southern Norway, which in many ways is the heart of NATO’s Northern Command. It is protected in the north by northern Nor­way, in the east by Sweden, in the west by NATO’s naval forces, and in the south by Danish and German forces. Strategically, southern Norway acts as a base area for sup­port of operations in the Baltic and North seas and north­ern Norway.

The main task of the commander-in-chief of southern Norway is, however, to reinforce and support northern Norway. But to do this, he must have the necessary forces to employ the resources. This applies to protection of any mobilization, the transfer of reinforcements, and the re­supply of the northern Norway forces. Military and politi­cal developments in Central Europe may, however, exac­erbate the commander-in-chief’s job in the future.

The Navy’s Tasks                                                                        

Norwegian naval defense consists of three branches:

• The coastal artillery, which includes the permanent combat elements with coastal batteries, torpedo batteries, and controllable minefields
• The navy, with its submarines, frigates, motor torpedo boats, minelayers, minesweepers, and various auxiliary ships
• The coast guard, which is an organ of the navy.

Our task must also be seen in the context of the allied

naval forces that operate in the Baltic and its exit, in the North Sea, and in the Norwegian Sea. No naval forces

have been earmarked for Norway, but the presence and priorities of NATO naval forces influence the resources that the Soviet Union could spare for an attack on Norway. Nevertheless, Norway must depend on NATO’s ear­marked army and air force reinforcements as chief deter­rents against war on the northern flank.

The main task of our navy is to protect our territory from attacks launched from the sea. The task is divided into three main portions: surveillance, anti-invasion, and protection of coastal sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Because of our long coastline and limited available re­sources, we have structured the navy in such a way that we can use small and relatively inexpensive units that are more or less tailor-made for the jobs to be carried out in coastal waters. In this process, we have had to sacrifice ocean-going qualities, endurance, on-board repair facili­ties, and, to a great extent, the multicombat options typi­cal of vessels in ocean-going navies. We can live without many of the multicombat options, since the lack of them can be largely compensated for by our modus operandi in a designated area.

We look at the coastal environment as a force multi­plier. By pursuing such a philosophy, we can, with limited resources, maintain more units than what we otherwise could. This is essential when we have to compensate for elements of uncertainty in an adversary’s modus operandi.

To assess and implement necessary measures in re­sponse to irregularities in our coastal and ocean areas, we place great emphasis on surveillance. In addition to patrols by our submarines and maritime surveillance aircraft, the new coast guard vessels contribute significantly.

In the future, the need for surveillance along the coast will increase because of increased threats to the environ­ment from pollution. This is true for surveillance and con­trol of both civilian maritime activities and shipping in the ocean areas that we are responsible for. All our ships and coastal artillery units must take part in surveillance of our maritime environment and related resources and guard our national interests and international commitments. Here we also find new peacetime tasks for our coastal radar sta­tions. In crises and in war, our many fishing boats and coastal monitoring stations will enhance our surveillance capabilities.

Our coastal population provides perhaps our best sur­veillance. The women and men who live along our 21,000-kilometer-long coast are very observant and sensi­tive to irregularities at the water’s edge. Many nations envy this capability, but they also fear the alertness and contribution by the coastal population to our outer defense line and peacetime surveillance interests.

Anti-invasion               ___________________________

If we are unable to delay or avert an invasion, there will be no place to send reinforcements, and nothing to rein­force. Top priority, therefore, goes to defending against a naval invasion.

The naval anti-invasion concept is based on three prin­ciples, often referred to as the maritime triad of the anti­invasion defense: Delays and channelization; Survivability and perseverance; Mobility and concentration of forces.

The delay and channelization effect is designed to win time for Norway to concentrate its forces or channel a naval invasion to areas less vulnerable or easier to defend. The main elements in achieving this are the permanent installations of the coastal artillery.

Coastal artillery installations are strategically located to Protect the entrances to crucial areas and resource centers. They consist of some 20 seafront batteries, a number of fire-sweep batteries, torpedo batteries, and controllable minefields. The most exposed installations are manned in Peacetime; the others can be operational within 48 hours.

In addition, operational and requisitional minelayers will lay defensive minefields. The first field can be in place in less than 12 hours after initiation. Coastal artillery will cover most minefields.

Last year we took delivery of the first of several new seafront batteries, which give an entirely new dimension to the defense of the main entrances in northern and south­ern Norway. These forts represent the best of Norwegian and Swedish coastal artillery experience and technology. But the price is, of course, commensurate with the capa­bility. Our submarines and, to some degree, the fortified Permanent defensive facilities of the coastal artillery han­dle the aspects of survivability and perseverance.

Submarines are least vulnerable to changes in the threat, Particularly, the air threat. Therefore, they can operate in

Our 38 motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and 62 F-16 light­ers provide mobility and concentration of lorccs. Most ol the missile-capable MTBs will be deployed in the North. The MTBs in the naval anti-invasion defense will operate as needed to inflict maximum losses on the invasion lorce and its amphibious and troop transport vessels, while the invasion elements are still shut up and inactive on board. Coordination with the coastal artillery is needed to avoid mutual interference and to achieve the best possible com­bat effect that cooperation between these two types ol units can foster. Another chief task for the M TBs will be to attack invasion forces out of range of the coastal artil­lery.

With maximum exploitation of the coastal environment, we believe that every element of the anti-invasion defense force’s maritime triad represents a threat not to be over­looked by the enemy. After approaching the coastline from the open sea, an adversary’s movements will be seri­ously restricted in the inner coastal waters. An enemy will, therefore, be forced to structure forces to cope with each of these threats. The implementation of a naval attack in a multithreat defensive environment, and with limited freedom of navigation, will, without a doubt, place a heavy burden on the enemy’s tactical leadership and