The New German Navy Moves Out

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By Vice Admiral Dieter F. Braun, German Navy

Despite changes in political boundaries, Germany remains a trading nation depen­dent on the sea for imports and exports. Its naval forces must reflect the requirement to guarantee the nation access to the sea lines of communication that link it with the World.

The positive change in East-West relations, the Vi­enna negotiations on arms control and disarma­ment, the fundamental political changes taking place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the unification of the two German states have combined to change decisively the terms of security policy in Europe.

There is the chance that continued arms-control negotia­tions, the increasing cooperation of former Cold War op­ponents, and the democratization of countries hitherto governed by authoritarian regimes will lead to an era that will rule out—even in the long run—the probability of war between East and West.

Against this background of change, the German Navy must reassess its future role and reevaluate the resources that may be required. The budget problems that conlront Germany as a consequence of the unification will make it more difficult to obtain the necessary political and public support for all matters of maritime defense. Scrutiny of our present conceptual foundation, however, shows clearly that in spite of the changes in European security policy, the German Navy can find its bearings by rclerring to several constants:

• The easily quantifiable dependence of Germany—a highly industrialized country, short of it not poor in raw materials—on the unimpeded use of the sea lines of com­munication connecting us with friends and partners (see Table 1).
• The Navy’s peacetime mission—national defense, con­tributions to detente, execution ot maritime tasks, and

support of other institutions

• The Navy’s mission during crises—crisis management, intensified precautions for defense, and the crisis-oriented execution of maritime tasks
• The Navy’s wartime mission
• The Navy’s designated area of operations—the sea areas of the European Northern Flank, where the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of the members of the European Community are situated, and through which vital sea lines of communication are routed
• The ability to accomplish essential missions such as in­telligence gathering and reconnaissance, mine counter­measures, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface warfare outside the Northern European Flank
• The ability to operate in and out of area as part of an alliance (Membership jn an alliance includes the right to cooperation on the basis of solidarity and commitment to the common cause, commensurate with own capabilities.)

Thus for the German Navy the development of security policy does not mean a general reorientation. Its future tasks rather will reflect the continuity of the current con­ceptual foundations. One should not fail to recognize, however, that the ‘aim’ of the mission assigned to the German Navy and hence the required effort will change. Thus it will be possible at the national and at the alliance levels to give up—gradually—the concentration on coun­tering a seaborne Warsaw Pact attack conducted in con­junction with a land attack against our central front. At the same time, the operational orientation will shift from countering an existing threat to preparing for general mari­time defense.

The undisputed capabilities of the Soviet Navy, how­ever, will remain an important datum point that must be kept in mind. This huge navy has a potential that demands our general attention because it is capable at any time of restricting or denying our right of free, unimpeded use of our own territorial waters and of the high seas. In this context, we must realize that the slowly diminishing of­fensive capability of Soviet ground forces will permit the gradual emancipation of the Soviet Navy from its support­ing role on the central land front. As this process contin­ues, the Soviet Union may assign its navy the classic far- ranging role of a great power—whose area of operation

^can no longer be predicted by simply looking at its bases.

The Soviet Navy calls for our particular attention be­cause it is an immediately available, combat-ready, mod­^ern super-navy—right on our door step.

Defining the naval warfare assets the German Navy will ^require in the future, we must consider not only the na­tional mission but also the commitments arising from our Membership in the Atlantic Alliance. In defining our re­quirements we had to bear in mind that:

^ Modem ships cannot be expected to maintain any rea­sonable level of operational readiness if their crews are at cadre strength.

* The German Navy cannot plan on reinforcements.

^ Any mobilization will be restricted to technical person­al required to perform secondary tasks.

^ Increasing the number of ships and aircraft will depend °n warning time sufficient to buy off-the-shelf replace­ments or develop new equipment.

► Nothing short of coordinated operations—air, surface, and undersea—will ensure lull exploitation ol the existing capabilities.

The Peacetime Mission: This mission includes visible presence at sea aimed at demonstrating our national will; reconnaissance and intelligence gathering; and participa­tion in common activities within the lramewoik ol the Atlantic Alliance—the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, Standing Naval Force Channel, and Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean.

The Navy’s contribution to detente is another peacetime mission. Because of the political and military changes in the East-West relations, naval forces will be employed even more than they are today in shaping and lostcring international moves to preserve peace. The German

The End of the East German Navy

By Lieutenant Commander Siegfried Gates, U.S. Navy

The German Democratic Re­public ceased to exist on 3 Oc­tober 1990 and a new Germany ^emerged to face a future filled with an uncertainty unmatched since the grim hours of what some Germans called “Zero Hour”—the end of World War H. Restructuring a society and economy held back by 45 years of communist rule will not be easy.

The questions of armed forces Unification and what is to be­come of the Soviet armament with which East Germany’s mil­itary was equipped concern more than equipment compatibility and political differences. Their cost must be reckoned in human terms.

The East Germans: In the past no Warsaw Pact ally of the So­viets enjoyed a better reputation for trustworthiness, training, readiness, discipline, and mili­tary bearing than did the Ger­man Democratic Republic’s (GDR) People’s National Army—or, in German terms, the Nationale Volksarmee.

Today, career soldiers who once enjoyed the prospect of a secure future are faced with early retirement or discharge and no guarantee of a pension.

Officers and enlisted men have been crossing the border into West Germany not only to shop with their newly acquired German marks, but to assess their prospects for retention in the unified armed forces or pos­sibilities for employment in the civilian sector. Others cross to consult with their West German military counterparts in an effort to reorient their thinking in the areas of leadership and manage­ment—and to acquire as much reference material as they can stuff into their suitcases and ugly little cars called “Trabbies.”

Individual prospects for reten­tion are clouded by the German government’s intention to reduce the size of its armed forces sig­nificantly. The perception of a diminished threat and the desire to prove to the world, and to the Soviets in particular, that there is nothing to fear from a unified Germany, have created over­whelming political pressure to reduce military spending. In Jan­uary 1988, West Germany had

1. personnel in its armed forces; East Germany had 173,000—although by Septem­ber 1990, the East German total had dropped dramatically to about 90,000.

The figures most recently agreed to by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev call for a total German armed force end- strength of 370,000 men. Since Germany’s goal is to absorb about 50,000 personnel from whatever remains of the old East German forces, West German forces must be reduced to

1. to meet the total.

Proposed German armed forces strengths by 1994 are:

• Army—240,000
• Navy—25,000
• Air Force—105,000
• Total—370,000

Draftees from East Germany called up at reunification will be inducted directly into the Ger­man armed forces and will have the same rights, pay, and privi­leges as those from any other part of the country.

The most pressing problems concern the fate of East German career officers and those soldiers who, prior to reunification, en­listed for a specific period of time. All who were serving prior to reunification will leave active

Navy’s contribution to such measures includes port visits, participation in international conferences on maritime se­curity, and responding to other missions directed by the government.

The Navy also meets commitments under international law and bears responsibilities outside German territorial waters, including international search and rescue opera­tions, protection of the oceans against environmental pol­lution, and supporting fishery agencies or fishing fleets.

Other national tasks include ship degaussing and mer­chant marine officer training; antipollution operations; the collection and transmission of oceanographic, hydro­graphic, and nautical data to the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency; combating crime at sea, e.g., drug trafficking or arms smuggling; and rendering support to authorities in fulfilling domestic tasks such as support of federal and land authorities, maintaining public order, and

disaster relief.

The Crisis Mission: The government may employ the Navy to support national as well as international actions aimed at coping with developing or full-scale crises. Mo­bility and a comparatively low risk of escalation—as long as such operations are limited to the high seas—qualify naval forces especially for this kind of task. Friendly rela­tionships developed in peacetime between navies and bi­lateral or multilateral agreements are additional factors forming a solid basis for the successful completion of such tasks.

A high degree of operational readiness is a prerequisite for successful maritime crisis management. A decisive task under this heading is, and will continue to be, to prepare for securing the sea lines of communication and for the direct protection of merchant shipping by an in­

old will have their cases re­viewed on an individual basis, while those over 55 will be pen­sioned. Those selected for active duty will serve a two-year pro­bationary period during which they can be discharged on short notice if background investiga­tions reveal activities that would make them unacceptable as sol­diers of the Bundeswehr.

Officers will be screened indi­vidually—to include personal interviews—by an independent committee that will determine fitness for further service. Simi­lar committees were used in 1955 to weed out former Nazis

What will happen to these former East German torpedo-boat sailors is uncertain—there is not room for all of them in the German Navy and the civilian economy may have to absorb them.

duty and revert to standby sta­tus. Pay grades and ranks may be retained pending selection by the Ministry of Defense.

Individuals under age 50, offi­cer or enlisted, may be selected for service in the German armed forces. Applicants 50-55 years

and other unacceptable former Wehrmacht personnel when the groundwork was being laid for the West German Bundeswehr.

Those individuals under 50 who are not selected for duty in the armed forces will continue their reserve status for six months of inactive duty, during which time they will receive 70% of their average salary; they will then be discharged. As an option, individuals may forgo the six-months service and settle for a lump sum payment not to exceed 7,000 marks. Those indi­viduals 50 and older will be al­lowed to remain in the same duty and pay status for nine months. If eligible, they will be allowed to retire immediately. If they are not selected for active duty, they will be allowed to retire after the nine-month stand-down ends.

Weeding out the unacceptable individuals is only the first step toward the post-unification armed forces. Those East Ger­mans who are retained will have to learn the ways of the West German soldier.

While this may seem a daunt­ing task, there is historical pre­cedent for it in Germany. When the West German armed forces were reestablished in 1955, planners recognized that a new leadership philosophy would be required if the excesses of the past were to be avoided. The

creased presence on the spot ensured by appropriate de­ployment of ships; and reconnaissance, surveillance, shadowing and, if need be, countering intruders.

In a crisis, the German Navy will prepare to shilt the emphasis of tasks both nationally and with respect to the Alliance, paying special attention to naval control of ship­ping and fishery control.

The War Mission: The German Navy contributes to na­tional security as well as to the security ot the alliance by executing its mission to deter seaborne operations against Germany and its allies and restoring, if need be, the integ­rity of national and allied territories as well as political freedom of action.

Few operational commanders will ever state that they have surplus or even sufficient forces. But the adequacy of forces will be scrutinized publicly by self-appointed ex­perts, as well as by members of parliament with consider­able experience in all matters of dclcnse budgets. Only a dispassionate and credible approach will in the end be ac­cepted by our political leaders.

The force requirements that follow arc based on the German Navy’s contribution to the security of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. The adequacy, and hence the credibility, of the Navy’s contribution to maritime defense becomes less and less calculable if referred to a specific friend-foe scenario. The force requirement is determined instead by a complex approach that must above all take into consideration:

• Our vital maritime dependence
• The intended degree of emphasis ot our political role in matters of maritime security, including the exploitation ol the sea
• The expectations of our allies with regard to our contri-

'dea became the Sclutle flier In­here Fuehrung (School for Inner Leadership), which included po­litical training in addition to leadership and management. It ^was established in Cologne in 1956 and moved to Koblenz in 1957. The officers and enlisted men who attended these courses formed the core of the new Ger­man armed forces and their stud­ies reflected the democratic ideals of the new German state. The curriculum included courses in economics, leadership, poli­tics, and international law. The school has evolved and is now called the Center (Zentrum) for Inner Leadership. It is more than ^a civics classroom for staff offi­cers, but its original function has not been forgotten. It will ex­pand to fulfill an old-new mis­sion of retraining the former East German soldier.

The Soviets: When the Soviets leave, they will insist on pay­ment for the barracks, airfields, and practice ranges—which they confiscated as prizes of war in 1945. If the past is any indica­tion, anything still useful that is not permanently attached or needed to keep the building from falling on the Soviets will be taken back to the Soviet Union.

One thing they cannot take back is the environment, and the German government is con­cerned about its condition. For years open barracks latrines, offal from animal pens (for live­stock kept to supplement their rations), leaking petroleum prod­ucts storage areas, and unex­ploded ordnance on live-fire ranges, have damaged the envi­ronment and polluted the area’s streams and rivers. The clean-up will come at Germany’s ex­pense.

The remains of World War II-era weaponry, which include chemical weapons and 380,000 tons of Soviet ordnance plus an estimated 20,000 metric tons of modern chemical weapons stored in containers of questionable in­tegrity, causes some to fear that the new Germany is on the brink of an ecological disaster that must somehow be averted before the land can be used again.

Whatever pace the Soviets set themselves for pulling out of Germany will be determined by economics back home, availabil­ity of housing, and the level of confidence they have in the new political order in Europe.

The German Navy: The Ger­man Navy will lose a total of

1. officers and sailors. The desired result is a smaller, more modern, and flexible navy ready for the 21st century.

In considering the fate of ad­ditional equipment and personnel

that will become available upon reunification, it must be remem­bered that manpower and weap­ons by themselves create consid­erable pressures on the Ministry of Defense and the Navy. The additional manpower and equip­ment resulting from reunification only increase those pressures.

Following is a list of East German Navy assets at reunifi­cation:

• 23 Frigates
• 52 Guided-missile patrol boats
• 24 Mine warfare vessels
• 20 Fighter-bombers
• 14 ASW helicopters
• 20 Search-and-rescue helos
• 10 Tenders/support ships

The German Navy is probably not going to keep many East German ships. The Soviets do not want the ships—and neither do the Germans—so they will be scrapped or sold. There has been considerable negative press in Germany caused by German (East and West) sales to the Third World, especially in view of events in Iraq and Kuwait. Fear of adverse public reaction will probably prevent sales abroad. 1 think that the ships that can be demilitarized credi­bly will be converted and sold to the private sector and that the remaining ships will be scrapped.

Commander Gates, a surface line otficer, is attending the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Ham­burg, Germany.