This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg, Royal Swedish Navy
Ten years ago we realized that violations of our territorial integrity were of a new kind. The problem is still not solved.
The submarine crises, more than any other issue, have most hurt the image of Swedish security policy in the postwar period.
There have been and still are many misunderstandings and interpretations of what has happened and what has been done. From the beginning I have been deeply involved in the navy’s efforts to rebuild our ASW capacity. I have met many questions; some are always the same. So I thought by asking some of them and trying to answer them, perhaps I might straighten out some question marks.
Are submarine intrusions a modern phenomena?
No. In Sweden we have had them since World War II.
Why all this fuss about them now?
Earlier we thought they were normal violations. We did not want to encourage the opinion that the military invented submarine violations (“budget boats”) as a justification to receive more money. But they changed in character during the 1980s. The incidents during this period, especially the “Whiskey on the rocks” in 1981, made us aware the violations were not normal.
What would have happened if ten years ago someone had suggested that a Soviet sub would be stranded deep in our naval base area in Karlskrona and that in the years to follow we would be fighting a peacetime war under the water?
Although any such person would certainly have been maligned as an alarmist, many in the navy were expecting this I problem to occur.
Is the Swedish navy that bad?
Yes. Despite these liberal rules of engagements, we have not been able to take a submarine. But we are slowly improving our capability. We have forced the intruder to change its operational pattern. We came close to capturing a submarine in the Havringebay incident. Two attacks were mounted and
Does the Swedish government restrict the navy from sinking an intruding submarine?
People generally seem to think there must be some sort of restriction. But, in fact, the government has given freedom of action to the military—more, I think, than any other country gives to its commanding officers. The rules of engagement today do not hamper our ability to attack.
The only restrictions we operate under in our territorial waters are to avoid sinking a submarine that is faulty in its navigation. When we have stated that we have submarines in our innermost waters, the supreme commander can order an attack without any forewarning.
Are we sure that we are not hunting phantoms? Are not the “possible submarines’’ similar to the sightings of spacecraft during the 1950s and 1960s?
Of course, many reports are false. But the amount of hard evidence is so high that we have a fairly good picture of what is going on. We have:
- Sightings documented with photos
- Active high- and low- frequency sonar contacts
- Passive sonar contacts
- Magnetic detection
- Bottom tracks from special vehicles
came squarely on target but did not hit. Close, however, is not enough.
Is it that difficult to hunt submarines in the Baltic?
Yes. The conditions are not favorable. The Baltic has:
- Changes in temperature and salinity
- Rugged bottom
- Extremely shallow water
- Archipelago features
- Magnetic disturbances
- Poor visibility
- Significant currents in various patterns
The only advantage, compared to the vast oceans, is the low salinity concentration. This means one could expect longer detection ranges. The strong nonlinear speed of a sound profile counteracts this advantage, however. The energy is mostly dissipated in the bottom. But we are learning all the time.
Political decisions during the 1950s and 1960s made us do away with most of our ASW capability and knowledge. That takes time to rebuild.
What are the bottlenecks in Swedish ASW capability?
The number of ASW surface ships, submarines, helicopters and aircraft is limited, despite the fact that we started rebuilding our ASW capacity in 1980. We still have only one ASW task group. The means to locate and classify submarines are complicated. But we have improved substantially.
Swedish weapons are poor:
- The probability of achieving a kill using depth charges is very low (even after we upgraded them).
- The probability of a hit is somewhat better for antisubmarine grenades. A kill, in turn, depends on the submarine’s hull design.
- The Type-431 ASW torpedoes just now operational fulfill the requirement but not the needs. Submarines lying quietly on the bottom are not possible targets.
- The enemy can avoid fixed controllable lines, which make a lot of false contacts.
Submarines must be the best
way to hunt other submarines. Why don't the Swedes use them more?
When we started our ASW efforts, our submarines had a limited capacity. We have now improved passive sonars (FAS and circular arrays). We have reduced the noise. We will get an ASW torpedo operational this year. The submarines have had quite a lot of our contacts. The submarines are our most important system for surveillance, but 1 don’t think we can solve the problem with submarines alone.
Why not use civilian fishing vessels with their sonars and nets to catch the submarines?
We have tested and used fishing vessels. They are perfect for limited missions in narrow passages. But the commanding officers of the submarines seem to be more clever than a school of fish.
Are there any signs that the submarine campaign against Sweden will stop?
Not any that we dare to believe in. The number of indications went down during 1989 to the level of mid-1980s; the number of operations probably also went down. But they continue. I believe that Sweden is part of the intruder’s wartime contingency plans.
A real change in the strategic value of the Scandinavian peninsula is not yet foreseeable. On the contrary, I think its strategic importance will increase as a result of the changes taking place in central Europe.
What about the nationality of the intruder?
The submarine that ran aground in Karlskrona 1981 was clearly Soviet. The submarine defense commission stated in its report that the Soviet Union was the violator of Swedish territory at the Harstjiirden incident 1982 and in a couple of other earlier incidents. We have not since 1983 been able to confirm the nationality of the intruder.
What do critics say about the Swedish handling of the submarine crises?
I quote from the RAND report by Gordon McCormick:
“As it is, Swedish policy continues to manifest an air of unreality. Stockholm still hides behind the fiction of ‘alien intruders.’ ...”
“Stockholm appears to have maneuvered itself into a position in which it must carry through on its threat to sink a submarine before anyone believes it was serious about doing so. In the absence of such an action, the future of the submarine crises will be determined by events beyond Sweden’s control.”
McCormick shows a good insight into the Swedish submarine crises dilemma.
From the naval operational side, does it create problems when Sweden avoids talking about the nationality of the submarines?
For us in the fleet it does not matter which intruders we have to fight. In our analyses of the threat it is, of course, not difficult to come to a conclusion as to who our opponent is.
I agree with McCormick that by not officially stating who the intruder is, many in the establishment have been able to sweep the problem under the carpet. I am convinced that the only way to stop the submarine campaign against us is by military means. The risk when operating in Swedish waters has to be too high for an enemy.
Why is the submarine campaign waged just on Sweden?
Who says it is? I am convinced that Sweden is not the only target. Sweden, with its insular position on the borderline between the strategic interests of the superpowers, is a suitable target. What we see is a use of submarines in clandestine warfare that historically is not new, but is different in its operational pattern and the use of modern technology. I believe other nations ought to rethink or at least test their threat perspectives, keeping in mind the German submarine campaign that almost cut off the sea lines of communication during World War II.
Doesn’t the difficulty in thwarting the submarine campaign against Sweden show the effectiveness of submarines for all types of missions—special warfare, antishipping, surveillance, mine warfare, etc.?
Yes. It has surprised me that this has not come through better in the supreme commanders’ studies and priorities for our future defense. The defense committee in 1987 stressed the submarine system. The reality has been that the number of Type-90 submarine has shrunk from six to three—hardly cost-effective. Moreover, the supreme commander demands an increased budget to be willing to support the contract for new submarines.
I think that the submarines we have today in the Swedish fleet are most potent. Mine girdels and sterling engines would improve the operational capability even more. The submarines have important missions to fulfill in both peace and war. The submarines hold a key position in our naval operational system.
We in the navy have felt much frustration in not obtaining hard proof about the submarines trespassing in our waters. On the other hand, these incursions have given us a clear and defined objective. I am very proud of the small but potent fleet we have today, which has grown stronger from fighting the intruder.
Admiral Tomberg is the director of the Swedish Armed Forces Staff & War College in Stockholm. He won Second Honorable Mention in the 1989 International Navies Essay Contest.