The End of the East German Navy

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

The End of the East German Navy

By Lieutenant Commander Siegfried Gates, U.S. Navy

The German Democratic Re­public ceased to exist on 3 Oc­tober 1990 and a new Germany ^emerged to face a future filled with an uncertainty unmatched since the grim hours of what some Germans called “Zero Hour”—the end of World War H. Restructuring a society and economy held back by 45 years of communist rule will not be easy.

The questions of armed forces Unification and what is to be­come of the Soviet armament with which East Germany’s mil­itary was equipped concern more than equipment compatibility and political differences. Their cost must be reckoned in human terms.

The East Germans: In the past no Warsaw Pact ally of the So­viets enjoyed a better reputation for trustworthiness, training, readiness, discipline, and mili­tary bearing than did the Ger­man Democratic Republic’s (GDR) People’s National Army—or, in German terms, the Nationale Volksarmee.

Today, career soldiers who once enjoyed the prospect of a secure future are faced with early retirement or discharge and no guarantee of a pension.

Officers and enlisted men have been crossing the border into West Germany not only to shop with their newly acquired German marks, but to assess their prospects for retention in the unified armed forces or pos­sibilities for employment in the civilian sector. Others cross to consult with their West German military counterparts in an effort to reorient their thinking in the areas of leadership and manage­ment—and to acquire as much reference material as they can stuff into their suitcases and ugly little cars called “Trabbies.”

Individual prospects for reten­tion are clouded by the German government’s intention to reduce the size of its armed forces sig­nificantly. The perception of a diminished threat and the desire to prove to the world, and to the Soviets in particular, that there is nothing to fear from a unified Germany, have created over­whelming political pressure to reduce military spending. In Jan­uary 1988, West Germany had

1. personnel in its armed forces; East Germany had 173,000—although by Septem­ber 1990, the East German total had dropped dramatically to about 90,000.

The figures most recently agreed to by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev call for a total German armed force end- strength of 370,000 men. Since Germany’s goal is to absorb about 50,000 personnel from whatever remains of the old East German forces, West German forces must be reduced to

1. to meet the total.

Proposed German armed forces strengths by 1994 are:

• Army—240,000
• Navy—25,000
• Air Force—105,000
• Total—370,000

Draftees from East Germany called up at reunification will be inducted directly into the Ger­man armed forces and will have the same rights, pay, and privi­leges as those from any other part of the country.

The most pressing problems concern the fate of East German career officers and those soldiers who, prior to reunification, en­listed for a specific period of time. All who were serving prior to reunification will leave active

Navy’s contribution to such measures includes port visits, participation in international conferences on maritime se­curity, and responding to other missions directed by the government.

The Navy also meets commitments under international law and bears responsibilities outside German territorial waters, including international search and rescue opera­tions, protection of the oceans against environmental pol­lution, and supporting fishery agencies or fishing fleets.

Other national tasks include ship degaussing and mer­chant marine officer training; antipollution operations; the collection and transmission of oceanographic, hydro­graphic, and nautical data to the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency; combating crime at sea, e.g., drug trafficking or arms smuggling; and rendering support to authorities in fulfilling domestic tasks such as support of federal and land authorities, maintaining public order, and

disaster relief.

The Crisis Mission: The government may employ the Navy to support national as well as international actions aimed at coping with developing or full-scale crises. Mo­bility and a comparatively low risk of escalation—as long as such operations are limited to the high seas—qualify naval forces especially for this kind of task. Friendly rela­tionships developed in peacetime between navies and bi­lateral or multilateral agreements are additional factors forming a solid basis for the successful completion of such tasks.

A high degree of operational readiness is a prerequisite for successful maritime crisis management. A decisive task under this heading is, and will continue to be, to prepare for securing the sea lines of communication and for the direct protection of merchant shipping by an in­

old will have their cases re­viewed on an individual basis, while those over 55 will be pen­sioned. Those selected for active duty will serve a two-year pro­bationary period during which they can be discharged on short notice if background investiga­tions reveal activities that would make them unacceptable as sol­diers of the Bundeswehr.

Officers will be screened indi­vidually—to include personal interviews—by an independent committee that will determine fitness for further service. Simi­lar committees were used in 1955 to weed out former Nazis

What will happen to these former East German torpedo-boat sailors is uncertain—there is not room for all of them in the German Navy and the civilian economy may have to absorb them.

duty and revert to standby sta­tus. Pay grades and ranks may be retained pending selection by the Ministry of Defense.

Individuals under age 50, offi­cer or enlisted, may be selected for service in the German armed forces. Applicants 50-55 years

and other unacceptable former Wehrmacht personnel when the groundwork was being laid for the West German Bundeswehr.

Those individuals under 50 who are not selected for duty in the armed forces will continue their reserve status for six months of inactive duty, during which time they will receive 70% of their average salary; they will then be discharged. As an option, individuals may forgo the six-months service and settle for a lump sum payment not to exceed 7,000 marks. Those indi­viduals 50 and older will be al­lowed to remain in the same duty and pay status for nine months. If eligible, they will be allowed to retire immediately. If they are not selected for active duty, they will be allowed to retire after the nine-month stand-down ends.

Weeding out the unacceptable individuals is only the first step toward the post-unification armed forces. Those East Ger­mans who are retained will have to learn the ways of the West German soldier.

While this may seem a daunt­ing task, there is historical pre­cedent for it in Germany. When the West German armed forces were reestablished in 1955, planners recognized that a new leadership philosophy would be required if the excesses of the past were to be avoided. The

creased presence on the spot ensured by appropriate de­ployment of ships; and reconnaissance, surveillance, shadowing and, if need be, countering intruders.

In a crisis, the German Navy will prepare to shilt the emphasis of tasks both nationally and with respect to the Alliance, paying special attention to naval control of ship­ping and fishery control.

The War Mission: The German Navy contributes to na­tional security as well as to the security ot the alliance by executing its mission to deter seaborne operations against Germany and its allies and restoring, if need be, the integ­rity of national and allied territories as well as political freedom of action.

Few operational commanders will ever state that they have surplus or even sufficient forces. But the adequacy of forces will be scrutinized publicly by self-appointed ex­perts, as well as by members of parliament with consider­able experience in all matters of dclcnse budgets. Only a dispassionate and credible approach will in the end be ac­cepted by our political leaders.

The force requirements that follow arc based on the German Navy’s contribution to the security of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. The adequacy, and hence the credibility, of the Navy’s contribution to maritime defense becomes less and less calculable if referred to a specific friend-foe scenario. The force requirement is determined instead by a complex approach that must above all take into consideration:

• Our vital maritime dependence
• The intended degree of emphasis ot our political role in matters of maritime security, including the exploitation ol the sea
• The expectations of our allies with regard to our contri-