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East Europe

By Milan Vego
March 1991
Proceedings
Vol. 117/3/1,057
Article
View Issue
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By Milan Vego

The political and military landscape in Eastern Europe has changed beyond rec­ognition in the past 12 months. The War­saw Pact as a military organization is for all practical purposes defunct. The com­munist ideology and the Soviet-style eco­nomic system have practically collapsed. East Germany does not exist, and its once-powerful army has vanished. All the remaining armed forces of Eastern Europe are undergoing radical structural changes. Growing economic difficulties have virtually stopped naval construction throughout Eastern Europe. “Depolitici­zation'’ and “deideologization” of the East European navies formally began in Poland and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the changes are still more cosmetic than real.

Baltic Sea: The most significant naval changes in Eastern Europe took place in the Baltic. The Joint Command of the Socialist fleets in the Baltic essentially has ceased to exist. The Soviet naval po­sition in the area thus has considerably

J. WHARTON

weakened. The Soviets still have access to their warships in Polish ports, but probably not for long. There was only one report on any joint maneuver—a very small one—of Warsaw Pact navies in the Baltic in 1990.

East Germany: The Volksmarine ceased to exist after Germany’s unifica­tion on 3 October 1990. The German Ministry of Defense has established a new command in what was formerly East Germany; it is called the Bundeswehr Kommando-Ost and is located in Straus- berg near Berlin. This command admin­isters the takeover of the former East German National People’s Army by the Bundeswehr. It is planned to operate for at least six months.

The naval component of this command was initially designated the Transfer Es­tablishment Group-Rostock and then the Naval District Command at Rostock. It is headed by Flotilla Admiral Dirk Horten; 90 officers and petty officers (15 serve in the staff) are assigned to this command' are responsible for all the ships and craft and some 9.000 personnel of the former Volksmarine. The Naval District Com­mand at Rostock also controls the naval bases at Warnemiinde and Peenemiinde and a few logistical support units and command-and-control posts.

Eventually, about 60 units and billets for 2,000 persons of the former Volks­marine will be retained. But only a few officers and petty officers will have a chance to continue their professional ca­reers in the Bundesmarine; their initial contract will be for only two years. All admirals and officers older than 50 were forced to retire on 2 October 1990.1

In the last months before Germany’s unification the Volksmarine was busy dis­posing of many of its older ships and craft. Reportedly, at least five and most likely all six remaining Shershen-class torpedo craft, three Kondor-II-class coastal minesweepers, and two Kondor-1 class patrol craft of the Coastal Border Brigade were scrapped in Denmark.2

The lead ship of the Sassnitz-class (ex- Balcom-10) small missile ships was com­missioned on 31 July 1990. The 369-ton (standard load) and 38-knot Sassnitz class was slated to be fitted with two quadruple - launchers for the new SS-N-25 antiship missile, an SA-N-5 quadruple launcher for the SA-7 or SA-14 surface-to-air mis­sile, a single 76-mm./L60 AK-176 auto­matic gun, and a six-barreled 30-mm-/ L65 AK-630 (Gatling type) antiaircraft gun. The SS-N-25 missiles, however, were returned to the Soviets. The Sassnitz class was the first Warsaw Pact ship fitted with two 32-tube chaff launchers. The German government decided that only two out of ten (some sources say 16) planned ships of this class would be com­pleted and offered for export. The ships may be refitted with three MTU marine diesels and would carry the same arma­ment minus the SS-N-25 and SA-N-5 systems.2

Several weeks before unification, the last Commander-in-Chief of the Volks­marine, Rear Admiral Hendrik Born, pleaded for the German government to take over at least five Tarantul-1-class missile corvettes, ten of the new Sassnitz- class missile craft, as many as 16 Par- chim-class antisubmarine warfare cor­vettes, and 20 Kondor-II-class coastal minesweepers. He proposed that about 90% of the Volksmarine's personnel (of which 30% are officers) be merged with

the Bundesmarine 4 However, in the end the German government decided to retain °nly 13 surface combatants of the former Volksmarine. These ships include two ^o/ii'-class frigates (Halle and Rostock), 0ne Sassnitz (ex-Balcom-10) class and one Tarantul-class (Project 1241) small missile ship, four Parchim-class cor­vettes (Gadebuscli, Liibz, Teterow, and ^ismar), and five Kondor-II-class c°astal minesweepers (Sormmerda, Eis- bben, Eilenburg, Bernau, and Bitter- feld). Only oneKo/n'-class frigate, the Ros­tock, will be kept in service, and only for a limited time. In addition, the Bundes- 'narine took over three 2,390-ton Ohre- olass floating bases, three tugs, one salvage tug, and 23 miscellaneous floating craft.

The Bundesmarine's first inspection of the Soviet-built ships in the Volksmarine revealed major deficiencies in the quality °f their engines. The remaining ships and Craft of the Volksmarine will be evaluated to decide whether they should be sold or scrapped, and commercial operators might acquire some of them.5

These 13 combatants are currently or­ganized into a Coastal Guard Squadron subordinate to the Naval District Com­mand at Rostock. Germany plans to keep this squadron until the end of 1991/’ Its ships and craft are used primarily for nav­igational training and visits to the former East German ports of Wismar, Stralsund, Sassnitz (on the island of Rugen), and ZVolgast. Similar cruises for former Volksmarine ships should take place with visits to the ports of Kiel, Flensburg, Wilhelmshaven, and Bremerhaven in the western Baltic and North Sea.7

Poland: The Polish Navy is changing considerably because of the announced shift toward a new national defense doc­trine and the cuts in the size of the country’s armed forces. Polish armed forces have been depoliticized more than almost any of East Europe.

The first all-purpose landing and mine­laying ship, the 1,620-ton 17-knot Lublin class, was at sea by August 1989. The ship has a continuous deck accessible from both ends and is completely open upward, except where it is spanned by the bridge superstructure. The ship’s esti­mated loading area is 500 square meters, which allows it to carry as many as eight medium tanks or a corresponding number of vehicles. Lublin-class landing ships reportedly can carry as many as 135 troops with their equipment. They also can lay mines and have begun replacing the Polnocny class, at least five of which were sold abroad in 1990 for commercial service.8

The replacement for the old Eichstaden-class landing craft are the 170-ton Deba-class Project 851 small landing ships, previously the NATO- dubbed Bal-Com-9 class. The lead craft entered service in June 1988. These craft can attain a maximum speed of 20 knots and are armed with a twin 23-mm. ZU- 23-2M antiaircraft gun mount. They are fitted with a bow ramp and can carry two

The German government lias retained only 13 surface combatants of the former Volksmarine, including the frigate Halle (top left), a Sassnitz-dnss missile ship (above), and a Tarantul-dass corvette (left).

to three vehicles or two reconnaissance tanks.9

Probably in late September 1990, Po­land formally asked Germany’s govern­ment to provide free of charge, among other things, a number of ships of the former Volksmarine including Tarantul- class guided-missile patrol boats. By mid-November, however, the German government had not replied.10 It is un­likely to donate these craft to Poland.

In November 1990, the Polish press reported that the training ship Wodnik was being outfitted as a hospital ship for service in the Middle East as part of the international forces involved in Desert Shield. She had all her armament tempo­rarily removed so as to serve under the flag of the International Red Cross. She is fitted with two large operating rooms and will carry 14 medical personnel on board. The salvage ship Piast was armed to es­cort the Wodnik. Both ships left for a Saudi Arabian port on 29 December 1990." Poland thus became the first Warsaw Pact nation to send ships to sup­port the international effort under the United Nations banner.

The new Polish Minister of Defense is former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczik. His previous post was taken by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Romuald Waga.

The new law on military service pro­vides for the first time two forms of ser­vice in the Polish armed forces: perma­nent and contract. Those citizens with qualifications unobtainable in the military schools can be offered five-year contracts in the officer corps. Also, graduates of technical and secondary schools and re­serve noncommissioned officers will be admitted on contract service in the non­commissioned officer corps. All con­tracts are renewable. Some who serve initially on contract basis but excel in their jobs might be admitted to permanent

service.12

In June 1990 the Soviets for the first time publicly revealed the existence of their base in Swinoujscie (in western Po­land), which reportedly covers about five miles of the coast. A Soviet one-star admiral commands a ship brigade based there, which consists of four missile

craft, four small antisubmarine warfare j ships, and some auxiliary ships.13 The Soviets built the docks and the electricity' | water-supply systems, and storage area-


The Polish Navy


The effective end of the Warsaw Pact as a military or­ganization brought about radical and still-ongoing changes in the role of the Polish armed forces. Poland regards it­self today as a de facto neutral country. It has proposed jointly with Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia to dissolve the joint command and headquarters of the Warsaw Pact.

Poland’s new defensive system is planned to be in place by the end of this decade. By then, the Polish armed forces would consist of two main parts: a numerically smaller professional military force called Field Forces and a regional defense force or Home Army.1

Poland’s new defensive doctrine is based on the princi­ple of offensive neutrality. This means distancing itself from all military activity by the country’s former allies and strictly applying the principle of minimum deterrence. The national defensive doctrine stipulates that Poland must maintain such a level of defense capability that would make a potential aggressor pay too high a price for launching any kind of aggression.

The wartime missions and tasks of the Polish Navy are currently undergoing a thorough review. Joint actions with the Soviet Baltic Fleet are a thing of the past. The navy’s main tasks instead will be limited to largely defensive ac­tions in coastal waters. Hence, the fleet’s striking power is concentrated in the force of submarines and small combat­ants. The ASW and mine warfare components will proba­bly be enhanced considerably—subject to Poland’s eco­nomic ability. The continuing modernization of amphibious warfare forces obviously does not fit into the new defensive doctrine, but is more a reflection of the thinking while the Warsaw Pact was still a viable military organization. Another change is that the Polish Navy in the future will not bear responsibility for protecting the country’s economic interests in the Baltic in peacetime. This task has been entrusted to the Border Guard, which reportedly has duties similar to those of the U.S. Coast Guard.2

The Polish Defense Ministry announced plans to deploy more of its forces in the eastern part of the country. Be­sides three existing military districts (Silesian, Pomeranian, and Mazurian), a new district, Malkopolska, has been cre­ated. Poland also decided to acquire weapons and equip­ment from some Western and neutral countries.

History: The Navy of the Polish People’s Republic began in October 1944, when the First Independent Ma­rine Battalion of the communist-dominated Polish Army was formed at Majdanek (near Lublin). The battalion was to serve as the nucleus for the cadre of the then-still- nonexistent Polish Navy. It fought with advancing Soviet forces along the Baltic coast. By early April 1945, the 640-man battalion entered the ports of Gdansk and Gdynia. By mid-summer of 1945, its strength had in­creased to about 2,560.3

The new Polish Navy was officially formed on 7 July 1945. Shortly afterward, the first schools and shore facili­ties were established: the navy’s main staff, headed by a one-star admiral, controlled the First Marine Battalion, the main naval base, and the navy club. In mid-August, the First Marine Battalion was transformed into a naval train­ing regiment. A month later, the first naval specialist school opened in Oksywie.

The first naval officer school was established in Gdynia in January 1946. A month later, the naval training regi­ment was transformed into the Seamen’s and Specialists’ School. Also in 1946, the first minesweeper division and a naval artillery regiment were formed, as were the naval bases at Oksywie and Swinoujscie. By the end of 1946, the Polish Navy had 656 officers and 5,260 enlisted.4

In its first few years, the Polish Navy acquired a num­ber of the ships of the prewar Polish Navy—which either had been taken over by the Germans or left in British ports. The Soviets also transferred five ships to the new Polish Navy.

After 1947, Soviet influence within the Polish armed forces strengthened rapidly. The presence of military ad­visers and arms deliveries both increased. From then on, the Polish Navy’s internal organization, educational sys­tem, and indoctrination closely followed the Soviets’.

The Development of Poland’s Navy: In 1949, Poland adopted a six-year plan for the development of the country’s armed forces. The sovietization of the Polish armed forces came into full swing after the appointment ot Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskiy as Poland’s de­fense minister. Under his command, many officers were purged from the Polish Navy. The newly admitted replace­ment officers had no professional qualifications but were considered loyal to the Communist regime. By 1950, the first group of the Polish naval officers was sent to the Soviet Union to complete higher professional education.

By 1952, the last Polish ships in British custody were re­turned to Poland. But the large deliveries of ships prom­ised by the Soviets and envisaged under Poland’s six-year plan did not materialize.

In the early 1950s, the Polish Navy improved and ex­panded its educational system. It established in 1954 a School for Naval Specialists and Cadres to train future petty officers. By June 1955 the Naval Officer School changed its name to Higher Naval School and its status was formally upgraded to the same level as the country’s civilian universities. The school’s name again changed in 1956 to the Higher Naval School “Bohaterow Wester- platte” (Heroes of Westerplatte).

By late 1956 the Polish Navy consisted of 38 warships, a dozen auxiliary craft, and 10,000 men. The largest ships then in service were two destroyers and four submarines. In addition, 12 submarine chasers, 17 minesweepers, two torpedo craft, and two gunboats were on the list.5

Poland joined the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. In the fall of 1956, Marshal Rokossovskiy was dismissed as the Pol­ish Defense Minister and a Polish general replaced him.


About 5,000 Soviet sailors are cur- fently stationed in Poland. The Soviets Plan to depart their naval facilities in Po­land but have not yet set a specific dead­line. Preparatory work for leaving these facilities is in progress and should be completed in 1991-92.14

Black Sea: The naval situation in the

Black Sea also has changed because of the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution. The Bul­garian Navy is not expected to cooperate as closely with the Soviets as it did in the


Many Polish officers, including some naval officers who "ad been purged in the 1940s and early 1950s, were read- 111 Wed to active service.

The most intensive development of the Polish Navy in 'he postwar period started in 1956-57 and continued for Wore than a decade. Poland acquired many surface com- oatants and submarines from the Soviets and built some Soviet-designed ships domestically. In 1957-58, the Sovi­ets transferred to Poland four Whiskey-class submarines ar>d scrapped three prewar Wilk-class boats. By 1957, six Soviet MV-class coastal submarines were commissioned. n November of the same year, Poland acquired the first '''Wxy-class destroyer from the Soviet Union. In June 957, the Soviets transferred the second ship of the same ojass and, in 1957-58, delivered a total of eight Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers. Between 1957 and '959, 20 P-6-class torpedo craft were received from the Soviets. In addition, a dozen Soviet-designed T-43 class oceangoing minesweepers were built in a Polish shipyard, as Were about two dozen KB-class minesweeping boats.

In the early 1960s, Poland built a relatively large num­ber of warships domestically. Between 1960 and 1966, it constructed nine Gdansk- , four Oksywie- , and five Obluze-class large patrol craft for the Polish Border Guard; and between 1963 and 1967, it built a dozen Polish-designed Orlik-class minesweepers (known as the Krogulec class in NATO).

By the mid-1960s, the Polish Navy consisted of about ^0 combatants, 11 small auxiliaries, and 55 service craft. The navy’s personnel numbered about 1,800 officers and 20,000 enlisted.

In the late 1960s, Poland’s navy acquired a number of Wodem Soviet ships and craft: the first two Osa-I-class Wissile craft in 1966-67, followed by an additional ten by '970. A Polish yard began to build large numbers of So­viet-designed Polnocny-class medium landing ships. The first of these for the Polish Navy were built in 1966—67.

'n the late 1960s, eight additional modified Obluzes were built domestically for the navy. A relatively modern So- v>et SAM Kotlin-class missile destroyer was transferred from the Soviets in 1970 to replace an inoperable Skoryy. The first of the unsuccessful domestically designed Wislu- class torpedo craft entered service in 1970. After 1973,

’be construction of Pilica-class coastal patrol cralt for the Polish Border Guard began.

As the new ships and craft entered service, older and 'ess-useful ships were deleted—including, by 1970, all six MV-class submarines. The sole remaining prewar subma­rine, Sep, and the old destroyer Blyskawica were retired ’he following year. The size of the Polish Navy was tur- ’her reduced in 1973-74, when all eight Kronshtadts and Tiore than half of the 20 P-6s were decommissioned. Both S&oryy-class destroyers and four additional P-6s were re­moved from service in 1975.

By the mid-1970s, the Polish Navy had embarked on a Program to increase its amphibious-lift capabilities and its •orce of auxiliary ships. The construction of four KJarabut-class landing craft began. By the end of 1976, six training ships (two Wodnik- and four firyza-class) and ’wo intelligence-collection ships (modified versions of the

Moma) had entered service.

At this time, the Polish Navy had 2,800 officers and 22,200 enlisted.

The 1980s began with the lead ship of the domestically designed Notec-class coastal minesweepers being commis­sioned in 1981, thus initiating a modest modernization ol the navy’s obsolescent mine-warfare force.

An honor guard of Polish sailors in Gdansk stands ready to welcome the crews of two U.S. Navy ships (the Harry E. Yarnell [CG-17] and the Kauffman [FFG-59]) in June 1990—the first such visit since 1927.

A modernization program of small combant forces began in 1984 with the transfer from the Soviets of the first of an eventual four Tarantul-class missile patrol boats. But by then the unsuccessful Wisla class had al­ready begun to be discarded.

The Kaszub, the first of what was meant to be a class of domestically designed frigates, was launched on 6 Janu­ary 1987, but the ship was unsatisfactory and was rele­gated to service with the Border Guard after extensive tri­als. A relatively modern modified Kashin-class missile destroyer was transferred from the Soviets in December 1987 to replace the SAM Kotlin, which had been stricken on 31 January 1986; the replacement was given the same name: Warszawa.

The modernization of the submarine arm started in 1986, when the Soviets transferred one modern Kilo-class submarine. The Poles leased two Foxtrot-class submarines from the Soviets and commissioned them in November 1987 and February 1989 because Poland could not afford to buy any more Kilos. The last of the Whiskey-class sub­marines were retired in 1988.

A program to modernize amphibious warfare forces started in 1989, with the commissioning of the first of an expected five Lublin-class multipurpose landing ships to replace the aging Polnocnys. The Delta-class landing craft.


past. But the change of the regime in Bucharest might result in stronger ties between the Romanian Navy and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

Romania: The December 1989 Ro­manian Revolution led to the bloody downfall of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, but apparently not to the end of commu­nist rule in that country. Although the , ruling National Salvation Front allows a degree of multiparty democracy, it is es­sentially a party led by reformed comm"'


intended to replace the outdated Eichstaden-class personnel landing craft and the unsuccessful Marabuts, is also under construction.

Naval Organization: The Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Polish Navy is a two- or three-star admiral head­quartered in Gdansk. The first Deputy CinC and the Chief of the Main Naval Staff are one-star admirals. Until re­cently, most of the Polish Navy, together with the now- defunct East German Volksmarine, was in the operational chain of command subordinate to the CinC of the Socialist Fleets in the Baltic, with its headquarters in Leningrad. This command relationship for all practical purposes no longer exists.

The navy’s major commands are:

  • 3rd Ship Flotilla (Gdynia)
  • 8th Coastal Defense Flotilla (Swinoujscie)
  • 9th Coastal Defense Flotilla (Hel Peninsula)
  • Naval Coastguard Brigade of Ships (Gdansk).
  • Naval Aviation (Gdynia)
  • Coastal Defense
  • Naval Schools and Training Centers
  • Shore Establishment

The 2,500-person naval aviation component operates 29 helicopters, including 12 Mi-14 PL Haze-A antisubmarine warfare helos, three Mi-14 PS Flaze search-and-rescue helos, and nine obsolescent Mi-2 Hoplite and five Mi-8 Hip utility helicopters. Also in service are six An-2 Colt biplane utility transports.

The 4,000-man coastal defense force consists of several missile battalions of SSC-2b Samlet missiles and many gun batteries placed at the approaches of naval bases and important commercial ports.

Submarines and landing ships are normally based at Gdansk and Gdynia, while missile craft are based at Swinoujscie. Minor naval bases are at Ustka and on the Hel Peninsula.

Border Guard: The Border Guard, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, has had its strength reduced from 22,500 to about 19,000 men.6 The Border Guard currently operates the one Kaszub-class corvette, five Obluze-class large patrol craft, 16 Pilica-torpedo boats, and a dozen Wisloka-class coastal patrol craft. In wartime these craft are operationally subordinate to the Polish Navy. The first of a planned four SKS-40 fisheries-inspection craft was under construction for the Maritime Office of Inspections in 1990.

Personnel: The total strength of the Polish armed forces was 314,000 in January 1990. This figure included 54,200 officers, 29,058 warrant officers, and 24,600 noncommis­sioned officers. The navy’s total strength was about 19,000, or a bit more than 6% of the total.7 Career per­sonnel in the Polish Navy belong to officer, warrant offi­cer, and petty officer corps.

The principal source of line officers was until recently the Higher Naval School “Heroes of Westerplatte” in Gdynia. Candidates for the school were normally high- school graduates. After passing entrance examinations, the midshipmen had to complete a four-year curriculum. Suc­cess in the comprehensive examinations led to commis­sions as sub-lieutenants with bachelors degrees in engi­neering. This school was recently changed into a naval academy, but no further details are known.

After every four to five years in service, each officer must take one two-to-four-month specialist or refresher

Polish Navy: 1990 Force Composition

__________________ Submarines_________________ -

1 ex-Soviet 2,500-ton Kilo-class 2 ex-Soviet 1,950-ton Foxtrot-class

___________ Major Surface Combatants-------------------

1 ex-Soviet 4,950-ton modified Kashin- class missile destroyer

_________________ Light Forces__________________

4 ex-Soviet 550-ton Tarantul-class guided- missile patrol boats

11 ex-Soviet 209-ton Osa-I class missile boats 8 240-ton modified Obluze-class large patrol boats

______________ Mine Warfare Forces_______________

12 484-ton Orlik-class ocean minesweepers 8 590-ton T-43-class ocean minesweepers 11 250-ton Notec-class coastal minesweepers

  1. Leniwka-class coastal minesweepers

___________ Amphibious Warfare Forces------------------

18 770-1,120-ton Polnocny-class medium landing ships 3 + 21,650-ton Lublin-class multi-purpose landing ships 1 + 2 170-ton Deba-class landing craft 15 25-ton Eichstaden-class landing craft

__________________ Auxiliaries__________________

2 modified Moma-class intelligence collectors 2 Finik-class surveying vessels 1 Moma-class surveying and research vessel 4 Bryza-class training craft 2 Wodnik-class training ships 2 Piast-class salvage ships 2 Gniewko-class salvage tugs 6 coastal fuel lighters 2 torpedo recovery craft 14 tugs

1 icebreaker (civil-subordinated but navy-crewed)

6 diving tenders 16 miscellaneous service craft

_________________ Border Guard--------------------------

1 1,200-ton Kaszub-class corvette

  1. 235-ton Obluze-class large patrol craft 16 90-ton Pilica-class torpedo boats

12 50-ton Wisloka-class coastal patrol craft 2 Type-724-class coastal patrol craft


n|sts. Moreover, the old communist structures in the country, including the armed forces, still exist.

After the revolutionary events of De­cember 1989, the internal organization of the Romanian armed forces changed greatly. The old structure of the Roman­ian Defense Ministry was reportedly dis­solved and the entire educational system transformed. Officer schools were sepa­rated from warrant officer schools; new sections of the Naval Academy were cre-


course to complement his professional knowledge. In the Past, those officers selected for high command posts were Pained at the Soviet Naval Academy A.A. Grechko at Leningrad. Only those few officers slated for flag rank have attended the General Staff Academy K.V. Voroshilov ln Moscow.

The highest command-staff school in the country is the General Staff Academy, Karol Swiercezewski, in Warsaw. The Academy of the General Staff in Warsaw, the Acad- eiT>y of the General Staff, and the Military Political Acad­emy were merged into National Defense Academy in 1990.

Until recently, high-ranking officers for political affairs ^tended the now-dissolved Feliks Dzerzhinski Academy lor Political and Military Sciences.

Warrant officer ranks were introduced in 1963. After the national defense law of 1967 was enacted, the warrant officer corps was established separately from the petty of­ficers. The only school for naval warrant officers is a naval school in Gdynia. Candidates pass through a two- year curriculum and are awarded a diploma corresponding |° that of a civilian vocational school. After commission- ’ng, the warrant officers are posted to mid-level technical Positions in the navy, where they exercise considerable command authority over petty officers and seamen.

Career petty officers are educated at the Francizcek Zubrycky School Center for the Navy’s Specialists, in Ustka. Graduates of that school serve as low-level techni­cians in their chosen specialties.

Polish seamen are conscripts drafted at age 19; volun­teers can sign up at age 17. Military service is obligatory for men between the ages of 18 and 50, and the normal •our of duty for sailors is three years. Newly enlisted men, upon completing basic training, are sent to the School ol Naval Specialists and Cadre for training in their assigned specialities. Some of naval draftees pass through Premilitary training at the centers of the Polish National Defense League.

In 1990, the Polish armed forces reduced obligatory military service from 24 to 18 months. This reduction will result in more frequent callup of draftees. The current re­cruitment rate of 25% will be increased to about 33%.8

The navy will introduce this measure gradually, starting •° release from active duty the seamen who have served •he longest time. The order will be lully implemented by • October 1991. The Polish Navy intends to reduce the duration of military training for its seamen, but to increase '•s intensity .

Political Indoctrination: As in other East European Countries, the depoliticization of the Polish armed forces— despite apparently strong efforts by the government—faces some real problems. The Polish Ministry of Defense de­cided in early February 1990 to suspend all political activ­ity in the armed forces.9 It replaced Communist Party po­litical bodies with officers’ education corps controlled by •he Main Education Board of the Polish Armed Forces. This has fundamentally changed the program of soldiers’ civic training.10

Furthermore, the Military Council of the National De­fense Ministry decided on 2 February 1990 to abolish all kinds of party activity within the armed lorces. In prac­tice, this means that military professionals and draltees cannot belong to any political party.11

The power of political officers was drastically reduced by the transformation of the Main Political Administration to the Main Education Administration. Former political officers are now called “education officers.’’ Until 1989, almost 90% of all officers were party members. Since then, many officers have no party affiliation. I“

The new directive on educational work in the armed forces was issued by the National Defense Ministry on 21 March 1990. Free from Communist Party jargon, it stipu­lates that education must strive to enhance morale and dis­cipline and must emphasize the patriotic feelings of the rank and file. There is not a word about the Soviet Union or brotherly armies of the Warsaw Pact. The new directive also guarantees full religious freedom in the armed lorces. It drastically increases the number ot chaplains, who are now present in the navy and air torce and in units ol the Ministry of Interior. The chaplains are also organized into a separate section of the officer corps."

Many of the announced changes to dissolve the political education and indoctrination affect form more than con­tent. The same secretaries and deputy commanders for political affairs still occupy the positions of influence in the armed forces. The change of name trom Main Political Administration to Main Education Administration on 1 July 1990 was more cosmetic than real.

One must doubt the sincerity of these changes. One now sees some of the most ardent Stalinists suddenly turned into enthusiastic reformers.14 '“The Return of the Home Army,” Zycie Warszawy, Warsaw, 5 July 1990, p. 3.

2"Polish Navy Commander Interviewed on Military,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-003, 4 January 1990, p. 72.

3E. Kosiarz. Poles on the Seas 1939-1945, Warsaw: 1969, p. 131; J. Per- lek. Pod Polska Bandera (Under the Polish Flag), Warsaw: Wohenna na Zachodzie, 1957, pp. 6-8; Zolnierz Polski, Warsaw, 25 April 1981, p. 20. 4A. V. Antosek, Zarozhdeniye Narodnnykh Arntiy Stran Varshavskaia Dogovora 1941-1945, Moscow: Nauka Press, 1975, p. 155.

3R. C. Blackman, editor. Jane's Fighting Ships 1956-57 London: Jane’s Fighting Ships Publishing House, 1956, pp. 266-267.

'’J. G. Gocrlich. "Die polnische Anncc wieder mit Adler und Krone," Europaeische Wehrkunde, June 1990, p. 338.

7M. Plucgge. “In Transition: The Polish Armed Forces," International Defence Review, 1990, p. 134; H. Dodds, "Update on the Polish Armed Forces," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, March 1990. p. 128.

"“Defense Ministry Reduces Military Service,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-193, 4 October 1990, pp. 35-36.

’''Political Activity in Armed Forces To End,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-025 , 6 February 1990, p. 54.

'““National Defense Minister Grant Interview." Daily Report East Europe FB1S-EEU-90-007, 10 January 1990, p. 59.

"“Defense Body Rejects Party Affiliation in Army,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-035, 21 February 1990, p. 45.

"Gocrlich, p. 338.

"Ibid., pp. 338-339.

"“Polityka Examines Armed Forces Reforms,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-051. 15 March 1990, p. 43; “Armed Forces Restructuring Takes Effect,” Ibid., FBIS-EEU-90-126, p. 43.

Milan Vego


ated. Democratization of the armed forces was announced. This supposedly includes abolishing the practice of com­piling dossiers on the backgrounds and political leanings of relatives of prospec­tive officers. Instead, the admittance ex­amination will receive greater attention.

Romanian Defense Minister Colonel General Victor Stanculescu announced in July 1990 changes in the promotions of officers. Reportedly, promotions will be based mainly on merit rather than politi­cal loyalty. Those officers who excel in their work can be promoted one to two years ahead of schedule. Another impor­tant change was the removal of troops from unpopular work on various civilian construction projects and harvesting.15

The grave and worsening economic crisis in the country prevented any new ships or craft from being built or acquired in 1990. The riverine craft force was re­duced in the past two years: reportedly four VG and four SM 165-class river pa­trol craft were scrapped in 1988 and

  1. respectively. Previously publicly unknown was the purchase of an undis­closed number of the Nestin-class riverine minesweepers built at a Yugoslav shipyard.16

Bulgaria: Modernization of the Bul­garian Navy got a shot in the arm in the summer of 1990 when the only remaining /fom'-class frigate (Del’fin) under the Soviet flag was transferred to replace one of the older R/ga-class frigates. In the Bulgarian Navy the ship is named Smeli; the same name as the Riga-class ship it replaced. Also acquired in 1990 were two Tarantul-I-dass missile corvettes (see Soldat und Technik 12, December 1990, p. 909). Hence, probably all the remain­ing three Osa-I missile craft are or will be decommissioned soon. The announced reduction of the navy’s strength in 1989 apparently referred to the withdrawal from service of two of Bulgaria’s four Roli-class ASW corvettes, two (proba­bly) Shershen-dass torpedo craft, and one Romeo-class patrol submarine. The Pods were disarmed and moved to the Varna Lake, where they will be either scrapped or sold. A similar fate awaits two Shershen-dass torpedo craft. The Romeo-class submarine was disarmed after 20 July and is planned to be scrapped. All five warships are planned to be discarded by 1 October 1990.17 Five of 23 Vydra-class medium landing ships were probably taken out of service by

1990.

Political changes in the country con­siderably affected the Bulgarian People’s Army. New laws on the National Defense and the Armed Forces are currently being drafted.18 The Politburo of the Central

Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided on 24 January 1990 to dis­band all the political organs and Kom­somol youth organizations in the army. In their stead were created new organs for supervising education in the armed forces. The country’s State Council de­creed that the depoliticization of the army be effective on 15 February 1990. The Main Political Administration was dis­solved and political bodies throughout the armed forces abolished. A Directorate for Educational Work was created at the Ministry of National Defense. Depart­ments for education were formed in the armed services; in tactical-size units sec­tions for educational work were set up. The goal of the new bodies is to promote readiness and patriotism.

The government ordered that no na­tional political party or association could be established within the army, the Min­istry of Interior, or the People’s Militia. Active-duty personnel were given 30 days to sign a declaration that they were not members of any political party. About 2% of active servicemen, of whom about half were lower-ranking officers in the army, refused to relinquish their membership in political parties and thus were discharged.19

Depoliticization of the army allowed the officers and enlisted to join various party organizations only at their place of residence. An officer union, the Georgi Sava Rakovski League, was established in the summer of 1990. Some Bulgarian officers reportedly joined the Social Democratic, Agrarian, and other non­communist parties.

In the summer of 1990, the entire army had only 154 officers for educational work, compared with about 2,000 politi­cal workers in 1989. Reportedly, 845 political officers were forced into retire­ment, while 170 others chose to retire. Because of this, the responsibility of troop commanders and ship commanding officers increased considerably. Some former political officers were posted to the command duties, while others were sent to complete their higher education at civilian universities.21

The opposition press in Bulgaria charged that the army’s depoliticization had a number of weaknesses. In fact, no new bodies for educational work have been formed. The previously existing political organs simply changed their name and kept the same personnel. The same officers who disseminated propa­ganda for the army are in charge of the army’s dcpoliticization. In fact, the new educational bodies continue their old stereotype ideology and party affiliation.

The Bulgarian Ministry of National

Defense reduced in April 1990 the dura- I tion of military service from 24 to 18 t months. The callup of draftees is to take place twice a year, in March and Septem­ber. The changes on the law of military service were adopted by the National Assembly on 9 August 1990.22 The Min­istry of National Defense also amended the text of military oath on 21 September 1990 to reflect the depoliticization pro­cess in the armed forces. The new text reads as follows: “All members of the military personnel of the armed forces m the People’s Republic of Bulgaria take a military oath of loyalty to their people and their homeland.” The new constitu­tion and the new Law on the Armed Forces currently being prepared will* however, require another amendment of the military oath.23

Bulgaria’s military doctrine is still based on the Warsaw Pact military doc­trine of 30 May 1987. Bulgaria’s govern­ment, however, changes the obligation so j that under no circumstances will it be the first to begin military actions against any state or alliance of states, and that it will use weapons only if it becomes the target of an armed attack. Bulgaria has no terri­torial claims on any of its neighbors and does not consider any state or people an

94

enemy.

In miscellaneous news of maritime in­terest, an incident between a Bulgarian ( Border Guard craft and five Turkish fish­ing vessels took place on 4 March 1990 •some 14 miles north of the Rezovska River estuary close to the town of Akhtopol. After being warned by a Bul­garian patrol craft, the Turkish vessels allegedly maneuvered dangerously close to the Bulgarian craft but then left the ter­ritorial waters.25

A similar incident took place on 15 July 1990. The Bulgarians alleged that two Turkish fishing boats violated the country’s territorial waters about two miles north of the Rezovska River estu­ary, some nine miles off the Bulgarian coast. A Turkish vessel approached the coast to a distance of about one and a half miles but then left Bulgaria’s territo­rial waters. No shots were fired.26

Adriatic Sea: There were no signifi- : cant naval developments in the area in the past year. No new ships or craft were re­ported to have been acquired by either the Yugoslav or the Albanian navies.

Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia, once consid­ered in the forefront of democratic re­forms in Eastern Europe, is one of the laggards. The country’s two northwestern republics of Slovenia and Croatia elected noncommunist governments in spring 1990, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina



and Macedonia in November 1990. How­ever, Serbia, the largest republic, and Montenegro, the smallest, voted over­whelmingly to retain communists in Power in their first free elections held in early December 1990. The Yugoslav People’s Army lags far behind the demo- eratic changes in the country. Its leader­ship, in fact, is the most reactionary and ■he biggest obstacle for the country’s road toward a pluralistic, free society.

. The Yugoslav Navy is experiencing financial difficulties. The federal defense budget for 1990 is 3.57% of the gross national product instead of the originally agreed 4.90%, which was later amended to 4.6% This obviously affects the navy’s ability to continue with its planned mod­ernization and harms the quality of its combat training. The peacetime strength °f Yugoslavia’s army was recently re­duced by as much as 12%.27 But there is n° sign yet that the navy’s size has been affected by these reductions.

Six apparently successful (7/ia-class (MO-100 Type) midget submarines are in service. About six 55-ton Typc-20, five 23-ton Botica-class (Type-16), and a dozen 19.5-ton Type-15 domestically built river patrol craft are also in service. Some of the 32 Type-601 attack landing Craft might have been scrapped.

The process of depoliticization ot the army was widely expected to have been completed in the summer of 1990. Alter ,T1uch hesitation and delay, the army for­mally announced it was abolishing its 0rganization of the League of Commu­nists of Yugoslavia in December 1990. Yet a group of active and retired army officers took the initiative in forming a new political party, the League of Com­munists Movement for Yugoslavia, in November 1990. The existing members °f the League of Communists of Yugo­slavia in the army were simply enrolled in ■he new party. Thus while the army was formally “departyized” it did not depo- hticize. In fact, the army’s top leaders continue to swear to preserve socialism and the federal system, no matter what fhe will of the population and the cost Prove to be. Moreover, Yugoslav De­fense Minister General Veljko Kadijevic ■n December 1990 explicitly threatened file use of force against those republics fPrimarily Croatia and Slovenia) that seek to regain their sovereignty.

The Yugoslav Navy is the smallest of ■he three services, but it exercises an unu­sually strong influence in the military as a Whole. For example, the secretary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in ■he army was Vice Admiral Bozidar Grubisic (his predecessor was now- deceased Vice Admiral Petar Simic), and

Deputy of Federal Secretary for National Defense is Vice Admiral Stanc Brovet. Among the members of the new party’s Executive Committee are Admiral Grubisic, Captain Vukota Popovic, and retired Fleet Admiral Branko Mamula. Commander of Naval Region Split, with headquarters in Split, is Vice Admiral Mile Kandic, who commands, besides fleet forces, all army troops deployed in the littoral area. These officers play a vis­ible role in expressing the military’s views on political and social issues. They are among the leaders of the new League of Communists Movement.

Albania: Some significant shifts of policy occurred, internally and exter­nally. The country moved toward estab­lishing diplomatic relations with many countries, including those to which Alba­nia has been implacably hostile. This may lead to the resumption of military relations with Albania’s previous mentor, the Soviet Union, and an easing of the problem of the Albanian armed forces in maintaining many Soviet-designed weap­ons and equipment.

Internally, the Albanian communist regime began to open and made the first moves toward lessening its hitherto iron­clad control over the population. Recent disturbances in many parts of the country led to violent clashes with police and the army in December 1990. The Tirana re­gime finally gave in to the demands of the populace and formally approved the in­troduction of the multiparty system.

The size and composition of Albania’s navy reportedly did not change in the past year. The ships and craft on the list must be very decrepit. In fact, most of the Al­banian Navy is not operational.

'“Forces merge too fast, says Eppelmann” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 October 1990, p. 699; “New role for 12 E German ships,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 November 1990, p. 869; H. Hoffmann, “Kurz vor dcr Ucbemahme durch die Bundesmarine: Besuch bei dcr Marine der Nationalen Volksmarinc,” Marineforum, October 1990, p. 343; “Das schrittwcisc Endc einer Armec,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 22 November 1990, p. 1; “NVA- Volksmarinc uebernommen,” Marineforum, No­vember 1990, p. 397; “Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Tcil Deutschlands,” Soldat and Tech- nik, November 1990, pp. 775, 777.

2Soldat und Technik, September 1990, p. 676. 3“Gcrmans look for Sassnitz exports,” Jane’s De­fence Weekly 13 October 1990, p. 690; “Von BALCOM-10 zur SASSNITZ-Klassc,” Soldat und Technik, October 1990, p. 739.

4Frank Ulrich, “Gesamtdcutsche Marine: Die ersten Schritte,” Marineforum, November 1990, p. 374. 5“Was geschieht mit dem NVA-Matcrial?” Soldat und Technik, November 1990, p. 783.

6Ibid., p. 783.

7F. Holtzcndorf, “Die Bundeswehr im Prozcss dcr Vcreinigung: Die Gesamtdcutsche Streitmacht noch ein Bild in vagen Konturcn,” Europaeische Wehrkunde, November 1990, p. 634.

8Zolnierz Polski, January 1990 p. 16; “Modernisa­tion of the Polish amphibious forces," International Defence Review, January 1990, p. 89; “New Polish Landing Ship,” Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, January 1990, p. 15.

9“Ncue Landungsfahrzcuge der polnischcn Seek- ricgsflottc,” Soldat und Technik, March 1990, p. 169.

"’“Defense Ministry Seeks Gilt of GDR lanks. Planes,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90- 194, 5 October 1990, p. 34; “Defense Chief Com­ments on Army, Pact Issues,” Ibid., FBIS-EEU-90- 223, 19 November 1990, p. 53.

11“Navy Hospital Ship Ready To Sail lo Persian Gulf,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90- 232, 3 December 1990, p. 47.

,2“Ncw Draft Military Service Law Discussion,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-133, 11 July 1990. p. 48.

,3“USSR Admiral on Swinoujscic Naval Base,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-123, 26 June 1990, p. 42; “Soviet Commander Confirms Naval Base Existence,” Ibid., FB1S-EEU-90-118, p. 45.

I4R. Stefanowski, “Timing of Soviet Troop With­drawal Still Uncertain,” Report on Eastern Europe, Munich, Radio Free Europe, 24 August 1990, p. 34; “Navy Works Toward Closure of Base in Poland,” Daily Report Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-90-228, 27 November 1990, p. 21.

15“The Democratization of the Army,” Romania Muncitoare (Bucharest), 1 July 1990, pp. 1-2. 16Capt. R. Sharpe, RN, editor, Jane's Fighting Ships 1990-91, Couldson, England: Jane's Publishing Group, 1990, pp. 471-472; M. Lazanski, “Tenk in Sjcniku,” (Tank in a Haystack) Danas (Zagreb), 6 November 1990, p. 67.

17“Unilateral Cut in Naval Forces Implemented,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-131,9 July 1990, p. 41.

l8“Gcn. Dzurcv Addresses National Assembly,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-019 29, January 1990, p. 9.

l9“Rcsults of Army Depoliticization Published,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-237, 10 December 1990, p. 17.

20“Politburo Orders Dissolution of Army BCP Bod­ies,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-019 29 January 1990, p. 4; “State Council on Depolitici­zation of Army,” Ibid., FBIS-EEU-90-023, 2 Febru­ary 1990, p. 12; “Politics Barred from Army” Ibid., 2 February 1990, p. 13; “New Army Educational Bodies Formed” Ibid., FBIS-EEU-90-032, 16 Feb­ruary 1990, p. 6; “Defense Ministry Briefs Officers on Organization” Ibid., FBIS-EEU-90-131, 9 July 1990, pp. 40-41.

21 “Defense Minister on Retraining Political Offi­cers,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90- 223, 19 November 1990, p. 20.

22Proposal To Cut Military Service Viewed,” Daily Report East Europe FBIS-EEU-90-080, 26 April 1990, p. 1; “National Assembly Adopts Law on Mil­itary Service” Ibid., FBIS-EEU-90-155, 10 August 1990, p. 2.

23“Dcfcnsc Ministry Amends Text on Military Oath,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90- 212, 1 November 1990, p. 6.

24“Gcncral Dobrcv Discusses Military Doctrine,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-019, 29 January 1990, p. 10.

25“Border Guard on Accident With Turkish Boat,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-044 , 6 March 1990, pp. 7-8.

26“Border Incident With Turkish Vessels Reported,” Daily Report East Europe, FBIS-EEU-90-137, 17 July 1990, p. 14.

27“Chicf of Staff Discusses Military’s Role,” Daily Report East Europe, FB1S-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990, p. 88.

Dr. Vego is adjunct professor of East European stud­ies at the Defense Intelligence College.

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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