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Ordnancement on board the Kennedy
Ordnancemen on board the Kennedy. “. . . the money invested in recruiting smart young Americans into our armed forces, affording them the best training, and paying them a decent wage was well spent.”
(U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive)

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Desert Storm—Early Gulf War Lessons

By Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, USN (Ret.)
March 1991
Proceedings
Vol. 117/3/1,057
Commentary
View Issue
Comments

War in the Gulf: Day by day, a continuing, absorbing, real-life drama unfolds. Correspondents report live from Baghdad under attack and from cities on alert for Iraqi Scud surface-to-surface missiles. Videotapes from the cockpits of attacking aircraft are on television for all to see, and analysts and experts by the dozen trot out to offer their thoughts. The public gets saturated with fact, opinion, and data beyond what many can absorb and—to the dismay of some—the networks return to their situation- comedy shows. But the professional warrior and his colleagues continue to pay attention to the war. They must. They have to learn the essential lessons.

The first and most obvious lesson of the Gulf War to date is that technology works. In fact, Buck Rogers or Luke Skywalker would be at home in the Gulf War. Cruise missiles launched from ships far at sea destroy enemy air defense systems and other point targets. Iraqi ballistic missiles spread terror among the civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia, although Patriot missiles intercept and destroy most of those ballistic missiles. Aegis- controlled missiles are on standby, should Iraqi weapons reach seaward. Missiles from fighter planes destroy other aircraft, and laser-guided weapons from tactical bombers pound heavily defended targets on the ground—the targets having been located with the aid of satellite-based navigation systems, television, infrared, and night-vision devices. Several types of missiles suppress and attack enemy radars. Meanwhile, other satellites gather intelligence, give warning, relay communications, and help commanders assess target damage. The money allocated to technology has been well-spent. The new gear works.. .over and over again.

Yet despite all the technology—and because of it, as well— joint warfare and combined warfare work too. This is the early second lesson-learned. Seldom before has such a varied Coalition been cobbled together to face a common enemy. Despite differences in nationalities, cultures, languages, communications systems, weapons, and ways of doing things, the Coalition armies, navies, and air forces are working well together for one purpose: to curb and eliminate the aggressor. Joint and combined operations work in large measure because in peacetime the Navy has practiced with the Air Force, the Army, and most of the Coalition allies. These peacetime operations have laid the foundation for cooperation in war. It’s well that they have, because everyone is needed.

Just as there is no such thing as a battlefield too crowded with allied forces, neither can there be a risk-free war. Some would believe that in an age of technology this might be so, but the early Gulf War results prove otherwise. This is the third lesson. In war, people get hurt, killed, and taken prisoner. Aircraft, ships, and other equipment will be damaged and destroyed. Ammunition will be used at rates unplanned for in peacetime, and some systems won’t work as they’re supposed to. Nor will the enemy always operate as we expect. He will strike back from unexpected directions with unexpected means in unexpected ways.

Only people—smart, well-trained, motivated, and well-led— can adapt and respond to such sudden shifts in the wind. Only such people can devise counters and take the prudent risks needed to beat the foe. The American forces—and most of those from the other members of the Coalition—have such people.

Lesson number four is that the money invested in recruiting smart young Americans into our armed forces, affording them the best training available, then paying them a decent wage, was also well-spent.

Lesson five is that return on the investment in naval forces in recent years also was a good one. A navy built around the principles of mobility, flexibility, and global reach is not only worthy of a great nation but is essential. That’s what the U.S. Navy—once again—has proved to be. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups were the first U.S. forces on the scene when Saddam Hussein crossed into Kuwait and will probably be the last to leave when the war grinds down. Those carrier forces deterred Saddam from going farther; at the same time, they displayed American resolve to the Saudis, and probably played a key role in their granting permission for us to move in our land-based combat units. Even after the land-based forces fully deployed and the Coalition began the campaign to retake Kuwait, the special capabilities and strength of naval forces proved essential. Ships steaming in several areas created a multi-axis threat for Iraq. Tomahawk, SLAM (modified Harpoon land-attack missile), Phoenix, and the EA-6B provided capabilities not available in the land-based forces. Tailhook aircraft carrying HARM (high-speed anti-radar missile) and the A-6 Intruder augmented capabilities that were in short supply among the land-based forces. Beyond those things, the sheer numbers of carrier aircraft almost doubled the number of planes available to the Coalition for counter-air, strike, interdiction, and reconnaissance. Marines added their special talents, and SEALs and shipboard guns played as well. Meanwhile, naval forces tightened the noose of the blockade set months before. Once again, flexibility, readiness, and the indispensible role of the Navy to combat operations become apparent to all.

At the same time, despite success in the air and on the sea, no credible observer claimed that the war could be won without a soldier or Marine, rifle in hand, claiming the ground. This was, perhaps, not a lesson learned, but a lesson underscored. As much as it might be wished otherwise, war still means mortal combat between armed warriors, often up close and personal. Infantrymen are still tasked “to close with and destroy the enemy.” Brutal and dirty, yes; but that’s the way it is.

Finally, it’s still early to identify all the lessons from the Gulf War. These are offered to start the discussion. Time will tell how right—or wrong—they are.

 

Robert F.  Dunn

Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, USN (Ret.)

Admiral Dunn commanded the USS Saratoga (CV-60), Carrier Group Eight, and Naval Air Force, Atlantic. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare (OP-05), when he retired in 1989.

More Stories From This Author View Biography

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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