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RADM W.J. Holland, Jr.,
USN (Ret.)________________________
Total Quality Leadership (TQL) is the latest in a panoply of Programs offered or imposed over the past 20 years as mecha- n'slT|s to improve management of the U.S. Navy. Like the oth- Crs> it has been greeted with cheers and sneers.
For the Navy, however, the personal commitment of the Chief °1 Naval Operations promises a serious effort to use this method- 0|°gy, which has become the state of the art in industry.1 Admi-
Frank B. Kelso’s publicly stated goal is to figure how to
'v°rk smarter, not harder . . . that means innovation and Total Quality Leadership.”2
. As in business, some successes have been registered in Navy 'ndustrial activities, using Deming’s Total Quality Management <TQM) methodology. The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the F^aval Air Rework Facility in Norfolk show what can be done when TQM methods are used. Both activities have made substantial improvements in quality and productivity, with lower e°sts, over several years.
Deming and his followers focus on planning and process. They reject “Management by Objectives.” Constancy of pur- P°se is essential. They seek long-term goals—not near-term guins. They preach careful planning and followup, to create steady incremental improvement. Their approach to management ls that of systems engineers, not accountants or psychologists.
. The concepts embodied in TQL are not new. “Most ol TQM ls Leadership 101,” is not an unusual reaction. But TQM pro- v'des a methodology to question processes. In any bureaucracy, utost processes are taken for granted and many produce nothing °f value. TQM methods offer a way to change.
. Sailors associated with aircraft accident analysis or boards of Investigation might think they understand process improvement. Fut these are “fire drills,” and in TQM putting out lires at which line officers excel—is not improvement. In TQM, There 's more to be learned from chronic problems than from problems *hat suddenly occur.”3 In this sense, below-decks inspections have greater potential for effecting real improvements than any casualty ever will.
In adapting to this new way of doing business, the Navy has Several advantages over industry. To begin with, an easily recog- aized general mission provides overall constancy ot purpose. ^I°re important, the Navy has one of the most skilled work forces in the world, because it recognizes the value of education ar>d training. Systemic failure is attacked vigorously, but mistakes are tolerated wherever the stakes are reasonable and the individual acknowledges responsibility. Finally, most Navy systems are stabilized through standard organization manuals and °Perating procedures. This is a necessary ingredient in permit- l|ng incremental improvement.
But these advantages are offset by long-standing hierarchical relationships, operational environments, and institutional procedures that are at odds with this philosophy. To benefit fully from TQL, those things that can be changed must change openly and visibly. The more dramatic the change, the more likely it will be token as convincing evidence of a clear-cut institutional commitment to TQL. Some examples:
“Drive out fear.” Deming condemns annual performance reviews that “result in people working for themselves and not for
the company.”4 If reports must be made and grades have to be assigned he suggests “Above-”, “Meets-” and “Below Expectations” as the only grades to use. This mirrors what is really done now in fitness reports. Such a step would not only be a dramatic endorsement of TQM methodology but also would answer the widely held objections about grade inflation.5
“End the process of awarding contracts on the basis of price tag alone.” This calls for a reversal of field in the acquisition process. For example, this point includes the admonition to “share knowledge with suppliers.” Ethics regulations are now so confusing that few officers are comfortable in any type of communication with contractors. Legal officers need to be ordered to find avenues for interaction between government and business rather than their usual practice of limiting any exchange on the chance it might be seen as tainted.
“Institute training.” Admiral Kelso demands “training, training and more training,” as the basis for a climate that handles change.6 In the TQM philosophy, training on the process is required at every level. For example, the Board of Directors of Komatsu attends a 16-hour course for members. This suggests courses for new fleet commanders, Pentagon planners, and hundreds of other assignments.
Most serious of Deming’s points with which the CNO’s TQL Executive Steering Committee must wrestle are the interdictions against mobility of management, which pose real problems for officer career and promotion patterns. “People need time to learn to work together,” Deming says, condemning mobility in management. This is not something undiscovered on the waterfront. Short command tours debilitate ships’ companies.
To achieve excellence—to create a climate where TQL can work—requires command tours of a least two years. Longer would be even better. Immediate seniors-in-command (ISICs), commanders’ mentors, and monitors will be the most important posts in a TQL Navy and should be filled with the very best officers—even at the cost of not meeting the gates for joint duty that have been mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
The CNO has said that he wants to change the culture ol the Navy to reflect Deming’s ideas. The fact that no directives are planned itself reflects Deming’s credo that instructions maintain the status quo, and do not encourage change. The ways that issues inherent in TQL are concretely handled at the top will tell the rest of the Navy how fast and how seriously TQL is to be treated. But no matter what the action anywhere else, TQL deserves the attention of every commander, because the methodology has proved successful in every application.
- Adm. Kelso’s most recent public statement of his views on TQL was published in the May 1991 Proceedings, pp. 107-109.
- Adm. Frank B.Kelso. Speech to Naval Reserve Association's National Conference, 4 October 1990.
- Imai, Masaaki, •'KAIZEN". McGraw-Hill, New York, 1986, p. 90.
- All Deming quotes from Mary Walton, The Deming Management Method, New York: Putnam, 1986.
- Sec Capt. John L. Byron, “Evil Fitreps,” Proceedings, December 1990, p. 90.
- Kelso, ibid.
Admiral Holland was in command of a submarine when Z-grams were issued. As Director of Professional Development at the Naval Academy, lie oversaw a major revision to the Leadership curricula. While in command of Submarine School he helped design Leadership and Management Training for the submarine community. He presently serves on the National Commission for the Skills of the American Work Force and is President of the AFCEA Educational Foundation.
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Proceedings / July 1991