The U.S. Navy

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By Norman Polmar, Author, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet

Cutting Back . . . SSBNs, Too?

Vice Admiral William D. Smith, Dep­uty Chief of Naval Operations (Program Planning), recently briefed a select group of industry representatives in detail con­cerning the Navy’s budget picture for the next few years.¹ His message was clear: things will get worse for the Navy’s per­sonnel, shipbuilding, and operations bud­get accounts—much worse than many People now anticipate. The future Navy, the briefing indicated, could be the size it Was just before the Korean War (see Table 1).

The U.S. fleet is being reduced by de­activating numerous surface warships and attack submarines built during the 1960s and early 1970s. How deeply the active carrier force will be reduced has not yet been decided. The Navy has 13 aircraft carriers in service—the venerable Mid­way (CV-41) of World War II construc­tion, seven oil-burning carriers (CVs) completed from 1955-1968, and five Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carriers com­pleted since 1975. In addition, the con­ventional carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) is in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for a three-year-plus SLEP upgrade, while the nuclear-propelled Enterprise (CVN-65) *s undergoing a lengthy modernization­refueling at Newport News Shipbuilding 'n Virginia.^[1] The Midway will soon de­commission, and the Forrestal (CV-59) has been tagged to become th? Navy’s Pilot training ship, to replace the Lexing- t°n (AVT-16), which has served in that role since December 1962.

Three additional Mmilz-class carriers ^are under construction, the last to be completed in 1998.³ Thus, in the mid- 1990s the Navy could have 7 conven- lional and 7 nuclear carriers for a total of 14 in the active fleet. However, at this time, it is more likely that there will be °nly 12 carriers—and possibly as few as 10. Both numbers have been prominently mentioned in congressional hearings. While the Navy has included two addi­tional nuclear-powered carriers in plan­ⁿing for the fiscal year 1996 budget, under the current fiscal conditions the chances of the administration and the Congress approving even one ship seems unlikely at this time.

Without building additional carriers, and accepting a 45-year service life, the Navy still could have a theoretical strength of 15 carriers in the year 2000. However, six ships would reach that “magic” 45 number by 2006, meaning that several replacements would be needed to keep the force at more than eight ships. New construction of addi­tional carriers in the fiscal year 1996 shipbuilding program seems logical, even if difficult.

With respect to other classes of war­ships, the recent major warship review by the Secretary of Defense approved an annual construction rate of 4 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers and 1.5 Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarines for the foreseeable future. These rates are factored in Table 1. However, the

Seawolf rate seems unlikely to be sus­tained. Four DDGs per year—the only surface combatants that the U.S. Navy now can be expected to build during the 1990s—could support two shipyards, Bath Iron Works in Maine and Litton/ Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi, with the Litton yard also building other Navy ships. But with a rate of 1.5 SSNs per year, it is unlikely that Newport News Shipbuilding and Electric Boat/General Dynamics will both remain in the subma­rine construction business.^[2] The cutback

The bottom line is that budget plan­ners are looking to cut ship and air­craft programs, as well as personnel. Accelerated retirement of the ex-Polaris submarines in favor of attack submarines and surface ships might be another option.

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I'roceedings / January 1991

of SSNs to 1.5 per year will further exac­erbate their unit cost (now well in excess of $1.5 billion per ship), making them a prime target for further cuts. Also, while carriers and surface combatants—and amphibious ships—participate exten­sively in the Iraqi-sparked Middle East crisis, attack submarines are not being seen nor heard from.

The amphibious ship picture is rela­tively positive ... for the moment. The' Navy now has 64 in service (including two LSTs assigned to the Naval Reserve Force).^{[3] 2 [4] 4 [5]} But these numbers are mislead­ing: the Wasp (LHD-1) and five Tarawa (LHA-l)-class assault ships-V/STOL carriers are highly capable and versatile ships, far outperforming any previous amphib. Three more LHDs are under construction and the Navy hopes to build a total force of 12 LHA/LHDs. Building three more LHDs as seven older, less- effective two Jima (LPH-2)-class ships are discarded during the 1990s, as they exceed 30 years of service life, appears to be an achievable objective.

Replacements for the 20 tank landing ships (LSTs) completed in the early 1970s, and 18 docking-well ships (LSDs/ LPDs) that joined the fleet from the early 1960s through 1972 will be more critical. The Navy is designing a new, large am­phibious ship (LX) to replace these 38 amphibs. But that program, too, will have rough going in the expected budget environment of the 1990s, unless the Navy and the Marine Corps can effec­tively articulate a case that these ships will play a key role in future crises, as they did in the Grenada assault and the current Middle East buildup.

The bottom line is that many ship and aircraft programs, as well as operations and personnel strength, will be cut— quite severely. As Navy planners and budget experts wrestle with this insolv­able program, they avoid one ship pro­gram—the strategic missile submarines (SSBNs). The Navy now has in service 23 ex-Polaris submarines that have been rearmed with Poseidon or Trident mis­siles, and 11 newly built Trident subma­rines. Another seven Trident SSBNs are being built or have been authorized.

These will provide the Navy with a force of 18 modem SSBNs by the year 2000. The Navy’s submarine leadership had sought a force of 24 SSBNs, but the realities of the Soviet political-military situation as well as U.S. budgetary fac­tors in the 1990s make a total force of 18 SSBNs more realistic for the foreseeable future.

Not addressed in the budget debates has been the cost of maintaining the cur­rent 23 rearmed SSBNs that were com­pleted between 1964-1967. Although those ships are bought and paid for, their operational costs are high—46 crews are assigned, each with some 145 highly trained officers and enlisted men; they are supported by four specialized submarine tenders, each with a crew of 600-900. Add to these numbers those men and women assigned to SSBN logistics, maintenance, and training, and the high cost of maintaining those older subma­rines becomes obvious.

At the same time, the number of strate­gic targets is shrinking. The Soviets are withdrawing from Eastern Europe; their theater nuclear missiles are already gone.

Also, the general drawdown of the Soviet armed forces has reduced the targets within the Soviet Union. Fewer strategic missiles are needed today than even a few years ago. Further, as the Navy has widely publicized, Trident SSBNs are far more survivable and effective than the earlier submarines.

At the same time, the land-based stra­tegic missile and bomber forces have been modernized, and the deployment of nuclear-tipped Tomahawk missiles in U.S. surface warships and attack subma­rines has further enhanced the nation’s strategic striking forces. The personnel, operating, and maintenance funds saved by an accelerated retirement of the ex- Polaris submarines could transfer needed dollars to surface ship and SSN pro­grams. Those programs will better sup­port U.S. national policies and strategy in the international environment that most foresee for the remainder of this century and into the next.